







Abstract Most US credit card holders revolve high-interest debt, often with substantial liquid and retirement assets. We model separation of accounting from shopping allowed by credit cards, in a rational, dynamic game. When the shopper is more impatient than the accountant, selling assets to repay debt is not necessarily optimal, as the shopper can restore debt. Modest relative impatience generates asset-debt co-existence and target utilization rates, matching incidence and median assets of debt revolvers with substantial assets. Empirical evidence is consistent with a role for spending control considerations, after allowing for standard determinants of credit card debt.
Leave Home without it? The Effects of Credit Card Debt and Available Credit on Spending
This research examines how credit card debt affects consumer spending. In five experimental and field studies, the authors demonstrate that outstanding credit card debt increases spending for consumers with high self-control. They also show that this effect can be eliminated by increasing the available credit on the credit card. Thus, when the available credit is low, consumers with greater self-control increase spending, but when the available credit is high, they reduce spending. The results extend the literature on goal violation and self-control and offer insights into consumer decision making and consumption patterns under conditions of debt.

Overconfidence and the Credit Card Debt Puzzle
This article investigates the credit card debt puzzle. Simultaneously holding credit card debt and liquid assets is puzzling given the sizeable difference between interest rates of debt and assets. However, this behavior is common—about 31% of households in the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances. The cost of co-holding may be justified if consumers anticipate future restrictions in credit or if they need to maintain liquidity. Other existing explanations for co-holding include impulsive spending and low financial literacy. This research reveals a new explanation for the credit card debt puzzle: consumers’ overconfidence of their financial knowledge. Using a Coarsened Exact Matching method, we found that overconfident consumers were 20%–40% more likely to co-hold credit card debt and liquid assets.
The Credit Card Debt Puzzle: The Role of Preferences, Credit Access Risk, and Financial Literacy
Abstract. We use the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to revisit what is termed the credit card debt puzzle: why consumers simultaneously co-hold high-interest credit card debt and low-interest assets that could be used to pay down this debt. Relative to individuals with no credit card debt but positive liquid assets, borrower-savers have very different perceptions of future credit access risk and use credit cards for precautionary motives. Moreover, changing perceptions about credit access risk are essential for predicting transitions among the two groups. Preferences and the composition of financial portfolios also play a role in these transitions.

Precautionary borrowing and the credit card debt puzzle
The Red, the Black, and the Plastic: Paying Down Credit Card Debt for Hotels, Not Sofas
Using transaction data from a sample of 1.8 million credit card accounts, we provide the first field test of a major prediction of Prelec and Loewenstein’s theory of mental accounting: that consumers will pay off expenditure on transient forms of consumption more quickly than expenditure on durables. According to the theory, this is because the pain of paying can be offset by the future anticipated pleasure of consumption only when money is spent on consumption that endures over time. Consistent with this prediction, we found that repayment of debt incurred for nondurable goods is an absolute 10% more likely than repayment of debt incurred for durable goods. The strength of this relationship is comparable to an increment in 15 percentage points in the credit card annualized percentage rate. Our results have not only managerial implications for the structuring of financial transactions (e.g., that credit card customers should be given the option of paying off specific purchases) but also more general implications for exploiting variations in the pain of paying in incentive schemes aimed at customers and employees. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.

Credit Card Debt and Consumer Payment Choice: What Can We Learn from Credit Bureau Data?
We estimate a two-stage Heckman selection model of credit card adoption and use with a unique dataset that combines administrative data from the Equifax credit bureau and self-reported data from a representative survey of consumers. Higher-income consumers carry higher credit card balances, but they tend to repay those balances each month. Credit card revolvers have lower income and are less educated. Revolvers are twice as likely to use debit cards as credit cards for payments, but they carry much higher balances on their credit cards. The high cost of paying off credit card debt likely exacerbates existing inequalities in disposable income. Unlike the mortgage market, we find no evidence for lenders’ cutoff between subprime and prime consumers in the credit card market.
Credit Card Debt Puzzle: Liquid Assets to Pay Bills
Using transaction data from a US consumer payments diary, we revisit the credit card debt puzzle—a scenario in which consumers revolve credit card debt while al
Does Saving Cause Borrowing? Implications for the Co-Holding Puzzle
Using an experiment in which 3.1 million bank customers were encouraged to save, we explore the mechanisms behind co-holding liquid savings and credit card debt. Theoretically, we first show that the joint responses of spending, saving, and borrowing to the nudge differ for different economic models of co-holding. Using machine learning techniques, we then find that the most responsive individuals reduce spending and increase their savings by 4.9% (206 USD PPP per month) while their credit card debt remains unchanged. For them, the marginal responses to the nudge are consistent with our model of co-holding for the purpose of self- or partner control.

When Motivation is against Debtors' Best Interest: The Illusion of Goal Progress in Credit Card Debt Repayment
The authors explore the illusion of goal progress by consumers who own multiple credit cards and pay off their debt balances to facilitate the achievement of their subgoal rather than the superordinate goal of being debt-free. The first experiment shows that debtors use their savings toward the credit card debt they can pay off entirely or substantially, even if it is associated with the smallest balance and the lowest annual percentage rate rather than toward the debt with the highest annual percentage rate. The second experiment reveals that when the income available to pay down the debt is in the form of effortless money (i.e., windfall or reward money) as opposed to hard-earned savings, the tendency to allocate money toward the smallest credit card debt is exacerbated. However, people tend to pay their debt more rationally when the number of debt accounts increases. Finally, the third experiment shows that credit card debt repayment decisions depend on the nature of the debt (hedonic vs. utilitarian) and the timing of consumption benefits (past vs. future). The article concludes with a discussion of managerial and public policy implications.

Managing Mental Accounts: Payment Cards and Consumption Expenditures
Does mental accounting matter for total consumption expenditures? We exploit a unique setting in which individuals exogenously received a new credit card, without requesting one. Using random variation in the time of receipt we show that individuals temporarily increase total consumption expenditure by making purchases with the new card without reducing spending on the others. We do not observe a corresponding increase in indebtedness. Total consumption expenditure rises even for the least liquidity-constrained individuals. The evidence is consistent with consumers treating methods of payment as nonfungible budget categories, as suggested by models of mental accounting and narrow bracketing.

The Credit Card Debt Puzzle and Noncognitive Ability
Abstract Many households concurrently hold low-yield liquid assets while incurring costly credit card debt. In our sample, more than 80% of households with credit card debt also have low-yield liquid assets. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (N = 30,517), we examine the role of noncognitive skills as well as the economic, financial, and demographic factors that affect the likelihood of co-holding. We find that the “Big Five” personality traits have a statistically significant and economically important effect: households with a more agreeable, introvert, and less conscientious head of household are more likely to co-hold. We also examine the role of intra-household dynamics.

Credit card debt puzzle: liquid assets to pay household bills
Using transaction data from a US consumer payments diary, we revisit the credit card debt puzzle—a scenario in which households revolve credit card debt while also keeping liquid assets as bank account deposits. This scenario is very common: 42 percent of consumers in our sample were borrower-savers in 2019. We explain the puzzle by showing that consumers need their liquid assets to pay household bills and other necessary expenses, including mortgage or rent. More than 80 percent of bills by value were paid out of bank accounts and could not be charged to credit cards, so bank account balances were needed to cover those basic expenses. On average, borrower-savers’ credit card debt exceeded their liquid assets. The average borrower-saver carried almost $6,400 in unpaid credit card debt and had $5,400 in liquid assets. On average, the value of their liquid assets could cover only about 60 percent of their unpaid debt plus monthly bills. In almost every category of assets or debts, borrower-savers were worse off financially than savers. Thus, the differences between borrower-savers and savers are much broader than just their credit card debt and bank account balances; they extend to mortgage debt and home equity. Carrying a mortgage or other debt (such as auto or educational loans) is associated with a higher probability of revolving on a credit card, suggesting that various types of household debt might be complements rather than substitutes. We do not find evidence that either financial literacy scores or the “Big 5” personality traits predict whether a consumer is a borrower-saver. During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, bor-savs’ behavior was consistent with what we would expect under our explanation for the credit card puzzle. However, consumers’ unpaid credit card debt decreased, and their liquid assets increased, so the fraction of borrower-savers dropped to 35 percent of the sample.

Does Saving Cause Borrowing? Implications for the Coholding Puzzle
ABSTRACT Using an experiment in which 3.1 million bank customers were encouraged to save, we explore the mechanisms behind coholding liquid savings and credit card debt. Theoretically, we show that the joint responses of spending, saving, and borrowing to the nudge differ across economic models of coholding. Using machine learning techniques, we find that the most responsive individuals reduce spending and increase savings by 4.9% (206 USD PPP per month) while their credit card debt remains unchanged. These individuals' marginal responses to the nudge are consistent with our model of coholding for the purpose of self‐ or partner‐control.

A Debt Puzzle
Over 60% of US households with credit cards are currently borrowing – i.e., paying interest – on those cards. We attempt to reconcile the high rate of credit card borrowing with observed levels of life cycle wealth accumulation. We simulate a lifecycle model with five properties that create demand for credit card borrowing. First, the calibrated labor income path slopes upward early in life. Second, income has transitory shocks. Third, consumers invest actively in an illiquid asset, which is sufficiently illiquid that it can not be used to smooth transitory income shocks. Fourth, consumers may declare bankruptcy, reducing the effective cost of credit card borrowing. Fifth, households have relatively more dependents early in the life-cycle. Our calibrated model predicts that 20% of the population will borrow on their credit card at any point in time, far less than the observed rate of over 60%. We identify a resolution to this puzzle: hyperbolic time preferences. Simulated hyperbolic consumers borrow actively in the revolving credit card market and accumulate relatively large stocks of illiquid wealth, matching observed data.

Managing Mental Accounts: Payment Cards and Consumption Expenditures
Abstract Does mental accounting matter for total consumption expenditures? We exploit a unique setting in which individuals exogenously receive a new payment card, without requesting one. Using random variation in the time of receipt, we show that individuals temporarily increase total consumption expenditure by making purchases with the new card without reducing spending on the others. We do not observe a corresponding increase in indebtedness. Total consumption expenditure rises even for the least liquidity-constrained individuals. The evidence is consistent with consumers treating methods of payment as nonfungible budget categories, as suggested by models of mental accounting and narrow bracketing.

Disclosing the costs of co-holding liquid assets and high-interest debt has limited impact on behavior
Abstract Why do consumers simultaneously maintain low-yield liquid assets and high-interest revolving debt? This behavior, known as ``co-holding,'' affects 23\% of credit card users in our sample from a major international bank and costs the typical co-holder hundreds of dollars annually in unnecessary interest charges. Our analysis of 38 months of detailed banking records reveals that co-holding is remarkably persistent, with typical co-holders maintaining this behavior for most months observed. Our analysis also reveals that co-holding is not a static financial position: co-holders regularly deposit and withdraw from asset accounts while simultaneously making new credit card purchases. To test whether co-holding could be addressed through information disclosure, we conducted a large-scale field experiment (n = 125,328), providing clear information about co-holding behavior and its costs. Customers received targeted messages through their bank's mobile app, where they could easily transfer money from assets to pay down debt. Despite sufficient power to detect economically small effects, we found no meaningful changes in debt repayment amount, though customers did respond in other ways---making more frequent repayments and paying above required minimums. These results challenge explanations based on limited attention or information gaps and suggest that simple information disclosure, even when carefully designed and delivered through trusted channels, may not effectively address costly financial behaviors.
