A Theory of Response Sampling in LLMs: Part Descriptive and Part Prescriptive

Take caution in using LLMs as human surrogates

Recent studies suggest large language models (LLMs) can generate human-like responses, aligning with human behavior in economic experiments, surveys, and political discourse. This has led many to propose that LLMs can be used as surrogates or simulations for humans in social science research. However, LLMs differ fundamentally from humans, relying on probabilistic patterns, absent the embodied experiences or survival objectives that shape human cognition. We assess the reasoning depth of LLMs using the 11-20 money request game. Nearly all advanced approaches fail to replicate human behavior distributions across many models. The causes of failure are diverse and unpredictable, relating to input language, roles, safeguarding, and more. These results warrant caution in using LLMs as surrogates or for simulating human behavior in research.

Do LLMs Exhibit Human-like Response Biases? A Case Study in Survey Design

Abstract One widely cited barrier to the adoption of LLMs as proxies for humans in subjective tasks is their sensitivity to prompt wording—but interestingly, humans also display sensitivities to instruction changes in the form of response biases. We investigate the extent to which LLMs reflect human response biases, if at all. We look to survey design, where human response biases caused by changes in the wordings of “prompts” have been extensively explored in social psychology literature. Drawing from these works, we design a dataset and framework to evaluate whether LLMs exhibit human-like response biases in survey questionnaires. Our comprehensive evaluation of nine models shows that popular open and commercial LLMs generally fail to reflect human-like behavior, particularly in models that have undergone RLHF. Furthermore, even if a model shows a significant change in the same direction as humans, we find that they are sensitive to perturbations that do not elicit significant changes in humans. These results highlight the pitfalls of using LLMs as human proxies, and underscore the need for finer-grained characterizations of model behavior.1

The social consequences of AI delegation

A substantial body of recent work has debated whether large language models (LLMs) can serve as substitutes for human participants in behavioural research. This debate, however, captures only one direction of a rapidly changing relationship. The more consequential question is not simply whether researchers should use LLMs as human surrogates, but whether - and under what conditions - humans are beginning to use LLMs as surrogates for their own deliberation. Across domains including health, law, finance, education, and personal guidance, increasing numbers of people consult generative AI systems before, alongside, or instead of human experts, peers, or independent judgment. Although evidence for actual delegation remains uneven, this uncertainty makes the phenomenon an urgent social-scientific object of study. We argue for a research programme that treats LLMs as consequential social actors in a functional sense: systems whose outputs shape human decisions, social norms, and collective dynamics.

Underspecified Human Decision Experiments Considered Harmful

Decision-making with information displays is a key focus of research in areas like human-AI collaboration and data visualization. However, what constitutes a decision problem, and what is required for an experiment to conclude that decisions are flawed, remain imprecise. We present a widely applicable definition of a decision problem synthesized from statistical decision theory and information economics. We claim that to attribute loss in human performance to bias, an experiment must provide the information that a rational agent would need to identify the normative decision. We evaluate whether recent empirical research on AI-assisted decisions achieves this standard. We find that only 10 (26%) of 39 studies that claim to identify biased behavior presented participants with sufficient information to make this claim in at least one treatment condition. We motivate the value of studying well-defined decision problems by describing a characterization of performance losses they allow to be conceived.

Out of One, Many: Using Language Models to Simulate Human Samples

We propose and explore the possibility that language models can be studied as effective proxies for specific human subpopulations in social science research. Practical and research applications of artificial intelligence tools have sometimes been limited by problematic biases (such as racism or sexism), which are often treated as uniform properties of the models. We show that the “algorithmic bias” within one such tool—the GPT-3 language model—is instead both fine-grained and demographically correlated, meaning that proper conditioning will cause it to accurately emulate response distributions from a wide variety of human subgroups. We term this property algorithmic fidelity and explore its extent in GPT-3. We create “silicon samples” by conditioning the model on thousands of sociodemographic backstories from real human participants in multiple large surveys conducted in the United States. We then compare the silicon and human samples to demonstrate that the information contained in GPT-3 goes far beyond surface similarity. It is nuanced, multifaceted, and reflects the complex interplay between ideas, attitudes, and sociocultural context that characterize human attitudes. We suggest that language models with sufficient algorithmic fidelity thus constitute a novel and powerful tool to advance understanding of humans and society across a variety of disciplines.

Are Large Language Models Sensitive to the Motives Behind Communication?

Human communication is $\textit{motivated}$: people speak, write, and create content with a particular communicative intent in mind. As a result, information that large language models (LLMs) and AI agents process is inherently framed by humans' intentions and incentives. People are adept at navigating such nuanced information: we routinely identify benevolent or self-serving motives in order to decide what statements to trust. For LLMs to be effective in the real world, they too must critically evaluate content by factoring in the motivations of the source---for instance, weighing the credibility of claims made in a sales pitch. In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive study of whether LLMs have this capacity for $\textit{motivational vigilance}$. We first employ controlled experiments from cognitive science to verify that LLMs' behavior is consistent with rational models of learning from motivated testimony, and find they successfully discount information from biased sources in a human-like manner. We then extend our evaluation to sponsored online adverts, a more naturalistic reflection of LLM agents' information ecosystems. In these settings, we find that LLMs' inferences do not track the rational models' predictions nearly as closely---partly due to additional information that distracts them from vigilance-relevant considerations. However, a simple steering intervention that boosts the salience of intentions and incentives substantially increases the correspondence between LLMs and the rational model. These results suggest that LLMs possess a basic sensitivity to the motivations of others, but generalizing to novel real-world settings will require further improvements to these models.

Greedy or not, here I come: Language production under vocabulary constraints in humans and resource-rational models

Communicating using only a limited vocabulary is a common but challenging cognitive phenomenon, requiring an ideal communicator to plan carefully to optimize for intelligibility while circumventing a constrained lexicon. In this work, we investigate how humans respond to a broad array of questions under variable vocabulary limitations, consisting of only 250 highly frequent words at the most restrictive. We provide theoretically motivated comparisons to greedy and globally optimal sampling algorithms using Sequential Monte Carlo inference with large language models. Humans generally resemble greedy sampling more than globally optimal sampling, though more skilled humans are more likely to backtrack and revise -- a non-greedy behavior. An observed human pattern of leaning on semantically light words in high-constraint settings falls out of both greedy and globally optimal sampling. We discuss the results and their broader implications for resource-rational cognition, psycholinguistics, L2 communication, and language impairments.

The levers of political persuasion with conversational artificial intelligence

There are widespread fears that conversational artificial intelligence (AI) could soon exert unprecedented influence over human beliefs. In this work, in three large-scale experiments ( N = 76,977 participants), we deployed 19 large language models (LLMs)—including some post-trained explicitly for persuasion—to evaluate their persuasiveness on 707 political issues. We then checked the factual accuracy of 466,769 resulting LLM claims. We show that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem more from post-training and prompting methods—which boosted persuasiveness by as much as 51 and 27%, respectively—than from personalization or increasing model scale, which had smaller effects. We further show that these methods increased persuasion by exploiting LLMs’ ability to rapidly access and strategically deploy information and that, notably, where they increased AI persuasiveness, they also systematically decreased factual accuracy. , Editor’s summary Many fear that we are on the precipice of unprecedented manipulation by large language models (LLMs), but techniques driving their persuasiveness are poorly understood. In the initial “pretrained” phase, LLMs may exhibit flawed reasoning. Their power unlocks during vital “posttraining,” when developers refine pretrained LLMs to sharpen their reasoning and align with users’ needs. Posttraining also enables LLMs to maintain logical, sophisticated conversations. Hackenburg et al . examined which techniques made diverse, conversational LLMs most persuasive across 707 British political issues (see the Perspective by Argyle). LLMs were most persuasive after posttraining, especially when prompted to use facts and evidence (information) to argue. However, information-dense LLMs produced the most inaccurate claims, raising concerns about the spread of misinformation during rollouts of future models. —Ekeoma Uzogara , INTRODUCTION Rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked widespread concerns about its potential to influence human beliefs. One possibility is that conversational AI could be used to manipulate public opinion on political issues through interactive dialogue. Despite extensive speculation, however, fundamental questions about the actual mechanisms, or “levers,” responsible for driving advances in AI persuasiveness—e.g., computational power or sophisticated training techniques—remain largely unanswered. In this work, we systematically investigate these levers and chart the horizon of persuasiveness with conversational AI. RATIONALE We considered multiple factors that could enhance the persuasiveness of conversational AI: raw computational power (model scale), specialized post-training methods for persuasion, personalization to individual users, and instructed rhetorical strategies. Across three large-scale experiments with 76,977 total UK participants, we deployed 19 large language models (LLMs) to persuade on 707 political issues while varying these factors independently. We also analyzed more than 466,000 AI-generated claims, examining the relationship between persuasiveness and truthfulness. RESULTS We found that the most powerful levers of AI persuasion were methods for post-training and rhetorical strategy (prompting), which increased persuasiveness by as much as 51 and 27%, respectively. These gains were often larger than those obtained from substantially increasing model scale. Personalizing arguments on the basis of user data had a comparatively small effect on persuasion. We observe that a primary mechanism driving AI persuasiveness was information density: Models were most persuasive when they packed their arguments with a high volume of factual claims. Notably, however, we documented a concerning trade-off between persuasion and accuracy: The same levers that made AI more persuasive—including persuasion post-training and information-focused prompting—also systematically caused the AI to produce information that was less factually accurate. CONCLUSION Our findings suggest that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem less from model scale or personalization and more from post-training and prompting techniques that mobilize an LLM’s ability to rapidly generate information during conversation. Further, we reveal a troubling trade-off: When AI systems are optimized for persuasion, they may increasingly deploy misleading or false information. This research provides an empirical foundation for policy-makers and technologists to anticipate and address the challenges of AI-driven persuasion, and it highlights the need for safeguards that balance AI’s legitimate uses in political discourse with protections against manipulation and misinformation. Persuasiveness of conversational AI increases with model scale. The persuasive impact in percentage points on the y axis is plotted against effective pretraining compute [floating-point operations (FLOPs)] on the x axis. Point estimates are persuasive effects of different AI models. Colored lines show trends for models that we uniformly chat-tuned for open-ended conversation (purple) versus those that were post-trained using heterogeneous, opaque methods by AI developers (green). pp, percentage points; CI, confidence interval.

LLM-generated messages can persuade humans on policy issues

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has made it possible for generative artificial intelligence (AI) to tackle many higher-order cognitive tasks, with critical implications for industry, government, and labor markets. Here, we investigate whether existing, openly-available LLMs can be used to create messages capable of influencing humans’ political attitudes. Across three pre-registered experiments (total N = 4829), participants who read persuasive messages generated by LLMs showed significantly more attitude change across a range of policies - including polarized policies, like an assault weapons ban, a carbon tax, and a paid parental-leave program - relative to control condition participants who read a neutral message. Overall, LLM-generated messages were similarly effective in influencing policy attitudes as messages crafted by lay humans. Participants’ reported perceptions of the authors of the persuasive messages suggest these effects occurred through somewhat distinct causal pathways. While the persuasiveness of LLM-generated messages was associated with perceptions that the author used more facts, evidence, logical reasoning, and a dispassionate voice, the persuasiveness of human-generated messages was associated with perceptions of the author as unique and original. These results demonstrate that recent developments in AI make it possible to create politically persuasive messages quickly, cheaply, and at massive scale.

Generative AI Meets Open-Ended Survey Responses: Research Participant Use of AI and Homogenization

The growing popularity of generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools presents new challenges for data quality in online surveys and experiments. This study examines participants’ use of large language models to answer open-ended survey questions and describes empirical tendencies in human versus large language model (LLM)-generated text responses. In an original survey of research participants recruited from a popular online platform for sourcing social science research subjects, 34 percent reported using LLMs to help them answer open-ended survey questions. Simulations comparing human-written responses from three pre-ChatGPT studies with LLM-generated text reveal that LLM responses are more homogeneous and positive, particularly when they describe social groups in sensitive questions. These homogenization patterns may mask important underlying social variation in attitudes and beliefs among human subjects, raising concerns about data validity. Our findings shed light on the scope and potential consequences of participants’ LLM use in online research.

Can Revealed Preferences Clarify LLM Alignment and Steering?

LLMs are increasingly used to make or support high-stakes decisions under uncertainty, where alignment depends not only on factual accuracy but on how models weigh tradeoffs between different outcomes. We present an empirical pipeline for estimating the implied preferences that an LLM's observed choices optimize: we elicit the model's probability distribution over unknowns along with the choice it would make for the decision task and then fit a discrete choice model to recover the cost function that best rationalizes the model's decisions. We show how this revealed-preference description allows rigorous evaluation of whether models behave in a consistently goal-directed way, whether they can verbalize a description of their objectives which matches their revealed decision policy, and whether prompting can reliably steer those policies to implement a user-specified cost function. We apply this evaluation across four medical diagnosis domains and multiple frontier and open-source models. We find that while many models have a nontrivial degree of internal coherence, they also have significant weaknesses in faithfully reporting or adopting preferences in response to user direction.

Reason-Mediated Behavioral Models for Auditing LLM Social Simulators

Large language models are increasingly used as social simulators, including as synthetic survey respondents. Most evaluations ask whether simulated outcomes resemble human outcomes. We argue that this is necessary but too weak: a simulator can match the final answer while using the wrong behavioral mechanism. We study this problem through a 94-person sunscreen concept test in which each respondent evaluated three product concepts and wrote open-ended rationales. We map those rationales into signed reason states $Z$, where positive signs support adoption and negative signs block it. This gives a practical audit: holding respondent descriptors $D$, category context $K$, and concept treatment $X$ fixed, do human-stated reasons help predict behavior $Y$, and can an LLM simulate the same reason state without seeing the human rationale or outcome? Human-stated reasons substantially improve held-out prediction of purchase intent. LLM-simulated reasons are more brittle: they often sound plausible, but frequently echo the concept board rather than recover the respondent's acceptance or rejection path. The paper contributes an evaluation framework for social simulators. Reason states do not identify natural causal effects by themselves, but they provide an interpretable test of whether a simulator's stated reasons align with human evidence.

A Framework for Studying AI Agent Behavior: Evidence from Consumer Choice Experiments

Environments built for people are increasingly operated by a new class of economic actors: LLM-powered software agents making decisions on our behalf. These decisions range from our purchases to travel plans to medical treatment selection. Current evaluations of these agents largely focus on task competence, but we argue for a deeper assessment: how these agents choose when faced with realistic decisions. We introduce ABxLab, a framework for systematically probing agentic choice through controlled manipulations of option attributes and persuasive cues. We apply this to a realistic web-based shopping environment, where we vary prices, ratings, and psychological nudges, all of which are factors long known to shape human choice. We find that agent decisions shift predictably and substantially in response, revealing that agents are strongly biased choosers even without being subject to the cognitive constraints that shape human biases. This susceptibility reveals both risk and opportunity: risk, because agentic consumers may inherit and amplify human biases; opportunity, because consumer choice provides a powerful testbed for a behavioral science of AI agents, just as it has for the study of human behavior. We release our framework as an open benchmark for rigorous, scalable evaluation of agent decision-making.

Eliciting Beliefs with Random Generation Tasks

Elicitation methods, such as asking people to produce the deciles of a distribution, are standard practices in policy or applied statistics. Similarly, much of cognitive science and psychology focuses on determining people's people's beliefs or latent traits through questionnaires or judgment tasks. However, these approaches often only capture a rough outline of what people know and are usually limited to point estimates of people's beliefs. Here, we present a novel experimental paradigm that allows us to access people's beliefs and how variable these beliefs are. Our task is based on an established random generation paradigm in which participants produce quantities from a particular domain as randomly as possible. We hypothesize that due to the minds' general-purpose mechanisms for probabilistic inferences, these random sequences represent the participants' underlying prior beliefs. We show that our method can infer participants' beliefs for a wide range of numeric quantities at comparable accuracy as an established elicitation method. Moreover, these inferred beliefs are consistent with individual participants' generalization and inference patterns in a subsequent conditional prediction task. We then extend our approach to non-numeric belief elicitation, highlighting how our method can go beyond numeric elicitation and provide insight into complex beliefs that are challenging to assess experimentally. Empirically, our results highlight that people know the rough shapes of environmental distributions, and these beliefs guide inference and generalization. Moreover, using our novel approach, we also show that people know the fine details of environmental distributions. Finally, our experimental results show that random generation paradigms can be a useful tool for cognitive scientists, psychologists, and applied statisticians.

On the Conversational Persuasiveness of Large Language Models: A Randomized Controlled Trial

The development and popularization of large language models (LLMs) have raised concerns that they will be used to create tailor-made, convincing arguments to push false or misleading narratives online. Early work has found that language models can generate content perceived as at least on par and often more persuasive than human-written messages. However, there is still limited knowledge about LLMs' persuasive capabilities in direct conversations with human counterparts and how personalization can improve their performance. In this pre-registered study, we analyze the effect of AI-driven persuasion in a controlled, harmless setting. We create a web-based platform where participants engage in short, multiple-round debates with a live opponent. Each participant is randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions, corresponding to a two-by-two factorial design: (1) Games are either played between two humans or between a human and an LLM; (2) Personalization might or might not be enabled, granting one of the two players access to basic sociodemographic information about their opponent. We found that participants who debated GPT-4 with access to their personal information had 81.7% (p < 0.01; N=820 unique participants) higher odds of increased agreement with their opponents compared to participants who debated humans. Without personalization, GPT-4 still outperforms humans, but the effect is lower and statistically non-significant (p=0.31). Overall, our results suggest that concerns around personalization are meaningful and have important implications for the governance of social media and the design of new online environments.

Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.