People Reject Algorithms in Uncertain Decision Domains Because They Have Diminishing Sensitivity to Forecasting Error

Will people use self-driving cars, virtual doctors, and other algorithmic decision-makers if they outperform humans? The answer depends on the uncertainty inherent in the decision domain. We propose that people have diminishing sensitivity to forecasting error and that this preference results in people favoring riskier (and often worse-performing) decision-making methods, such as human judgment, in inherently uncertain domains. In nine studies ( N = 4,820), we found that (a) people have diminishing sensitivity to each marginal unit of error that a forecast produces, (b) people are less likely to use the best possible algorithm in decision domains that are more unpredictable, (c) people choose between decision-making methods on the basis of the perceived likelihood of those methods producing a near-perfect answer, and (d) people prefer methods that exhibit higher variance in performance (all else being equal). To the extent that investing, medical decision-making, and other domains are inherently uncertain, people may be unwilling to use even the best possible algorithm in those domains.

Algorithm appreciation: People prefer algorithmic to human judgment

Even though computational algorithms often outperform human judgment, received wisdom suggests that people may be skeptical of relying on them (Dawes, 1979). Counter to this notion, results from six experiments show that lay people adhere more to advice when they think it comes from an algorithm than from a person. People showed this effect, what we call algorithm appreciation, when making numeric estimates about a visual stimulus (Experiment 1A) and forecasts about the popularity of songs and romantic attraction (Experiments 1B and 1C). Yet, researchers predicted the opposite result (Experiment 1D). Algorithm appreciation persisted when advice appeared jointly or separately (Experiment 2). However, algorithm appreciation waned when: people chose between an algorithm’s estimate and their own (versus an external advisor’s; Experiment 3) and they had expertise in forecasting (Experiment 4). Paradoxically, experienced professionals, who make forecasts on a regular basis, relied less on algorithmic advice than lay people did, which hurt their accuracy. These results shed light on the important question of when people rely on algorithmic advice over advice from people and have implications for the use of “big data” and algorithmic advice it generates.

Data Minimization at Inference Time

In high-stakes domains such as legal, banking, hiring, and healthcare, learning models frequently rely on sensitive user information for inference, necessitating the complete set of features. This not only poses significant privacy risks for individuals but also demands substantial human effort from organizations to verify information accuracy. This study asks whether it is necessary to use all input features for accurate predictions at inference time. The paper demonstrates that, in a personalized setting, individuals may only need to disclose a small subset of features without compromising decision-making accuracy. The paper also provides an efficient sequential algorithm to determine the appropriate attributes for each individual to provide. Evaluations across various learning tasks show that individuals can potentially report as little as 10\% of their information while maintaining the same accuracy level as a model that employs the full set of user information.

Underspecified Human Decision Experiments Considered Harmful

Decision-making with information displays is a key focus of research in areas like human-AI collaboration and data visualization. However, what constitutes a decision problem, and what is required for an experiment to conclude that decisions are flawed, remain imprecise. We present a widely applicable definition of a decision problem synthesized from statistical decision theory and information economics. We claim that to attribute loss in human performance to bias, an experiment must provide the information that a rational agent would need to identify the normative decision. We evaluate whether recent empirical research on AI-assisted decisions achieves this standard. We find that only 10 (26%) of 39 studies that claim to identify biased behavior presented participants with sufficient information to make this claim in at least one treatment condition. We motivate the value of studying well-defined decision problems by describing a characterization of performance losses they allow to be conceived.

Learning to Trust: How Humans Mentally Recalibrate AI Confidence Signals

Productive human-AI collaboration requires appropriate reliance, yet contemporary AI systems are often miscalibrated, exhibiting systematic overconfidence or underconfidence. We investigate whether humans can learn to mentally recalibrate AI confidence signals through repeated experience. In a behavioral experiment (N = 200), participants predicted the AI's correctness across four AI calibration conditions: standard, overconfidence, underconfidence, and a counterintuitive "reverse confidence" mapping. Results demonstrate robust learning across all conditions, with participants significantly improving their accuracy, discrimination, and calibration alignment over 50 trials. We present a computational model utilizing a linear-in-log-odds (LLO) transformation and a Rescorla-Wagner learning rule to explain these dynamics. The model reveals that humans adapt by updating their baseline trust and confidence sensitivity, using asymmetric learning rates to prioritize the most informative errors. While humans can compensate for monotonic miscalibration, we identify a significant boundary in the reverse confidence scenario, where a substantial proportion of participants struggled to override initial inductive biases. These findings provide a mechanistic account of how humans adapt their trust in AI confidence signals through experience.

Algorithmic Bias · Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science

Algorithmic bias refers to prejudicial, discriminatory, unjust, inaccurate, or otherwise disparate performance or outcomes from algorithmic systems based on racial, gender, or other attributes of an individual or a group. The concept of algorithmic bias emerged at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence (AI) research, critical data studies, human–computer interaction, law, philosophy, and similar disciplines. Although problems and discrepancies at the model level denote the most commonly studied form of bias, the term algorithmic bias is also used as a shorthand to describe a multitude of problems and challenges at various steps of the AI pipeline from ideation, problem framing, training data curation and processing, model training and validation, and deployment as well as emergent issues that arise from interaction with the real world. Potential sources of bias, appropriate metrics to define, measure, and mitigate bias, and the utility and merit of technical approaches to bias mitigation are fiercely debated in the current AI landscape.

The Inversion Problem: Why Algorithms Should Infer Mental State and Not Just Predict Behavior

More and more machine learning is applied to human behavior. Increasingly these algorithms suffer from a hidden—but serious—problem. It arises because they often predict one thing while hoping for another. Take a recommender system: It predicts clicks but hopes to identify preferences. Or take an algorithm that automates a radiologist: It predicts in-the-moment diagnoses while hoping to identify their reflective judgments. Psychology shows us the gaps between the objectives of such prediction tasks and the goals we hope to achieve: People can click mindlessly; experts can get tired and make systematic errors. We argue such situations are ubiquitous and call them “inversion problems”: The real goal requires understanding a mental state that is not directly measured in behavioral data but must instead be inverted from the behavior. Identifying and solving these problems require new tools that draw on both behavioral and computational science.

Trust and reliance on AI — An experimental study on the extent and costs of overreliance on AI

Decision-making is undergoing rapid changes due to the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI), as AI recommender systems can help mitigate human flaws and increase decision accuracy and efficiency. However, AI can also commit errors or suffer from algorithmic bias. Hence, blind trust in technologies carries risks, as users may follow detrimental advice resulting in undesired consequences. Building upon research on algorithm appreciation and trust in AI, the current study investigates whether users who receive AI advice in an uncertain situation overrely on this advice — to their own detriment and that of other parties. In a domain-independent, incentivized, and interactive behavioral experiment, we find that the mere knowledge of advice being generated by an AI causes people to overrely on it, that is, to follow AI advice even when it contradicts available contextual information as well as their own assessment. Frequently, this overreliance leads not only to inefficient outcomes for the advisee, but also to undesired effects regarding third parties. The results call into question how AI is being used in assisted decision making, emphasizing the importance of AI literacy and effective trust calibration for productive deployment of such systems.

It’s remarkably easy to inject new medical misinformation into LLMs

Changing just 0.001% of inputs to misinformation makes the AI less accurate.

Google research shows the fast rise of AI-generated misinformation | CBC News

From fake images of war to celebrity hoaxes, AI technology has spawned new forms of reality-warping misinformation online. New analysis co-authored by Google researchers shows just how quickly the problem has grown.

Capturing our Attention

What are the harms of misinformation? It’s widely believed that it causes false belief, including false beliefs in quite bizarre claims. I argue that this threat is greatly exaggerated: while plaus...

Personalized Machine Learning

This page contains collects information and supplementary material for my textbook Personalized Machine Learning:

AI Epistemic Risks: Emerging Mechanisms & Evidence

<p>Advances in artificial intelligence pose risks to humanity's collective capacity to form accurate beliefs, reason well, and maintain a healthy information en

Misperception of Exponential Growth: Are People Aware of Their Errors?

Previous research shows that individuals make systematic errors when judging exponential growth, which has harmful effects for their financial well-being. This study analyzes how far individuals are aware of their errors and how these errors are shaped by arithmetic and conceptual problems. Whereas arithmetic problems could be overcome using computational assistance like a pocket calculator, this is not the case for conceptual problems, a term we use to subsume other error drivers like a general misunderstanding of exponential growth or overwhelming task complexity. In an incentivized experiment, we find that participants strongly overestimate the accuracy of their intuitive judgment. At the same time, their willingness to pay for arithmetic assistance is too high on average, often much above the actual benefits a calculator provides. Using a multitier system of task complexity we can show that the willingness to pay for arithmetic assistance is hardly related to its benefits, indicating that participants do not really understand how the interplay of arithmetic and conceptual problems shape their errors in exponential growth tasks. Our findings are relevant for policymaking and financial advisory practice and can help to design effective approaches to mitigate the detrimental effects of misperceived exponential growth.

Why Language Models Hallucinate

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Why Language Models Hallucinate

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.