







even if you're going to do legal identity verification (which sucks!), i don't like that they didn't even attempt to make the user own their own data in their own repo, and make verification only be a record with a strongRef in W's repo. why publish full names and birthdates to W's own repo? wild
Kirsten Fiedler
🤦♀️ #WSocial is posting legal names, nationalities and approx. birthdays of verified users as a public record on the Atmosphere. Confronted, they claim it's "by design" 🤯
Oct 10, 2026 at 8:43 AM
The Age Verification Privacy Paradox: Why Document Uploads Hurt Everyone—and How World Solves It
Age verification is now required by many digital platforms worldwide, but most systems create new risks for user data and privacy. This article explores why document-based age verification exposes everyone to greater risk—and how privacy-first technology like World ID offers a safer path for consumers and platforms.

Walrus (@walrus.northsky.social)
Whats your motive in making data like nationality and approximate date of birth public? It seems like users have/had the option to not have their full name made public, do users have the option to hide their nationality or approximate date of birth as well? If not, then why?
Hack of Age Verification Company Shows Privacy Danger of Social Media
We’ve said it before: online age verification is incompatible with privacy. Companies responsible for storing or processing sensitive documents like drivers’ licenses are likely to encounter data
Undocumented Feature
And it doesn't pop up a box every time asking you to use your real name. In fact, there's no way to set your name at all. You just have to keep reminding people who you are.

Self-authoring LLM knowledge base
Prior to 6 months ago, I wouldn't trust an LLM to automatically manage my personal records. They were too dumb and too much of a liability. But recently…
IACIS 2026 - OpenConf Abstract Submission, Peer Review, and Event Management System
As lawmakers across the United States move to require age verification for access to adult content online, new questions are emerging about the unintended risks these laws create. While intended to protect minors, many of these policies rely on systems that collect and store overly sensitive personal information such as government-issued IDs or biometric data without adequate safeguards. This introduces serious cybersecurity vulnerabilities, privacy concerns, and potential legal liability for platforms and users alike. Some major platforms have already withdrawn from certain states rather than comply, raising questions about the real-world feasibility of these laws. This study examines the intersection of digital privacy, cybersecurity, and legal compliance in the context of mandatory age verification. It analyzes the risks posed by identity-based and biometric systems, the role of third-party vendors, and the inconsistencies in how states define and enforce these requirements. The paper evaluates several age verification models and concludes that attribute-based verification systems that confirm age eligibility without revealing full identities offers the most secure and privacy-conscious path forward. The findings underscore a critical need for better-designed legislation that balances child protection with digital rights and security. This research provides targeted recommendations for policymakers, platform operators, and cybersecurity professionals, urging a shift toward transparent, accountable, and technically sound solutions before flawed systems become entrenched.
Hackers Had A Live Feed Of Every ID This Verification Company Scanned. For Over A Year.
From the very beginning of this recent obsession with identifying everyone online (yes, they like to call it “age” verification, but it always ends up as identity verification), we̵…

The Vault: a (possible) answer to the "Fully-Private Community Data" question
Oh yeah, I should clarify that I totally expect a community DID to have a repo and in some cases, it makes sense for that repo to publish community-owned data. Just as a baseline, I think it’s good for most social activity to happen in a repo without needing to interact with the community’s repo. Even in the cases where a community DID wants to “pull in” some user content, I think it’s better for it to do it non-interactively with the user. For instance, publishing its side of things after syn...

Have you been Wned? | W Don't Have Time | Offprint
W Social may have published personal information such as your full legal name, date of birth, email address, and nationality in their public records. Information which many would expect to be remain private. Use our data privacy tool to check if W Social

Terms of Use - W Identity
1.1. These Terms of Use ("Terms") form a legally binding agreement between you and W Identity AB, Malmgårdsvägen 63, 116 38 Stockholm, Sweden, a company incorporated under the laws of Sweden registered under no. 559576-7061 ("W Identity AB", "we," "us," or "our"). When creating a W Identity account, using the W Identity app, or using any related W Identity services (together, the "Service" or "W Identity"), you agree to be bound by these Terms. If you do not agree with these Terms, you must not use the Service.
Permissioned Data Diary 7: Off the Record - Daniel's Leaflets
In which we put records in a repo, sign them, and sync them (but not quite the way you think).
Building Unforgeable Professional Endorsements with ATProtocol - Nick's Blog
Traditional professional endorsements on platforms like LinkedIn lack cryptographic proof—anyone could forge them, and the platform controls the truth. This article introduces a two-record architecture using ATProtocol's Content Identifiers (CIDs) and Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) to create mathematically unforgeable mutual attestations. By separating proof creation from endorsement acceptance and leveraging the firehose for distributed validation, we build a system where both parties cryptographically consent and no central authority can manipulate the record.
Hi Jan. Thanks for sharing. Do you believe that the average user will understand fully that their full legal name, nationality and in many cases *real* birth dates and email addresses (We can send you DIDs in private) will be published to the open web, where W cannot retain control?