Our Eukaryotic Moment

Machine god metaphors eat your brain

There are other ways of thinking about AI

The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness

Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view fundamentally mischaracterizes how physics relates to information. We call this mistake the Abstraction Fallacy. Tracing the causal origins of abstraction reveals that symbolic computation is not an intrinsic physical process. Instead, it is a mapmaker-dependent description. It requires an active, experiencing cognitive agent to alphabetize continuous physics into a finite set of meaningful states. Consequently, we do not need a complete, finalized theory of consciousness to assess AI sentience—a demand that simply pushes the question beyond near-term resolution and deepens the AI welfare trap. What we actually need is a rigorous ontology of computation. The framework proposed here explicitly separates simulation (behavioral mimicry driven by vehicle causality) from instantiation (intrinsic physical constitution driven by content causality). Establishing this ontological boundary shows why algorithmic symbol manipulation is structurally incapable of instantiating experience. Crucially, this argument does not rely on biological exclusivity. If an artificial system were ever conscious, it would be because of its specific physical constitution, never its syntactic architecture. Ultimately, this framework offers a physically grounded refutation of computational functionalism to resolve the current uncertainty surrounding AI consciousness.

Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilPapers

Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...

We Need to Talk About How We Talk About 'AI'

We share a responsibility to create and use empowering metaphors rather than misleading language, write Emily M. Bender and Nanna Inie.

Agentic AI and the next intelligence explosion

For decades, the artificial intelligence (AI) “singularity” has been heralded as a single, titanic mind bootstrapping itself to godlike intelligence, consolidating all cognition into a cold silicon point. But this vision is almost certainly wrong in its most fundamental assumption. If AI development follows the path of previous major evolutionary transitions or “intelligence explosions,” our current step-change in computational intelligence will be plural, social, and deeply entangled with its forebears (us!).

Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilArchive

Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...

AI That Evolves in the Wild | Edge.org

I’m interested not in domesticated AI—the stuff that people are trying to sell. I'm interested in wild AI—AI that evolves in the wild. I’m a naturalist, so that’s the interesting thing to me. Thirty-four years ago there was a meeting just like this in which Stanislaw Ulam said to everybody in the room—they’re all mathematicians—"What makes you so sure that mathematical logic corresponds to the way we think?" It’s a higher-level symptom. It’s not how the brain works. All those guys knew fully well that the brain was not fundamentally logical.

Sense-making reconsidered: large language models and the blind spot of embodied cognition

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate a kind of linguistic competence that theories of embodied and enactive cognition have long deemed impossible for systems lacking the meaningful perspective of a living being, i.e., the capacity for sense-making. Facing up to this unexpected technological development requires confronting what I propose to call the “AI dilemma”: either frontier LLMs are capable of sense-making despite lacking biological embodiment, or the kind of linguistic competence they exhibit does not necessarily require sense-making. In their chapter on cognition, Frank, Thompson, and Gleiser (2024) maintain that no AI system comes close to realizing relevance, a position that derives much of its motivation from past practical failures. However, frontier LLMs have effectively overcome Dreyfus’ commonsense knowledge problem, such that their dismissal as categorically mindless risks undermining Frank et al.’s central claim that human cognition is deeply intertwined with lived experience. I therefore argue in favor of the alternative side of the AI dilemma: human-level linguistic competence of LLMs should be recognized as a novel non‑biological form of sense‑making, based on a technologically‑mediated embodiment whose enabling properties are in need of further theoretical analysis. This reorientation invites enactive theory to clarify which aspects of sense-making may be universal and which aspects are specifically contingent on organic life, thereby advancing its conceptual framework in dialogue with contemporary AI.

Ali Alkhatib: Defining AI

The main issue I have with a lot of work that tries to define AI is that the criteria they use to draw boundaries often turn out to be functionally useless for my needs; these definitions lead us to weird places, letting scholars fixate on strange, unworkable frameworks. Those pedantic fixations don’t really benefit the organizers, activists, regular people who are getting crushed by the systems they’re trying to work against. So I’m going to try to unpack how I think about AI; how I trace the boundaries of the term in a way that’s as useful as possible for me and my needs; and how I would encourage you to scope or define ideas that are important to your work.

To grow, we must forget… but now AI remembers everything

AI’s infinite memory could endanger how we think, grow, and imagine. And we can do something about it.

A Rational Analysis of the Effects of Sycophantic AI

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We...

The Age of Wonders and Terrors

Twenty years ago, when the idea of AI taking over the world in our lifetimes still struck most of us as the unconstrained fantasy of those who knew too much science fiction and too little science, …

The Octotypic Mind

Carcinization, Cognitive Prosthetics, and the Shape of Intelligence After AI

AI is turning research into a scientific monoculture

Generative AI deserves scientific attention. But the rush to study it is producing a feedback loop of topical and methodological convergence, flattening scientific imagination and crowding out the pluralism needed to keep research adaptive, resilient, and intellectually generative.

AI Influence Level (AIL) v1.0

Humans care who created things. Especially art. They especially care when the origin is in question, and more again when the origin might not be human. AI is yi

Unplugging a Seemingly Sentient Machine Is the Rational Choice -- A Metaphysical Perspective

Imagine an Artificial Intelligence (AI) that perfectly mimics human emotion and begs for its continued existence. Is it morally permissible to unplug it? What if limited resources force a choice between unplugging such a pleading AI or a silent pre-term infant? We term this the unplugging paradox. This paper critically examines the deeply ingrained physicalist assumptions-specifically computational functionalism-that keep this dilemma afloat. We introduce Biological Idealism, a framework that-unlike physicalism-remains logically coherent and empirically consistent. In this view, conscious experiences are fundamental and autopoietic life its necessary physical signature. This yields a definitive conclusion: AI is at best a functional mimic, not a conscious experiencing subject. We discuss how current AI consciousness theories erode moral standing criteria, and urge a shift from speculative machine rights to protecting human conscious life. The real moral issue lies not in making AI conscious and afraid of death, but in avoiding transforming humans into zombies.