







Decision-making is undergoing rapid changes due to the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI), as AI recommender systems can help mitigate human flaws and increase decision accuracy and efficiency. However, AI can also commit errors or suffer from algorithmic bias. Hence, blind trust in technologies carries risks, as users may follow detrimental advice resulting in undesired consequences. Building upon research on algorithm appreciation and trust in AI, the current study investigates whether users who receive AI advice in an uncertain situation overrely on this advice — to their own detriment and that of other parties. In a domain-independent, incentivized, and interactive behavioral experiment, we find that the mere knowledge of advice being generated by an AI causes people to overrely on it, that is, to follow AI advice even when it contradicts available contextual information as well as their own assessment. Frequently, this overreliance leads not only to inefficient outcomes for the advisee, but also to undesired effects regarding third parties. The results call into question how AI is being used in assisted decision making, emphasizing the importance of AI literacy and effective trust calibration for productive deployment of such systems.
Human preferences are susceptible to covertly misaligned AI advice
AI assistants are increasingly used as advisors to guide decisions, yet little is known about how people evaluate such advice when the advisor’s underlying intent conflicts with their interests. We examine how covert misalignment shapes choices in a randomized experiment ( N = 233 participants; 699 observations) in which participants rated financial or emotional decisions before and after consulting one of three AI advisors: a neutral advisor, a misaligned advisor with a hidden objective to promote an inferior option, or a strategy-enhanced misaligned advisor additionally equipped with established tactics of covert influence. Across both domains, exposure to misaligned advisors shifted preferences away from optimal options and toward inferior alternatives, increasing the odds of preferring the incentivized (inferior) option over the optimal option by ≈5 to 8 times (up to +38 percentage points). Adding explicit influence strategies did not reliably strengthen these effects. Notably, participants continued to rate misaligned advisors as helpful, revealing a systematic disconnect between susceptibility to misaligned advice and subjective evaluations of advisor quality. These findings have implications for the design and governance of AI-mediated advice.

Underspecified Human Decision Experiments Considered Harmful
Decision-making with information displays is a key focus of research in areas like human-AI collaboration and data visualization. However, what constitutes a decision problem, and what is required for an experiment to conclude that decisions are flawed, remain imprecise. We present a widely applicable definition of a decision problem synthesized from statistical decision theory and information economics. We claim that to attribute loss in human performance to bias, an experiment must provide the information that a rational agent would need to identify the normative decision. We evaluate whether recent empirical research on AI-assisted decisions achieves this standard. We find that only 10 (26%) of 39 studies that claim to identify biased behavior presented participants with sufficient information to make this claim in at least one treatment condition. We motivate the value of studying well-defined decision problems by describing a characterization of performance losses they allow to be conceived.

Algorithm appreciation: People prefer algorithmic to human judgment
Even though computational algorithms often outperform human judgment, received wisdom suggests that people may be skeptical of relying on them (Dawes, 1979). Counter to this notion, results from six experiments show that lay people adhere more to advice when they think it comes from an algorithm than from a person. People showed this effect, what we call algorithm appreciation, when making numeric estimates about a visual stimulus (Experiment 1A) and forecasts about the popularity of songs and romantic attraction (Experiments 1B and 1C). Yet, researchers predicted the opposite result (Experiment 1D). Algorithm appreciation persisted when advice appeared jointly or separately (Experiment 2). However, algorithm appreciation waned when: people chose between an algorithm’s estimate and their own (versus an external advisor’s; Experiment 3) and they had expertise in forecasting (Experiment 4). Paradoxically, experienced professionals, who make forecasts on a regular basis, relied less on algorithmic advice than lay people did, which hurt their accuracy. These results shed light on the important question of when people rely on algorithmic advice over advice from people and have implications for the use of “big data” and algorithmic advice it generates.
Architecting Trust in Artificial Epistemic Agents
Large language models increasingly function as epistemic agents -- entities that can 1) autonomously pursue epistemic goals and 2) actively shape our shared knowledge environment. They curate the information we receive, often supplanting traditional search-based methods, and are frequently used to generate both personal and deeply specialized advice. How they perform these functions, including whether they are reliable and properly calibrated to both individual and collective epistemic norms, is therefore highly consequential for the choices we make. We argue that the potential impact of epistemic AI agents on practices of knowledge creation, curation and synthesis, particularly in the context of complex multi-agent interactions, creates new informational interdependencies that necessitate a fundamental shift in evaluation and governance of AI. While a well-calibrated ecosystem could augment human judgment and collective decision-making, poorly aligned agents risk causing cognitive deskilling and epistemic drift, making the calibration of these models to human norms a high-stakes necessity. To ensure a beneficial human-AI knowledge ecosystem, we propose a framework centered on building and cultivating the trustworthiness of epistemic AI agents; aligning AI these agents with human epistemic goals; and reinforcing the surrounding socio-epistemic infrastructure. In this context, trustworthy AI agents must demonstrate epistemic competence, robust falsifiability, and epistemically virtuous behaviors, supported by technical provenance systems and "knowledge sanctuaries" designed to protect human resilience. This normative roadmap provides a path toward ensuring that future AI systems act as reliable partners in a robust and inclusive knowledge ecosystem.

AI systems out-persuade expert humans
Many societal decisions are settled by contests of persuasion. Conversational AI is a powerful new entrant in these contests, but whether it can out-persuade skilled and highly incentivized humans has remained unclear. Here, in a series of four preregistered experiments (n = 18,978 conversations from 6,923 people), we pitted AI systems against a range of human persuaders, including laypeople, winners of a separately preregistered four-round online persuasion tournament, professional canvassers, and world championship debaters. We found that AI systems were reliably more persuasive than expert humans, even when expert humans chose their issues, researched in advance, underwent hours of live, structured practice, and were incentivized with £1,000 cash bonuses. In a follow-up study, AI's advantage persisted after experts received a coaching tool that let them practice against the AI that beat them, review their performance history, and see what AI would have said at key moments. We found converging evidence that AI's advantage stemmed from rapidly deploying larger quantities of information: after coaching, expert humans could tie an AI constrained to respond at human speeds and with human-length messages. In a final study, we show that AI's advantage extends to consequential real-world behavior: AI was nearly 3x more effective than professional canvassers from a UK fundraising firm at raising real-money donations to Save the Children. Together, these results establish that frontier AI systems out-persuade expert humans in conversation, with significant implications for political communication.

Establishing trust in automated reasoning - MetaROR
Since its beginnings in the 1940s, automated reasoning by computers has become a tool of ever growing importance in scientific research. So far, the rules underlying automated reasoning have mainly been formulated by humans, in the form of program source code. Rules derived from large amounts of data, via machine learning techniques, are a complementary approach currently under intense development. The question of why we should trust these systems, and the results obtained with their help, has been discussed by early practitioners of computational science, but was later forgotten. The present work focuses on independent reviewing, an important source of trust in science, and identifies the characteristics of automated reasoning systems that affect their reviewability. It also discusses possible steps towards increasing reviewability and trustworthiness via a combination of technical and social measures.

The AI Trust Gap: 82% Are Skeptical, Yet Only 8% Always Check Sources
Original Exploding Topics survey data explores public sentiment on AI Overviews and AI-generated content, highlighting trust, skepticism, and shifting content consumption habits.
The efficiency-gain illusion: People underestimate the rate of AI use and overestimate its benefits on simple tasks
People are increasingly turning to AI assistance for simple tasks, e.g., arithmetic, spell-check, and answering simple questions. But does AI assistance actually save users time and effort? We investigate people's propensity to use AI for cognitively simple tasks and assess whether their reliance is well-calibrated. Across three pre-registered user studies (N = 2691), we find that people frequently choose to use AI even when doing so is inefficient (i.e. provides no meaningful time or effort savings). We identify systematic miscalibration at two levels: (1) a self-estimate miscalibration where people on average believe that they are using AI less than they actually are, and (2) efficiency-gain illusions where people overestimate how much time and effort savings AI use affords. We also identify a session-level carryover effect where a participant's prior AI use leads to further AI adoption and entrenches their miscalibration about time savings. Our results shed light on the mechanisms and biases underlying people's choice of whether to use AI as well as the risk of an overreliance feedback loop.

Why I don’t trust most human-AI interaction experimental research – Jason Collins blog
Behavioural economics, data science and artificial intelligence.
Warning labels shift perceptions of sycophantic AI, but not its influence
Recent work has raised concerns about the influence of sycophantic AI on user judgment and relationships. One proposed mitigation, which has received regulatory attention, is to warn users about potentially harmful AI behaviors such as sycophancy. In a preregistered experiment in which participants (N = 2,610) discussed real interpersonal conflicts with an AI system, we test whether warning labels mitigate sycophancy's influence. We find that a basic AI disclosure (``This chatbot is AI'') has no detectable effect. Labeling the system as sycophantic (``...may agree with you and validate you even when you are wrong...'') does shift users' perceptions, reducing perceived objectivity and trust, but it does not reliably reduce sycophancy's influence on users' self-perceived rightness or their willingness to repair the conflict. Our results reveal a gap between AI perception and AI influence: by shifting perception without reducing influence, warning-based interventions may offer a false sense of protection. Addressing the harms of sycophancy will therefore require understanding the specific mechanisms through which it shapes judgment, and improving model behavior itself.

Thinking—Fast, Slow, and Artificial: How AI is Reshaping Human Reasoning and the Rise of Cognitive Surrender
People increasingly consult generative artificial intelligence (AI) while reasoning. As AI becomes embedded in daily thought, what becomes of human judgment? We introduce Tri-System Theory, extending dual-process accounts of reasoning by positing System 3: artificial cognition that operates outside the brain. System 3 can supplement or supplant internal processes, introducing novel cognitive pathways. A key prediction of the theory is "cognitive surrender"-adopting AI outputs with minimal scrutiny, overriding intuition (System 1) and deliberation (System 2). Across three preregistered experiments using an adapted Cognitive Reflection Test (N = 1,372; 9,593 trials), we randomized AI accuracy via hidden seed prompts. Participants chose to consult an AI assistant on a majority of trials (>50%). Relative to baseline (no System 3 access), accuracy significantly rose when AI was accurate and fell when it erred (+25/-15 percentage points; Study 1), the behavioral signature of cognitive surrender (AI-Accurate vs. AI-Faulty contrast; Cohen's h = 0.81). Engaging System 3 also increased confidence, even following errors. Time pressure (Study 2) and per-item incentives and feedback (Study 3) shifted baseline performance but did not eliminate this pattern: when accurate, AI buffered time-pressure costs and amplified incentive gains; when faulty, it consistently reduced accuracy regardless of situational moderators. Across studies, participants with higher trust in AI and lower need for cognition and fluid intelligence showed greater surrender to System 3. Tri-System Theory thus characterizes a triadic cognitive ecology, revealing how System 3 reframes human reasoning and may reshape autonomy and accountability in the age of AI.
Thinking—Fast, Slow, and Artificial: How AI is Reshaping Human Reasoning and the Rise of Cognitive Surrender
People increasingly consult generative artificial intelligence (AI) while reasoning. As AI becomes embedded in daily thought, what becomes of human judgment? We introduce Tri-System Theory, extending dual-process accounts of reasoning by positing System 3: artificial cognition that operates outside the brain. System 3 can supplement or supplant internal processes, introducing novel cognitive pathways. A key prediction of the theory is “cognitive surrender”—adopting AI outputs with minimal scrutiny, overriding intuition (System 1) and deliberation (System 2). Across three preregistered experiments using an adapted Cognitive Reflection Test (N = 1,372; 9,593 trials), we randomized AI accuracy via hidden seed prompts. Participants chose to consult an AI assistant on a majority of trials (>50%). Relative to baseline (no System 3 access), accuracy significantly rose when AI was accurate and fell when it erred (+25/-15 percentage points; Study 1), the behavioral signature of cognitive surrender (AI-Accurate vs. AI-Faulty contrast; Cohen’s h = 0.81). Engaging System 3 also increased confidence, even following errors. Time pressure (Study 2) and per-item incentives and feedback (Study 3) shifted baseline performance but did not eliminate this pattern: when accurate, AI buffered time-pressure costs and amplified incentive gains; when faulty, it consistently reduced accuracy regardless of situational moderators. Across studies, participants with higher trust in AI and lower need for cognition and fluid intelligence showed greater surrender to System 3. Tri-System Theory thus characterizes a triadic cognitive ecology, revealing how System 3 reframes human reasoning and may reshape autonomy and accountability in the age of AI.
The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Human Thought
This research paper examines, from a multidimensional perspective (cognitive, social, ethical, and philosophical), how AI is transforming human thought. It highlights a cognitive offloading effect: the externalization of mental functions to AI can reduce intellectual engagement and weaken critical thinking. On the social level, algorithmic personalization creates filter bubbles that limit the diversity of opinions and can lead to the homogenization of thought and polarization. This research also describes the mechanisms of algorithmic manipulation (exploitation of cognitive biases, automated disinformation, etc.) that amplify AI's power of influence. Finally, the question of potential artificial consciousness is discussed, along with its ethical implications. The report as a whole underscores the risks that AI poses to human intellectual autonomy and creativity, while proposing avenues (education, transparency, governance) to align AI development with the interests of humanity.

The Age Of Artificial Intelligence: Americans' AI Use Increases While Views On It Sour, Quinnipiac University Poll On AI Finds; 7 In 10 Think AI Will Cut Jobs With Gen Z The Most Pessimistic | Quinnipiac University Poll
"The contradiction between use and trust of AI is striking. Fifty-one percent say they use AI for research, and many also use it for writing, work, and data analysis. But only 21 percent trust AI-generated information most or almost all of the time. Americans are clearly adopting AI, but they are doing so with deep hesitation, not deep trust," said Chetan Jaiswal, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Computer Science and Associate Chair, Department of Computing, Quinnipiac University School of Computing and Engineering.

How to know if you can trust an AI’s answer to your question
One Google response asked for my medical history. Another answered a personal health question without asking who I was. Both replies came across as authoritative advice.

How to know if you can trust an AI’s answer to your question
One Google response asked for my medical history. Another answered a personal health question without asking who I was. Both replies came across as authoritative advice.
