It looks like scientists and philosophers might have made consciousness far more mysterious than it needs to be
How and why exactly did consciousness become a problem? | Aeon Essays
How exactly did consciousness become a problem? And why, after years off the table, is it a hot research subject now?
There Is No ‘Hard Problem Of Consciousness’
Consciousness is not separate from the physical world — our “soul” is of the same nature as our body and any other phenomenon of the world.
Consciousness as a Gödel sentence in the language of science
Why the Hard Problem (might be) so Hard
There Is No Hard Problem of Consciousness
Expecting a verifiable answer makes no sense. Here’s why.
Arguments About AI Consciousness Remain Highly Motivated and At Best Overconfident
It has been roughly a year since my last dedicated post on this question. Its first sentence has not changed: I happily admit I am deeply confused about consciousness.
The Mythology Of Conscious AI
Why consciousness is more likely a property of life than of computation and why creating conscious, or even conscious-seeming AI, is a bad idea.
Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism
As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to advance, it is natural to ask whether AI systems can be not only intelligent, but also conscious. I consider why people might think AI could develop consciousness, identifying some biases that lead us astray. I ask what it would take for conscious AI to be a realistic prospect, challenging the assumption that computation provides a sufficient basis for consciousness. I'll instead make the case that consciousness depends on our nature as living organisms – a form of biological naturalism. I lay out a range of scenarios for conscious AI, concluding that real artificial consciousness is unlikely along current trajectories, but becomes more plausible as AI becomes more brain-like and/or life-like. I finish by exploring ethical considerations arising from AI that either is, or convincingly appears to be, conscious. If we sell our minds too cheaply to our machine creations, we not only overestimate them – we underestimate ourselves.
Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilArchive
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...
The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
Abstract. This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basi
Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilPapers
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...
Contra Chiang on machine consciousness
If you think you understand AI consciousness, then you don't understand AI consciousness
The cell membrane as the ‘missing link’ for the evolution of consciousness
While Prof. Torday agrees with Federico Faggin that quantum mechanics is salient to consciousness, he maintains that the role of the cell membrane—which separates an organism from its environment—is key to the selective assimilation or mirroring of the quantum properties of the cosmos into the differentiated consciousness of the organism. This essay is short, dense, and may be difficult to unpack. But it handsomely rewards the effort of the patient and determined reader. The many literature citations in the essay also provide rich ground for further exploration.
On working machines
In part one, on thinking machines, I explored two facets of the philosophy of artificial intelligence: “intelligence”, and consciousness. That left an important topic to consider for this post: the...
Can only meat machines be conscious?
Computational functionalism claims that executing certain computations is sufficient for consciousness, regardless of the physical mechanisms implementing those computations. This view neglects a compelling alternative: that subcomputational biological mechanisms, which realize computational processes, are necessary for consciousness. By contrasting computational roles with their subcomputational biological realizers, I show that there is a systematic tension in our criteria for consciousness: prioritizing computational roles favors consciousness in AI, while prioritizing subcomputational biological realizers favors consciousness in simpler animals. Current theories of consciousness are 'meat-neutral', but if specific physical substrates are necessary, AI may never achieve consciousness. Understanding whether consciousness depends on computational roles, biological realizers, or both, is crucial for assessing the prospects of consciousness in AI and less complex animals.
The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind
The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind is a 1976 book by the Princeton psychologist, psychohistorian and consciousness theorist Julian Jaynes (1920–1997). It explores the nature of consciousness – particularly "the ability to introspect" – and its evolution in ancient human history. Jaynes proposes that consciousness is a learned behavior rooted in language and culture rather than being innate. He distinguishes consciousness from sensory awareness and cognition. Jaynes introduces the concept of the "bicameral mind", a non-conscious mentality prevalent in early humans that relied on auditory hallucinations.
AI Is Not Conscious, But It Is Our Unconscious
The Convivial Society: Vol. 7, No. 4
