







Abstract The Dispersion of Power is an urgent call to rethink centuries of conventional wisdom about what democracy is, why it matters, and how to make it better. Drawing from history, social science, psychology, and critical theory, it explains why elections do not and cannot realize the classic ideal of popular rule, and why prevailing strategies of democratic reform often make things worse. Instead, Bagg argues, we should see democracy as a way of protecting public power from capture—an alternative vision that is at once more realistic and more inspiring. Despite their many shortcomings, real-world elections do prevent the most extreme forms of tyranny, and are therefore indispensable. In dealing with the vast inequalities that remain, however, we cannot rely on standard solutions such as electoral reform, direct democracy, deliberation, and participatory governance. Instead, Bagg shows, protecting and enriching democracy requires addressing underlying inequalities of power directly. In part, this entails substantive policies attacking the advantages of wealthy elites. Even more crucially, deepening democracy requires the organization of oppositional, countervailing power among ordinary people. Neither task is easy, but historical precedents exist in both cases—and if democracy is to survive contemporary crises, leaders and citizens alike must find ways to revive and reinvent these essential democratic practices for the twenty-first century.
We Need To Rethink Democracy
Time and the Neo-Monarchist Turn
One of the classical arguments against democracy concerns its supposed short-termism. Early-modern political thought contrasted the pitfalls of elected authority, whose timebound character was seen to invite inconstancy, instability and plunder, with the merits of indefinite rule on the model of kingship. Such reasoning has seen two revivals in recent years, first in a neo-liberal form as an argument for technocracy (see independent central banking), second in a neo-reactionary form as an argument for an all-powerful executive or ‘monarch’ (see the contemporary international far Right). This article looks at the structure of these political arguments and the work they do. Having reconstructed their historical background, it charts how the neo-monarchist turn marks a radicalisation in democracy-scepticism, guided by a patrimonial logic of authority as property ownership. The article goes on to examine the political-economic factors to which this responds, as well as the contradictions to which neo-monarchism is prone. As the article concludes, temporal arguments for authoritarian politics may be dubious in substance but merit careful observation in a context of widespread disaffection with existing institutions.

Conclave Democracy
What divine authority can teach us about democratic principles.

Billionaires Gone Wild
Understanding the oligarchs’ power grab and the dire threat to American democracy

The Global State of Democracy 2026: Democracy in an Age of Conflict
In the face of increasing political and societal fragmentation, the Global State of Democracy 2026 explains the patterns that define the direction of democratization around the world. Drawing on the latest data from the Global State of Democracy Indices, the report documents both democratic stagnation and key declines in indicators that measure the credibility of elections, the effectiveness of legislatures, respect for freedoms of expression and the press, and access to justice. These phenomena affect countries across thespectrum of democratic performance.

The Global State of Democracy 2026: Democracy in an Age of Conflict
In the face of increasing political and societal fragmentation, the Global State of Democracy 2026 explains the patterns that define the direction of democratization around the world. Drawing on the latest data from the Global State of Democracy Indices, the report documents both democratic stagnation and key declines in indicators that measure the credibility of elections, the effectiveness of legislatures, respect for freedoms of expression and the press, and access to justice. These phenomena affect countries across thespectrum of democratic performance.

It’s Not Polarization; It’s the Radicalization of the Political Right
Polarization has become the master concept for diagnosing contemporary democratic crises. The notion denotes three features: symmetry between parties, politics as an opinion space where positions diverge, and mutual repulsion between opposing camps. Yet none of these capture current realities. Across democracies, the central dynamic is not two poles drifting apart but the transformation of the political right into authoritarianism, norm breaking, and openness to political violence. Social democratic and center-right parties tend to respond in the opposite way from what “polarization” implies: by accommodating rightward. Attempts to salvage the polarization frame with modifiers (“asymmetric,” “affective,” “sectarian,” “pernicious”) concede these realities but risk hollowing out the concept’s definitional core. These limitations reveal a deeper misdiagnosis: when one party turns antidemocratic and illiberal, incivility and conflict are inevitable—but they are symptoms, not the root problem. Misdiagnosing them as the central issue leads to viewing civility and compromise as remedies, thereby risking the legitimation of authoritarian actors. This article proposes an alternative lens: the radicalization of the political right. Developed in the study of extremism, the radicalization framework better captures asymmetric change, identity-driven politics, and the mainstreaming of illiberalism. It foregrounds identity fusion, threat narratives, elite entrepreneurship, and escalation. Concepts are never politically innocent and persisting with “polarization” risks both misdiagnosing and normalizing authoritarian threats.

It’s Not Polarization; It’s the Radicalization of the Political Right
Polarization has become the master concept for diagnosing contemporary democratic crises. The notion denotes three features: symmetry between parties, politics as an opinion space where positions diverge, and mutual repulsion between opposing camps. Yet none of these capture current realities. Across democracies, the central dynamic is not two poles drifting apart but the transformation of the political right into authoritarianism, norm breaking, and openness to political violence. Social democratic and center-right parties tend to respond in the opposite way from what “polarization” implies: by accommodating rightward. Attempts to salvage the polarization frame with modifiers (“asymmetric,” “affective,” “sectarian,” “pernicious”) concede these realities but risk hollowing out the concept’s definitional core. These limitations reveal a deeper misdiagnosis: when one party turns antidemocratic and illiberal, incivility and conflict are inevitable—but they are symptoms, not the root problem. Misdiagnosing them as the central issue leads to viewing civility and compromise as remedies, thereby risking the legitimation of authoritarian actors. This article proposes an alternative lens: the radicalization of the political right. Developed in the study of extremism, the radicalization framework better captures asymmetric change, identity-driven politics, and the mainstreaming of illiberalism. It foregrounds identity fusion, threat narratives, elite entrepreneurship, and escalation. Concepts are never politically innocent and persisting with “polarization” risks both misdiagnosing and normalizing authoritarian threats.

The Myth of Authoritarian Efficiency
When it comes to getting stuff done, democracies win every time.

Five Dimensions of Scaling Democratic Deliberation: With and Beyond AI
DemocracyNext's new paper on Five dimensions of scaling democratic deliberation: With and beyond AI

Hold the Line: A Guide to Defending Democracy
A practical guide for organizers, communities, and individuals defending democracy.

Cambridge Analytica and the end of elections
The latest Cambridge Analytica leaks show just how compromised voting - one of the pillars of democracy - has become.

Hyperpolitics: Extreme Politicization without Political Consequences
POLITICS AFTER THE END OF THE END OF HISTORYWhat happens when politics is everywhere, yet nothing seems to change? From the abandoned dance floors of Thatcher’s London to the mass mobilizations of Black Lives Matter, Anton Jäger traces how public life has become infused with protest, spectacle, and moral urgency — while the old infrastructure of parties, unions, and civic solidarity has been hollowed out.Hyperpolitics revisits the illusions of the “end of history” and dissects the strange energies that replaced them: viral outrage, endless culture wars, and the digital rush of causes that flare and vanish overnight. Jäger shows how the promises of post–Cold War liberalism gave way to a restless, unsteady public sphere where private passions overflow into politics but rarely build enduring power.Ranging from Guy Debord and Wolfgang Tillmans to Houellebecq’s disenchanted fictions, Hyperpolitics makes sense of a world in which collective action remains fragmented and the social fabric thinner than ever. For anyone trying to grasp why our age feels so charged yet so inconsequential, this book offers a vital map through the new contradictions of our hyperpolitical moment.
Democracy and the Epistemic Commons
The Consilience Project is a publication of the Civilization Research Institute (CRI)

Public support for the <i>cordon sanitaire</i> : Descriptive evidence from Spain
Reactions to the rise of far-right parties that advocate democratic backsliding, and the dilution of socially liberal democratic norms present a dilemma for existing political parties. How should existing political parties respond to this challenge? A commonly adopted strategy is to apply a cordon sanitaire which excludes radical right-wing challengers from the government-forming process. Do voters support this policy? Leveraging data from Spain – where the mainstream right has accommodated the radical right-wing party, VOX, via numerous governing coalitions – I rely on individual citizens’ views on how parties should respond to rise of the far-right party, to answer this question. Empirically, the results show very low-level support for the cordon sanitaire in Spain. Indeed, the modal position of the electorate, regardless of their ideological position, is to treat the party just like any other. These results are not conditioned by the propensity of individuals to identify VOX as indeed being a “radical right” party. These descriptive findings suggest that whilst radical right-wing parties may present an inimical threat to democratic norms, citizens do not necessarily view the means of squashing this threat to be one of strategic exclusion. This likely explains why the mainstream right has been able to institutionalise VOX as a political ally: where strategic exclusion is not expected, the mainstream right need not fear violating an expectation that does not exist.

Democracy is an epistemic discipline, it only works if truth can constrain power. Without a faster, more transparent architecture for shared reality, the arc of democracy bends away from substance, through simulation, and toward authoritarianism. Without major action, it's the inevitable end state.