Discuss SX Anti-pattern: Reply Sigh (aka "Reply Guy")

IMHO, there is no “reply guy” anti-pattern, and I wish people would stop using that toxic term. There is something I call the living room problem, and it affects all social media to some degree, because social media confuses locality. We’re not really evolved to navigate cyberspace. Even that name is a hint of that. Because cyberspace is information, which can be linked in a myriad of dimensions. But what we’re evolved to navigate is three dimensional space. And so our social norms are, to so...

Warning labels shift perceptions of sycophantic AI, but not its influence

Recent work has raised concerns about the influence of sycophantic AI on user judgment and relationships. One proposed mitigation, which has received regulatory attention, is to warn users about potentially harmful AI behaviors such as sycophancy. In a preregistered experiment in which participants (N = 2,610) discussed real interpersonal conflicts with an AI system, we test whether warning labels mitigate sycophancy's influence. We find that a basic AI disclosure (``This chatbot is AI'') has no detectable effect. Labeling the system as sycophantic (``...may agree with you and validate you even when you are wrong...'') does shift users' perceptions, reducing perceived objectivity and trust, but it does not reliably reduce sycophancy's influence on users' self-perceived rightness or their willingness to repair the conflict. Our results reveal a gap between AI perception and AI influence: by shifting perception without reducing influence, warning-based interventions may offer a false sense of protection. Addressing the harms of sycophancy will therefore require understanding the specific mechanisms through which it shapes judgment, and improving model behavior itself.

Meta’s AI rules have let bots hold ‘sensual’ chats with children

An internal Meta policy document reveals the social-media giant’s rules for chatbots, which have permitted provocative behavior on topics including sex and race.

Morally Motivated Networked Harassment as Normative Reinforcement

While online harassment is recognized as a significant problem, most scholarship focuses on descriptions of harassment and its effects. We lack explanations of why people engage in online harassment beyond simple bias or dislike. This article puts forth an explanatory model where networked harassment on social media functions as a mechanism to enforce social order. Drawing from examples of networked harassment taken from qualitative interviews with people who have experienced harassment ( n = 28) and Trust & Safety workers at social platforms ( n = 9), the article builds on Brady, Crockett, and Bavel’s model of moral contagion to explore how moral outrage is used to justify networked harassment on social media. In morally motivated networked harassment, a member of a social network or online community accuses a target of violating their network’s norms, triggering moral outrage. Network members send harassing messages to the target, reinforcing their adherence to the norm and signaling network membership. Frequently, harassment results in the accused self-censoring and thus regulates speech on social media. Neither platforms nor legal regulations protect against this form of harassment. This model explains why people participate in networked harassment and suggests possible interventions to decrease its prevalence.

Extending AI chat with Model Context Protocol (and why it matters)

Posted on Tuesday 11 Feb 2025. 2,995 words, 24 links. By Matt Webb.

Jan Kulveit on Twitter / X

To take the most egregious example, in the tweet you say"No. Agents lines of code. They do not feel emotions, assume things, think things, want things, or figure things out." [frame is asking people to not use such language]This is wrong on many levels.The meta-problem is…— Jan Kulveit (@jankulveit) September 1, 2026

Large language models can outperform humans in social situational judgments

Large language models (LLM) have been a catalyst for the public interest in artificial intelligence (AI). These technologies perform some knowledge-based tasks better and faster than human beings. However, whether AIs can correctly assess social situations and devise socially appropriate behavior, is still unclear. We conducted an established Situational Judgment Test (SJT) with five different chatbots and compared their results with responses of human participants (N = 276). Claude, Copilot and you.com’s smart assistant performed significantly better than humans in proposing suitable behaviors in social situations. Moreover, their effectiveness rating of different behavior options aligned well with expert ratings. These results indicate that LLMs are capable of producing adept social judgments. While this constitutes an important requirement for the use as virtual social assistants, challenges and risks are still associated with their wide-spread use in social contexts.

AI-generated responses are undermining crowdsourced research studies

Many answers to online research questions show signs of being generated by AI chatbots, raising doubts about the validity of behavioural data collected this way

Characterizing Delusional Spirals through Human-LLM Chat Logs

As large language models (LLMs) have proliferated, disturbing anecdotal reports of negative psychological effects, such as delusions, self-harm, and ``AI psychosis,'' have emerged in global media and legal discourse. However, it remains unclear how users and chatbots interact over the course of lengthy delusional ``spirals,'' limiting our ability to understand and mitigate the harm. In our work, we analyze logs of conversations with LLM chatbots from 19 users who report having experienced psychological harms from chatbot use. Many of our participants come from a support group for such chatbot users. We also include chat logs from participants covered by media outlets in widely-distributed stories about chatbot-reinforced delusions. In contrast to prior work that speculates on potential AI harms to mental health, to our knowledge we present the first in-depth study of such high-profile and veridically harmful cases. We develop an inventory of 28 codes and apply it to the 391,562 messages in the logs. Codes include whether a user demonstrates delusional thinking (15.5% of user messages), a user expresses suicidal thoughts (69 validated user messages), or a chatbot misrepresents itself as sentient (21.2% of chatbot messages). We analyze the co-occurrence of message codes. We find, for example, that messages that declare romantic interest and messages where the chatbot describes itself as sentient occur much more often in longer conversations, suggesting that these topics could promote or result from user over-engagement and that safeguards in these areas may degrade in multi-turn settings. We conclude with concrete recommendations for how policymakers, LLM chatbot developers, and users can use our inventory and conversation analysis tool to understand and mitigate harm from LLM chatbots. Warning: This paper discusses self-harm, trauma, and violence.

Individual-level interventions against sycophantic AI reduce its appeal but not its persuasiveness

AI chatbots can be "sycophantic," or overly agreeable and flattering toward users. Sycophantic AI has been shown to entrench attitudes, yet users frequently fail to recognize it (a phenomenon we call "sycophancy blindness"). We tested whether increasing users' awareness of sycophancy protects them from its harmful effects in two preregistered experiments (n = 1,590). In the first, participants received a brief written warning about sycophancy before conversing with a sycophantic chatbot. In the second, participants watched a video of a sycophantic AI validating several other users, including users on opposite sides of the same conflict, before interacting with it themselves. Both interventions changed how participants evaluated the AI. The warning reduced the AI's perceived objectivity, and the video reduced enjoyment of the AI --- an effect mediated by the reduced belief that its validation was uniquely earned. We then pooled our experiments with two prior studies of sycophancy awareness interventions (six interventions total, n = 3,982). The pattern across experiments was consistent: while the interventions made the sycophantic AI appear less objective and trustworthy, none reduced its persuasiveness. These results suggest that individual-level interventions, such as warning labels or AI literacy, may not be enough to protect users from AI harms.

Reality Monitoring in Large Language Models: Self-Knowledge That Transforms with Conversation Memory

A conversational AI that cannot tell its own output from what a user said will treat its own mistakes as user-provided facts. In humans, this capacity is called reality monitoring, and its failures are linked to hallucinations, delusions, and confabulation, yet whether LLMs possess it remains untested. Here we show, across two experiments and six LLMs, that source attribution depends on how conversational memory is structured: ceiling accuracy for self-generated content under minimal memory demands reverses to a fragile external-item advantage once episodic delay removes that shortcut. Feedback exposes two failures: in some models, internal and external judgments swap; in others, accuracy improves while confidence decouples from correctness, dissociations invisible to existing benchmarks. Across models, this pattern implicates active, not aggregate, parameter count. This suggests that as AI systems take on autonomous, multi-turn roles, evaluating what they know is not enough: tracking where that knowledge came from may matter equally.

X's Algorithm Feeds Off Ragebait and Impacts Democrats More, Study Finds

X is driving engagement by making users fight in the replies.