The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework

Monetary incentives, what are they good for?

This paper is a critical reflection on the use of monetary incentives in economic experiments. The argument is that incentives have their effect through their influence on one or more of three fact...

How Field Experiments in Economics Can Complement Psychological Research on Judgment Biases

This review summarizes results of field experiments examining individual behaviors across several market settings—from open-air markets to rideshare markets to tax-compliance markets—where people sort themselves into market roles wherein they make consequential decisions. Using three distinct examples from my own research on the endowment effect, left-digit bias, and omission bias, I showcase how field experiments can help researchers understand mediators, heterogeneity, and causal moderation involved in judgment biases in the field. In this manner, the review highlights that economic field experiments can serve an invaluable intellectual role alongside traditional laboratory research.

Mis-Nudging Morality

Morals constrain self-serving behavior. Yet, self-regulation failures in the face of monetary temptation are common at the workplace. To limit such failures, organizations can design environments that limit the temptation to behave self-servingly, nudging workers to uphold their morals. In a series of experiments where participants may be tempted to take excessive pay after exerting effort, we study whether a simple intervention—asking individuals to state the wage they believe should be paid ex ante, before facing the temptation to take excessive compensation—prevents self-serving behavior. In contrast to lay beliefs and the predictions from prior work, we find that such an intervention is not effective, leading to self-serving behavior. However, a more realistic elicitation procedure of the appropriate wage mitigates this effect. These findings contribute to work on the malleability of moral behavior showing that simple interventions thought to effectively mitigate self-serving behavior can prompt individuals to stretch their moral boundaries. They also stress the importance of properly testing interventions that might seem intuitive. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: Financial support from the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 766/19] is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4344 .

Integrative experiments identify how punishment affects welfare in public goods games

Despite decades of research, the conditions under which punishment promotes cooperation remain unclear. Through an integrative experiment varying 14 design parameters of public goods games across 360 experimental conditions (147,618 decisions from 7100 participants), we reveal substantial heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness: Its impact on welfare ranges from 43% improvement to 44% reduction depending on the game parameters. To characterize these patterns, we developed models that outperformed human forecasters in predicting punishment effectiveness in new experiments. Communication emerges as the most important factor, followed by contribution framing (opt out versus opt in), contribution type (variable versus all-or-nothing), game length, and outcome visibility, though these factors often interact. The results reframe the debate from whether punishment works to when it does, demonstrating how integrative experiments enable discovery of generalizable patterns in social phenomena. , Editor’s summary People face conflicts between maximizing personal gain versus supporting collective interests. If we cooperatively recycle or donate to charities, it benefits society, but it also costs us time and resources that could be selfishly preserved for ourselves. We impose penalties to deter those undesirable or selfish behaviors, but under what conditions do punishments or penalties effectively modify behavior to benefit group welfare? Alsobay et al . systematically and simultaneously varied 14 factors together instead of in isolation. Punishment was unequivocally most effective when paired with consistent communication, particularly over time. Another effective factor was “opting out” or withdrawing some, but not all, endowments already in the public fund. These methodological advances revealed when, rather than whether, punishment works. —Ekeoma Uzogara , INTRODUCTION Human societies face many situations where individual and collective interests conflict, often referred to as social dilemmas. Costly peer punishment has been studied for more than 25 years in public goods games (stylized behavioral experiments in which individuals decide how much to contribute to a shared pool that benefits everyone) as a mechanism to promote cooperation. Prior research has identified many contextual factors that moderate punishment’s effectiveness, including game length, communication, group size, punishment cost, and so on. However, the specific conditions under which punishment improves group welfare remain unclear. RATIONALE We argue that this lack of clarity derives from the dominant experimental paradigm, in which any given study manipulates only one or a few theoretically informed factors. Because such studies differ in many ways (different experimental procedures, populations), their results are often difficult to compare or integrate. Consequently, one can list many factors that have some effect, but cannot say how much each matters relative to the others, or how they work together, and as a result, cannot predict when punishment will help or harm welfare in new settings. To address this fundamental knowledge gap, we use an integrative experimental design and systematically vary 14 parameters across 360 conditions (147,618 decisions from 7100 participants) to elucidate when punishment improves versus undermines welfare in public goods games, which factors matter most, and how they interact. RESULTS The effect of punishment on welfare ranged from 43% improvement to 44% reduction depending on the specific combination of game parameters. To characterize this heterogeneity, we trained a model that outperformed all 553 human forecasters (laypeople and experts) in predicting whether punishment would help or harm welfare in new experiments. Communication emerged as roughly three times more important than any other factor, followed by contribution framing (opt in versus opt out), contribution type (variable versus all-or-nothing), game length, and peer outcome visibility (whether participants can see others’ earnings). These factors often interact. For example, longer games enhance punishment’s effectiveness only when communication is available, and contribution framing effects depend on both contribution type and outcome visibility. CONCLUSION Many phenomena in social science are shaped by many factors whose interactions are consequential, yet the dominant experimental paradigm often limits its inquiry to “does a given effect exist?” and examines hypothesized factors in isolation. As a result, research programs can accumulate many partial explanations without a clear picture of how they combine to determine outcomes across settings. Knowing that factors matter individually is fundamentally different from knowing how much each matters and how they interact. The integrative approach implemented here offers one way forward. It varies many factors simultaneously within a shared design space, evaluates models by their predictive accuracy on new experiments, and probes those models to constrain and develop theory. Our hope is that integrative experiment designs, combined with models that integrate prediction and explanation, represent a path toward more cumulative social science. Integrative experiment reveals when punishment helps versus harms. We systematically varied 14 design parameters across 360 experimental conditions. The effect of punishment on cooperation efficiency ranged from −44% to +43% depending on the specific game parameters. Communication emerged as three times more important than any other factor, followed by contribution framing, contribution type, and game length.

Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*

Abstract. Economists usually assume that monetary incentives improve performance, and psychologists claim that the opposite may happen. We present and disc

Payment Rewards and Credit Card Debt: Experimental Evidence

We report on a controlled laboratory experiment in which participants make consumption, saving, and credit card repayment decisions when credit card purchases e

Small Probabilistic Discounts Stimulate Spending: Pain of Paying in Price Promotions

AbstractWe find that small probabilistic price promotions effectively stimulate demand, even more so than comparable fixed price promotions (e.g., “1% chance it’s free” vs. “1% off,” respectively), because they more effectively reduce the pain of paying. In three field experiments at a grocer, we exogenously and endogenously manipulated the salience of pain of paying via elicitation timing (e.g., at entrance or checkout) and payment method (i.e., cash/debit cards or credit cards). This modulated the attractiveness of probabilistic discounts and their ability to stimulate spending. Shoppers paying with cash or debit cards, for example, spent 54% more if they received a 1% probabilistic discount than a 1% fixed discount (experiment 2). A fourth experiment showed that consumers’ sensitivity to pain of paying modulates the greater comparative efficacy of small probabilistic than fixed discounts. More broadly, the results elucidate a novel affective route through which price promotions stimulate demand––pain of paying.

Getting to the Top of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving

We provide evidence from field experiments with three different banks that reminder messages increase commitment attainment for clients who recently opened commitment savings accounts. Messages that mention both savings goals and financial incentives are particularly effective, whereas other content variations such as gain versus loss framing do not have significantly different effects. Nor do we find evidence that receiving additional late reminders has an additive effect. These empirical results do not map neatly into existing models, so we provide a simple model where limited attention to exceptional expenses can generate undersaving that is in turn mitigated by reminders. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2296 . This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics.

Do people like financial nudges?

Do people like financial nudges? To answer that question we conducted a pre-registered survey presenting people with 36 hypothetical scenarios describing financial interventions. We varied levels of transparency (i.e., explaining how the interventions worked), framing (interventions framed in terms of spending, or saving), and ‘System’ (interventions could target either System 1 or System 2). Participants were a random sample of 2,100 people drawn from a representative Australian population. All financial interventions were tested across six dependent variables: approval, benefit, ethics, manipulation, the likelihood of use, as well as the likelihood of use if the intervention were to be proposed by a bank. Results indicate that people generally approve of financial interventions, rating them as neutral to positive across all dependent variables (except for manipulation, which was reverse coded). We find effects of framing and System. People have strong and significant preferences for System 2 interventions, and interventions framed in terms of savings. Transparency was not found to have a significant impact on how people rate financial interventions. Financial interventions continue to be rated positive, regardless of the messenger. Looking at demographics, we find that participants who were female, younger, living in metro areas and earning higher incomes were most likely to favor financial interventions, and this effect is especially strong for those aged under 45. We discuss the implications for these results as applied to the financial sector.

Prosocial Compliance in P2P Lending: A Natural Field Experiment

We implement behavioral mechanisms in a natural field experiment to increase loan repayment rates on a peer-to-peer (P2P) lending website. The results show that text message reminders that convey lenders’ positive expectations considerably increase the likelihood that borrowers will repay their loans, whereas reminders emphasizing the adverse consequences of failure to repay loans do not have enduring effects. Our experiment results in an increase in loan repayments in the sample period. In addition, our reminders are cost-free to implement, showing the potential importance of such interventions in enhancing prosocial compliance in P2P lending. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday Borrowing

ABSTRACT Can psychology‐guided information disclosure induce borrowers to lower their use of high‐cost debt? In a field experiment at payday stores, we find that information that makes people think less narrowly (over time) about finance costs results in less borrowing. In particular, reinforcing the adding‐up dollar fees incurred when rolling over loans reduces the take‐up of future payday loans by 11% in the subsequent 4 months. Although we remain agnostic as to the overall sufficiency of better disclosure policy to “remedy” payday borrowing, we cast the 11% reduction in borrowing in light of the relative low cost of this policy.

Adult age differences in monetary decisions with real and hypothetical reward

Abstract Age differences in monetary decisions may emerge because younger and older adults perceive the value of outcomes differently. Yet, age‐differential effects of monetary rewards on decisions are not well understood. Most laboratory studies on aging and decision making have used scenarios in which rewards were merely hypothetical (decisions did not have any real consequences) or in which only small amounts of money were at stake. In the current study, we compared younger adults' (20–29 years) and older adults' (61–82 years) decisions in probabilistic choice problems with real or hypothetical rewards. Decision‐contingent rewards were in a typical range of previous studies (gains of up to ~4.25 USD) or substantially scaled up (gains of up to ~85 USD per participant). Reward type (real vs. hypothetical) affected decision quality, including value maximization, switching between options, and dominance violations (choices of an option that was inferior to another option in all respects). Decision quality was markedly better with real than hypothetical rewards in older adults and correlated with numeracy in both age groups. However, we found no evidence that reward type affected people's risk preferences. Overall, the findings portray a fairly positive picture regarding the use of hypothetical scenarios to assess preferences: With carefully prepared instructions, people from different age groups indicate preferences in hypothetical scenarios that match their decisions with real and much higher rewards. One advantage of using real rewards is that they help to reduce decision noise.

The High Cost of Not Doing Experiments - Behavioral Scientist

We can pay dearly, in blood, treasure, and well-being, for experiments that aren’t done. -Richard Nisbett, Mindware

Consumption Response to Credit Expansions: Evidence from Experimental Assignment of 45,307 Credit Lines

In a field experiment that constructs a randomized credit limit shock, participants borrow to spend 11 cents on the dollar in the first quarter and 28 cents by the third year. Effects extend to those far from the limit, those who had the new limits as available credit, and those with a liquid asset buffer. In the short-run, flexible and installment contracts are used in tandem, with unconstrained using installments more. Long-run borrowing is predominantly using installments. Near limits, participants borrow when credit expands but save out of constraints when limits are tight. Findings support a buffer-stock interpretation emphasizing precautionary saving.

Moral Incentives in Credit Card Debt Repayment: Evidence from a Field Experiment

We study the role of morality in debt repayment, using an experiment with the credit card customers of a large Islamic bank in Indonesia. In our main treatment, clients receive a text message stating that “non-repayment of debts by someone who is able to repay is an injustice.” This moral appeal decreases delinquency by 4.4 percentage points from a baseline of 66 percent and reduces default among customers with the highest ex ante credit risk. Additional treatments help benchmark the effects against direct financial incentives and rule out competing explanations, such as reminder effects, priming religion, and provision of new information.

The Effect of Payment Transparency on Consumption: Quasi-Experiments from the Field

Recent research suggests that the method of making a payment can influence the willingness to pay and consumption behavior. In this manuscript, we argue that payment mechanisms differ from each other along the dimensions of transparency, and that the degree of transparency correlates positively with the pain of paying using the mechanism, and negatively with consumption and spending. We replicate previous experimental results using quasi-experiments from the field, and find that the lower the payment transparency, the greater is the consumption. However, this effect is weak for products whose consumption rates are inflexible.