







Misinformation and disinformation about elections remain pressing concerns for researchers, policymakers, and the public. Critics, however, argue that fears surrounding these issues are exaggerated due to a lack of evidence of impact. This debate highlights the challenges inherent in assessing the impacts of misinformation, as the drivers of false and misleading content often exist in the context of a specific claim. To address this issue, we examined false and misleading information surrounding the 2020 and 2022 U.S. national elections, focusing on the contextual features of online conversations that fueled various rumors. We developed two qualitative codebooks, creating the second after realizing that the first, which labeled individual tweets, failed to capture broader rumoring dynamics. By integrating multi-layered qualitative coding with thematic analysis and quantitative visualizations, we show how influencers, political elites, and audiences collaboratively told deep stories from 2020 through 2022. As these stories were told, audiences interpreted events in 2022 through the lens of the 2020 story, guided by influencers' cues, leading to an evolution in storytelling style between the two election cycles. This ongoing performance was tailored to align with the incentive structures, affordances, and attention economy of social media. We combine deep stories with theories of collective sensemaking and rumoring, creating a framework to better assess the contextual features surrounding false and misleading information.
Election Disinformation in Different Languages is a Big Problem in the U.S.
And it’s driving a wedge between voters in non-English communities Mis- and disinformation about elections predate the endless scroll of modern social media services. [1] Yet easy access to online information channels and amplification tools enable false narratives to spread at a massive scale. When false narratives are combined with data voids and unique cultural […]

The Liar’s Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability?
This study addresses the phenomenon of misinformation about misinformation, or politicians "crying wolf"' over fake news. Strategic and false claims that stories are fake news or deepfakes may benefit politicians by helping them maintain support after a scandal. We posit that this benefit, known as the "liar's dividend," may be achieved through two politician strategies: by invoking informational uncertainty or by encouraging oppositional rallying of core supporters. We administer five survey experiments to over 15,000 American adults detailing hypothetical politician responses to stories describing real politician scandals. We find that claims of misinformation representing both strategies raise politician support across partisan subgroups. These strategies are effective against text-based reports of scandals, but are largely ineffective against video evidence and do not reduce general trust in media. Finally, these false claims produce greater dividends for politicians than alternative responses to scandal, such as remaining silent or apologizing.
Redesigning algorithms to intervene on social norm misperceptions during a national election
For the first time in history, civic discourse commonly occurs in digital environments in which algorithms influence exposure to social information1,2. It is increasingly important to understand whether and how these algorithms affect political discourse3–5. Here we built custom feed-ranking algorithms with full control over their features, and randomly assigned 2,000 participants to use them for 8 weeks (before and after the 2024 US presidential election). We tested whether an engagement-based algorithm (used on major social media platforms6,7) amplifies intergroup, moralized and emotional (IME) information in ways that skew perceptions of social norms around political dialogue5,8, and whether it increased engagement with IME content and perceptions of partisan animosity (compared with a reverse-chronological feed9,10). We also developed and tested a ‘diversified extremity’ algorithm to reduce the influence of extreme users11–13 to improve the accuracy of social norm perception14–16 and reduce perceptions of partisan animosity. We found that engagement-based feeds amplified IME and toxic content relative to reverse-chronological feeds, with the largest increases in moral outrage and political content. Engagement-based feeds also reduced prescriptive norm perception accuracy (albeit in an unexpected direction) and increased perceived partisan animosity. However, they did not significantly alter users’ own engagement behaviours. The diversified extremity algorithm reduced IME and toxic content exposure, improved prescriptive norm accuracy, yet maintained comparable platform enjoyment—suggesting that reducing the influence of extreme users can curb algorithmic distortions without diminishing user experience.

Unveiling the waves of mis- and disinformation from social media
In the digital era, social media platforms have become the focal point for public discourse, with a significant impact on shaping societal narratives. However, they are also rife with mis- and disinformation, which can rapidly disseminate and influence public opinion. This paper investigates the propagation of mis- and disinformation on X, a social media platform formerly known as Twitter. We employ a multidimensional analytical approach, integrating sentiment analysis, wavelet analysis, and network analysis to discern the patterns and intensity of misleading information waves. Sentiment analysis elucidates the emotional tone and subjective context within which information is framed. Wavelet analysis reveals the temporal dynamics and persistence of disinformation trends over time. Network analysis maps the intricate web of information flow, identifying key nodes and vectors of virality. The results offer a granular understanding of how false narratives are constructed and sustained within the digital ecosystem. This study contributes to the broader field of digital media literacy by highlighting the urgent need for robust analytical tools to navigate and neutralize the infodemic in the age of social media.
The spreading of misinformation online
Significance The wide availability of user-provided content in online social media facilitates the aggregation of people around common interests, worldviews, and narratives. However, the World Wide Web is a fruitful environment for the massive diffusion of unverified rumors. In this work, using a massive quantitative analysis of Facebook, we show that information related to distinct narratives––conspiracy theories and scientific news––generates homogeneous and polarized communities (i.e., echo chambers) having similar information consumption patterns. Then, we derive a data-driven percolation model of rumor spreading that demonstrates that homogeneity and polarization are the main determinants for predicting cascades’ size. , The wide availability of user-provided content in online social media facilitates the aggregation of people around common interests, worldviews, and narratives. However, the World Wide Web (WWW) also allows for the rapid dissemination of unsubstantiated rumors and conspiracy theories that often elicit rapid, large, but naive social responses such as the recent case of Jade Helm 15––where a simple military exercise turned out to be perceived as the beginning of a new civil war in the United States. In this work, we address the determinants governing misinformation spreading through a thorough quantitative analysis. In particular, we focus on how Facebook users consume information related to two distinct narratives: scientific and conspiracy news. We find that, although consumers of scientific and conspiracy stories present similar consumption patterns with respect to content, cascade dynamics differ. Selective exposure to content is the primary driver of content diffusion and generates the formation of homogeneous clusters, i.e., “echo chambers.” Indeed, homogeneity appears to be the primary driver for the diffusion of contents and each echo chamber has its own cascade dynamics. Finally, we introduce a data-driven percolation model mimicking rumor spreading and we show that homogeneity and polarization are the main determinants for predicting cascades’ size.

2026 IC2S2: Keynote Presentation by Kate Starbird
Sharing without clicking on news in social media
Social media have enabled laypersons to disseminate, at scale, links to news and public affairs information. Many individuals share such links without first reading the linked information. Here we analysed over 35 million public Facebook posts with uniform resource locators shared between 2017 and 2020, and discovered that such ‘shares without clicks’ (SwoCs) constitute around 75% of forwarded links. Extreme and user-aligned political content received more SwoCs, with partisans engaging in it more than politically neutral users. In addition, analyses with 2,969 false uniform resource locators revealed higher shares and, hence, SwoCs by conservatives (76.94%) than liberals (14.25%), probably because, in our dataset, the vast majority (76–82%) of them originated from conservative news domains. Findings suggest that the virality of political content on social media (including misinformation) is driven by superficial processing of headlines and blurbs rather than systematic processing of core content, which has design implications for promoting deliberate discourse in the online public sphere.

AMMeBa: A Large-Scale Survey and Dataset of Media-Based Misinformation In-The-Wild
The prevalence and harms of online misinformation is a perennial concern for internet platforms, institutions and society at large. Over time, information shared online has become more media-heavy and misinformation has readily adapted to these new modalities. The rise of generative AI-based tools, which provide widely-accessible methods for synthesizing realistic audio, images, video and human-like text, have amplified these concerns. Despite intense public interest and significant press coverage, quantitative information on the prevalence and modality of media-based misinformation remains scarce. Here, we present the results of a two-year study using human raters to annotate online media-based misinformation, mostly focusing on images, based on claims assessed in a large sample of publicly-accessible fact checks with the ClaimReview markup. We present an image typology, designed to capture aspects of the image and manipulation relevant to the image's role in the misinformation claim. We visualize the distribution of these types over time. We show the rise of generative AI-based content in misinformation claims, and that its commonality is a relatively recent phenomenon, occurring significantly after heavy press coverage. We also show "simple" methods dominated historically, particularly context manipulations, and continued to hold a majority as of the end of data collection in November 2023. The dataset, Annotated Misinformation, Media-Based (AMMeBa), is publicly-available, and we hope that these data will serve as both a means of evaluating mitigation methods in a realistic setting and as a first-of-its-kind census of the types and modalities of online misinformation.

AMMeBa: A Large-Scale Survey and Dataset of Media-Based Misinformation In-The-Wild
The prevalence and harms of online misinformation is a perennial concern for internet platforms, institutions and society at large. Over time, information shared online has become more media-heavy and misinformation has readily adapted to these new modalities. The rise of generative AI-based tools, which provide widely-accessible methods for synthesizing realistic audio, images, video and human-like text, have amplified these concerns. Despite intense public interest and significant press coverage, quantitative information on the prevalence and modality of media-based misinformation remains scarce. Here, we present the results of a two-year study using human raters to annotate online media-based misinformation, mostly focusing on images, based on claims assessed in a large sample of publicly-accessible fact checks with the ClaimReview markup. We present an image typology, designed to capture aspects of the image and manipulation relevant to the image's role in the misinformation claim. We visualize the distribution of these types over time. We show the rise of generative AI-based content in misinformation claims, and that its commonality is a relatively recent phenomenon, occurring significantly after heavy press coverage. We also show "simple" methods dominated historically, particularly context manipulations, and continued to hold a majority as of the end of data collection in November 2023. The dataset, Annotated Misinformation, Media-Based (AMMeBa), is publicly-available, and we hope that these data will serve as both a means of evaluating mitigation methods in a realistic setting and as a first-of-its-kind census of the types and modalities of online misinformation.

Disinformation and grievance narratives
Synthese - Disinformation is often defined as misleading content intended to instill false beliefs. But this definition is too narrow. We need to focus instead on its broader epistemic effects....
How to Responsibly Report on Hacks and Disinformation
The run-up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election illustrated how vulnerable our most venerated journalistic outlets are to a new kind of information warfare. Reporters are a targeted adversary of foreign and domestic actors who want to harm our democracy. And to cope with this threat, especially in an election year, news organizations need to prepare for another wave of false, misleading, and hacked information. Often, the information will be newsworthy. Expecting reporters to refrain from covering news goes against core principles of American journalism and the practical business drivers that shape the intensely competitive media marketplace. In these cases, the question is not whether to report but how to do so most responsibly. Our goal is to give journalists actionable guidance.
Can We Fix Social Media? Testing Prosocial Interventions using Generative Social Simulation
Social media platforms have been widely linked to societal harms, including rising polarization and the erosion of constructive debate. Can these problems be mitigated through prosocial interventions? We address this question using a novel method - generative social simulation - that embeds Large Language Models within Agent-Based Models to create socially rich synthetic platforms. We create a minimal platform where agents can post, repost, and follow others. We find that the resulting following-networks reproduce three well-documented dysfunctions: (1) partisan echo chambers; (2) concentrated influence among a small elite; and (3) the amplification of polarized voices - creating a 'social media prism' that distorts political discourse. We test six proposed interventions, from chronological feeds to bridging algorithms, finding only modest improvements - and in some cases, worsened outcomes. These results suggest that core dysfunctions may be rooted in the feedback between reactive engagement and network growth, raising the possibility that meaningful reform will require rethinking the foundational dynamics of platform architecture.

Can We Fix Social Media? Testing Prosocial Interventions using Generative Social Simulation
Social media platforms have been widely linked to societal harms, including rising polarization and the erosion of constructive debate. Can these problems be mitigated through prosocial interventions? We address this question using a novel method - generative social simulation - that embeds Large Language Models within Agent-Based Models to create socially rich synthetic platforms. We create a minimal platform where agents can post, repost, and follow others. We find that the resulting following-networks reproduce three well-documented dysfunctions: (1) partisan echo chambers; (2) concentrated influence among a small elite; and (3) the amplification of polarized voices - creating a 'social media prism' that distorts political discourse. We test six proposed interventions, from chronological feeds to bridging algorithms, finding only modest improvements - and in some cases, worsened outcomes. These results suggest that core dysfunctions may be rooted in the feedback between reactive engagement and network growth, raising the possibility that meaningful reform will require rethinking the foundational dynamics of platform architecture.

Who Gets Which Message? Auditing Demographic Bias in LLM-Generated Targeted Text
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of generating personalized, persuasive text at scale, raising new questions about bias and fairness in automated communication. This paper presents the first systematic analysis of how LLMs behave when tasked with demographic-conditioned targeted messaging. We introduce a controlled evaluation framework using three leading models: GPT-4o, Llama-3.3, and Mistral-Large-2.1, across two generation settings: Standalone Generation, which isolates intrinsic demographic effects, and Context-Rich Generation, which incorporates thematic and regional context to emulate realistic targeting. We evaluate generated messages along three dimensions: lexical content, language style, and persuasive framing. We instantiate this framework on climate communication and find consistent age- and gender-based asymmetries across models: male- and youth-targeted messages tend to emphasize more assertive and progressive framing, while female- and senior-targeted messages more often reflect warmth, care, and traditional themes. Contextual prompts systematically amplify these disparities, with persuasion scores being higher for male-targeted messages, while age-related differences vary across models. Our findings demonstrate how demographic stereotypes can surface and intensify in LLM-generated targeted communication, underscoring the need for bias-aware generation pipelines and transparent auditing frameworks that explicitly account for demographic conditioning in socially sensitive applications.

The Role of Media in Political Polarization| Inoculation Can Reduce the Perceived Reliability of Polarizing Social Media Content
Little research is available on psychological interventions that counter susceptibility to polarizing online content. We conducted 3 studies (n1 = 472, n2 = 193, n3 = 772) to evaluate whether psychological resistance against polarizing social media content can be conferred, using the Bad News game, a “technique-based inoculation” intervention that simulates a social media feed. We investigate (1) whether technique-based inoculation can reduce susceptibility to content designed to fuel intergroup polarization; (2) whether technique-based inoculation can offer cross-protection against misinformation techniques that people were not inoculated against; and (3) whether political ideology plays a role in how people engage with anti-misinformation interventions. In Studies 1 and 3 (but not Study 2), we found that technique-based inoculation significantly reduces the perceived reliability of polarizing content and offers partial cross-protection against untreated misinformation techniques. We found no effect for attitudinal certainty and news-sharing intentions. Finally, we report preliminary evidence that people may choose to engage with politically congruent news topics within the intervention.
Leveraging Motivations to Curb Misinformation: Self-Affirmation Reduces the Appeal of Political Conspiracy Theories
Abstract: In an era where digital misinformation poses significant challenges to societal well-being, this study explores a novel approach to preserving information integrity by addressing the motivational underpinnings of conspiracy theory engagement. As conspiracy theories proliferate online, traditional fact-checking and debunking strategies often prove ineffective due to the self-reinforcing nature of conspiracy theories. This research investigates whether a priori self-affirmation interventions can reduce individuals’ propensity to engage with conspiracy theories by preemptively fulfilling the ego-protective function these theories often serve. Using a randomized experiment ( N = 451), this study finds that participants who completed a self-affirmation task were less likely to read politicized conspiracy theories, and those who chose to read a conspiracy theory reported greater feelings of affirmation than those who did not. Thus, bolstering individuals’ self-integrity may offer an opportunity to mitigate the appeal of politicized conspiracy theories.
