Project APE: Can policy evaluation be automated? Or is hallucinated slop unavoidable? Let's find out.

📢 New paper: Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But most evaluations of agents conducting AI research focus on narrow, verifiable tasks. Can AI agents… | Sayash Kapoor

📢 New paper: Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But most evaluations of agents conducting AI research focus on narrow, verifiable tasks. Can AI agents conduct open-ended research? https://lnkd.in/gfP-q4CD We gave agents research questions from two unpublished papers, six days, and thousands of dollars of API credits and compute. The authors of the original papers reviewed the AI-generated papers. They unambiguously rejected agents' outputs. Agents were fluent at most *engineering* tasks. They conducted serious literature reviews, debugged GPU environments, ran hundreds of experiments, and turned in camera-ready LaTeX without human help. We also found no evidence of reward hacking. If anything, we found the opposite: the agents started with marketable claims and walked them back to negative results as the evidence came in. But neither agent output was close to the bar of a top conference paper. Both papers suffered from similar failures: poor judgment about the bar for an AI paper submitted to a top conference, the lack of creative problem solving and ineffective backtracking, poor awareness of resources, and instruction drift. This research design has many limitations: the small sample size, non-blind reviews, and the reviewers knowing that the work was AI-generated. We also couldn't test Anthropic's strongest model, because Fable 5 is deliberately limited on frontier AI research tasks, so ended up using OpenClaw with Opus 4.8 (extra-high) for our main experiments and Codex with Sol 5.6 (ultra) for a robustness check. But we think the research design is still helpful in assessing AI agents' ability to conduct research, and it is complementary to evaluations on verifiable tasks, as well as blinded reviews of AI outputs. In follow-up studies, we are expanding the set of non-public papers we evaluate. If you are an AI researcher with unpublished papers, we would love to collaborate with you on our next evaluation. Expression of interest: https://lnkd.in/gpeykJea We also release the agent logs and all the code and data, so that others can conduct their own analyses of our results: https://lnkd.in/gJarPAnb Finally, we plan to conduct such evaluations regularly, and are hiring a senior researcher to help lead these efforts. Apply here: https://lnkd.in/erJZdmve I'm grateful for the core team leading this effort: Peter Kirgis, Andrew Schwartz, Stephan Rabanser, and Arvind Narayanan, and to our collaborators who reviewed AI papers, analyzed agents logs, and gave feedback on the paper: David Demitri Africa, Konstantinos V., Viet Nguyen, Dr Toby D. Pilditch, Magda Dubois, Harry Coppock, Cozmin Ududec, Nitya Nadgir, Matilda Orona, Tilman Bayer, Derrick Chan-Sew, Eric (Yue) Ling, Abhishek Shetty, Helen Toner, Gillian K. Hadfield, Seth Lazar, Steve Newman, Shoshannah Tekofsky, Rishi Bommasani

Can AI agents conduct open-ended AI research? Early evidence from two case studies

Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But evidence on whether agents can carry out open-ended AI research is thin. Current evaluations either test agents on narrow, verifiable tasks, which excludes open-ended research, or submit AI-generated papers to blind peer review, which is overstretched, stochastic, and suffers from poor review quality. We introduce a third way to measure progress towards AI R\&D automation. An agent takes on the central, open-ended research question of a high-quality unpublished paper, and the paper's original authors grade its output. We call these shadow evaluations. We ran shadow evaluations on two unpublished NeurIPS 2026 submissions, giving frontier agents six days and thousands of dollars of compute. The agents completed all of the engineering without human help, yet could not make substantial progress towards answering the research questions. As a result, both papers were unambiguously rejected by the authors. We identify five recurring failure modes: poor judgment about the bar for publishable research, uncreative responses to shortcomings in the research design, ineffective backtracking from dead ends, poor resource awareness, and instruction drift. A robustness check with a second model and scaffold reproduced these failures. We release the expert reviews, survey responses, agent repositories, and logs. Our results provide early evidence that today's agents can do the engineering of AI research, but struggle with critical parts of the research lifecycle.

Mechanism Experiments and Policy Evaluations

Randomized controlled trials are increasingly used to evaluate policies. How can we make these experiments as useful as possible for policy purposes? We argue greater use should be made of experiments that identify the behavioral mechanisms that are central to clearly specified policy questions, what we call "mechanism experiments." These types of experiments can be of great policy value even if the intervention that is tested (or its setting) does not correspond exactly to any realistic policy option.

Sharing the Algorithm: The Tax Solution to Generative AI

This article argues that tax policy offers a core tool for mitigating the sweeping public policy challenges of generative Artificial Intelligence ("AI"

AI agents can't yet do open-ended AI research

Early evidence from two case studies

Cosmik Updates: February 2026 - Cosmik Labs

@atproto.science @cosmik.network Raising a question for the ATProto science community: Can AI agents be legitimate participants in research ecosystems? What would make their outputs trustworthy?

The AI "Evaluation Crisis" Is an Opportunity to Get Data Flow Right

Why the AI evaluation crisis could force a reckoning on dataset provenance, attribution, and consent.

Society-in-the-loop: programming the algorithmic social contract

Recent rapid advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning have raised many questions about the regulatory and governance mechanisms for autonomous machines. Many commentators, scholars, and policy-makers now call for ensuring that algorithms governing our lives are transparent, fair, and accountable. Here, I propose a conceptual framework for the regulation of AI and algorithmic systems. I argue that we need tools to program, debug and maintain an algorithmic social contract, a pact between various human stakeholders, mediated by machines. To achieve this, we can adapt the concept of human-in-the-loop (HITL) from the fields of modeling and simulation, and interactive machine learning. In particular, I propose an agenda I call society-in-the-loop (SITL), which combines the HITL control paradigm with mechanisms for negotiating the values of various stakeholders affected by AI systems, and monitoring compliance with the agreement. In short, ‘SITL = HITL + Social Contract.’

AI peer review goes pro

A what we're reading spotlight

Underspecified Human Decision Experiments Considered Harmful

Decision-making with information displays is a key focus of research in areas like human-AI collaboration and data visualization. However, what constitutes a decision problem, and what is required for an experiment to conclude that decisions are flawed, remain imprecise. We present a widely applicable definition of a decision problem synthesized from statistical decision theory and information economics. We claim that to attribute loss in human performance to bias, an experiment must provide the information that a rational agent would need to identify the normative decision. We evaluate whether recent empirical research on AI-assisted decisions achieves this standard. We find that only 10 (26%) of 39 studies that claim to identify biased behavior presented participants with sufficient information to make this claim in at least one treatment condition. We motivate the value of studying well-defined decision problems by describing a characterization of performance losses they allow to be conceived.

Agentic AI Governance: Securing Autonomous AI Agents in Enterprise

When AI agents start making decisions, calling tools, and coordinating with other agents without waiting for human approval, the governance playbook most...

Agentic Engineering Management

To what extent AI is OK to use in software development might be debated, but in general, the idea is not a controversial one anymore. The debate rather moved on from code completion and simple PR summarizations to Agentic Engineering, where an execution loop allows an AI Agent to function

AI Research Evaluation: Negative Findings and Failure Modes | Arvind Narayanan posted on the topic | LinkedIn

📢AI agents can autonomously conduct AI research when the result is easily verifiable, but what about open-ended AI research? That’s much harder to study, and our new preprint is our first crack at doing so. Our main finding is negative, and we identify five recurring failure modes. https://lnkd.in/eGKYi4Sa Our results are tentative, and we are working to address the limitations (sample size, potential scaffold improvements). But if the finding holds up, what are the implications? It depends on whether you think recursive self improvement can be achieved simply by hill climbing at scale (I personally don’t think so) and whether you think current limitations of open-ended research like judgment and creativity could change quickly (I’m personally very open to this possibility). We plan to continue this style of evaluation — which we call shadow evaluation — on a regular basis. We’ve wanted to do this for two years, but it took so long because we wanted to get the method right. The idea behind shadow evaluation was suggested by some of the UK AISI coauthors of the paper and refined by the Princeton team. This method has important advantages (and limitations) over the current ways of evaluating agents’ ability to conduct AI research. If you’re an AI researcher interested in working with us on a shadow evaluation based on one of your papers, we’d love to hear from you. https://lnkd.in/ecyp55SW This type of evaluation necessarily involves a ton of researcher flexibility in design, execution, and interpretation. Members of the core team have a particular position in the debate on recursive self-improvement / superintelligence, and this could influence how we conduct the research. We have a detailed section in the paper on our potential biases and how we address them. We sought out a team of collaborators who don’t all share our priors, and we explicitly surface the interpretive disagreements that resulted. For future evaluations, we are interested in having “adversarial collaborators” as part of the core team. This paper exists because of the careful, time-consuming and very much human work that Peter Kirgis, Sayash Kapoor, Andrew Schwartz, and Stephan Rabanser did over the last few months. I’m also very grateful to the larger group of collaborators and co-authors. The work is part of the larger CRUX project that pushes frontier AI agents beyond what benchmarks can measure (https://cruxevals.com/). We are looking for a senior researcher to join the team: https://lnkd.in/e9dC22X5