The ACL model is unable to make correct access decisions for interactions involving more than two principals, since required information is not retained across message sends. Though this deficiency has long been documented in the published literature, it is not widely understood. This logic error in the ACL model is exploited by both the clickjacking and Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks that affect many Web applications.
WAVE: A Decentralized Authorization Framework with Transitive Delegation | USENIX
Michael P Andersen, Sam Kumar, Moustafa AbdelBaky, Gabe Fierro, John Kolb, Hyung-Sin Kim, David E. Culler, and Raluca Ada Popa, University of California, Berkeley
Agentic Browser Security: Indirect Prompt Injection in Perplexity Comet | Brave
The attack we developed shows that traditional Web security assumptions don't hold for agentic AI, and that we need new security and privacy architectures for agentic browsing.
Building Unforgeable Professional Endorsements with ATProtocol - Nick's Blog
Traditional professional endorsements on platforms like LinkedIn lack cryptographic proof—anyone could forge them, and the platform controls the truth. This article introduces a two-record architecture using ATProtocol's Content Identifiers (CIDs) and Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) to create mathematically unforgeable mutual attestations. By separating proof creation from endorsement acceptance and leveraging the firehose for distributed validation, we build a system where both parties cryptographically consent and no central authority can manipulate the record.
Capability Trees: Sovereignty Is the Point
This piece argues that DASL introduces security risk when applied to delegations, and that by not using DASL, capability trees avoid that risk.
Protocol Handler Registration via Browser Extensions – make everything intensely
Custom URL schemes have traditionally served as an integration bridge between the browser and external capabilities. Schemes such as mailto: and tel: allow navigation to trigger actions beyond ordinary HTTP resource retrieval. The HTML Standard formalizes this mechanism through the Custom Scheme Handlers API, which enables websites to register themselves as handlers for specific URL schemes.
Authenticated Transfer: Architecture Overview
Authenticated Transfer (AT) is a collection of protocol components that together provide a generic framework for interoperable social web applications, using global aggregations of interlinked, self-certifying data records. This informational document provides an overview of the entire system, as implemented in late 2025. Some of those components may be in scope as work for the IETF, while other components may not. Many components are general-purpose and may find use outside of the context of AT. The intent of this document is to provide context for how all the components can fit together for certain use cases.
Server Side Request Forgery | OWASP Foundation
Server Side Request Forgery on the main website for The OWASP Foundation. OWASP is a nonprofit foundation that works to improve the security of software.
AT Protocol Primer
What is the AT Protocol and why does it matter in the grand scheme of the web
XRPC requests between atproto servers are authenticated using JWTs. There are some inconsistencies in how OAuth permissions, PDS proxy headers, and JWTs all represent the "audience" of these tokens. This proposal gives background and describes a rough solution. Looking for rapid feedback!
proposals/0013-service-auth-refs at main · bluesky-social/proposals
github.comI hope @dholms.at or someone else at @bsky.app considers this before it's too late and ACLs are baked into the protocol.
Authority as Possession: Permissioned Spaces Deserve Better Than ACLs
leaflet.pub
