







We may not always know it, but we think in metaphor. A large proportion of our most commonplace thoughts make use of an extensive, but unconscious, system of metaphorical concepts, that is, concepts from a typically concrete realm of thought that are used to comprehend another, completely different domain. Such concepts are often reflected in everyday language, but their most dramatic effect comes in ordinary reasoning. Because so much of our social and political reasoning makes use of this system of metaphorical concepts, any adequate appreciation of even the most mundane social and political thought requires an understanding of this system. But unless one knows that the system exists, one may miss it altogether and be mystified by its effects.
Metaphor and the Political War
Metaphor and the Political War
Commentary: Metaphors We Live By
Four decades ago, linguists and philosophers George Lakoff and Mark Johnson published an influential book on the nature of metaphors. In Metaphors We Live By they argued that abstract thought is mostly metaphorical (having a literal core extended by mutually inconsistent metaphors and incomplete without them), that metaphors are fundamentally conceptual (while metaphorical language is secondary), and that metaphorical thought is ubiquitous, unavoidable, largely unconscious, and grounded on everyday life. Despite the popular acclaim of the book and its impact across academic disciplines, their claims met with resistance as they challenged objectivist views of meaning and language.Two decades ago, in the afterword of the updated edition of their classic book, the authors insisted on some persistent fallacies that contribute to a false view of what metaphors are and do. Especially relevant to scientists is the mistaken idea that metaphors are just "a matter of words", namely, a way of speaking that can be shielded from rational thinking, and ultimately innocuous to it. Such a fallacy is related to the belief that metaphors are mainly "a matter of definition". The conversation stopper "it's just semantics" is simply stupid since, after all, meaning is all that matters. Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson remarked that metaphors are natural phenomena, not mere arbitrary historical contingencies or cultural constructions; they are grounded in the very bodily nature of our daily cognitive pursuits.Today, neuroscientists remain ensnared in disputes about whether brains are computers or not. In fact, the very Research Topic to which this piece belongs shows that the debate about the appropriateness of the brain-computer analogy, and its pervasive metaphorical use, is alive and ticking. Of course, some will deem the exchange as useless while others will insist that, until we figure out what we mean by what we say, a proper scientific discussion is defective or cannot even start. Whatever the position, it is interesting to note that linguists' concerns about the neural basis of metaphorical thought mirror those of neuroscientists about the metaphorical basis of neural jargon.Here, rather than poking the brain-as-computer blister again, I would like to walk through a very brief history of the metaphorical brain, and then mention an alternative class of metaphors that could offer fresh, offbeat, and even rebel perspectives on our conception of that mushy little thing called the brain.Brains have been many things indeed. Four centuries ago, Descartes suggested that cerebral hydraulic automata produced behavior by powering animal spirits thought the nerves. Nicolas Steno then cast the brain as a machine. Fountain metaphors gave way to clocks. Leibniz objected: entering a brain as one enters a mill would reveal mechanical parts only, but nothing mind-like whatsoever. In the time of Shelley's Frankenstein, Galvani and Volta explored the role of electricity in animal bodies. Nerves turned into wires and brains into telegraphs. Neural plasticity rendered the analogy obsolete. Cajal preferred natural images (trees, gardens, forests). For Darwin, thought was a "secretion" of the brain. It was soon postulated that all animals, including humans, were conscious machines. Machines would become animal-like too (electric dogs, clockwork beetles, three-wheeled moths). With the theoretical articulation and empirical implementation of feedback loops, the line between biology and technology thinned. Pitts and McCulloch's "neural network" further blurred the distinction between natural and artificial ones. The metaphor was turned inside-out: computers were like brains, then brains became computers. With information theory in place, code-breaking percolated from the war to the lab. Physicalists stopped worshipping matter and turned into information, a notion as pervasive as confounded. The brain has, thenceforth, been revered as the preeminent computational organ. Despite considerable progress and obvious updates of the metaphor du jour (networks, the internet, and so on), we have not gone further.The less told story of the idea of the brain involves other images. A remarkably forgotten one, inspired by a fascinating physical technique, is the hologram. The brain would be a holographic information device, modulating waves within a holographic field. Any part could contain the whole, allowing for non-local memory storage -the elusive engram would be lost and found. Alternative metaphors do not need to be sophisticated to be conceptually juicy. Consider a prism, whereby light is reflected (perception as virtual action) and refracted (embodied affect). Blue would not be created in the prism but selected from the incoming beam. Similarly, revisiting the telephone switchboard analogy renders the brain as the organ of "attention to life" (as Henri Bergson put it), and whose main role is to receive, delay and conduit movement, selecting external images rather than producing them. From this perspective, brains are more like radios than VR headsets. The so-called resonant brain theory and the phenomenon of representational drift are kindred contemporary ideas. This whole class of metaphors leads us back to William James foundational (and forgotten) distinction between brain function as productive versus permissive. That the brain is a "reducing valve", in Aldous Huxley's words, is an intriguing hypothesis that could be investigated within the current renaissance of psychedelic research. Brains would not create thoughts but filter them. There are other metaphors neuroscientists could live by.It is also helpful to note that English is not the only language spoken by human beings. The word computer is not universally translated as such. A computer is still a "computer" in Italian, Portuguese, or German. But in Catalan we say ordinador, which we took from the French ordinateur. The same happens in Spanish with ordenador (except outside of Spain, where people say computadora). The story behind the choice of words is peculiar: In 1955, the IBM marketing team in France decided against branding their new product too similarly to existing "calculators". As a better (and shorter) name for "the new electronic (programable) machine intended for information processing", they decided on ordinatrice électronique. Finally ordinateur settled as a trademark, percolating to current language. Brains are thus pictured in the image of a person who organizes or who computes, depending on the country. We can remain lost in translation.Like fish in the sea, we often fail to notice the entrenched metaphors we swim in. Brains aren't really any of those, and yet treating brains as such can provide valuable insights unless one does not erect one's favorite image into an idol. As Lewontin's quote of Wiener and Rosenblueth puts it, "the price of metaphor is eternal vigilance". A metaphorical monoculture is a burden rather than a blessing. All metaphors are wrong (when literally taken), but all metaphors are useful (when kept in their local domain of application). Screwdrivers are handy, but not to eat soup. Entertaining other ways to conceive what brains are and what they do is not only valuable but necessary. Moreover, in the light of Lakoff and Johnson's thesis, honoring the metaphorical nature of much of our scientific thinking frees us from a shamefaced exercise of imagination and allows us to deliberately explore the many-sided nature of the brain. In the bigger picture, Metaphors We Live By was a reaction to the tendency within the analytical tradition to demote metaphors as either meaningless or simply pragmatic vectors to literal meanings. The thesis of the book was discordant with those provinces of the Western cannon that ascribe an immaculate purity to concepts, but also with the skeptic relativism of postmodernist doctrines. As we think, we live. The metaphors we use shape what we can and cannot see under our microscopes and in the real world. When it comes to understanding human mental life, the study of metaphors is complementary to the study of brains themselves.

Why mental metaphors do not help us understand chatbot mistakes
The function of chatbots like OpenAI’s ChatGPT is based on detecting probabilistic patterns in the training data. This makes them vulnerable to generating factual mistakes in their outputs. Recently, it has become commonplace in philosophical, scientific, and popular discourses to capture such mistakes by metaphors that draw on discourses about the human mind. The two most popular metaphors at present are hallucinating and bullshitting. In this paper, we review, discuss, and criticise these mental metaphors. By applying conceptual metaphor theory, we provide numerous reasons why they do not succeed in providing us with a better understanding of factual chatbot mistakes. We conclude by calling for justifications of the epistemic feasibility and fruitfulness of the metaphors at issue. Furthermore, we raise the question what would be lost if we stopped trying to capture factual chatbot mistakes by mental metaphors.
Verbalizable Representations Form a Global Workspace in Language Models
If the mind is an ocean, we spend our lives floating at the surface. Beneath us, an enormous amount of processing takes place without our knowledge: our visual systems parsing the contours of a face, our motor circuits maintaining our posture. At any given moment, only a small fraction of this neural activity is accessible to us. Yet it is this privileged sliver of activity that we rely on to reason deliberately: to plan what ingredients to buy for a recipe, or to puzzle out why an engine won’t start. Such thoughts can be articulated out loud, deliberately held in mind, and brought to bear on whatever task the moment demands. This distinction, between our accessible thoughts and our unconscious processing, is perhaps the most striking feature of human cognition.
Verbalizable Representations Form a Global Workspace in Language Models
If the mind is an ocean, we spend our lives floating at the surface. Beneath us, an enormous amount of processing takes place without our knowledge: our visual systems parsing the contours of a face, our motor circuits maintaining our posture. At any given moment, only a small fraction of this neural activity is accessible to us. Yet it is this privileged sliver of activity that we rely on to reason deliberately: to plan what ingredients to buy for a recipe, or to puzzle out why an engine won’t start. Such thoughts can be articulated out loud, deliberately held in mind, and brought to bear on whatever task the moment demands. This distinction, between our accessible thoughts and our unconscious processing, is perhaps the most striking feature of human cognition.
Many Minds: Seven metaphors for AI
If you wanted a petri dish for understanding metaphors—how they emerge and evolve and jostle with each other—it would be hard to do better than the world of AI. We talk about AI systems variously as coaches or co-pilots, little genies or alien intelligences. Some researchers claim that AIs "grow," that they're entering their phase of "adolescence." Critics deride AI products as slop and dismiss LLMs as a kind of autocomplete on steroids. What's behind these different characterizations? Which ones are accurate and which are unfair? And are our metaphors mostly colorful rhetoric or do they matter? Are they shaping how we understand, adopt, and ultimately regulate these new technologies? My guest today is . Melanie is a computer scientist and Professor at the Santa Fe Institute. She is the author of the book, and she writes a by the same name. This episode is a bit of a companion to with Steve Flusberg. In that episode, Steve and I attempted a kind of crash course on metaphor and the human mind. Here, Melanie and I sit down for more of an extended case study: how metaphors are guiding, galvanizing, and maybe deceiving us in the contested realm of AI discourse. We unpack seven of the most widely used metaphors in this space. We consider how these metaphors are shaping not only our everyday understandings of AI, but also law and policy. We also talk about the metaphor and analogy capabilities of AI itself. Can these systems reason abstractly in the way that humans can? Along the way, Melanie and I touch on: AI-generated poetry, anthropomorphism, the original sin of AI research, the myth of Narcissus, psychometric testing and its pitfalls, metaphors for AI that are a bit hard to spot, and the question of whether an AI has ever come up with a decent analogy for itself. Longtime fans of the show will know that we've had Melanie on the show . We invited her back, not only because she's thought about metaphor and analogy in AI discourse for decades, but because she's a voice of calm insight in an area that’s increasingly awash in hype and polemic. Longtime fans of the show may also note that we are now celebrating our 6th birthday at Many Minds. That's right, the show launched in February 2020. If you'd like to support us as we recognize this milestone, you can leave us a rating or a review, recommend us to a friend, or give us a shout out on social media. Your support is always appreciated. Without further ado, on to my conversation with Dr. Melanie Mitchell. Enjoy! Notes 3:30 – For an overview of Douglas Hofstadter’s work on analogy, see . 8:00 – Much of our discussion in this interview draws on Dr. Mitchell’s piece on the in Science magazine. 13:30 – For earlier discussions of anthropomorphism on the show, see our earlier episodes and . 16:00 – See for the original discussion of LLMs as “stochastic parrots.” 17:00 – See for the original discussion of ChatGPT as a “blurry jpeg.” 18:30 – See for the original discussion of LLMs as role players. 22:00 – See for one use of the “LLMs as crowds” metaphor. See also a discussion of this metaphor (and other metaphors for AI) . 25:00 – For one discussion of AI as a “cultural technology” by Alison Gopnik and colleagues, see . For a more recent discussion of the same metaphor by Henry Farrell, Alison Gopnik and others, see . 27:00 – For the podcast series on intelligence that Dr. Mitchell co-hosted for the Santa Fe Institute, see . 28:00 – See for an influential formulation of the idea that AI is an “alien intelligence.” 29:00 – For philosopher Shannon Vallor’s book about AI as “mirror,” see . 31:00 – For the recent study on users’ metaphors for AI systems, see . 33:00 – For more on the rise of social AI, see our earlier episode . 38:00 – For more on what AI researchers might learn from developmental and comparative psychologists, see Dr. Mitchell’s (summarizing her keynote at NeurIPs). 42:00 – For more on the ARC (Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus) and the research that Dr. Mitchell and colleagues have been doing with it, see and . 48:30 – For the study on humans' preference for AI-generated poetry, see . 50:30 – For Brigitte Nerlich’s documentation and discussion of various metaphors for AI (including AI’s metaphors for itself), see . Recommendations , by Shannon Vallor ‘,’ by Murray Shanahan (!) et al. ‘,’ by Henry Farrell et al. Many Minds is a project of the , which is made possible by a generous grant from the John Templeton Foundation to Indiana University. The show is hosted and produced by , with help from Assistant Producer and with creative support from DISI Directors Erica Cartmill and Jacob Foster. Our artwork is by . Subscribe to Many Minds on Apple, Stitcher, Spotify, Pocket Casts, Google Play, or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can also now subscribe to the Many Minds newsletter ! We welcome your comments, questions, and suggestions. Feel free to email us at: manymindspodcast@gmail.com. For updates about the show, visit or follow us on Bluesky ().
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Morality vs. Politics as a Framing Problem: How (Not) to Misunderstand the Fight Against Climate Change
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Relying on AI chatbots for historical facts can influence your political beliefs, new study shows
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Position: Stop Anthropomorphizing Intermediate Tokens as Reasoning/Thinking Traces!
Intermediate token generation (ITG), where a model produces output before the solution, has become a standard method to improve the performance of language models on reasoning tasks. These intermediate tokens have been called \say{reasoning traces} or even \say{thinking traces} -- implicitly anthropomorphizing the traces, and implying that these traces resemble steps a human might take when solving a challenging problem, and as such can provide an interpretable window into the operation of the model's thinking process to the end user. In this position paper, we present evidence that this anthropomorphization isn't a harmless metaphor, and instead is quite dangerous -- it confuses the nature of these models and how to use them effectively, and leads to questionable research. We call on the community to avoid such anthropomorphization of intermediate tokens.

Position: Stop Anthropomorphizing Intermediate Tokens as Reasoning/Thinking Traces!
Intermediate token generation (ITG), where a model produces output before the solution, has become a standard method to improve the performance of language models on reasoning tasks. These intermediate tokens have been called \say{reasoning traces} or even \say{thinking traces} -- implicitly anthropomorphizing the traces, and implying that these traces resemble steps a human might take when solving a challenging problem, and as such can provide an interpretable window into the operation of the model's thinking process to the end user. In this position paper, we present evidence that this anthropomorphization isn't a harmless metaphor, and instead is quite dangerous -- it confuses the nature of these models and how to use them effectively, and leads to questionable research. We call on the community to avoid such anthropomorphization of intermediate tokens.

Machine god metaphors eat your brain
There are other ways of thinking about AI
