People often provide answers that go beyond what a question literally asks, but it has been difficult to pin down what makes some answers more relevant than others. Here, we introduce Pragmatic Reasoning In Overinformative Responses to Polar Questions (PRIOR-PQ), a probabilistic cognitive model formalizing how people use theory of mind (ToM) to produce and interpret relevantly overinformative answers to yes–no questions. Specifically, PRIOR-PQ grounds the pragmatics of question answering in inferences about the underlying goal that motivated the questioner to ask the given question as opposed to a different question. We evaluate our probabilistic model against human answering behaviour elicited in three case studies of increasing complexity, demonstrating its ability to predict nuanced patterns of relevance better than existing models, including state-of-the-art large language models. We also show how the goal-sensitive reasoning instantiated in our probabilistic model motivates a novel chain-of-thought prompting method allowing language models to approach more human-like performance. This work illuminates the mechanistic role of ToM in the pragmatics of question–answer exchanges, bridging formal semantics, cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Our findings have implications for developing more socially grounded dialogue systems and highlight the importance of integrating explanatory cognitive models with machine learning approaches. This article is part of the theme issue ‘At the heart of human communication: new views on the complex relationship between pragmatics and Theory of Mind’.
It's Possible to Reduce Polarization without Reducing Engagement
The results of the Prosocial Ranking Challenge
Art or tool?
The Internet spaces I tend to inhabit have more polarisation than at many other recent times, and little explication of the worldviews that lead to different premises for discussion, that in turn...
Political Compass or Spinning Arrow? Towards More Meaningful Evaluations for Values and Opinions in Large Language Models
Much recent work seeks to evaluate values and opinions in large language models (LLMs) using multiple-choice surveys and questionnaires. Most of this work is motivated by concerns around real-world LLM applications. For example, politically-biased LLMs may subtly influence society when they are used by millions of people. Such real-world concerns, however, stand in stark contrast to the artificiality of current evaluations: real users do not typically ask LLMs survey questions. Motivated by this discrepancy, we challenge the prevailing constrained evaluation paradigm for values and opinions in LLMs and explore more realistic unconstrained evaluations. As a case study, we focus on the popular Political Compass Test (PCT). In a systematic review, we find that most prior work using the PCT *forces models to comply with the PCT's multiple-choice format. We show that models give substantively different answers when not forced; that answers change depending on how models are forced; and that answers lack paraphrase robustness. Then, we demonstrate that models give different answers yet again in a more realistic open-ended answer setting. We distill these findings into recommendations and open challenges in evaluating values and opinions in LLMs.
Algorithms may be making political polarization worse than we think
Marc Torrens and Carlos Carrasco-Farré analyze how algorithms influence opinions and heighten our emotional responses.
Resource-rational belief revision can mitigate as well as amplify polarization
People's beliefs sometimes diverge after observing the same information, which has been interpreted as evidence of irrationality. This behaviour has been proposed to result from people's limited cognitive resources and motivated reasoning, but how belief revision differs across these explanations has not been formalized or compared to a rational norm. Further, while people may be biased relative to a normative ideal, they may still make optimal choices given their limited cognitive resources, or rationally balance the utility of holding accurate beliefs with the belief's intrinsic utility. Across two studies, we develop and test a unified computational account of belief polarization under these proposed mechanisms, showing that people's performance on a belief updating task best fits a limited-resource Bayesian model; external motivations may contribute to divergence (or convergence) by determining what pre-existing information people consider relevant to a situation, rather than by changing how people evaluate new information in isolation.
π = 3: Pointing out flaws does not require solving them
I think science often takes the requirement that criticism be constructive too far. Most definitions of constructive criticism refer to feedback that is intended to help by pointing out flaws in a way that is specific, actionable, and respectful. This is good, I’m in favor of it. However, in practice, the demands for constructive criticism in science go much further: frequently, we are told that, to publicly point out serious flaws, you must also solve them, and to do otherwise is somehow rude, unscholarly, or low effort.
Political polarization at its worst since the Civil War
Data scientists try to explain the U.S. government’s shifting ideologies over the past four decades.
The Illusion of Asymmetric Insight
The Misconception: You celebrate diversity and respect others’ points of view. The Truth: You are driven to create and form groups and then believe others are wrong just because they are oth…
The social media discourse of engaged partisans is toxic even when politics are irrelevant
Abstract Prevailing theories of partisan incivility on social media suggest that it derives from disagreement about political issues or from status competition between groups. This study—which analyzes the commenting behavior of Reddit users across diverse cultural contexts (subreddits)—tests the alternative hypothesis that such incivility derives in large part from a selection effect: Toxic people are especially likely to opt into discourse in partisan contexts. First, we examined commenting behavior across over 9,000 unique cultural contexts (subreddits) and confirmed that discourse is indeed more toxic in partisan (e.g. r/progressive, r/conservatives) than in nonpartisan contexts (e.g. r/movies, r/programming). Next, we analyzed hundreds of millions of comments from over 6.3 million users and found robust evidence that: (i) the discourse of people whose behavior is especially toxic in partisan contexts is also especially toxic in nonpartisan contexts (i.e. people are not politics-only toxicity specialists); and (ii) when considering only nonpartisan contexts, the discourse of people who also comment in partisan contexts is more toxic than the discourse of people who do not. These effects were not driven by socialization processes whereby people overgeneralized toxic behavioral norms they had learned in partisan contexts. In contrast to speculation about the need for partisans to engage beyond their echo chambers, toxicity in nonpartisan contexts was higher among people who also comment in both left-wing and right-wing contexts (bilaterally engaged users) than among people who also comment in only left-wing or right-wing contexts (unilaterally engaged users). The discussion considers implications for democratic functioning and theories of polarization.
The Dynamics of Distortion: How Successive Summarization Alters the Retelling of News
This work advances and tests a theory of how news information evolves as it is successively retold by consumers. Drawing on data from over 11,000 participants across ten experiments, the authors offer evidence that when news is repeatedly retold, it undergoes a stylistic transformation termed “disagreeable personalization,” wherein original facts are increasingly supplanted by opinions and interpretations with a slant toward negativity. The central thesis is that when retellers believe they are more (vs. less) knowledgeable than their recipient about the information they are relaying, they feel more compelled to provide guidance on its meaning and to do so in a persuasive manner. This enhanced motivation to guide persuasively, in turn, leads retellers to not only select the subset of facts they deem most essential but, critically, to provide their interpretations and opinions on those facts, with negativity being used as a means of grabbing their audience’s attention. Implications of this work for research on retelling and consumer information diffusion are explored.
The Dynamics of Distortion: How Successive Summarization Alters the Retelling of News
This work advances and tests a theory of how news information evolves as it is successively retold by consumers. Drawing on data from over 11,000 participants across ten experiments, the authors offer evidence that when news is repeatedly retold, it undergoes a stylistic transformation termed “disagreeable personalization,” wherein original facts are increasingly supplanted by opinions and interpretations with a slant toward negativity. The central thesis is that when retellers believe they are more (vs. less) knowledgeable than their recipient about the information they are relaying, they feel more compelled to provide guidance on its meaning and to do so in a persuasive manner. This enhanced motivation to guide persuasively, in turn, leads retellers to not only select the subset of facts they deem most essential but, critically, to provide their interpretations and opinions on those facts, with negativity being used as a means of grabbing their audience’s attention. Implications of this work for research on retelling and consumer information diffusion are explored.
Social media discourse is driven by false #polarization We find that: 1) ideologues post opinions more than moderates 2) extreme attitudes are posted more than moderate one 3) This replicates in 40 countries 4) Opinions that users post are more hostile than the beliefs they keep to themselves
tired of the bickering at the polar extremes
Technorealists, the silent majority?
notes.erlend.sh‘Polarization’ has become the master concept for diagnosing our current democratic crisis. But this is not polarization. It is the radicalization of the political right. By misdiagnosing it, we risk becoming complicit in the crisis. 🧵 Just out in Perspectives on Politics doi.org/10.1017/S1537592726105246
Is social media truly making us more politically polarized, or does it simply over-represent our most extreme opinions? In our new preprint, @small-schulz.bsky.social and I present *punishing evidence* that social media systematically overrepresents users’ most extreme political opinions. 1/n
