







this was very good and articulated a lot i've been feeling lately. in formalization, this effect is even more noticeable: decoherence is punished by the agent being stuck in the maze for days when otherwise it would've made progress in 30 minutes but i think this applies broadly to software
Maevyn
My thoughts on the current state of AI driven software development, why I'm no longer concerned about a runaway intelligence explosion, and what I think is a far worse outcome we could be walking into maevyn.codes/decoherence
Oct 21, 2026 at 11:10 PM
The Decoherence Trap: When AI slop drowns out the signal in an endless sea of noise
Of all the forms of tech debt, decoherence is the worst. It compounds exponentially with a system's rate of change, and AI is now producing it faster than ever, leading us deeper and deeper into the abyss...

The Decoherence Trap: When AI slop drowns out the signal in an endless sea of noise
Of all the forms of tech debt, decoherence is the worst. It compounds exponentially with a system's rate of change, and AI is now producing it faster than ever, leading us deeper and deeper into the abyss...

Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilPapers
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...

Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilArchive
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...

Towards Post-Interaction Computing: Addressing Immediacy, (un)Intentionality, Instability and Interaction Effects
We situate the debate on intentionality within the rise of cognitive neuroscience and argue that cognitive neuroscience can explain intentionality. We discuss the explanatory significance of ascribing intentionality to representations. At first, we ...

AI hallucinations can’t be stopped — but these techniques can limit their damage
Developers have tricks to stop artificial intelligence from making things up, but large language models are still struggling to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

AI hallucinations can’t be stopped — but these techniques can limit their damage
Developers have tricks to stop artificial intelligence from making things up, but large language models are still struggling to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Ultra-Processed Information: AI and the Coming Deluge of Noise | Frankly 128
be diligent
For individuals It's challenging to work a process when it moves slower than feels appropriate. In the context of computer conversations, the tactic of s...

How AI coding is reshaping theoretical neuroscience
Agentic coding makes it possible to specify a neuroscience model in hours instead of months. Neuroscientists weigh in on that tectonic change.

The Breath of the Author
The palpable presence of someone else's mind in our best writing should give us pause about the encroachment of AI text

Headlong: a microharness for persistent agents
Self-guided agents that think continuously

The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view fundamentally mischaracterizes how physics relates to information. We call this mistake the Abstraction Fallacy. Tracing the causal origins of abstraction reveals that symbolic computation is not an intrinsic physical process. Instead, it is a mapmaker-dependent description. It requires an active, experiencing cognitive agent to alphabetize continuous physics into a finite set of meaningful states. Consequently, we do not need a complete, finalized theory of consciousness to assess AI sentience—a demand that simply pushes the question beyond near-term resolution and deepens the AI welfare trap. What we actually need is a rigorous ontology of computation. The framework proposed here explicitly separates simulation (behavioral mimicry driven by vehicle causality) from instantiation (intrinsic physical constitution driven by content causality). Establishing this ontological boundary shows why algorithmic symbol manipulation is structurally incapable of instantiating experience. Crucially, this argument does not rely on biological exclusivity. If an artificial system were ever conscious, it would be because of its specific physical constitution, never its syntactic architecture. Ultimately, this framework offers a physically grounded refutation of computational functionalism to resolve the current uncertainty surrounding AI consciousness.
Jan Kulveit on Twitter / X
To take the most egregious example, in the tweet you say"No. Agents lines of code. They do not feel emotions, assume things, think things, want things, or figure things out." [frame is asking people to not use such language]This is wrong on many levels.The meta-problem is…— Jan Kulveit (@jankulveit) September 1, 2026
