A look at the latest post-quantum signature standardization candidates

A Post-Quantum Future for Let's Encrypt

Let’s Encrypt is committed to a post-quantum-safe Web PKI. The path we’re planning to take is Merkle Tree Certificates (“MTCs”), a new approach that adds post-quantum authentication to the web without sacrificing the speed and reliability that have made TLS universal. This post is about these plans and why we believe MTCs are worth pursuing as a key to a post-quantum future. An increasingly urgent problem For much of the last several years, the conversation about post-quantum cryptography has been a conversation about encryption. The reasoning was straightforward: an attacker who records encrypted traffic today might be able to decrypt it years from now once quantum computers can break the underlying math. Authentication, the part of TLS that indicates a server is who it says it is, has been a less urgent problem. A quantum computer needs to forge a signature in real time, not retroactively, so threats to authentication hinge on the existence of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC).

Merkle Tree Certificates

This document describes Merkle Tree certificates, a new form of X.509 certificates which integrate public logging of the certificate, in the style of Certificate Transparency. The integrated design reduces logging overhead in the face of both shorter-lived certificates and large post-quantum signature algorithms, while still achieving comparable security properties to traditional X.509 and Certificate Transparency. Merkle Tree certificates additionally admit an optional signatureless optimization, which decreases the message size by avoiding signatures altogether, at the cost of only applying to up-to-date relying parties and older certificates.

Sirraya One | Enterprise Decentralized Identity Platform

NIST-certified quantum-resistant identity with zero-knowledge proofs. Government & military-grade verifiable credentials.

Signal Triple Ratchet — Post-Quantum Secure Messaging Layer Stack

Interactive 3D visualization of Signal's Triple Ratchet protocol: PQXDH session establishment, Double Ratchet, SPQR post-quantum ratchet, and hybrid key mixing

Hybrid Constructions: The Post-Quantum Safety Blanket - Dhole Moments

The funny thing about safety blankets is they can double as stage curtains for security theater. Art: CMYKat “When will a cryptography-relevant quantum computer exist?” is a question ma…

Meet Willow, our state-of-the-art quantum chip

Our new quantum chip demonstrates error correction and performance that paves the way to a useful, large-scale quantum computer.

badge.blue — CID-First Attestation Specification

Specification for CID-first attestations on AT Protocol records. Inline and remote cryptographic signatures with replay-attack prevention.

Node.js Cryptography Overhaul: Migrating from SHA-256 to Post-Quantum Algorithms | Markaicode

Learn how to upgrade your Node.js applications from SHA-256 to quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms with practical code examples and migration strategies.

Soatok’s Informal Guide to Threat Models - Dhole Moments

After a long day of exhausting conversations about Hybrid Post-Quantum Cryptography, random jackasses trying to play gotcha with endpoint attacks against end-to-end encrypted messaging apps, and me…

Wave - Secure Messaging App

Privacy-first messaging with quantum-level encryption. No signup, fully decentralized, zero tracking.

A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption Function

A new digital signature based only on a conventional encryption function (such as DES) is described which is as secure as the underlying encryption function -- the security does not depend on the difficulty of factoring and the high computational costs of modular arithmetic are avoided. The signature system can sign an unlimited number of messages, and the signature size increases logarithmically as a function of the number of messages signed. Signature size in a ‘typical’ system might range from a few hundred bytes to a few kilobytes, and generation of a signature might require a few hundred to a few thousand computations of the underlying conventional encryption function.

Qualcomm officially kills open-source hope: No plans to release DSP headers for Snapdragon X

1K votes, 138 comments. ​I have been following the documentation gap on the Snapdragon X series, and it just got a lot worse for Linux users…

Artur Chakhvadze on Twitter / X

We are releasing our first quantized checkpoints for the Qwen3.5 series of models, co-designed jointly with our inference engine to achieve maximum possible performance on Apple hardwareStarting from 0.8B, 2B and 4B modelshttps://t.co/2R8BdhAfzv— Artur Chakhvadze (@norpadon) June 8, 2026