Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday Borrowing

Minimum Required Payment and Supplemental Information Disclosure Effects on Consumer Debt Repayment Decisions

Repayment decisions—how much of the loan to repay and when to make the payments—directly influence consumer debt levels. The authors examine how minimum required payment policy and loan information disclosed to consumers influence repayment decisions. They find that while presenting minimum required payment information has a negative impact on repayment decisions, increasing the minimum required level has a positive effect on repayment for most consumers. Experimental evidence from U.S. consumers shows that consumers’ propensity to pay the minimum required each month moderates these effects; U.K. credit card field data indicate that borrowers’ credit limit and balance due also moderate these effects. However, increasing the minimum level is unlikely to completely eliminate the negative effect of presenting minimum payment information. In addition, disclosing supplemental information, such as future interest cost and time needed to repay the loan, does not reduce the negative effects of including minimum payment information and has no substantial positive effect on repayments. This research offers new insights into the debt repayment process and has implications for consumers, lenders, and public policy.

Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything

We review literature examining the effects of laws and regulations that require public disclosure of information. These requirements are most sensibly imposed in situations characterized by misaligned incentives and asymmetric information between, for example, a buyer and seller or an advisor and advisee. We review the economic literature relevant to such disclosure and then discuss how different psychological factors complicate, and in some cases radically change, the economic predictions. For example, limited attention, motivated attention, and biased assessments of probability on the part of information recipients can significantly diminish, or even reverse, the intended effects of disclosure requirements. In many cases, disclosure does not much affect the recipients of the information but does significantly affect the behavior of the providers, sometimes for the better and sometimes for the worse. We review research suggesting that simplified disclosure, standardized disclosure, vivid disclosure, and social comparison information can all be used to enhance the effectiveness of disclosure policies.

The Hedonics of Debt

Psychologists and economists often discuss the “pain” of paying for our purchases. Four experiments examine how people evaluate prospective debt payments, analyzing how different features of a loan (down payment, final payment, duration, monthly payments) affect willingness to accept the loan. Akin to previous findings on physical pain, participants exhibited duration neglect and over-weighted final moments. However, participants also focused heavily on the monthly or average payment (unlike in retrospective studies of physical pain where only peak-end moments seem to count). In Experiment 2, participants’ willingness to accept the loan was not significantly diminished by making it more expensive through keeping the same monthly payment but extending the length of the loan by 40 percent (evincing duration neglect). Further, in Experiments 3 and 4, we show that participants increased their willingness to buy if loans were made longer and more expensive by adding smaller, less “painful” payments to the end.

Are Information Disclosures Effective? Evidence from the Credit Card Market

Consumer protection in financial markets in the form of information disclosure is high on government agendas, even though there is little evidence of its effectiveness. We implement a randomized control trial in the credit card market for a large population of indebted cardholders and measure the impact of Truth-in-Lending-Act-type disclosures, de-biasing warning messages and social comparison information on default, indebtedness, account closings, and credit scores. We conduct extensive external validity exercises in several banks, with different disclosures, and with actual policy mandates. We find that providing salient interest rate disclosures had no effects, while comparisons and de-biasing messages had only modest effects at best.

Context-Dependent Drivers of Discretionary Debt Decisions: Explaining Willingness to Borrow for Experiential Purchases

Abstract Mental accounting research suggests that consumers prefer borrowing for longer-lasting purchases in order to receive benefits from the purchases as they pay for them. In contrast, two sets of archival data and five lab studies show that consumers are more willing to borrow for experiential versus material purchases, even though experiential purchases tend to have a shorter physical duration. Further, framing the same purchase as more experiential than material increases willingness to borrow. This effect occurs because purchase timing is more important for experiential purchases—a function of consumers’ aversion to missing out on planned consumption. Thus, we moderate the proposed effect by varying whether the borrowing decision impacts planned consumption. Other differences between material and experiential purchases, such as scarcity or expected happiness, cannot similarly explain our results. Moreover, our conceptualization allows us to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the previous and current research by examining the relative impact of purchase-timing importance and payment-benefit duration matching in different contexts (i.e., “purchasing” and “source-of-funding” decisions).

Knowing When to Spend: Unintended Financial Consequences of Earmarking to Encourage Savings

Maintaining savings is an important financial goal. Yet there are times when savings should be spent, such as when people face unavoidable costs, and spending their savings allows them to avoid high interest rate debt. Existing behavioral research has focused on consumer decisions between savings and discretionary spending and has proposed interventions to promote savings in these contexts. However, when spending is not discretionary, such interventions could risk exacerbating a pattern found in economic research in which people borrow high interest rate debt while maintaining savings that earn low levels of interest. To examine how mental accounting interacts with considerations of personal responsibility and guilt to contribute to this pattern, this article explores whether people spend their savings when they need money most: during emergencies. Six studies reveal that people's tendency to preserve savings by borrowing from a high interest rate credit option varies as a function of the savings’ intended use. Paradoxically, people are most likely to turn to high interest rate credit with the belief that doing so is the responsible option.

The Effects of Prior Spending on Future Spending Decisions: The Role of Acquisition Liabilities and Payments

Research in mental accounting shows that prior spending influences a consumer's decision to make a new spending decision (Heath and Soll 1996, Soman 2001). In particular, greater spending in a particular category reduces the likelihood of further spending in that category. In the present research, we decompose “spending” into two distinct episodes—the acquisition liability episode during which a purchase is made accompanied by a commitment to pay (e.g., using a credit card) and the payment episode during which the consumer's wealth actually gets depleted (e.g., paying the credit card bill). Using a controlled laboratory experiment and real world data from a group of consumers, we replicate earlier findings that prior spending influences a pending spending decision, but also show that the location of both the acquisition liability episode and the payment episode play a role. Our results contribute to an understanding of the dynamic mental accounting of acquisition liability and actual outflows.

Debt literacy, financial experiences, and overindebtedness

We analyze a national sample of Americans with respect to their debt literacy, financial experiences, and their judgments about the extent of their indebtedness. Debt literacy is a component of broader financial understanding that measures knowledge about debt and self-assessed financial knowledge. Financial experiences are the participants’ reported experiences with traditional borrowing, alternative borrowing, and investing. Overindebtedness is a self-reported measure. Debt literacy is low, with only about one-third of the population grasping the basics of interest compounding. Even after controlling for demographics, we find a relationship between debt literacy and both financial experiences and debt loads. Individuals with lower levels of debt literacy tend to transact in high-cost manners, incurring higher fees and using high-cost borrowing. We provide a rough estimate of the national implications of debt ignorance on credit card costs by consumers. Less knowledgeable individuals also report that their debt loads are excessive or that they are unable to judge their debt position.

Do Nudges Reduce Borrowing and Consumer Confusion in the Credit Card Market?

We study nudges that turn out to have precise null effects in reducing long‐run credit card debt. We test nudges across two field experiments covering 183,441 UK cardholders. Our first experiment studies nudges added to monthly credit card statements. Our second experiment studies letters and email nudges (separate from monthly statements) sent to cardholders who signed up to automatically pay the minimum required payment. In a follow‐up survey to our second experiment, we find that 96% of respondents underestimate the time it would take to fully repay a debt if the cardholder made only the minimum required payment. The nudges reduce this confusion, but underestimation remains overwhelmingly common.

On shifting consumers from high‐interest to low‐interest debt

Abstract In the United States, many consumers are increasingly accumulating debt, much of which is harmful and expensive. Prior research has devoted a great deal of attention to understanding why consumers generally get into debt and the strategies they can use to repay existing debts. While this work has furthered the agenda of helping consumers reduce or eliminate their overall debt balances, it has failed to emphasize the fact that for many consumers, debt may be unavoidable. This article aims to promote research that addresses not only overall debt reduction but also the need for consumers to shift from more to less costly types of debt. By shedding light on the psychological reasons why consumers may naturally gravitate toward more costly forms of debt when less costly ones may be available, we offer a novel perspective on why consumers get into and stay in debt longer than they should. This new angle has the potential to spur on further research into the ways consumers can use debt more effectively and less expensively in service of the overarching goal of debt reduction.

The Ostrich in Us: Selective Attention to Personal Finances

Abstract We analyze attention to personal finances using a high-frequency panel of bank data, including information on logins. We document a number of robust patterns. Relative to their personal histories, individuals pay more attention when holding more cash and liquidity and when receiving income. In contrast, attention decreases discretely as bank account balances go from positive to negative and then decreases further as overdraft debt increases. We conclude that Ostrich effects in a personal finance context, i.e., the avoidance of obtaining information on everyday personal finances, is a widespread phenomenon and explore a number of explanations for our findings.

Information disclosure and credit card repayments: evidence from Malaysia

Purpose This study analyzes the role of information disclosure in influencing credit card repayments by focusing on three intervention methods for improving repayment decisions among credit cardholders. Design/methodology/approach This study uses the survey method to collect data. Four questionnaires are designed to identify which types of disclosure elicit better repayment decisions among credit cardholders. The participants were approached using the mall intercept method, and a total of 1,775 responses were obtained. Findings Estimations using means comparison tests show that not providing minimum payment information improves repayments. The expected benefits are not delivered by the provision of higher minimum payment information or additional information that highlights the negative effects of making the minimum repayment only. Further analysis using logit estimation reconfirms the benefit of not providing minimum payment information. However, when such information is given, low minimum payment information elicits better repayment decisions than high minimum payment information or additional information. Repayment worsens under the additional information condition compared to the high minimum payment condition. Research limitations/implications The findings of this study have a bearing on the decisions of policy makers, credit card issuers and consumers. Originality/value This paper clarifies the role of information in improving debt repayment decisions.

Disclosing the costs of co-holding liquid assets and high-interest debt has limited impact on behavior

Abstract Why do consumers simultaneously maintain low-yield liquid assets and high-interest revolving debt? This behavior, known as ``co-holding,'' affects 23\% of credit card users in our sample from a major international bank and costs the typical co-holder hundreds of dollars annually in unnecessary interest charges. Our analysis of 38 months of detailed banking records reveals that co-holding is remarkably persistent, with typical co-holders maintaining this behavior for most months observed. Our analysis also reveals that co-holding is not a static financial position: co-holders regularly deposit and withdraw from asset accounts while simultaneously making new credit card purchases. To test whether co-holding could be addressed through information disclosure, we conducted a large-scale field experiment (n = 125,328), providing clear information about co-holding behavior and its costs. Customers received targeted messages through their bank's mobile app, where they could easily transfer money from assets to pay down debt. Despite sufficient power to detect economically small effects, we found no meaningful changes in debt repayment amount, though customers did respond in other ways---making more frequent repayments and paying above required minimums. These results challenge explanations based on limited attention or information gaps and suggest that simple information disclosure, even when carefully designed and delivered through trusted channels, may not effectively address costly financial behaviors.

Reading the Fine Print: Information Disclosure in the Brazilian Credit Card Market

Consumer credit regulations usually require that lenders disclose interest rates. However, in the absence of specific prominence requirements, lenders can conceal the interest rate in the fine print while still complying with the law. I examine the effect of such a strategy using a field experiment in Brazil in which a credit card company offered their clients payment plans to pay off their balances. Using randomized contract interest rates and the degree of rate disclosure, I show that most clients are rate sensitive, whether or not rates are prominently disclosed. The elasticity of payment plan enrollment with respect to the interest rate ranges from −0.711 to −0.880. High-risk clients are an exception; these clients are rate sensitive only when disclosure is prominent. I also show that clients are influenced by nudges that favor longer-term contracts. Conditional on enrollment, the proportion of clients who choose a longer-term contract is 40 percentage points higher when a longer-term contract is featured in the advertisement layout. This effect, however, is weaker when stakes are higher. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2281 . This paper was accepted by Wei Jiang, finance.

Borrowing on the Wrong Credit Card? Evidence from Mexico

We establish new facts about the way consumers allocate debt among their credit cards using data for a representative sample of cardholders in Mexico. We find that relative prices are weak predictors of the allocation of debt, purchases, and payments. Consumers allocate a large fraction of their debt to high-interest cards, incurring a cost of 31 percent above the minimum. Using an experiment, we find that consumers do not substitute in the price margin, although they respond to salient temporary low-interest offers. We conclude that limited attention and mental accounting best rationalize our results and discuss implications for the market.

Default Effects of Credit Card Minimum Payments

Credit card minimum payments are designed to ensure that individuals pay down their debt over time, and scheduling minimum automatic repayments helps people avoid forgetting to repay. Yet minimum payments have additional, unintended psychological default effects by drawing attention away from the card balance due. First, once individuals set the minimum automatic repayment as the default, they then neglect to make the occasional larger repayments they made previously. As a result, individuals incur considerably more credit card interest than late payment fees avoided. Using detailed transaction data, the authors show that approximately 8% of all of the interest ever paid is due to this effect. Second, manual credit card payments are lower when individuals are prompted with minimum payment information. In an experiment, the authors test two new interventions to mitigate this effect—a prompt for full repayment and a prompt asking those repaying little to pay more—yielding large counter effects. Thus, shrouding the minimum payment option for automatic and manual payments and directing attention to the full balance may remedy the unintended effects of default minimum payments.