It looks like scientists and philosophers might have made consciousness far more mysterious than it needs to be
There Is No ‘Hard Problem Of Consciousness’
Consciousness is not separate from the physical world — our “soul” is of the same nature as our body and any other phenomenon of the world.
Consciousness as a Gödel sentence in the language of science
Why the Hard Problem (might be) so Hard
The Mythology Of Conscious AI
Why consciousness is more likely a property of life than of computation and why creating conscious, or even conscious-seeming AI, is a bad idea.
Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism
As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to advance, it is natural to ask whether AI systems can be not only intelligent, but also conscious. I consider why people might think AI could develop consciousness, identifying some biases that lead us astray. I ask what it would take for conscious AI to be a realistic prospect, challenging the assumption that computation provides a sufficient basis for consciousness. I'll instead make the case that consciousness depends on our nature as living organisms – a form of biological naturalism. I lay out a range of scenarios for conscious AI, concluding that real artificial consciousness is unlikely along current trajectories, but becomes more plausible as AI becomes more brain-like and/or life-like. I finish by exploring ethical considerations arising from AI that either is, or convincingly appears to be, conscious. If we sell our minds too cheaply to our machine creations, we not only overestimate them – we underestimate ourselves.
Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilArchive
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...
The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
Abstract. This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basi
Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilPapers
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...
Contra Chiang on machine consciousness
If you think you understand AI consciousness, then you don't understand AI consciousness
The cell membrane as the ‘missing link’ for the evolution of consciousness
While Prof. Torday agrees with Federico Faggin that quantum mechanics is salient to consciousness, he maintains that the role of the cell membrane—which separates an organism from its environment—is key to the selective assimilation or mirroring of the quantum properties of the cosmos into the differentiated consciousness of the organism. This essay is short, dense, and may be difficult to unpack. But it handsomely rewards the effort of the patient and determined reader. The many literature citations in the essay also provide rich ground for further exploration.
On working machines
In part one, on thinking machines, I explored two facets of the philosophy of artificial intelligence: “intelligence”, and consciousness. That left an important topic to consider for this post: the...
Can only meat machines be conscious?
Computational functionalism claims that executing certain computations is sufficient for consciousness, regardless of the physical mechanisms implementing those computations. This view neglects a compelling alternative: that subcomputational biological mechanisms, which realize computational processes, are necessary for consciousness. By contrasting computational roles with their subcomputational biological realizers, I show that there is a systematic tension in our criteria for consciousness: prioritizing computational roles favors consciousness in AI, while prioritizing subcomputational biological realizers favors consciousness in simpler animals. Current theories of consciousness are 'meat-neutral', but if specific physical substrates are necessary, AI may never achieve consciousness. Understanding whether consciousness depends on computational roles, biological realizers, or both, is crucial for assessing the prospects of consciousness in AI and less complex animals.
The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind
The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind is a 1976 book by the Princeton psychologist, psychohistorian and consciousness theorist Julian Jaynes (1920–1997). It explores the nature of consciousness – particularly "the ability to introspect" – and its evolution in ancient human history. Jaynes proposes that consciousness is a learned behavior rooted in language and culture rather than being innate. He distinguishes consciousness from sensory awareness and cognition. Jaynes introduces the concept of the "bicameral mind", a non-conscious mentality prevalent in early humans that relied on auditory hallucinations.
AI Is Not Conscious, But It Is Our Unconscious
The Convivial Society: Vol. 7, No. 4
Debates over AI consciousness are a trap
If AI systems are viewed as too advanced to control, the companies that build them can’t held liable for the harms they cause.
The sentient cell: the cellular foundations of consciousness
"All species, extant and extinct, from the simplest unicellular prokaryotes to humans, have an existential consciousness. Without sentience, the first cells that emerged some 4 billion years ago would have been evolutionary dead-ends, unable to survive in the chaotic, dangerous environment in which life first appeared and evolved. In this book, Arthur Reber's theory, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), is outlined and distinguished from those models that argue that minds could be instantiated on artificial entities and those that maintain consciousness requires a nervous system. The CBC framework takes a novel approach to classic topics such as the origin-of-life, philosophy of mind, the role of genes, the impact of cognition, and how biological information is processed by all species. It also calls for a rethinking of a variety of issues including the moral implications of the sentient capacities of all species, how welfare concerns need to be expanded beyond where they currently are, and critically, how all life is intertwined in a coordinated cognitive ecology. The Sentient Cell explores this revolutionary model, which updates the standard neo-Darwinian framework within which current approaches operate and examines the underlying biomolecular features that are the likely candidates for the "invention" of consciousness and outline their role in cellular life." --
The inner screen model of consciousness: applying the free energy principle directly to the study of conscious experience
This paper presents a model of consciousness that follows directly from the free- energy principle (FEP). We first rehearse the classical and quantum formulations of the FEP. In particular, we consider the “inner screen hypothesis” that follows from the quantum information theoretic version of the FEP. We then review applications of the FEP to the known sparse (nested and hierarchical) neuro-anatomy of the brain. We focus on the holographic structure of the brain, and how this structure supports (overt and covert) action.