







Abstract. We use individual and aggregate data to ask how the Internet is changing the ideological segregation of the American electorate. Focusing on onli
Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook
Shifts in U.S. Social Media Use, 2020–2024: Decline, Fragmentation, and Enduring Polarization
Using nationally representative data from the 2020 and 2024 American National Election Studies (ANES), this paper describes how U.S. social media use has shifted across platforms, demographics, and politics. Overall platform reach declined, driven by growth in the share of Americans — especially the youngest and oldest cohorts — who report using no social media. Visiting and posting activity on Twitter/X and Facebook have fallen by nearly 50% since 2020, with the decline on Twitter/X driven primarily by reduced participation among Democratic users. While Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter/X lost ground, TikTok and Reddit grew modestly, consistent with a more fragmented digital public sphere. Platform audiences aged and became slightly more educated and racially diverse. Politically, most platforms shifted toward Republican users while remaining, on balance, Democratic-leaning. Twitter/X experienced the largest change: among posters, the partisan balance swung over 70 percentage points from Democrats to Republicans. Across platforms, political posting remains closely tied to affective polarization, as the most partisan respondents are also the most active. As casual users disengage while polarized partisans remain vocal, online discourse becomes narrower and more ideologically extreme.
The social media discourse of engaged partisans is toxic even when politics are irrelevant
Abstract. Prevailing theories of partisan incivility on social media suggest that it derives from disagreement about political issues or from status compet

The social media discourse of engaged partisans is toxic even when politics are irrelevant
Abstract. Prevailing theories of partisan incivility on social media suggest that it derives from disagreement about political issues or from status compet

Reranking partisan animosity in algorithmic social media feeds alters affective polarization
Today, social media platforms hold the sole power to study the effects of feed-ranking algorithms. We developed a platform-independent method that reranks participants’ feeds in real time and used this method to conduct a preregistered 10-day field ...

Sharing without clicking on news in social media
Social media have enabled laypersons to disseminate, at scale, links to news and public affairs information. Many individuals share such links without first reading the linked information. Here we analysed over 35 million public Facebook posts with uniform resource locators shared between 2017 and 2020, and discovered that such ‘shares without clicks’ (SwoCs) constitute around 75% of forwarded links. Extreme and user-aligned political content received more SwoCs, with partisans engaging in it more than politically neutral users. In addition, analyses with 2,969 false uniform resource locators revealed higher shares and, hence, SwoCs by conservatives (76.94%) than liberals (14.25%), probably because, in our dataset, the vast majority (76–82%) of them originated from conservative news domains. Findings suggest that the virality of political content on social media (including misinformation) is driven by superficial processing of headlines and blurbs rather than systematic processing of core content, which has design implications for promoting deliberate discourse in the online public sphere.

The political effects of X’s feed algorithm
Feed algorithms are widely suspected to influence political attitudes. However, previous evidence from switching off the algorithm on Meta platforms found no political effects1. Here we present results from a 2023 field experiment on Elon Musk’s platform X shedding light on this puzzle. We assigned active US-based users randomly to either an algorithmic or a chronological feed for 7 weeks, measuring political attitudes and online behaviour. Switching from a chronological to an algorithmic feed increased engagement and shifted political opinion towards more conservative positions, particularly regarding policy priorities, perceptions of criminal investigations into Donald Trump and views on the war in Ukraine. In contrast, switching from the algorithmic to the chronological feed had no comparable effects. Neither switching the algorithm on nor switching it off significantly affected affective polarization or self-reported partisanship. To investigate the mechanism, we analysed users’ feed content and behaviour. We found that the algorithm promotes conservative content and demotes posts by traditional media. Exposure to algorithmic content leads users to follow conservative political activist accounts, which they continue to follow even after switching off the algorithm, helping explain the asymmetry in effects. These results suggest that initial exposure to X’s algorithm has persistent effects on users’ current political attitudes and account-following behaviour, even in the absence of a detectable effect on partisanship.

The political effects of X’s feed algorithm
Feed algorithms are widely suspected to influence political attitudes. However, previous evidence from switching off the algorithm on Meta platforms found no political effects1. Here we present results from a 2023 field experiment on Elon Musk’s platform X shedding light on this puzzle. We assigned active US-based users randomly to either an algorithmic or a chronological feed for 7 weeks, measuring political attitudes and online behaviour. Switching from a chronological to an algorithmic feed increased engagement and shifted political opinion towards more conservative positions, particularly regarding policy priorities, perceptions of criminal investigations into Donald Trump and views on the war in Ukraine. In contrast, switching from the algorithmic to the chronological feed had no comparable effects. Neither switching the algorithm on nor switching it off significantly affected affective polarization or self-reported partisanship. To investigate the mechanism, we analysed users’ feed content and behaviour. We found that the algorithm promotes conservative content and demotes posts by traditional media. Exposure to algorithmic content leads users to follow conservative political activist accounts, which they continue to follow even after switching off the algorithm, helping explain the asymmetry in effects. These results suggest that initial exposure to X’s algorithm has persistent effects on users’ current political attitudes and account-following behaviour, even in the absence of a detectable effect on partisanship.

Redesigning algorithms to intervene on social norm misperceptions during a national election
For the first time in history, civic discourse commonly occurs in digital environments in which algorithms influence exposure to social information1,2. It is increasingly important to understand whether and how these algorithms affect political discourse3–5. Here we built custom feed-ranking algorithms with full control over their features, and randomly assigned 2,000 participants to use them for 8 weeks (before and after the 2024 US presidential election). We tested whether an engagement-based algorithm (used on major social media platforms6,7) amplifies intergroup, moralized and emotional (IME) information in ways that skew perceptions of social norms around political dialogue5,8, and whether it increased engagement with IME content and perceptions of partisan animosity (compared with a reverse-chronological feed9,10). We also developed and tested a ‘diversified extremity’ algorithm to reduce the influence of extreme users11–13 to improve the accuracy of social norm perception14–16 and reduce perceptions of partisan animosity. We found that engagement-based feeds amplified IME and toxic content relative to reverse-chronological feeds, with the largest increases in moral outrage and political content. Engagement-based feeds also reduced prescriptive norm perception accuracy (albeit in an unexpected direction) and increased perceived partisan animosity. However, they did not significantly alter users’ own engagement behaviours. The diversified extremity algorithm reduced IME and toxic content exposure, improved prescriptive norm accuracy, yet maintained comparable platform enjoyment—suggesting that reducing the influence of extreme users can curb algorithmic distortions without diminishing user experience.

Echo chambers can emerge without algorithmic personalization or a preference for homogeneity
Online ideological segregation—often described as “echo chambers”—is commonly attributed to algorithmic personalization (“filter bubbles”) or users’ preferences for like-minded environments. We propose a different mechanism. Using a minimal agent-based model, we show that strong segregation can arise even without algorithmic personalization and without users preferring homogeneous environments. Even when users exit communities only after finding themselves almost entirely surrounded by disagreement, cascading exits can push initially mixed communities toward high homogeneity. Once small imbalances arise, feedback between exit and regrouping generates a self-reinforcing process of system-level sorting. Extending the model further reveals that algorithmic personalization can, under some conditions, reduce segregation by lowering dissatisfaction, slowing exit cascades, and stabilizing mixed communities. As an empirical illustration, a longitudinal analysis of the subreddit r/MensRights shows that users whose language is more distant from the community’s evolving semantic center are more likely to exit. Taken together, these findings suggest that echo chambers need not depend on users seeking homogeneous environments or algorithmic personalization alone, but can also emerge from exit dynamics in the interaction structures characteristic of online platforms. More broadly, they show how interventions aimed at individual exposure can produce aggregate dynamics that differ from their intended effects, complicating both scientific and policy debates over online polarization.
Echo chambers can emerge without algorithmic personalization or a preference for homogeneity
Online ideological segregation—often described as “echo chambers”—is commonly attributed to algorithmic personalization (“filter bubbles”) or users’ preferences for like-minded environments. We propose a different mechanism. Using a minimal agent-based model, we show that strong segregation can arise even without algorithmic personalization and without users preferring homogeneous environments. Even when users exit communities only after finding themselves almost entirely surrounded by disagreement, cascading exits can push initially mixed communities toward high homogeneity. Once small imbalances arise, feedback between exit and regrouping generates a self-reinforcing process of system-level sorting. Extending the model further reveals that algorithmic personalization can, under some conditions, reduce segregation by lowering dissatisfaction, slowing exit cascades, and stabilizing mixed communities. As an empirical illustration, a longitudinal analysis of the subreddit r/MensRights shows that users whose language is more distant from the community’s evolving semantic center are more likely to exit. Taken together, these findings suggest that echo chambers need not depend on users seeking homogeneous environments or algorithmic personalization alone, but can also emerge from exit dynamics in the interaction structures characteristic of online platforms. More broadly, they show how interventions aimed at individual exposure can produce aggregate dynamics that differ from their intended effects, complicating both scientific and policy debates over online polarization.
The social media discourse of engaged partisans is toxic even when politics are irrelevant
Abstract Prevailing theories of partisan incivility on social media suggest that it derives from disagreement about political issues or from status competition between groups. This study—which analyzes the commenting behavior of Reddit users across diverse cultural contexts (subreddits)—tests the alternative hypothesis that such incivility derives in large part from a selection effect: Toxic people are especially likely to opt into discourse in partisan contexts. First, we examined commenting behavior across over 9,000 unique cultural contexts (subreddits) and confirmed that discourse is indeed more toxic in partisan (e.g. r/progressive, r/conservatives) than in nonpartisan contexts (e.g. r/movies, r/programming). Next, we analyzed hundreds of millions of comments from over 6.3 million users and found robust evidence that: (i) the discourse of people whose behavior is especially toxic in partisan contexts is also especially toxic in nonpartisan contexts (i.e. people are not politics-only toxicity specialists); and (ii) when considering only nonpartisan contexts, the discourse of people who also comment in partisan contexts is more toxic than the discourse of people who do not. These effects were not driven by socialization processes whereby people overgeneralized toxic behavioral norms they had learned in partisan contexts. In contrast to speculation about the need for partisans to engage beyond their echo chambers, toxicity in nonpartisan contexts was higher among people who also comment in both left-wing and right-wing contexts (bilaterally engaged users) than among people who also comment in only left-wing or right-wing contexts (unilaterally engaged users). The discussion considers implications for democratic functioning and theories of polarization.

David Rozado on Twitter / X
1. Have we been measuring AI political bias wrong? In a new paper @PTetlock and I argue that we might have. Studies have found that AIs tend to produce left-of-center responses to politically loaded questions. But ideological preferences are not the same as epistemic failure. pic.twitter.com/JuGrboRVb0— David Rozado (@DavidRozado) June 22, 2026

The limits of social media as a source of political information during routine and crisis times across 17 countries
Recent studies on political knowledge suggest people learn little about political events and societal issues from social media. Potentially, social media are a more effective source of information ...

Social media discourse is driven by false #polarization We find that: 1) ideologues post opinions more than moderates 2) extreme attitudes are posted more than moderate one 3) This replicates in 40 countries 4) Opinions that users post are more hostile than the beliefs they keep to themselves
This paper claims to provide evidence offline networks matter more than online for voting preferences, but winds up mistaking noise for signal and seems to forget that some folks online are quite influential. academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/4/10/pgaf30…
Physical partisan proximity outweighs online ties in predicting US voting outcomes
academic.oup.com