A full range of psychological processes has been put into play to explain judgment and choice phenomena. Complementing work on attention, information integration, and learning, decision research over the past 10 years has also examined the effects of goals, mental representation, and memory processes. In addition to deliberative processes, automatic processes have gotten closer attention, and the emotions revolution has put affective processes on a footing equal to cognitive ones. Psychological process models provide natural predictions about individual differences and lifespan changes and integrate across judgment and decision making (JDM) phenomena. “Mindful” JDM research leverages our knowledge about psychological processes into causal explanations for important judgment and choice regularities, emphasizing the adaptive use of an abundance of processing alternatives. Such explanations supplement and support existing mathematical descriptions of phenomena such as loss aversion or hyperbolic discounting. Unlike such descriptions, they also provide entry points for interventions designed to help people overcome judgments or choices considered undesirable.
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Adult age differences in monetary decisions with real and hypothetical reward
Abstract Age differences in monetary decisions may emerge because younger and older adults perceive the value of outcomes differently. Yet, age‐differential effects of monetary rewards on decisions are not well understood. Most laboratory studies on aging and decision making have used scenarios in which rewards were merely hypothetical (decisions did not have any real consequences) or in which only small amounts of money were at stake. In the current study, we compared younger adults' (20–29 years) and older adults' (61–82 years) decisions in probabilistic choice problems with real or hypothetical rewards. Decision‐contingent rewards were in a typical range of previous studies (gains of up to ~4.25 USD) or substantially scaled up (gains of up to ~85 USD per participant). Reward type (real vs. hypothetical) affected decision quality, including value maximization, switching between options, and dominance violations (choices of an option that was inferior to another option in all respects). Decision quality was markedly better with real than hypothetical rewards in older adults and correlated with numeracy in both age groups. However, we found no evidence that reward type affected people's risk preferences. Overall, the findings portray a fairly positive picture regarding the use of hypothetical scenarios to assess preferences: With carefully prepared instructions, people from different age groups indicate preferences in hypothetical scenarios that match their decisions with real and much higher rewards. One advantage of using real rewards is that they help to reduce decision noise.
Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases.
Resource-rational belief revision can mitigate as well as amplify polarization
People's beliefs sometimes diverge after observing the same information, which has been interpreted as evidence of irrationality. This behaviour has been proposed to result from people's limited cognitive resources and motivated reasoning, but how belief revision differs across these explanations has not been formalized or compared to a rational norm. Further, while people may be biased relative to a normative ideal, they may still make optimal choices given their limited cognitive resources, or rationally balance the utility of holding accurate beliefs with the belief's intrinsic utility. Across two studies, we develop and test a unified computational account of belief polarization under these proposed mechanisms, showing that people's performance on a belief updating task best fits a limited-resource Bayesian model; external motivations may contribute to divergence (or convergence) by determining what pre-existing information people consider relevant to a situation, rather than by changing how people evaluate new information in isolation.
Characterizing the causes, dynamics, and consequences of choice deferral
The fact that people often avoid making decisions is well known, and past research has helped to identify some of the conditions and reasons for doing so. For instance, people may forgo choices between bad options because they prefer not to end up with one of those options. It is much less clear when and why people avoid choosing in cases where they eventually will have to make a given decision. To study such instances of choice deferral, we presented participants with a series of choices, and for each choice they were allowed to either choose immediately or defer the decision until later in the experiment. Across six experiments and three choice domains (choices among consumer goods, artwork, and political candidates), we find that the strongest predictor of choice deferral is the overall value of a given set of options, with relative value (i.e., how hard it is to identify the best option) counterintuitively playing a smaller role. We show that the influence of overall value on choice deferral can be accounted for by a dynamic decision model according to which participants appraise the option set relative to a criterion before deciding whether to choose or defer, comparing this to a previous model whereby participants make such a decision based on a predetermined decision time limit. We further reveal that the influence of overall value on choice deferral is determined by how congruent options are with a given choice goal (choose-best or choose-worst) rather than simply how bad those options are. Collectively, our findings shed new light on how people decide to put off the inevitable.
Learning From Older Adults: An Intergoal Compatibility Account for Successful Happiness Pursuit
Academic Abstract People want to pursue happiness but often fail, a phenomenon known as the paradox of pursuing happiness. The mechanisms underlying this paradox remain elusive. Age differences in happiness—specifically that older adults appear more successful in pursuing happiness (the emotion paradox of aging)—provide valuable insights into effective happiness pursuit. Drawing on this literature, we propose an intergoal compatibility account to interpret both paradoxes through the lens of intergoal interactions, an intuitively critical yet underexplored factor in existing interpretations. This account asserts that greater compatibility (fewer conflicts and greater facilitation) between happiness pursuit and other important personal goals enhances the effectiveness of happiness pursuit, and such compatibility can be enhanced through contextual influences (e.g., age-graded developmental tasks) and strategic self-regulation (e.g., goal adjustments). This account generates testable predictions and practical implications for enhancing happiness pursuit across the lifespan. Public Abstract Why do people often struggle to achieve happiness? And why are older adults happier than younger adults, even though they face more losses in life? While these questions have drawn extensive attention, they remain puzzling. A crucial yet insufficiently explored factor in successful happiness pursuit is intergoal compatibility —the extent to which the pursuit of happiness aligns or conflicts with other important personal goals. For younger adults, the demands of age-related developmental tasks (e.g., educational and career aspirations) often create conflicts with the pursuit of happiness, diminishing its effectiveness. Conversely, in older adults, happiness becomes more prioritized and compatible with other important personal goals, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of pursuing happiness. A lesson we can learn from older adults is to pursue happiness in ways compatible with other important personal goals.
Metacognitive experiences as information: Processing fluency in consumer judgment and decision making
Abstract Thinking is accompanied by metacognitive experiences of ease or difficulty. People draw on these experiences as a source of information that can complement or challenge the implications of declarative information. We conceptualize the operation of metacognitive experiences within the framework of feelings‐as‐information theory and review their implications for judgments relevant to consumer behavior, including popularity, trust, risk, truth, and beauty.
Metacognitive experiences as information: Processing fluency in consumer judgment and decision making
Abstract Thinking is accompanied by metacognitive experiences of ease or difficulty. People draw on these experiences as a source of information that can complement or challenge the implications of declarative information. We conceptualize the operation of metacognitive experiences within the framework of feelings‐as‐information theory and review their implications for judgments relevant to consumer behavior, including popularity, trust, risk, truth, and beauty.
Choice Bracketing
When making many choices, a person can broadly bracket them by assessing the consequences of all of them taken together, or narrowly bracket them by making each choice in isolation. We integrate research conducted in a wide range of decision contexts which shows that choice bracketing is an important determinant of behavior. Because broad bracketing allows people to take into account all the consequences of their actions, it generally leads to choices that yield higher utility. The evidence that we review, however, shows that people often fail to bracket broadly when it would be feasible for them to do so. In addition to documenting the diverse effects of bracketing, we also discuss factors that determine whether people bracket narrowly or broadly. We conclude with a discussion of normative aspects of bracketing and argue that there are some situations in which narrower bracketing results in superior decision making.
Mechanisms of social cognition
Social animals including humans share a range of social mechanisms that are automatic and implicit and enable learning by observation. Learning from others includes imitation of actions and mirroring of emotions. Learning about others, such as their group membership and reputation, is crucial for social interactions that depend on trust. For accurate prediction of others' changeable dispositions, mentalizing is required, i.e., tracking of intentions, desires, and beliefs. Implicit mentalizing is present in infants less than one year old as well as in some nonhuman species. Explicit mentalizing is a meta-cognitive process and enhances the ability to learn about the world through self-monitoring and reflection, and may be uniquely human. Meta-cognitive processes can also exert control over automatic behavior, for instance, when short-term gains oppose long-term aims or when selfish and prosocial interests collide. We suggest that they also underlie the ability to explicitly share experiences with other agents, as in reflective discussion and teaching. These are key in increasing the accuracy of the models of the world that we construct.
A sampling model of social judgment.
Thinking—Fast, Slow, and Artificial: How AI is Reshaping Human Reasoning and the Rise of Cognitive Surrender
People increasingly consult generative artificial intelligence (AI) while reasoning. As AI becomes embedded in daily thought, what becomes of human judgment? We
The Inversion Problem: Why Algorithms Should Infer Mental State and Not Just Predict Behavior
More and more machine learning is applied to human behavior. Increasingly these algorithms suffer from a hidden—but serious—problem. It arises because they often predict one thing while hoping for another. Take a recommender system: It predicts clicks but hopes to identify preferences. Or take an algorithm that automates a radiologist: It predicts in-the-moment diagnoses while hoping to identify their reflective judgments. Psychology shows us the gaps between the objectives of such prediction tasks and the goals we hope to achieve: People can click mindlessly; experts can get tired and make systematic errors. We argue such situations are ubiquitous and call them “inversion problems”: The real goal requires understanding a mental state that is not directly measured in behavioral data but must instead be inverted from the behavior. Identifying and solving these problems require new tools that draw on both behavioral and computational science.
Chesterton’s Fence: A Lesson in Thinking
A core component of making great decisions is understanding previous decisions. If we don’t understand how we got “here,” we run the risk of making things much worse.
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Discover this 1986 paper in Psychological Review by Kahneman, Daniel; and, Miller, Dale T. focusing on: Attribution; Emotional Responses; Social Norms; Judgment; Models Abstract: Presents a theory of norms and normality and applies the theory to phenomena of emotional responses, social judgment, and conversations about causes. Norms are assumed to be constructed ad hoc by recruiting specific representations. Category norms are derived by recruiting exemplars. Specific objects or events generate their own norms by retrieval of similar experiences stored in memory or by construction of counterfactual alternatives. The normality of a stimulus is evaluated by comparing it with the norms that it evokes after the fact, rather than to precomputed expectations. Norm theory is applied in analyses of the enhanced emotional response to events that have abnormal causes, of the generation of predictions and inferences from observations of behavior, and of the role of norms in causal questions and answers. (3 p ref) (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
The Preference Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and Social Preferences
Incentivized choice experiments are a key approach to measuring preferences in economics but are also costly. Survey measures are a low-cost alternative but can suffer from additional forms of measurement error due to their hypothetical nature. This paper seeks to leverage the strengths of both approaches by proposing a new survey module on risk aversion, time discounting, trust, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity, in which survey items are selected based on ability to predict choices in corresponding, incentivized experiments. The methodology and results provided in the paper can also potentially provide a model for researchers who have specific requirements and want to design their own modules. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: The project received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7-2007-2013) [Grant 209214]. A. Falk and T. Dohmen acknowledge funding from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation) [Grant CRC TR 224 (Project A01)] and Germany’s Excellence Strategy [Grant EXC 2126/1-390838866]. Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4455 .
