Generative propaganda: Evidence of AI’s impact from a state-backed disinformation campaign

Generative propaganda: Evidence of AI’s impact from a state-backed disinformation campaign

Abstract. Can AI bolster state-backed propaganda campaigns, in practice? Growing use of AI and large language models has drawn attention to the potential f

A well-funded Moscow-based global ‘news’ network has infected Western artificial intelligence tools worldwide with Russian propaganda

An audit found that the 10 leading generative AI tools advanced Moscow’s disinformation goals by repeating false claims from the pro-Kremlin Pravda network 33 percent of the time

AI use in American newspapers is widespread, uneven, and rarely disclosed

AI is rapidly transforming journalism, but the extent of its use in published newspaper articles remains unclear. We address this gap by auditing a large-scale dataset of 186K articles from online editions of 1.5K American newspapers published in the summer of 2025. Using Pangram, a state-of-the-art AI detector, we discover that approximately 9% of newly-published articles are either partially or fully AI-generated. This AI use is unevenly distributed, appearing more frequently in smaller, local outlets, in specific topics such as weather and technology, and within certain ownership groups. We also analyze 45K opinion pieces from Washington Post, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal, finding that they are 6.4 times more likely to contain AI-generated content than news articles from the same publications, with many AI-flagged op-eds authored by prominent public figures. Despite this prevalence, we find that AI use is rarely disclosed: a manual audit of 100 AI-flagged articles found only five disclosures of AI use. Overall, our audit highlights the immediate need for greater transparency and updated editorial standards regarding the use of AI in journalism to maintain public trust.

AI use in American newspapers is widespread, uneven, and rarely disclosed

AI is rapidly transforming journalism, but the extent of its use in published newspaper articles remains unclear. We address this gap by auditing a large-scale dataset of 186K articles from online editions of 1.5K American newspapers published in the summer of 2025. Using Pangram, a state-of-the-art AI detector, we discover that approximately 9% of newly-published articles are either partially or fully AI-generated. This AI use is unevenly distributed, appearing more frequently in smaller, local outlets, in specific topics such as weather and technology, and within certain ownership groups. We also analyze 45K opinion pieces from Washington Post, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal, finding that they are 6.4 times more likely to contain AI-generated content than news articles from the same publications, with many AI-flagged op-eds authored by prominent public figures. Despite this prevalence, we find that AI use is rarely disclosed: a manual audit of 100 AI-flagged articles found only five disclosures of AI use. Overall, our audit highlights the immediate need for greater transparency and updated editorial standards regarding the use of AI in journalism to maintain public trust.

Fact-Checks Can Help Inoculate LLMs Against Disinformation

Large language models (LLMs) have become the first source millions consult when evaluating political claims, yet they were trained on an open internet that state-sponsored disinformation operations have been designed to pollute. We audit four frontier models across 2,268 responses to 63 fabrications from eight documented influence operations and find that even a single published fact-check can shift a model from hedging about a fabrication to rejecting it outright. Overall, models correctly rejected only 81% of fabrications while repeating disinformation in 3% of cases. Critically, the remaining 16% of responses would have left users unable to determine whether an fabricated claims were true or false. Fact-checks may present an avenue for addressing this vulnerability. Narratives which had been debunked by at least one IFCN certified fact-checking organization were correctly rejected as disinformation 93% of the time compared to just 76% of the time for unchecked narratives. Exploratory analyses suggest that this mechanism operates through training data, with models echoing the specific vocabulary of published corrections when available during their training windows. We conclude by discussing how fact-checks designed for human audiences appear to serve as effective protection for LLMs, converting both model uncertainty and outright disinformation into definitive rejections

EKI and Propastop Studied AI Resistance to Propaganda

Fresh comparisons of large language models show that AI’s ability to recognise Kremlin propaganda varies dramatically. At first glance, the leading models appear reliable, but targeted testing reveals that some of them remain surprisingly vulnerable to manipulation.

The levers of political persuasion with conversational artificial intelligence

There are widespread fears that conversational artificial intelligence (AI) could soon exert unprecedented influence over human beliefs. In this work, in three large-scale experiments ( N = 76,977 participants), we deployed 19 large language models (LLMs)—including some post-trained explicitly for persuasion—to evaluate their persuasiveness on 707 political issues. We then checked the factual accuracy of 466,769 resulting LLM claims. We show that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem more from post-training and prompting methods—which boosted persuasiveness by as much as 51 and 27%, respectively—than from personalization or increasing model scale, which had smaller effects. We further show that these methods increased persuasion by exploiting LLMs’ ability to rapidly access and strategically deploy information and that, notably, where they increased AI persuasiveness, they also systematically decreased factual accuracy. , Editor’s summary Many fear that we are on the precipice of unprecedented manipulation by large language models (LLMs), but techniques driving their persuasiveness are poorly understood. In the initial “pretrained” phase, LLMs may exhibit flawed reasoning. Their power unlocks during vital “posttraining,” when developers refine pretrained LLMs to sharpen their reasoning and align with users’ needs. Posttraining also enables LLMs to maintain logical, sophisticated conversations. Hackenburg et al . examined which techniques made diverse, conversational LLMs most persuasive across 707 British political issues (see the Perspective by Argyle). LLMs were most persuasive after posttraining, especially when prompted to use facts and evidence (information) to argue. However, information-dense LLMs produced the most inaccurate claims, raising concerns about the spread of misinformation during rollouts of future models. —Ekeoma Uzogara , INTRODUCTION Rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked widespread concerns about its potential to influence human beliefs. One possibility is that conversational AI could be used to manipulate public opinion on political issues through interactive dialogue. Despite extensive speculation, however, fundamental questions about the actual mechanisms, or “levers,” responsible for driving advances in AI persuasiveness—e.g., computational power or sophisticated training techniques—remain largely unanswered. In this work, we systematically investigate these levers and chart the horizon of persuasiveness with conversational AI. RATIONALE We considered multiple factors that could enhance the persuasiveness of conversational AI: raw computational power (model scale), specialized post-training methods for persuasion, personalization to individual users, and instructed rhetorical strategies. Across three large-scale experiments with 76,977 total UK participants, we deployed 19 large language models (LLMs) to persuade on 707 political issues while varying these factors independently. We also analyzed more than 466,000 AI-generated claims, examining the relationship between persuasiveness and truthfulness. RESULTS We found that the most powerful levers of AI persuasion were methods for post-training and rhetorical strategy (prompting), which increased persuasiveness by as much as 51 and 27%, respectively. These gains were often larger than those obtained from substantially increasing model scale. Personalizing arguments on the basis of user data had a comparatively small effect on persuasion. We observe that a primary mechanism driving AI persuasiveness was information density: Models were most persuasive when they packed their arguments with a high volume of factual claims. Notably, however, we documented a concerning trade-off between persuasion and accuracy: The same levers that made AI more persuasive—including persuasion post-training and information-focused prompting—also systematically caused the AI to produce information that was less factually accurate. CONCLUSION Our findings suggest that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem less from model scale or personalization and more from post-training and prompting techniques that mobilize an LLM’s ability to rapidly generate information during conversation. Further, we reveal a troubling trade-off: When AI systems are optimized for persuasion, they may increasingly deploy misleading or false information. This research provides an empirical foundation for policy-makers and technologists to anticipate and address the challenges of AI-driven persuasion, and it highlights the need for safeguards that balance AI’s legitimate uses in political discourse with protections against manipulation and misinformation. Persuasiveness of conversational AI increases with model scale. The persuasive impact in percentage points on the y axis is plotted against effective pretraining compute [floating-point operations (FLOPs)] on the x axis. Point estimates are persuasive effects of different AI models. Colored lines show trends for models that we uniformly chat-tuned for open-ended conversation (purple) versus those that were post-trained using heterogeneous, opaque methods by AI developers (green). pp, percentage points; CI, confidence interval.

Just Asking Questions: Doing Our Own Research on Conspiratorial Ideation by Generative AI Chatbots

Interactive chat systems that build on artificial intelligence frameworks are increasingly ubiquitous and embedded into search engines, Web browsers, and operating systems, or are available on websites and apps. Researcher efforts have sought to understand the limitations and potential for harm of generative AI, which we contribute to here. Conducting a systematic review of six AI-powered chat systems (ChatGPT 3.5; ChatGPT 4 Mini; Microsoft Copilot in Bing; Google Search AI; Perplexity; and Grok in Twitter/X), this study examines how these leading products respond to questions related to conspiracy theories. This follows the platform policy implementation audit approach established by Glazunova et al. (2023). We select five well-known and comprehensively debunked conspiracy theories and four emerging conspiracy theories that relate to breaking news events at the time of data collection. Our findings demonstrate that the extent of safety guardrails against conspiratorial ideation in generative AI chatbots differs markedly, depending on chatbot model and conspiracy theory. Our observations indicate that safety guardrails in AI chatbots are often very selectively designed: generative AI companies appear to focus especially on ensuring that their products are not seen to be racist; they also appear to pay particular attention to conspiracy theories that address topics of substantial national trauma such as 9/11 or relate to well-established political issues. Future work should include an ongoing effort extended to further platforms, multiple languages, and a range of conspiracy theories extending well beyond the United States.

Just Asking Questions: Doing Our Own Research on Conspiratorial Ideation by Generative AI Chatbots

Interactive chat systems that build on artificial intelligence frameworks are increasingly ubiquitous and embedded into search engines, Web browsers, and operating systems, or are available on websites and apps. Researcher efforts have sought to understand the limitations and potential for harm of generative AI, which we contribute to here. Conducting a systematic review of six AI-powered chat systems (ChatGPT 3.5; ChatGPT 4 Mini; Microsoft Copilot in Bing; Google Search AI; Perplexity; and Grok in Twitter/X), this study examines how these leading products respond to questions related to conspiracy theories. This follows the platform policy implementation audit approach established by Glazunova et al. (2023). We select five well-known and comprehensively debunked conspiracy theories and four emerging conspiracy theories that relate to breaking news events at the time of data collection. Our findings demonstrate that the extent of safety guardrails against conspiratorial ideation in generative AI chatbots differs markedly, depending on chatbot model and conspiracy theory. Our observations indicate that safety guardrails in AI chatbots are often very selectively designed: generative AI companies appear to focus especially on ensuring that their products are not seen to be racist; they also appear to pay particular attention to conspiracy theories that address topics of substantial national trauma such as 9/11 or relate to well-established political issues. Future work should include an ongoing effort extended to further platforms, multiple languages, and a range of conspiracy theories extending well beyond the United States.

Google Researchers Say AI Now Leading Disinformation Vector (and Are Severely Undercounting the Problem)

It’s much easier to produce AI-generated disinformation than it is to fact check it.

Can We Fix Social Media? Testing Prosocial Interventions using Generative Social Simulation

Social media platforms have been widely linked to societal harms, including rising polarization and the erosion of constructive debate. Can these problems be mitigated through prosocial interventions? We address this question using a novel method - generative social simulation - that embeds Large Language Models within Agent-Based Models to create socially rich synthetic platforms. We create a minimal platform where agents can post, repost, and follow others. We find that the resulting following-networks reproduce three well-documented dysfunctions: (1) partisan echo chambers; (2) concentrated influence among a small elite; and (3) the amplification of polarized voices - creating a 'social media prism' that distorts political discourse. We test six proposed interventions, from chronological feeds to bridging algorithms, finding only modest improvements - and in some cases, worsened outcomes. These results suggest that core dysfunctions may be rooted in the feedback between reactive engagement and network growth, raising the possibility that meaningful reform will require rethinking the foundational dynamics of platform architecture.

Can We Fix Social Media? Testing Prosocial Interventions using Generative Social Simulation

Social media platforms have been widely linked to societal harms, including rising polarization and the erosion of constructive debate. Can these problems be mitigated through prosocial interventions? We address this question using a novel method - generative social simulation - that embeds Large Language Models within Agent-Based Models to create socially rich synthetic platforms. We create a minimal platform where agents can post, repost, and follow others. We find that the resulting following-networks reproduce three well-documented dysfunctions: (1) partisan echo chambers; (2) concentrated influence among a small elite; and (3) the amplification of polarized voices - creating a 'social media prism' that distorts political discourse. We test six proposed interventions, from chronological feeds to bridging algorithms, finding only modest improvements - and in some cases, worsened outcomes. These results suggest that core dysfunctions may be rooted in the feedback between reactive engagement and network growth, raising the possibility that meaningful reform will require rethinking the foundational dynamics of platform architecture.

Google research shows the fast rise of AI-generated misinformation | CBC News

From fake images of war to celebrity hoaxes, AI technology has spawned new forms of reality-warping misinformation online. New analysis co-authored by Google researchers shows just how quickly the problem has grown.

Introducing AI to an Online Petition Platform Changed Outputs but not Outcomes

The rapid integration of AI writing tools into online platforms raises critical questions about their impact on content production and outcomes. We leverage a unique natural experiment on Change$.$org, a leading social advocacy platform, to causally investigate the effects of an in-platform ''write with AI'' tool. To understand the impact of the AI integration, we collected 1.5 million petitions and employed a difference-in-differences analysis. Our findings reveal that in-platform AI access significantly altered the lexical features of petitions and increased petition homogeneity, but did not improve petition outcomes. We confirmed the results in a separate analysis of repeat petition writers who wrote petitions before and after introduction of the AI tool. The results suggest that while AI writing tools can profoundly reshape online content, their practical utility for improving desired outcomes may be less beneficial than anticipated, and introduce unintended consequences like content homogenization.

The Impact of AI-Generated Text on the Internet

By mid-2025, roughly 35% of newly published websites were classified as AI-generated or AI-assisted.

The Impact of AI-Generated Text on the Internet

The proliferation of AI-generated and AI-assisted text on the internet is feared to contribute to a degradation in semantic and stylistic diversity, factual accuracy, and other negative...