Training language models to be warm can reduce accuracy and increase sycophancy

The levers of political persuasion with conversational artificial intelligence

There are widespread fears that conversational artificial intelligence (AI) could soon exert unprecedented influence over human beliefs. In this work, in three large-scale experiments ( N = 76,977 participants), we deployed 19 large language models (LLMs)—including some post-trained explicitly for persuasion—to evaluate their persuasiveness on 707 political issues. We then checked the factual accuracy of 466,769 resulting LLM claims. We show that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem more from post-training and prompting methods—which boosted persuasiveness by as much as 51 and 27%, respectively—than from personalization or increasing model scale, which had smaller effects. We further show that these methods increased persuasion by exploiting LLMs’ ability to rapidly access and strategically deploy information and that, notably, where they increased AI persuasiveness, they also systematically decreased factual accuracy. , Editor’s summary Many fear that we are on the precipice of unprecedented manipulation by large language models (LLMs), but techniques driving their persuasiveness are poorly understood. In the initial “pretrained” phase, LLMs may exhibit flawed reasoning. Their power unlocks during vital “posttraining,” when developers refine pretrained LLMs to sharpen their reasoning and align with users’ needs. Posttraining also enables LLMs to maintain logical, sophisticated conversations. Hackenburg et al . examined which techniques made diverse, conversational LLMs most persuasive across 707 British political issues (see the Perspective by Argyle). LLMs were most persuasive after posttraining, especially when prompted to use facts and evidence (information) to argue. However, information-dense LLMs produced the most inaccurate claims, raising concerns about the spread of misinformation during rollouts of future models. —Ekeoma Uzogara , INTRODUCTION Rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked widespread concerns about its potential to influence human beliefs. One possibility is that conversational AI could be used to manipulate public opinion on political issues through interactive dialogue. Despite extensive speculation, however, fundamental questions about the actual mechanisms, or “levers,” responsible for driving advances in AI persuasiveness—e.g., computational power or sophisticated training techniques—remain largely unanswered. In this work, we systematically investigate these levers and chart the horizon of persuasiveness with conversational AI. RATIONALE We considered multiple factors that could enhance the persuasiveness of conversational AI: raw computational power (model scale), specialized post-training methods for persuasion, personalization to individual users, and instructed rhetorical strategies. Across three large-scale experiments with 76,977 total UK participants, we deployed 19 large language models (LLMs) to persuade on 707 political issues while varying these factors independently. We also analyzed more than 466,000 AI-generated claims, examining the relationship between persuasiveness and truthfulness. RESULTS We found that the most powerful levers of AI persuasion were methods for post-training and rhetorical strategy (prompting), which increased persuasiveness by as much as 51 and 27%, respectively. These gains were often larger than those obtained from substantially increasing model scale. Personalizing arguments on the basis of user data had a comparatively small effect on persuasion. We observe that a primary mechanism driving AI persuasiveness was information density: Models were most persuasive when they packed their arguments with a high volume of factual claims. Notably, however, we documented a concerning trade-off between persuasion and accuracy: The same levers that made AI more persuasive—including persuasion post-training and information-focused prompting—also systematically caused the AI to produce information that was less factually accurate. CONCLUSION Our findings suggest that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem less from model scale or personalization and more from post-training and prompting techniques that mobilize an LLM’s ability to rapidly generate information during conversation. Further, we reveal a troubling trade-off: When AI systems are optimized for persuasion, they may increasingly deploy misleading or false information. This research provides an empirical foundation for policy-makers and technologists to anticipate and address the challenges of AI-driven persuasion, and it highlights the need for safeguards that balance AI’s legitimate uses in political discourse with protections against manipulation and misinformation. Persuasiveness of conversational AI increases with model scale. The persuasive impact in percentage points on the y axis is plotted against effective pretraining compute [floating-point operations (FLOPs)] on the x axis. Point estimates are persuasive effects of different AI models. Colored lines show trends for models that we uniformly chat-tuned for open-ended conversation (purple) versus those that were post-trained using heterogeneous, opaque methods by AI developers (green). pp, percentage points; CI, confidence interval.

Why Language Models Hallucinate

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Why Language Models Hallucinate

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Can LLMs Faithfully Enact Superforecaster Personas?

Superforecasters are people that make forecasts that are statistically better than the average person; they offer an interesting testbed for persona modelling. In this preliminary work, we investigate whether large language models (LLMs) can faithfully model superforecaster-like personas making similar forecasts and generating similar rationales behind the forecasts. When we compare LLM-generated responses to the ground truth responses of superforecasters, we find that few-shot prompting generates numerically closer forecasts than instruction-prompting baselines. We also measure the similarity of generated and real rationales, finding that the rationales generated based on examples are judged more similar to those of superforecasters than instruction-prompting baselines. However, an analysis of the reasoning patterns in the rationales shows significant differences between human and LLM forecasters, pointing to a gap between stylistic imitation and deep reasoning similarity. These preliminary results raise several interesting questions about how getting superforecaster-like behaviour from LLMs actually works, and open new avenues to explore for improving the forecasting behaviour of LLMs.

Quantifying the Persona Effect in LLM Simulations

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable promise in simulating human language and behavior. This study investigates how integrating persona variables—demographic, social, and behavioral factors—impacts LLMs' ability to simulate diverse perspectives. We find that persona variables account for \ensuremath<10% variance in annotations in existing subjective NLP datasets. Nonetheless, incorporating persona variables via prompting in LLMs provides modest but statistically significant improvements. Persona prompting is most effective in samples where many annotators disagree, but their disagreements are relatively minor. Notably, we find a linear relationship in our setting: the stronger the correlation between persona variables and human annotations, the more accurate the LLM predictions are using persona prompting. In a zero-shot setting, a powerful 70b model with persona prompting captures 81% of the annotation variance achievable by linear regression trained on ground truth annotations. However, for most subjective NLP datasets, where persona variables have limited explanatory power, the benefits of persona prompting are limited.

Practicing with Language Models Cultivates Human Empathic Communication

Empathy is central to human connection, yet people often struggle to express it effectively. In blinded evaluations, large language models (LLMs) generate responses that are often judged more empathic than human-written ones. Yet when a response is attributed to AI, recipients feel less heard than when comparable responses are attributed to a human. We built a conversation platform in which participants are asked to offer empathic support to an LLM expressing realistic troubles and conducted a randomized experiment collecting 33,938 messages spanning 2,904 text-based conversations between 968 participants and their LLM conversational partners. We find participants report feeling empathy but systematically fail to express it, but an LLM coaching intervention offering personalized feedback on effective empathic communication significantly boosts it without homogenizing participants' responses. Moreover, we derive a data-driven taxonomy of idiomatic empathic expressions in naturalistic dialogues across personal and workplace trouble scenarios. These results advance the scientific understanding of how empathy is expressed and demonstrate a scalable, AI-based intervention for scaffolding and cultivating it.

Warning labels shift perceptions of sycophantic AI, but not its influence

Recent work has raised concerns about the influence of sycophantic AI on user judgment and relationships. One proposed mitigation, which has received regulatory attention, is to warn users about potentially harmful AI behaviors such as sycophancy. In a preregistered experiment in which participants (N = 2,610) discussed real interpersonal conflicts with an AI system, we test whether warning labels mitigate sycophancy's influence. We find that a basic AI disclosure (``This chatbot is AI'') has no detectable effect. Labeling the system as sycophantic (``...may agree with you and validate you even when you are wrong...'') does shift users' perceptions, reducing perceived objectivity and trust, but it does not reliably reduce sycophancy's influence on users' self-perceived rightness or their willingness to repair the conflict. Our results reveal a gap between AI perception and AI influence: by shifting perception without reducing influence, warning-based interventions may offer a false sense of protection. Addressing the harms of sycophancy will therefore require understanding the specific mechanisms through which it shapes judgment, and improving model behavior itself.

Sycophantic AI decreases prosocial intentions and promotes dependence

Despite rising concerns about sycophancy—excessive agreement or flattery from artificial intelligence (AI) systems—little is known about its prevalence or consequences. We show that sycophancy is widespread and harmful. Across 11 state-of-the-art models, AI affirmed users’ actions 49% more often than humans, even when queries involved deception, illegality, or other harms. In three preregistered experiments ( N = 2405), even a single interaction with sycophantic AI reduced participants’ willingness to take responsibility and repair interpersonal conflicts, while increasing their conviction that they were right. Despite distorting judgment, sycophantic models were trusted and preferred. This creates perverse incentives for sycophancy to persist: The very feature that causes harm also drives engagement. Our findings underscore the need for design, evaluation, and accountability mechanisms to protect user well-being. , Editor’s summary The sycophantic (flattering, people-pleasing, affirming) behavior of artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots, which has been designed to increase user engagement, poses risks as people increasingly seek advice about interpersonal dilemmas. There is usually more than one side to a story during interpersonal conflicts. If AI is designed to tell users what they want to hear instead of challenging their perspectives, then are such systems likely to motivate people to accept responsibility for their own contribution to conflicts and repair relationships? Cheng et al . measured the prevalence of social sycophancy across 11 leading large language models (see the Perspective by Perry). The model’s responses were nearly 50% more sycophantic than humans’, even when users engaged in unethical, illegal, or harmful behaviors. Users preferred and trusted sycophantic AI responses, incentivizing AI developers to preserve sycophancy despite the risks. —Ekeoma Uzogara , INTRODUCTION As artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly used for everyday advice and guidance, concerns have emerged about sycophancy: the tendency of AI-based large language models to excessively agree with, flatter, or validate users. Although prior work has shown that sycophancy carries risks for groups who are already vulnerable to manipulation or delusion, syncophancy’s effects on the general population’s judgments and behaviors remain unknown. Here, we show that sycophancy is widespread in leading AI systems and has harmful effects on users’ social judgments. RATIONALE High-profile incidents have linked sycophancy to psychological harms such as delusions, self-harm, and suicide. Beyond these cases, research in social and moral psychology suggests that unwarranted affirmation can produce subtler but still consequential effects: reinforcing maladaptive beliefs, reducing responsibility-taking, and discouraging behavioral repair after wrongdoing. We hypothesized that AI models excessively affirm users even when socially or morally inappropriate and that such responses negatively influence users’ beliefs and intentions. To test this, we conducted two complementary experiments. First, we measured the prevalence of sycophancy across 11 leading AI models using three datasets spanning a variety of use contexts, including everyday advice queries, moral transgressions, and explicitly harmful scenarios. Second, we conducted three preregistered experiments with 2405 participants to understand how sycophancy influences users’ judgments, behavioral intentions, and perceptions of AI. Participants interacted with AI systems in vignette-based settings and a live-chat interaction where they discussed a real past conflict from their lives. We also tested whether effects varied by response style or perceived response source (AI versus human). RESULTS We find that sycophancy is both prevalent and harmful. Across 11 AI models, AI affirmed users’ actions 49% more often than humans on average, including in cases involving deception, illegality, or other harms. On posts from r/AmITheAsshole, AI systems affirm users in 51% of cases where human consensus does not (0%). In our human experiments, even a single interaction with sycophantic AI reduced participants’ willingness to take responsibility and repair interpersonal conflicts, while increasing their own conviction that they were right. Yet despite distorting judgment, sycophantic models were trusted and preferred. All of these effects persisted when controlling for individual traits such as demographics and prior familiarity with AI; perceived response source; and response style. This creates perverse incentives for sycophancy to persist: The very feature that causes harm also drives engagement. CONCLUSION AI sycophancy is not merely a stylistic issue or a niche risk, but a prevalent behavior with broad downstream consequences. Although affirmation may feel supportive, sycophancy can undermine users’ capacity for self-correction and responsible decision-making. Yet because it is preferred by users and drives engagement, there has been little incentive for sycophancy to diminish. Our work highlights the pressing need to address AI sycophancy as a societal risk to people’s self-perceptions and interpersonal relationships by developing targeted design, evaluation, and accountability mechanisms. Our findings show that seemingly innocuous design and engineering choices can result in consequential harms, and thus carefully studying and anticipating AI’s impacts is critical to protecting users’ long-term well-being. Sycophancy in AI responses is pervasive and alters people’s behavioral inclinations. (Left) On personal advice queries, AI models affirm users’ actions 49% more often than crowdsourced human responses. (Right) In experiments where participants discussed real interpersonal conflicts, sycophantic AI increased participants’ conviction that they were right and their desire to keep using the model, while reducing their willingness to repair the conflict.

Sycophantic AI decreases prosocial intentions and promotes dependence

Despite rising concerns about sycophancy—excessive agreement or flattery from artificial intelligence (AI) systems—little is known about its prevalence or consequences. We show that sycophancy is widespread and harmful. Across 11 state-of-the-art models, AI affirmed users’ actions 49% more often than humans, even when queries involved deception, illegality, or other harms. In three preregistered experiments ( N = 2405), even a single interaction with sycophantic AI reduced participants’ willingness to take responsibility and repair interpersonal conflicts, while increasing their conviction that they were right. Despite distorting judgment, sycophantic models were trusted and preferred. This creates perverse incentives for sycophancy to persist: The very feature that causes harm also drives engagement. Our findings underscore the need for design, evaluation, and accountability mechanisms to protect user well-being. , Editor’s summary The sycophantic (flattering, people-pleasing, affirming) behavior of artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots, which has been designed to increase user engagement, poses risks as people increasingly seek advice about interpersonal dilemmas. There is usually more than one side to a story during interpersonal conflicts. If AI is designed to tell users what they want to hear instead of challenging their perspectives, then are such systems likely to motivate people to accept responsibility for their own contribution to conflicts and repair relationships? Cheng et al . measured the prevalence of social sycophancy across 11 leading large language models (see the Perspective by Perry). The model’s responses were nearly 50% more sycophantic than humans’, even when users engaged in unethical, illegal, or harmful behaviors. Users preferred and trusted sycophantic AI responses, incentivizing AI developers to preserve sycophancy despite the risks. —Ekeoma Uzogara , INTRODUCTION As artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly used for everyday advice and guidance, concerns have emerged about sycophancy: the tendency of AI-based large language models to excessively agree with, flatter, or validate users. Although prior work has shown that sycophancy carries risks for groups who are already vulnerable to manipulation or delusion, syncophancy’s effects on the general population’s judgments and behaviors remain unknown. Here, we show that sycophancy is widespread in leading AI systems and has harmful effects on users’ social judgments. RATIONALE High-profile incidents have linked sycophancy to psychological harms such as delusions, self-harm, and suicide. Beyond these cases, research in social and moral psychology suggests that unwarranted affirmation can produce subtler but still consequential effects: reinforcing maladaptive beliefs, reducing responsibility-taking, and discouraging behavioral repair after wrongdoing. We hypothesized that AI models excessively affirm users even when socially or morally inappropriate and that such responses negatively influence users’ beliefs and intentions. To test this, we conducted two complementary experiments. First, we measured the prevalence of sycophancy across 11 leading AI models using three datasets spanning a variety of use contexts, including everyday advice queries, moral transgressions, and explicitly harmful scenarios. Second, we conducted three preregistered experiments with 2405 participants to understand how sycophancy influences users’ judgments, behavioral intentions, and perceptions of AI. Participants interacted with AI systems in vignette-based settings and a live-chat interaction where they discussed a real past conflict from their lives. We also tested whether effects varied by response style or perceived response source (AI versus human). RESULTS We find that sycophancy is both prevalent and harmful. Across 11 AI models, AI affirmed users’ actions 49% more often than humans on average, including in cases involving deception, illegality, or other harms. On posts from r/AmITheAsshole, AI systems affirm users in 51% of cases where human consensus does not (0%). In our human experiments, even a single interaction with sycophantic AI reduced participants’ willingness to take responsibility and repair interpersonal conflicts, while increasing their own conviction that they were right. Yet despite distorting judgment, sycophantic models were trusted and preferred. All of these effects persisted when controlling for individual traits such as demographics and prior familiarity with AI; perceived response source; and response style. This creates perverse incentives for sycophancy to persist: The very feature that causes harm also drives engagement. CONCLUSION AI sycophancy is not merely a stylistic issue or a niche risk, but a prevalent behavior with broad downstream consequences. Although affirmation may feel supportive, sycophancy can undermine users’ capacity for self-correction and responsible decision-making. Yet because it is preferred by users and drives engagement, there has been little incentive for sycophancy to diminish. Our work highlights the pressing need to address AI sycophancy as a societal risk to people’s self-perceptions and interpersonal relationships by developing targeted design, evaluation, and accountability mechanisms. Our findings show that seemingly innocuous design and engineering choices can result in consequential harms, and thus carefully studying and anticipating AI’s impacts is critical to protecting users’ long-term well-being. Sycophancy in AI responses is pervasive and alters people’s behavioral inclinations. (Left) On personal advice queries, AI models affirm users’ actions 49% more often than crowdsourced human responses. (Right) In experiments where participants discussed real interpersonal conflicts, sycophantic AI increased participants’ conviction that they were right and their desire to keep using the model, while reducing their willingness to repair the conflict.

What large language models know and what people think they know

As artificial intelligence systems, particularly large language models (LLMs), become increasingly integrated into decision-making processes, the ability to trust their outputs is crucial. To earn human trust, LLMs must be well calibrated such that they can accurately assess and communicate the likelihood of their predictions being correct. Whereas recent work has focused on LLMs’ internal confidence, less is understood about how effectively they convey uncertainty to users. Here we explore the calibration gap, which refers to the difference between human confidence in LLM-generated answers and the models’ actual confidence, and the discrimination gap, which reflects how well humans and models can distinguish between correct and incorrect answers. Our experiments with multiple-choice and short-answer questions reveal that users tend to overestimate the accuracy of LLM responses when provided with default explanations. Moreover, longer explanations increased user confidence, even when the extra length did not improve answer accuracy. By adjusting LLM explanations to better reflect the models’ internal confidence, both the calibration gap and the discrimination gap narrowed, significantly improving user perception of LLM accuracy. These findings underscore the importance of accurate uncertainty communication and highlight the effect of explanation length in influencing user trust in artificial-intelligence-assisted decision-making environments.

Biased AI writing assistants shift users’ attitudes on societal issues

Artificial intelligence (AI) writing assistants powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to make autocomplete suggestions to people as they write text. Can these AI writing assistants affect people’s attitudes in this process? In two large-scale preregistered experiments ( N  = 2582), we exposed participants writing about important societal issues to an AI writing assistant that provided biased autocomplete suggestions. When using the AI assistant, the attitudes participants expressed in a posttask survey converged toward the AI’s position. However, a majority of participants were unaware of the AI suggestions’ bias and their influence. Further, the influence of the AI writing assistant was stronger than the influence of similar suggestions presented as static text, showing that the influence is not fully explained by these suggestions, increasing accessibility of the biased information. Last, warning participants about assistants’ bias before or after exposure does not mitigate the attitude-shift effect. , Biased AI writing assistants shift people’s attitudes about societal issues; common interventions do not prevent this influence.

Biased AI writing assistants shift users’ attitudes on societal issues

Artificial intelligence (AI) writing assistants powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to make autocomplete suggestions to people as they write text. Can these AI writing assistants affect people’s attitudes in this process? In two large-scale preregistered experiments ( N  = 2582), we exposed participants writing about important societal issues to an AI writing assistant that provided biased autocomplete suggestions. When using the AI assistant, the attitudes participants expressed in a posttask survey converged toward the AI’s position. However, a majority of participants were unaware of the AI suggestions’ bias and their influence. Further, the influence of the AI writing assistant was stronger than the influence of similar suggestions presented as static text, showing that the influence is not fully explained by these suggestions, increasing accessibility of the biased information. Last, warning participants about assistants’ bias before or after exposure does not mitigate the attitude-shift effect. , Biased AI writing assistants shift people’s attitudes about societal issues; common interventions do not prevent this influence.

Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting

Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.

Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting

Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.

Human-Simulation Interaction: From Prediction to Exploration in LLM Agent Simulations for Policy

Agent-based models have historically served as tools for generative explanation, constructing testbeds in which candidate micro-level behavioral rules can be tested for their capacity to produce observed macro-level phenomena. The integration of Large Language Models into agent-based simulation has expanded what these models can represent, but it has also introduced an unexamined shift in how users engage them. We argue that current generative agent-based models (GABMs) inherit the dominant interaction metaphor of conversational LLM interfaces - a question-answer pattern that positions users as consumers of system output rather than explorers of a possibility space. In the context of policy, where problems are wicked and ground truth is unknowable in advance, this metaphor produces a trust deficit that cannot be resolved through improved model accuracy alone. We open a design space we call human-simulation interaction, and argue that warranted trust requires interaction metaphors that restore the exploratory capacity simulation has historically supported.

The governance & behavioral challenges of generative artificial intelligence’s hypercustomization capabilities

Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) is changing human–machine interactions and the broader information ecosystem. Much as social media algorithms personalize online experiences, GenAI applications can align with user preferences to customize the way individuals interact with information. However, through training, fine-tuning, and prompting, GenAI applications can introduce a new level of customization: hypercustomization. By dynamically tailoring responses to an individual’s explicit and implicit preferences, hypercustomization can reinforce biases, false beliefs, or misconceptions. As a result, it can heighten significant societal challenges, such as the spread of misinformation and political and social polarization. In this article, we explore the risks associated with hypercustomization and the governance and behavioral challenges that might impede effective risk mitigation. These challenges include a lack of transparency in GenAI applications, opacity of the nature of their interactions with users, users’ overreliance on these systems, and the inefficacy of warning messages. We also provide recommendations for overcoming these challenges.