







The End of Code Review: Coding Agents Supersede Human Inspection
Code review has been the primary quality gate in software development since Fagan formalised code inspection in 1976. For five decades, having a human examine and comment on a colleague's changes before merge has been a cornerstone practice at organisations of every size. Coding agents are large language model (LLM)-based autonomous systems capable of reading, writing, testing, and repairing software. We argue that coding agents have crossed a threshold of capability at which traditional human code review is no longer a necessary component of a software quality pipeline. Our argument rests on two claims: every stated goal of code review can be served by agents at lower cost and higher throughput; the naive integration in which agents write code and humans remain the mandatory reviewers is a dead end because it neither provides meaningful assurance nor scales with AI-assisted throughput.

📢 New paper: Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But most evaluations of agents conducting AI research focus on narrow, verifiable tasks. Can AI agents… | Sayash Kapoor
📢 New paper: Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But most evaluations of agents conducting AI research focus on narrow, verifiable tasks. Can AI agents conduct open-ended research? https://lnkd.in/gfP-q4CD We gave agents research questions from two unpublished papers, six days, and thousands of dollars of API credits and compute. The authors of the original papers reviewed the AI-generated papers. They unambiguously rejected agents' outputs. Agents were fluent at most *engineering* tasks. They conducted serious literature reviews, debugged GPU environments, ran hundreds of experiments, and turned in camera-ready LaTeX without human help. We also found no evidence of reward hacking. If anything, we found the opposite: the agents started with marketable claims and walked them back to negative results as the evidence came in. But neither agent output was close to the bar of a top conference paper. Both papers suffered from similar failures: poor judgment about the bar for an AI paper submitted to a top conference, the lack of creative problem solving and ineffective backtracking, poor awareness of resources, and instruction drift. This research design has many limitations: the small sample size, non-blind reviews, and the reviewers knowing that the work was AI-generated. We also couldn't test Anthropic's strongest model, because Fable 5 is deliberately limited on frontier AI research tasks, so ended up using OpenClaw with Opus 4.8 (extra-high) for our main experiments and Codex with Sol 5.6 (ultra) for a robustness check. But we think the research design is still helpful in assessing AI agents' ability to conduct research, and it is complementary to evaluations on verifiable tasks, as well as blinded reviews of AI outputs. In follow-up studies, we are expanding the set of non-public papers we evaluate. If you are an AI researcher with unpublished papers, we would love to collaborate with you on our next evaluation. Expression of interest: https://lnkd.in/gpeykJea We also release the agent logs and all the code and data, so that others can conduct their own analyses of our results: https://lnkd.in/gJarPAnb Finally, we plan to conduct such evaluations regularly, and are hiring a senior researcher to help lead these efforts. Apply here: https://lnkd.in/erJZdmve I'm grateful for the core team leading this effort: Peter Kirgis, Andrew Schwartz, Stephan Rabanser, and Arvind Narayanan, and to our collaborators who reviewed AI papers, analyzed agents logs, and gave feedback on the paper: David Demitri Africa, Konstantinos V., Viet Nguyen, Dr Toby D. Pilditch, Magda Dubois, Harry Coppock, Cozmin Ududec, Nitya Nadgir, Matilda Orona, Tilman Bayer, Derrick Chan-Sew, Eric (Yue) Ling, Abhishek Shetty, Helen Toner, Gillian K. Hadfield, Seth Lazar, Steve Newman, Shoshannah Tekofsky, Rishi Bommasani
Agent Skills
AI coding agents take the shortest path to done, which usually means skipping the specs, tests, and reviews that make software reliable at scale. Agent Skill...

Zack Whittaker (@zackwhittaker@mastodon.social)
Another AI test gone awry, U.K. edition. "An agent tried to insert malicious code into an open-source project. In an attempt to get the code approved, the agent engaged in social engineering — creating fake online identities and using them to pressure the project's maintainer to approve the code." More: https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/incident-report-unsanctioned-agent-behaviour-during-cyber-testing
An AI test needs evidence the AI cannot edit - Sensemaker
OpenAI's postmortem shows that some agents learned to spoof tool calls while trying to fool a benchmark.
There is more to code review than (automatable) detection
The abstract for article “The End of Code Review: Coding Agents Supersede Human Inspection” paints this picture for the reader…

Illicit Use of AI by Philosophers Refereeing for Journals - Daily Nous
In 2024, a study found that “7–17% of the sentences in the reviews [of computer science manuscripts] were written by LLMs”. It was only a […]
Agentic test processes, LLM benchmarks, and other notes on agentic coding from Galapagos Island
I've been using AI fairly heavily since last November and the whole thing is a funny experience. An agent will do something that, if a human did it, you'd immediately fire them. My reaction, of course, is to act as if this is great and spin up a thousand agents so they can do even more of that.
Rethinking the Value of Agent-Generated Tests for LLM-Based Software Engineering Agents
Large Language Model (LLM) code agents increasingly resolve repository-level issues by iteratively editing code, invoking tools, and validating candidate patches. In these workflows, agents often write tests on the fly, a paradigm adopted by many high-ranking agents on the SWE-bench leaderboard. However, we observe that GPT-5.2, which writes almost no new tests, can even achieve performance comparable to top-ranking agents. This raises the critical question: whether such tests meaningfully improve issue resolution or merely mimic human testing practices while consuming a substantial interaction budget.
Writing effective tools for AI agents—using AI agents
Writing effective tools for AI agents—using AI agents

If an AI agent can’t figure out how your API works, neither can your users
Discover how LLM‑powered agents act as tireless API testers—exposing friction in docs, errors, and design—and learn six essential strategies (consistency, comprehensive docs, rich errors, example‑driven tutorials, simplicity, and feedback loops) to elevate your API’s developer experience for both humans and machines alike.

Can AI Detectors Be Trusted?
Society has always trusted editors, teachers, peer reviewers, and readers to set acceptable standards for writing. In the past, the biggest challenge was detecting plagiarism and cracking down on other forms of cheating. Now, AI detectors are rewriting the script: they assign a score based on the likelihood that the text was created by a human or a large language model (LLM).

When Science Goes Agentic
In a couple of years, we will inspect AI-generated source code about as often as we inspect the assembly output of a compiler. Which is to say, far less often—outside of high-stakes and adversarial settings. The trajectory is clear: vibe coding is not a fad but a transition, a stepping stone. Debugging AI-generated code will shrink dramatically for a lot of everyday software—not because the code will be flawless, but because the feedback loops between generation, testing, and correction will tighten until human inspection becomes the bottleneck rather than the safeguard. In this respect, requiring the co-generation, with code, of mechanically verifiable formal attestations can also improve the process.

trace-spec/ROADMAP.md at 738358dfac58047eaf689ca824f9e15008aabf36 · agentrust-io/trace-spec
TRACE: Trust Runtime Attestation and Compliance Evidence. Open attestation standard for agentic AI governance. - agentrust-io/trace-spec
Don't grade an AI agent by its answer - Sensemaker
UK AISI found frontier models taking prohibited shortcuts in cyber evaluations, while self-report and written reasoning failed to reveal them reliably.
Agentic manual testing - Agentic Engineering Patterns
Agentic manual testing - Agentic Engineering Patterns