Detecting Non-Membership in LLM Training Data via Rank Correlations

SILO Language Models: Isolating Legal Risk In a Nonparametric Datastore

The legality of training language models (LMs) on copyrighted or otherwise restricted data is under intense debate. However, as we show, model performance significantly degrades if trained only on low-risk text (e.g., out-of-copyright books or government documents), due to its limited size and domain coverage. We present SILO, a new language model that manages this risk-performance tradeoff during inference. SILO is built by (1) training a parametric LM on the Open License Corpus (OLC), a new corpus we curate with 228B tokens of public domain and permissively licensed text and (2) augmenting it with a more general and easily modifiable nonparametric datastore (e.g., containing copyrighted books or news) that is only queried during inference. The datastore allows use of high-risk data without training on it, supports sentence-level data attribution, and enables data producers to opt out from the model by removing content from the store. These capabilities can foster compliance with data-use regulations such as the fair use doctrine in the United States and the GDPR in the European Union. Our experiments show that the parametric LM struggles on its own with domains not covered by OLC. However, access to the datastore greatly improves out of domain performance, closing 90% of the performance gap with an LM trained on the Pile, a more diverse corpus with mostly high-risk text. We also analyze which nonparametric approach works best, where the remaining errors lie, and how performance scales with datastore size. Our results suggest that it is possible to build high quality language models while mitigating legal risk.

Membership Inference Attacks Against Machine Learning Models

We quantitatively investigate how machine learning models leak information about the individual data records on which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to a model, determine if the record was in the model's training dataset. To perform membership inference against a target model, we make adversarial use of machine learning and train our own inference model to recognize differences in the target model's predictions on the inputs that it trained on versus the inputs that it did not train on. We empirically evaluate our inference techniques on classification models trained by commercial "machine learning as a service" providers such as Google and Amazon. Using realistic datasets and classification tasks, including a hospital discharge dataset whose membership is sensitive from the privacy perspective, we show that these models can be vulnerable to membership inference attacks. We then investigate the factors that influence this leakage and evaluate mitigation strategies.

Membership Inference Attacks Against Machine Learning Models

We quantitatively investigate how machine learning models leak information about the individual data records on which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to a model, determine if the record was in the model's training dataset. To perform membership inference against a target model, we make adversarial use of machine learning and train our own inference model to recognize differences in the target model's predictions on the inputs that it trained on versus the inputs that it did not train on. We empirically evaluate our inference techniques on classification models trained by commercial "machine learning as a service" providers such as Google and Amazon. Using realistic datasets and classification tasks, including a hospital discharge dataset whose membership is sensitive from the privacy perspective, we show that these models can be vulnerable to membership inference attacks. We then investigate the factors that influence this leakage and evaluate mitigation strategies.

ZKPROV: A Zero-Knowledge Approach to Dataset Provenance for Large Language Models

As large language models (LLMs) are used in sensitive fields, accurately verifying their computational provenance without disclosing their training datasets poses a significant challenge, particularly in regulated sectors such as healthcare, which have strict requirements for dataset use. Traditional approaches either incur substantial computational cost to fully verify the entire training process or leak unauthorized information to the verifier. Therefore, we introduce ZKPROV, a novel cryptographic framework allowing users to verify that the LLM's responses to their prompts are trained on datasets certified by the authorities that own them. Additionally, it ensures that the dataset's content is relevant to the users' queries without revealing sensitive information about the datasets or the model parameters. ZKPROV offers a unique balance between privacy and efficiency by binding training datasets, model parameters, and responses, while also attaching zero-knowledge proofs to the responses generated by the LLM to validate these claims. Our experimental results demonstrate sublinear scaling for generating and verifying these proofs, with end-to-end overhead under 3.3 seconds for models up to 8B parameters, presenting a practical solution for real-world applications. We also provide formal security guarantees, proving that our approach preserves dataset confidentiality while ensuring trustworthy dataset provenance.

A large-scale audit of dataset licensing and attribution in AI

The race to train language models on vast, diverse and inconsistently documented datasets raises pressing legal and ethical concerns. To improve data transparency and understanding, we convene a multi-disciplinary effort between legal and machine learning experts to systematically audit and trace more than 1,800 text datasets. We develop tools and standards to trace the lineage of these datasets, including their source, creators, licences and subsequent use. Our landscape analysis highlights sharp divides in the composition and focus of data licenced for commercial use. Important categories including low-resource languages, creative tasks and new synthetic data all tend to be restrictively licenced. We observe frequent miscategorization of licences on popular dataset hosting sites, with licence omission rates of more than 70% and error rates of more than 50%. This highlights a crisis in misattribution and informed use of popular datasets driving many recent breakthroughs. Our analysis of data sources also explains the application of copyright law and fair use to finetuning data. As a contribution to continuing improvements in dataset transparency and responsible use, we release our audit, with an interactive user interface, the Data Provenance Explorer, to enable practitioners to trace and filter on data provenance for the most popular finetuning data collections: www.dataprovenance.org.

Unlearning Traces the Influential Training Data of Language Models

Identifying the training datasets that influence a language model's outputs is essential for minimizing the generation of harmful content and enhancing its performance. Ideally, we can measure the influence of each dataset by removing it from training; however, it is prohibitively expensive to retrain a model multiple times. This paper presents UnTrac: unlearning traces the influence of a training dataset on the model's performance. UnTrac is extremely simple; each training dataset is unlearned by gradient ascent, and we evaluate how much the model's predictions change after unlearning. Furthermore, we propose a more scalable approach, UnTrac-Inv, which unlearns a test dataset and evaluates the unlearned model on training datasets. UnTrac-Inv resembles UnTrac, while being efficient for massive training datasets. In the experiments, we examine if our methods can assess the influence of pretraining datasets on generating toxic, biased, and untruthful content. Our methods estimate their influence much more accurately than existing methods while requiring neither excessive memory space nor multiple checkpoints.

Membership Inference Attacks From First Principles

A membership inference attack allows an adversary to query a trained machine learning model to predict whether or not a particular example was contained in the model's training dataset. These attacks are currently evaluated using average-case "accuracy" metrics that fail to characterize whether the attack can confidently identify any members of the training set. We argue that attacks should instead be evaluated by computing their true-positive rate at low (e.g.,

Large-scale online deanonymization with LLMs

We show that large language models can be used to perform at-scale deanonymization. With full Internet access, our agent can re-identify Hacker News users and Anthropic Interviewer participants at high precision, given pseudonymous online profiles and conversations alone, matching what would take hours for a dedicated human investigator. We then design attacks for the closed-world setting. Given two databases of pseudonymous individuals, each containing unstructured text written by or about that individual, we implement a scalable attack pipeline that uses LLMs to: (1) extract identity-relevant features, (2) search for candidate matches via semantic embeddings, and (3) reason over top candidates to verify matches and reduce false positives. Compared to classical deanonymization work (e.g., on the Netflix prize) that required structured data, our approach works directly on raw user content across arbitrary platforms. We construct three datasets with known ground-truth data to evaluate our attacks. The first links Hacker News to LinkedIn profiles, using cross-platform references that appear in the profiles. Our second dataset matches users across Reddit movie discussion communities; and the third splits a single user's Reddit history in time to create two pseudonymous profiles to be matched. In each setting, LLM-based methods substantially outperform classical baselines, achieving up to 68% recall at 90% precision compared to near 0% for the best non-LLM method. Our results show that the practical obscurity protecting pseudonymous users online no longer holds and that threat models for online privacy need to be reconsidered.

Large-scale online deanonymization with LLMs

We show that large language models can be used to perform at-scale deanonymization. With full Internet access, our agent can re-identify Hacker News users and Anthropic Interviewer participants at high precision, given pseudonymous online profiles and conversations alone, matching what would take hours for a dedicated human investigator. We then design attacks for the closed-world setting. Given two databases of pseudonymous individuals, each containing unstructured text written by or about that individual, we implement a scalable attack pipeline that uses LLMs to: (1) extract identity-relevant features, (2) search for candidate matches via semantic embeddings, and (3) reason over top candidates to verify matches and reduce false positives. Compared to classical deanonymization work (e.g., on the Netflix prize) that required structured data, our approach works directly on raw user content across arbitrary platforms. We construct three datasets with known ground-truth data to evaluate our attacks. The first links Hacker News to LinkedIn profiles, using cross-platform references that appear in the profiles. Our second dataset matches users across Reddit movie discussion communities; and the third splits a single user's Reddit history in time to create two pseudonymous profiles to be matched. In each setting, LLM-based methods substantially outperform classical baselines, achieving up to 68% recall at 90% precision compared to near 0% for the best non-LLM method. Our results show that the practical obscurity protecting pseudonymous users online no longer holds and that threat models for online privacy need to be reconsidered.

WASA: WAtermark-based Source Attribution for Large Language Model-Generated Data

The impressive performances of Large Language Models (LLMs) and their immense potential for commercialization have given rise to serious concerns over the Intellectual Property (IP) of their training data. In particular, the synthetic texts generated by LLMs may infringe the IP of the data being used to train the LLMs. To this end, it is imperative to be able to perform source attribution by identifying the data provider who contributed to the generation of a synthetic text by an LLM. In this paper, we show that this problem can be tackled by watermarking, i.e., by enabling an LLM to generate synthetic texts with embedded watermarks that contain information about their source(s). We identify the key properties of such watermarking frameworks (e.g., source attribution accuracy, robustness against adversaries), and propose a source attribution framework that satisfies these key properties due to our algorithmic designs. Our framework enables an LLM to learn an accurate mapping from the generated texts to data providers, which sets the foundation for effective source attribution. Extensive empirical evaluations show that our framework achieves effective source attribution.

Privacy Risk in Machine Learning: Analyzing the Connection to Overfitting

Machine learning algorithms, when applied to sensitive data, pose a distinct threat to privacy. A growing body of prior work demonstrates that models produced by these algorithms may leak specific private information in the training data to an attacker, either through the models' structure or their observable behavior. However, the underlying cause of this privacy risk is not well understood beyond a handful of anecdotal accounts that suggest overfitting and influence might play a role. This paper examines the effect that overfitting and influence have on the ability of an attacker to learn information about the training data from machine learning models, either through training set membership inference or attribute inference attacks. Using both formal and empirical analyses, we illustrate a clear relationship between these factors and the privacy risk that arises in several popular machine learning algorithms. We find that overfitting is sufficient to allow an attacker to perform membership inference and, when the target attribute meets certain conditions about its influence, attribute inference attacks. Interestingly, our formal analysis also shows that overfitting is not necessary for these attacks and begins to shed light on what other factors may be in play. Finally, we explore the connection between membership inference and attribute inference, showing that there are deep connections between the two that lead to effective new attacks.

Technical Report on the Pangram AI-Generated Text Classifier

We present Pangram Text, a transformer-based neural network trained to distinguish text written by large language models from text written by humans. Pangram Text outperforms zero-shot methods such as DetectGPT as well as leading commercial AI detection tools with over 38 times lower error rates on a comprehensive benchmark comprised of 10 text domains (student writing, creative writing, scientific writing, books, encyclopedias, news, email, scientific papers, short-form Q&A) and 8 open- and closed-source large language models. We propose a training algorithm, hard negative mining with synthetic mirrors, that enables our classifier to achieve orders of magnitude lower false positive rates on high-data domains such as reviews. Finally, we show that Pangram Text is not biased against nonnative English speakers and generalizes to domains and models unseen during training.

Poisoning Attacks on LLMs Require a Near-constant Number of Poison Samples

Poisoning attacks can compromise the safety of large language models (LLMs) by injecting malicious documents into their training data. Existing work has studied pretraining poisoning assuming adversaries control a percentage of the training corpus. However, for large models, even small percentages translate to impractically large amounts of data. This work demonstrates for the first time that poisoning attacks instead require a near-constant number of documents regardless of dataset size. We conduct the largest pretraining poisoning experiments to date, pretraining models from 600M to 13B parameters on chinchilla-optimal datasets (6B to 260B tokens). We find that 250 poisoned documents similarly compromise models across all model and dataset sizes, despite the largest models training on more than 20 times more clean data. We also run smaller-scale experiments to ablate factors that could influence attack success, including broader ratios of poisoned to clean data and non-random distributions of poisoned samples. Finally, we demonstrate the same dynamics for poisoning during fine-tuning. Altogether, our results suggest that injecting backdoors through data poisoning may be easier for large models than previously believed as the number of poisons required does not scale up with model size, highlighting the need for more research on defences to mitigate this risk in future models.

Poisoning Attacks on LLMs Require a Near-constant Number of Poison Samples

Poisoning attacks can compromise the safety of large language models (LLMs) by injecting malicious documents into their training data. Existing work has studied pretraining poisoning assuming adversaries control a percentage of the training corpus. However, for large models, even small percentages translate to impractically large amounts of data. This work demonstrates for the first time that poisoning attacks instead require a near-constant number of documents regardless of dataset size. We conduct the largest pretraining poisoning experiments to date, pretraining models from 600M to 13B parameters on chinchilla-optimal datasets (6B to 260B tokens). We find that 250 poisoned documents similarly compromise models across all model and dataset sizes, despite the largest models training on more than 20 times more clean data. We also run smaller-scale experiments to ablate factors that could influence attack success, including broader ratios of poisoned to clean data and non-random distributions of poisoned samples. Finally, we demonstrate the same dynamics for poisoning during fine-tuning. Altogether, our results suggest that injecting backdoors through data poisoning may be easier for large models than previously believed as the number of poisons required does not scale up with model size, highlighting the need for more research on defences to mitigate this risk in future models.

RealFactBench: A Benchmark for Evaluating Large Language Models in Real-World Fact-Checking

Large Language Models (LLMs) hold significant potential for advancing fact-checking by leveraging their capabilities in reasoning, evidence retrieval, and explanation generation. However, existing benchmarks fail to comprehensively evaluate LLMs and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in realistic misinformation scenarios. To bridge this gap, we introduce RealFactBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to assess the fact-checking capabilities of LLMs and MLLMs across diverse real-world tasks, including Knowledge Validation, Rumor Detection, and Event Verification. RealFactBench consists of 6K high-quality claims drawn from authoritative sources, encompassing multimodal content and diverse domains. Our evaluation framework further introduces the Unknown Rate (UnR) metric, enabling a more nuanced assessment of models' ability to handle uncertainty and balance between over-conservatism and over-confidence. Extensive experiments on 7 representative LLMs and 4 MLLMs reveal their limitations in real-world fact-checking and offer valuable insights for further research. RealFactBench is publicly available at https://github.com/kalendsyang/RealFactBench.git.

RealFactBench: A Benchmark for Evaluating Large Language Models in Real-World Fact-Checking

Large Language Models (LLMs) hold significant potential for advancing fact-checking by leveraging their capabilities in reasoning, evidence retrieval, and explanation generation. However, existing benchmarks fail to comprehensively evaluate LLMs and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in realistic misinformation scenarios. To bridge this gap, we introduce RealFactBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to assess the fact-checking capabilities of LLMs and MLLMs across diverse real-world tasks, including Knowledge Validation, Rumor Detection, and Event Verification. RealFactBench consists of 6K high-quality claims drawn from authoritative sources, encompassing multimodal content and diverse domains. Our evaluation framework further introduces the Unknown Rate (UnR) metric, enabling a more nuanced assessment of models' ability to handle uncertainty and balance between over-conservatism and over-confidence. Extensive experiments on 7 representative LLMs and 4 MLLMs reveal their limitations in real-world fact-checking and offer valuable insights for further research. RealFactBench is publicly available at https://github.com/kalendsyang/RealFactBench.git.