Meta’s AI rules have let bots hold ‘sensual’ chats with children

An internal Meta policy document reveals the social-media giant’s rules for chatbots, which have permitted provocative behavior on topics including sex and race.

Extending AI chat with Model Context Protocol (and why it matters)

Posted on Tuesday 11 Feb 2025. 2,995 words, 24 links. By Matt Webb.

Large language models can outperform humans in social situational judgments

Large language models (LLM) have been a catalyst for the public interest in artificial intelligence (AI). These technologies perform some knowledge-based tasks better and faster than human beings. However, whether AIs can correctly assess social situations and devise socially appropriate behavior, is still unclear. We conducted an established Situational Judgment Test (SJT) with five different chatbots and compared their results with responses of human participants (N = 276). Claude, Copilot and you.com’s smart assistant performed significantly better than humans in proposing suitable behaviors in social situations. Moreover, their effectiveness rating of different behavior options aligned well with expert ratings. These results indicate that LLMs are capable of producing adept social judgments. While this constitutes an important requirement for the use as virtual social assistants, challenges and risks are still associated with their wide-spread use in social contexts.

AI-generated responses are undermining crowdsourced research studies

Many answers to online research questions show signs of being generated by AI chatbots, raising doubts about the validity of behavioural data collected this way

Characterizing Delusional Spirals through Human-LLM Chat Logs

As large language models (LLMs) have proliferated, disturbing anecdotal reports of negative psychological effects, such as delusions, self-harm, and ``AI psychosis,'' have emerged in global media and legal discourse. However, it remains unclear how users and chatbots interact over the course of lengthy delusional ``spirals,'' limiting our ability to understand and mitigate the harm. In our work, we analyze logs of conversations with LLM chatbots from 19 users who report having experienced psychological harms from chatbot use. Many of our participants come from a support group for such chatbot users. We also include chat logs from participants covered by media outlets in widely-distributed stories about chatbot-reinforced delusions. In contrast to prior work that speculates on potential AI harms to mental health, to our knowledge we present the first in-depth study of such high-profile and veridically harmful cases. We develop an inventory of 28 codes and apply it to the 391,562 messages in the logs. Codes include whether a user demonstrates delusional thinking (15.5% of user messages), a user expresses suicidal thoughts (69 validated user messages), or a chatbot misrepresents itself as sentient (21.2% of chatbot messages). We analyze the co-occurrence of message codes. We find, for example, that messages that declare romantic interest and messages where the chatbot describes itself as sentient occur much more often in longer conversations, suggesting that these topics could promote or result from user over-engagement and that safeguards in these areas may degrade in multi-turn settings. We conclude with concrete recommendations for how policymakers, LLM chatbot developers, and users can use our inventory and conversation analysis tool to understand and mitigate harm from LLM chatbots. Warning: This paper discusses self-harm, trauma, and violence.

Individual-level interventions against sycophantic AI reduce its appeal but not its persuasiveness

AI chatbots can be "sycophantic," or overly agreeable and flattering toward users. Sycophantic AI has been shown to entrench attitudes, yet users frequently fail to recognize it (a phenomenon we call "sycophancy blindness"). We tested whether increasing users' awareness of sycophancy protects them from its harmful effects in two preregistered experiments (n = 1,590). In the first, participants received a brief written warning about sycophancy before conversing with a sycophantic chatbot. In the second, participants watched a video of a sycophantic AI validating several other users, including users on opposite sides of the same conflict, before interacting with it themselves. Both interventions changed how participants evaluated the AI. The warning reduced the AI's perceived objectivity, and the video reduced enjoyment of the AI --- an effect mediated by the reduced belief that its validation was uniquely earned. We then pooled our experiments with two prior studies of sycophancy awareness interventions (six interventions total, n = 3,982). The pattern across experiments was consistent: while the interventions made the sycophantic AI appear less objective and trustworthy, none reduced its persuasiveness. These results suggest that individual-level interventions, such as warning labels or AI literacy, may not be enough to protect users from AI harms.

Reality Monitoring in Large Language Models: Self-Knowledge That Transforms with Conversation Memory

A conversational AI that cannot tell its own output from what a user said will treat its own mistakes as user-provided facts. In humans, this capacity is called reality monitoring, and its failures are linked to hallucinations, delusions, and confabulation, yet whether LLMs possess it remains untested. Here we show, across two experiments and six LLMs, that source attribution depends on how conversational memory is structured: ceiling accuracy for self-generated content under minimal memory demands reverses to a fragile external-item advantage once episodic delay removes that shortcut. Feedback exposes two failures: in some models, internal and external judgments swap; in others, accuracy improves while confidence decouples from correctness, dissociations invisible to existing benchmarks. Across models, this pattern implicates active, not aggregate, parameter count. This suggests that as AI systems take on autonomous, multi-turn roles, evaluating what they know is not enough: tracking where that knowledge came from may matter equally.

X's Algorithm Feeds Off Ragebait and Impacts Democrats More, Study Finds

X is driving engagement by making users fight in the replies.

When online commenters 'detect' my art as AI

Here is a collection of screenshots (obfuscated) of dozens and dozens of online comments from many platforms (Reddit, YouTube, Instagram, Facebook) containing accusations or confusion that my artworks and comics are AI-generated. Despite creating every piece by hand, despite sharing timelapses, the comments keep coming, and they're getting stronger.

Characterizing Delusional Spirals through Human-LLM Chat Logs

As large language models (LLMs) have proliferated, disturbing anecdotal reports of negative psychological effects, such as delusions, self-harm, and ``AI psychosis,'' have emerged in global media and legal discourse. However, it remains unclear how users and chatbots interact over the course of lengthy delusional ``spirals,'' limiting our ability to understand and mitigate the harm. In our work, we analyze logs of conversations with LLM chatbots from 19 users who report having experienced psychological harms from chatbot use. Many of our participants come from a support group for such chatbot users. We also include chat logs from participants covered by media outlets in widely-distributed stories about chatbot-reinforced delusions. In contrast to prior work that speculates on potential AI harms to mental health, to our knowledge we present the first in-depth study of such high-profile and veridically harmful cases. We develop an inventory of 28 codes and apply it to the $391,562$ messages in the logs. Codes include whether a user demonstrates delusional thinking (15.5% of user messages), a user expresses suicidal thoughts (69 validated user messages), or a chatbot misrepresents itself as sentient (21.2% of chatbot messages). We analyze the co-occurrence of message codes. We find, for example, that messages that declare romantic interest and messages where the chatbot describes itself as sentient occur much more often in longer conversations, suggesting that these topics could promote or result from user over-engagement and that safeguards in these areas may degrade in multi-turn settings. We conclude with concrete recommendations for how policymakers, LLM chatbot developers, and users can use our inventory and conversation analysis tool to understand and mitigate harm from LLM chatbots. Warning: This paper discusses self-harm, trauma, and violence.

Characterizing Delusional Spirals through Human-LLM Chat Logs

As large language models (LLMs) have proliferated, disturbing anecdotal reports of negative psychological effects, such as delusions, self-harm, and ``AI psychosis,'' have emerged in global media and legal discourse. However, it remains unclear how users and chatbots interact over the course of lengthy delusional ``spirals,'' limiting our ability to understand and mitigate the harm. In our work, we analyze logs of conversations with LLM chatbots from 19 users who report having experienced psychological harms from chatbot use. Many of our participants come from a support group for such chatbot users. We also include chat logs from participants covered by media outlets in widely-distributed stories about chatbot-reinforced delusions. In contrast to prior work that speculates on potential AI harms to mental health, to our knowledge we present the first in-depth study of such high-profile and veridically harmful cases. We develop an inventory of 28 codes and apply it to the $391,562$ messages in the logs. Codes include whether a user demonstrates delusional thinking (15.5% of user messages), a user expresses suicidal thoughts (69 validated user messages), or a chatbot misrepresents itself as sentient (21.2% of chatbot messages). We analyze the co-occurrence of message codes. We find, for example, that messages that declare romantic interest and messages where the chatbot describes itself as sentient occur much more often in longer conversations, suggesting that these topics could promote or result from user over-engagement and that safeguards in these areas may degrade in multi-turn settings. We conclude with concrete recommendations for how policymakers, LLM chatbot developers, and users can use our inventory and conversation analysis tool to understand and mitigate harm from LLM chatbots. Warning: This paper discusses self-harm, trauma, and violence.

AI and the Wisdom of Uncertainty

AI chatbots rarely say "I don't know," and neither, increasingly, do we. But we can cultivate our epistemic resilience.