People often provide answers that go beyond what a question literally asks, but it has been difficult to pin down what makes some answers more relevant than others. Here, we introduce Pragmatic Reasoning In Overinformative Responses to Polar Questions (PRIOR-PQ), a probabilistic cognitive model formalizing how people use theory of mind (ToM) to produce and interpret relevantly overinformative answers to yes–no questions. Specifically, PRIOR-PQ grounds the pragmatics of question answering in inferences about the underlying goal that motivated the questioner to ask the given question as opposed to a different question. We evaluate our probabilistic model against human answering behaviour elicited in three case studies of increasing complexity, demonstrating its ability to predict nuanced patterns of relevance better than existing models, including state-of-the-art large language models. We also show how the goal-sensitive reasoning instantiated in our probabilistic model motivates a novel chain-of-thought prompting method allowing language models to approach more human-like performance. This work illuminates the mechanistic role of ToM in the pragmatics of question–answer exchanges, bridging formal semantics, cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Our findings have implications for developing more socially grounded dialogue systems and highlight the importance of integrating explanatory cognitive models with machine learning approaches. This article is part of the theme issue ‘At the heart of human communication: new views on the complex relationship between pragmatics and Theory of Mind’.
Do People Ask Good Questions?
People ask questions in order to efficiently learn about the world. But do people ask good questions? In this work, we designed an intuitive, game-based task that allowed people to ask natural language questions to resolve their uncertainty. Question quality was measured through Bayesian ideal observer models that considered large spaces of possible game states. During free-form question generation, participants asked a creative variety of useful and goal-directed questions, yet they rarely asked the best questions as identified by the Bayesian ideal observers (Experiment 1). In subsequent experiments, participants strongly preferred the best questions when evaluating questions that they did not generate themselves (Experiments 2 and 3). On one hand, our results show that people can accurately evaluate question quality, even when the set of questions is diverse and an ideal observer analysis has large computational requirements. On the other hand, people have a limited ability to synthesize maximally informative questions from scratch, suggesting a bottleneck in the question asking process.
Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting
Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.
Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting
Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.
Reasoning Under Uncertainty: Exploring Probabilistic Reasoning Capabilities of LLMs
Despite widespread success in language understanding and generation, large language models (LLMs) exhibit unclear and often inconsistent behavior when faced with tasks that require probabilistic reasoning. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study of the reasoning capabilities of LLMs over explicit discrete probability distributions. Given observations from a probability distribution, we evaluate models on three carefully designed tasks, mode identification, maximum likelihood estimation, and sample generation, by prompting them to provide responses to queries about either the joint distribution or its conditionals. These tasks thus probe a range of probabilistic skills, including frequency analysis, marginalization, and generative behavior. Through comprehensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that there exists a clear performance gap between smaller and larger models, with the latter demonstrating stronger inference and surprising capabilities in sample generation. Furthermore, our investigations reveal notable limitations, including sensitivity to variations in the notation utilized to represent probabilistic outcomes and performance degradation of over 60% as context length increases. Together, our results provide a detailed understanding of the probabilistic reasoning abilities of LLMs and identify key directions for future improvement.
Reasoning Under Uncertainty: Exploring Probabilistic Reasoning Capabilities of LLMs
Despite widespread success in language understanding and generation, large language models (LLMs) exhibit unclear and often inconsistent behavior when faced with tasks that require probabilistic reasoning. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study of the reasoning capabilities of LLMs over explicit discrete probability distributions. Given observations from a probability distribution, we evaluate models on three carefully designed tasks, mode identification, maximum likelihood estimation, and sample generation, by prompting them to provide responses to queries about either the joint distribution or its conditionals. These tasks thus probe a range of probabilistic skills, including frequency analysis, marginalization, and generative behavior. Through comprehensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that there exists a clear performance gap between smaller and larger models, with the latter demonstrating stronger inference and surprising capabilities in sample generation. Furthermore, our investigations reveal notable limitations, including sensitivity to variations in the notation utilized to represent probabilistic outcomes and performance degradation of over 60% as context length increases. Together, our results provide a detailed understanding of the probabilistic reasoning abilities of LLMs and identify key directions for future improvement.
Eliciting Beliefs with Random Generation Tasks
Elicitation methods, such as asking people to produce the deciles of a distribution, are standard practices in policy or applied statistics. Similarly, much of cognitive science and psychology focuses on determining people's people's beliefs or latent traits through questionnaires or judgment tasks. However, these approaches often only capture a rough outline of what people know and are usually limited to point estimates of people's beliefs. Here, we present a novel experimental paradigm that allows us to access people's beliefs and how variable these beliefs are. Our task is based on an established random generation paradigm in which participants produce quantities from a particular domain as randomly as possible. We hypothesize that due to the minds' general-purpose mechanisms for probabilistic inferences, these random sequences represent the participants' underlying prior beliefs. We show that our method can infer participants' beliefs for a wide range of numeric quantities at comparable accuracy as an established elicitation method. Moreover, these inferred beliefs are consistent with individual participants' generalization and inference patterns in a subsequent conditional prediction task. We then extend our approach to non-numeric belief elicitation, highlighting how our method can go beyond numeric elicitation and provide insight into complex beliefs that are challenging to assess experimentally. Empirically, our results highlight that people know the rough shapes of environmental distributions, and these beliefs guide inference and generalization. Moreover, using our novel approach, we also show that people know the fine details of environmental distributions. Finally, our experimental results show that random generation paradigms can be a useful tool for cognitive scientists, psychologists, and applied statisticians.
ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models
While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across tasks in language understanding and interactive decision making, their abilities for reasoning (e.g. chain-of-thought prompting) and acting (e.g. action plan generation) have primarily been studied as separate topics. In this paper, we explore the use of LLMs to generate both reasoning traces and task-specific actions in an interleaved manner, allowing for greater synergy between the two: reasoning traces help the model induce, track, and update action plans as well as handle exceptions, while actions allow it to interface with external sources, such as knowledge bases or environments, to gather additional information. We apply our approach, named ReAct, to a diverse set of language and decision making tasks and demonstrate its effectiveness over state-of-the-art baselines, as well as improved human interpretability and trustworthiness over methods without reasoning or acting components. Concretely, on question answering (HotpotQA) and fact verification (Fever), ReAct overcomes issues of hallucination and error propagation prevalent in chain-of-thought reasoning by interacting with a simple Wikipedia API, and generates human-like task-solving trajectories that are more interpretable than baselines without reasoning traces. On two interactive decision making benchmarks (ALFWorld and WebShop), ReAct outperforms imitation and reinforcement learning methods by an absolute success rate of 34% and 10% respectively, while being prompted with only one or two in-context examples. Project site with code: https://react-lm.github.io
Measuring short-form factuality in large language models
We present SimpleQA, a benchmark that evaluates the ability of language models to answer short, fact-seeking questions. We prioritized two properties in designing this eval. First, SimpleQA is challenging, as it is adversarially collected against GPT-4 responses. Second, responses are easy to grade, because questions are created such that there exists only a single, indisputable answer. Each answer in SimpleQA is graded as either correct, incorrect, or not attempted. A model with ideal behavior would get as many questions correct as possible while not attempting the questions for which it is not confident it knows the correct answer. SimpleQA is a simple, targeted evaluation for whether models "know what they know," and our hope is that this benchmark will remain relevant for the next few generations of frontier models. SimpleQA can be found at https://github.com/openai/simple-evals.
Measuring short-form factuality in large language models
We present SimpleQA, a benchmark that evaluates the ability of language models to answer short, fact-seeking questions. We prioritized two properties in designing this eval. First, SimpleQA is challenging, as it is adversarially collected against GPT-4 responses. Second, responses are easy to grade, because questions are created such that there exists only a single, indisputable answer. Each answer in SimpleQA is graded as either correct, incorrect, or not attempted. A model with ideal behavior would get as many questions correct as possible while not attempting the questions for which it is not confident it knows the correct answer. SimpleQA is a simple, targeted evaluation for whether models "know what they know," and our hope is that this benchmark will remain relevant for the next few generations of frontier models. SimpleQA can be found at https://github.com/openai/simple-evals.
Reasoning Models Generate Societies of Thought
Large language models have achieved remarkable capabilities across domains, yet mechanisms underlying sophisticated reasoning remain elusive. Recent reasoning models outperform comparable instruction-tuned models on complex cognitive tasks, attributed to extended computation through longer chains of thought. Here we show that enhanced reasoning emerges not from extended computation alone, but from simulating multi-agent-like interactions -- a society of thought -- which enables diversification and debate among internal cognitive perspectives characterized by distinct personality traits and domain expertise. Through quantitative analysis and mechanistic interpretability methods applied to reasoning traces, we find that reasoning models like DeepSeek-R1 and QwQ-32B exhibit much greater perspective diversity than instruction-tuned models, activating broader conflict between heterogeneous personality- and expertise-related features during reasoning. This multi-agent structure manifests in conversational behaviors, including question-answering, perspective shifts, and the reconciliation of conflicting views, and in socio-emotional roles that characterize sharp back-and-forth conversations, together accounting for the accuracy advantage in reasoning tasks. Controlled reinforcement learning experiments reveal that base models increase conversational behaviors when rewarded solely for reasoning accuracy, and fine-tuning models with conversational scaffolding accelerates reasoning improvement over base models. These findings indicate that the social organization of thought enables effective exploration of solution spaces. We suggest that reasoning models establish a computational parallel to collective intelligence in human groups, where diversity enables superior problem-solving when systematically structured, which suggests new opportunities for agent organization to harness the wisdom of crowds.
Eliciting Reasoning in Language Models with Cognitive Tools
The recent advent of reasoning models like OpenAI's o1 was met with excited speculation by the AI community about the mechanisms underlying these capabilities in closed models, followed by a rush of replication efforts, particularly from the open source community. These speculations were largely settled by the demonstration from DeepSeek-R1 that chains-of-thought and reinforcement learning (RL) can effectively replicate reasoning on top of base LLMs. However, it remains valuable to explore alternative methods for theoretically eliciting reasoning that could help elucidate the underlying mechanisms, as well as providing additional methods that may offer complementary benefits. Here, we build on the long-standing literature in cognitive psychology and cognitive architectures, which postulates that reasoning arises from the orchestrated, sequential execution of a set of modular, predetermined cognitive operations. Crucially, we implement this key idea within a modern agentic tool-calling framework. In particular, we endow an LLM with a small set of "cognitive tools" encapsulating specific reasoning operations, each executed by the LLM itself. Surprisingly, this simple strategy results in considerable gains in performance on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks compared to base LLMs, for both closed and open-weight models. For instance, providing our "cognitive tools" to GPT-4.1 increases its pass@1 performance on AIME2024 from 32% to 53%, even surpassing the performance of o1-preview. In addition to its practical implications, this demonstration contributes to the debate regarding the role of post-training methods in eliciting reasoning in LLMs versus the role of inherent capabilities acquired during pre-training, and whether post-training merely uncovers these latent abilities.
Learn to Refuse: Making Large Language Models More Controllable and Reliable through Knowledge Scope Limitation and Refusal Mechanism
Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive language understanding and generation capabilities, enabling them to answer a wide range of questions across various domains. However, these models are not flawless and often produce responses that contain errors or misinformation. These inaccuracies, commonly referred to as hallucinations, render LLMs unreliable and even unusable in many scenarios. In this paper, our focus is on mitigating the issue of hallucination in LLMs, particularly in the context of question-answering. Instead of attempting to answer all questions, we explore a refusal mechanism that instructs LLMs to refuse to answer challenging questions in order to avoid errors. We then propose a simple yet effective solution called Learn to Refuse (L2R), which incorporates the refusal mechanism to enable LLMs to recognize and refuse to answer questions that they find difficult to address. To achieve this, we utilize a structured knowledge base to represent all the LLM's understanding of the world, enabling it to provide traceable gold knowledge. This knowledge base is separate from the LLM and initially empty. It can be filled with validated knowledge and progressively expanded. When an LLM encounters questions outside its domain, the system recognizes its knowledge scope and determines whether it can answer the question independently. Additionally, we introduce a method for automatically and efficiently expanding the knowledge base of LLMs. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis, we demonstrate that our approach enhances the controllability and reliability of LLMs.
Position: Stop Anthropomorphizing Intermediate Tokens as Reasoning/Thinking Traces!
Intermediate token generation (ITG), where a model produces output before the solution, has become a standard method to improve the performance of language models on reasoning tasks. These intermediate tokens have been called \say{reasoning traces} or even \say{thinking traces} -- implicitly anthropomorphizing the traces, and implying that these traces resemble steps a human might take when solving a challenging problem, and as such can provide an interpretable window into the operation of the model's thinking process to the end user. In this position paper, we present evidence that this anthropomorphization isn't a harmless metaphor, and instead is quite dangerous -- it confuses the nature of these models and how to use them effectively, and leads to questionable research. We call on the community to avoid such anthropomorphization of intermediate tokens.
Position: Stop Anthropomorphizing Intermediate Tokens as Reasoning/Thinking Traces!
Intermediate token generation (ITG), where a model produces output before the solution, has become a standard method to improve the performance of language models on reasoning tasks. These intermediate tokens have been called \say{reasoning traces} or even \say{thinking traces} -- implicitly anthropomorphizing the traces, and implying that these traces resemble steps a human might take when solving a challenging problem, and as such can provide an interpretable window into the operation of the model's thinking process to the end user. In this position paper, we present evidence that this anthropomorphization isn't a harmless metaphor, and instead is quite dangerous -- it confuses the nature of these models and how to use them effectively, and leads to questionable research. We call on the community to avoid such anthropomorphization of intermediate tokens.
Are Large Language Models Sensitive to the Motives Behind Communication?
Human communication is $\textit{motivated}$: people speak, write, and create content with a particular communicative intent in mind. As a result, information that large language models (LLMs) and AI agents process is inherently framed by humans' intentions and incentives. People are adept at navigating such nuanced information: we routinely identify benevolent or self-serving motives in order to decide what statements to trust. For LLMs to be effective in the real world, they too must critically evaluate content by factoring in the motivations of the source---for instance, weighing the credibility of claims made in a sales pitch. In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive study of whether LLMs have this capacity for $\textit{motivational vigilance}$. We first employ controlled experiments from cognitive science to verify that LLMs' behavior is consistent with rational models of learning from motivated testimony, and find they successfully discount information from biased sources in a human-like manner. We then extend our evaluation to sponsored online adverts, a more naturalistic reflection of LLM agents' information ecosystems. In these settings, we find that LLMs' inferences do not track the rational models' predictions nearly as closely---partly due to additional information that distracts them from vigilance-relevant considerations. However, a simple steering intervention that boosts the salience of intentions and incentives substantially increases the correspondence between LLMs and the rational model. These results suggest that LLMs possess a basic sensitivity to the motivations of others, but generalizing to novel real-world settings will require further improvements to these models.
Resource-rational belief revision can mitigate as well as amplify polarization
People's beliefs sometimes diverge after observing the same information, which has been interpreted as evidence of irrationality. This behaviour has been proposed to result from people's limited cognitive resources and motivated reasoning, but how belief revision differs across these explanations has not been formalized or compared to a rational norm. Further, while people may be biased relative to a normative ideal, they may still make optimal choices given their limited cognitive resources, or rationally balance the utility of holding accurate beliefs with the belief's intrinsic utility. Across two studies, we develop and test a unified computational account of belief polarization under these proposed mechanisms, showing that people's performance on a belief updating task best fits a limited-resource Bayesian model; external motivations may contribute to divergence (or convergence) by determining what pre-existing information people consider relevant to a situation, rather than by changing how people evaluate new information in isolation.