wispctl 2.1.2

8 eMudhra certificates are compromised. Here's what you need to know

Following the discovery that eight eMudhra intermediate certificates use weak keys, Cloudflare is deploying mitigations and releasing client updates. We explain the impact, our response, and what customers and developers should do next.

Disgraced eMudhra drops out of TLS business after using cert private key of 4

Flubbed key signing "ceremony" allowed minting of web credentials for any site.

Firefox

Mozilla blocked compromised eMudhra intermediate certificates via OneCRL on October 17th. The blocks were distributed to clients via Remote Settings the same day. This update contains the updated OneCRL block list, ensuring clients will block the compromised certificates even if RemoteSettings is disabled by policy or otherwise unavailable in the user's network environment. (Learn More)

eMudhra Statement on distrust of select Global TLS Intermediate and one Root CA

eMudhra Limited (NSE: EMUDHRA | BSE: 543533) today issued a statement on recent reports about the distrust of some of its intermediate Certificate Authorities (CAs) used in its global TLS business.

647959 - Add Honest Achmed's root certificate

RESOLVED (kathleen.a.wilson) in CA Program - CA Certificate Root Program. Last updated 2026-04-24.

Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in milliseconds

One of eMudhra's certificate authority private keys is the number 4. Not a number that starts with 4, or the number 4 followed by a few hundred random digits, just, 4... Another one is 56, and another is 115. I know, because I recovered all of them from their

wisp.place - Static Hosting on AT Protocol

Deploy static sites on AT Protocol. Your site lives in your PDS. Global CDN included. Push updates instantly. Forever free.

Protecting Firefox users following the compromise of eMudhra intermediate certificates

On Saturday, October 17, at 20:06 UTC, Mozilla received a report that private keys associated with eight eMudhra intermediate certificates had been compromised. These keys could allow attackers to issue ...

Wisp.place Documentation

Decentralized static site hosting on the AT Protocol

Wimster9030 🇪🇺 🇧🇪 (@wimster9030.wsocial.eu)

I know, Daniel, but that's not the way WSocial "sold" it to us. We could only access trough ID-verification so we know for 100% they are EU and a "real person". That was the whole point. So we went trough that process, but now it seems that the backdoor are the other ATProt platforms to get in too.

Robin Berjon (@robin.berjon.com)

*Breaking* just as I'm writing this I hear that someone made a tool for W users to check if they're in the leak: wdonthavetime.tngl.io/wsocial-wned/.