







U.S. households currently hold $770 billion in credit card debt, often managing repayments across multiple accounts. The authors investigate how minimum payment requirements (i.e., the requirement to allocate at least some money to each account with a balance) alter consumers’ allocation strategies across multiple accounts. Across four experiments, they find that minimum payment requirements cause consumers to increase dispersion (i.e., spread their repayments more evenly) across accounts. The authors term this change in strategy “the dispersion effect of minimum payments” and provide evidence that it can be costly for consumers. They find that the effect is partially driven by the tendency for consumers to interpret minimum payment requirements as recommendations to pay more than the minimum amount. While the presence of the minimum payment requirement is unlikely to change, the authors propose that marketers and policy makers can influence the effects of minimum payments on dispersion by altering the way that information is displayed to consumers. Specifically, they investigate five distinct information displays and find that choice of display can either exaggerate or minimize dispersion and corresponding costs. They discuss implications for consumers, policy makers, and firms, with a particular focus on ways to improve consumer financial well-being.
Minimum Required Payment and Supplemental Information Disclosure Effects on Consumer Debt Repayment Decisions
Repayment decisions—how much of the loan to repay and when to make the payments—directly influence consumer debt levels. The authors examine how minimum required payment policy and loan information disclosed to consumers influence repayment decisions. They find that while presenting minimum required payment information has a negative impact on repayment decisions, increasing the minimum required level has a positive effect on repayment for most consumers. Experimental evidence from U.S. consumers shows that consumers’ propensity to pay the minimum required each month moderates these effects; U.K. credit card field data indicate that borrowers’ credit limit and balance due also moderate these effects. However, increasing the minimum level is unlikely to completely eliminate the negative effect of presenting minimum payment information. In addition, disclosing supplemental information, such as future interest cost and time needed to repay the loan, does not reduce the negative effects of including minimum payment information and has no substantial positive effect on repayments. This research offers new insights into the debt repayment process and has implications for consumers, lenders, and public policy.

The Hidden Role of Contract Terms: The Case of Credit Card Minimum Payments in Mexico
This paper argues that thresholds in financial contracts act as implicit nudges in consumers’ decisions. Exploiting a regulatory change to credit card minimum payments in Mexico, we find that a 1-percentage point change in minimum payments leads to a 0.87-percentage point change in actual payments, both expressed as a percentage of total balances. We decompose the effect of minimum payments into a constraining effect and a reference effect. The former captures the effect of minimum payments as a binding constraint and accounts for 59% of its total effect. The latter captures any remaining impact of changes in minimum payments beyond their constraining effect and represents 41% of the total. In turn, 67% of the reference effect is explained by the multiple heuristic: the tendency of consumers to pay whole-number multiples of the minimum payment. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance.

Timing to the Statement: Understanding Fluctuations in Consumer Credit Use
We show that consumers spend 15% more per day in the first week following the receipt of a credit card statement than in the days just prior to the statement. This increase in spending includes both an increase in the likelihood that they use the credit card in the first weeks following their statement and an increase in transaction amount on days they use the credit card. In contrast to the effect on credit card spending, debit card spending is unaffected by credit card statement issuance, suggesting that consumers are not simply switching among modes of payment. Our estimates are based on exogenous variation from bank-assigned statement dates. We propose and test several alternative explanations to this spending puzzle: optimization of the free float, salience effect of the credit card statement, mental accounting, liquidity constraints, and automatic payments. We find that the consumers most apt to spend early in the credit card cycle tend to be those who do not revolve balances and are not close to their credit limit. Thus, this paper documents a puzzle with mixed support for several alternative explanations. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.

On shifting consumers from high‐interest to low‐interest debt
Abstract In the United States, many consumers are increasingly accumulating debt, much of which is harmful and expensive. Prior research has devoted a great deal of attention to understanding why consumers generally get into debt and the strategies they can use to repay existing debts. While this work has furthered the agenda of helping consumers reduce or eliminate their overall debt balances, it has failed to emphasize the fact that for many consumers, debt may be unavoidable. This article aims to promote research that addresses not only overall debt reduction but also the need for consumers to shift from more to less costly types of debt. By shedding light on the psychological reasons why consumers may naturally gravitate toward more costly forms of debt when less costly ones may be available, we offer a novel perspective on why consumers get into and stay in debt longer than they should. This new angle has the potential to spur on further research into the ways consumers can use debt more effectively and less expensively in service of the overarching goal of debt reduction.

Cash versus Debit Card: The Role of Budget Control
Due to the financial crisis, an increasing number of households face financial problems. This may lead to an increasing need for monitoring spending and budgets. We demonstrate that both cash and the debit card are perceived as helpful in this respect. We show that, on average, consumers responsible for financial decision making within a household find cash and the debit card equally helpful for monitoring their household finances. Individuals differ in major respects, however. In particular, low earners and the liquidity‐constrained prefer cash as a budgeting tool. Finally, we present evidence that at an aggregated level, such preferences strongly affect consumer payment behavior. These findings suggest that the substitution of cash by cards may slow down because of the financial crisis.

“Repayment-by-Purchase” Increases Consumer Debt Repayment
This article tests the effect of a novel credit card payment format—repayment-by-purchase—on consumers’ payments toward credit card debt. In contrast to typical balance repayment, where consumers make repayments relative to a total amount owed, repayment-by-purchase prompts consumers to select items (e.g., a Starbucks coffee) or categories of purchase (e.g., restaurant and café purchases) and to make payments toward their related debt. A field experiment first suggests that customers who opted into repayment-by-purchase paid 12.18% more toward their statement balance than a control group. Subsequently, five lab experiments show that consumers repaying-by-purchase increase repayment by an average of 22.47% over typical balance repayment. Process evidence suggests that these differences may be driven by repayment-by-purchase's power to increase purchase salience, which in turns increases perceptions of progress toward reducing debt. Consistent with this theory, the effect of repayment-by-purchase on bill repayment emerges regardless of whether consumers repay durable versus nondurable goods, and for specific items or categories of purchases, as long as the bill uses labels that are concrete enough to raise past purchase salience.

Default Effects of Credit Card Minimum Payments
Credit card minimum payments are designed to ensure that individuals pay down their debt over time, and scheduling minimum automatic repayments helps people avoid forgetting to repay. Yet minimum payments have additional, unintended psychological default effects by drawing attention away from the card balance due. First, once individuals set the minimum automatic repayment as the default, they then neglect to make the occasional larger repayments they made previously. As a result, individuals incur considerably more credit card interest than late payment fees avoided. Using detailed transaction data, the authors show that approximately 8% of all of the interest ever paid is due to this effect. Second, manual credit card payments are lower when individuals are prompted with minimum payment information. In an experiment, the authors test two new interventions to mitigate this effect—a prompt for full repayment and a prompt asking those repaying little to pay more—yielding large counter effects. Thus, shrouding the minimum payment option for automatic and manual payments and directing attention to the full balance may remedy the unintended effects of default minimum payments.

Do Nudges Reduce Borrowing and Consumer Confusion in the Credit Card Market?
We study nudges that turn out to have precise null effects in reducing long‐run credit card debt. We test nudges across two field experiments covering 183,441 UK cardholders. Our first experiment studies nudges added to monthly credit card statements. Our second experiment studies letters and email nudges (separate from monthly statements) sent to cardholders who signed up to automatically pay the minimum required payment. In a follow‐up survey to our second experiment, we find that 96% of respondents underestimate the time it would take to fully repay a debt if the cardholder made only the minimum required payment. The nudges reduce this confusion, but underestimation remains overwhelmingly common.

Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit Card Data
Abstract. This paper utilizes a unique data set of credit card accounts to analyze how people respond to credit supply. Increases in credit limits generate

The Impact of Payment Frequency on Consumer Spending and Subjective Wealth Perceptions
Abstract Payment frequency is a fundamental yet underexplored feature of consumers’ finances. As higher payment frequencies are becoming more prevalent, consumers are receiving more frequent yet smaller paychecks. An analysis of income and expenditure data of over 30,000 consumers from a financial services provider demonstrates a naturally occurring relationship between higher payment frequencies and increased spending. A series of lab studies support this finding, providing causal evidence that higher (vs. lower) payment frequencies increase spending. The effect of payment frequency on spending is driven by changes in consumers’ subjective wealth perceptions. Specifically, higher payment frequencies reduce consumers’ uncertainty in predicting whether they will have enough resources throughout a period, increasing their subjective wealth perceptions. As such, situational factors that reduce prediction uncertainty for those paid less frequently (e.g., the timing of consumers’ expenses, income levels) moderate the impact of payment frequency. The effects of payment frequency on subjective wealth and spending can occur even when objective wealth favors those with lower payment frequencies. More broadly, the current work underscores a need to understand how timing variations in consumers’ income impact their perceptions, behaviors, and general well-being.

Information disclosure and credit card repayments: evidence from Malaysia
Purpose This study analyzes the role of information disclosure in influencing credit card repayments by focusing on three intervention methods for improving repayment decisions among credit cardholders. Design/methodology/approach This study uses the survey method to collect data. Four questionnaires are designed to identify which types of disclosure elicit better repayment decisions among credit cardholders. The participants were approached using the mall intercept method, and a total of 1,775 responses were obtained. Findings Estimations using means comparison tests show that not providing minimum payment information improves repayments. The expected benefits are not delivered by the provision of higher minimum payment information or additional information that highlights the negative effects of making the minimum repayment only. Further analysis using logit estimation reconfirms the benefit of not providing minimum payment information. However, when such information is given, low minimum payment information elicits better repayment decisions than high minimum payment information or additional information. Repayment worsens under the additional information condition compared to the high minimum payment condition. Research limitations/implications The findings of this study have a bearing on the decisions of policy makers, credit card issuers and consumers. Originality/value This paper clarifies the role of information in improving debt repayment decisions.

When Motivation is against Debtors' Best Interest: The Illusion of Goal Progress in Credit Card Debt Repayment
The authors explore the illusion of goal progress by consumers who own multiple credit cards and pay off their debt balances to facilitate the achievement of their subgoal rather than the superordinate goal of being debt-free. The first experiment shows that debtors use their savings toward the credit card debt they can pay off entirely or substantially, even if it is associated with the smallest balance and the lowest annual percentage rate rather than toward the debt with the highest annual percentage rate. The second experiment reveals that when the income available to pay down the debt is in the form of effortless money (i.e., windfall or reward money) as opposed to hard-earned savings, the tendency to allocate money toward the smallest credit card debt is exacerbated. However, people tend to pay their debt more rationally when the number of debt accounts increases. Finally, the third experiment shows that credit card debt repayment decisions depend on the nature of the debt (hedonic vs. utilitarian) and the timing of consumption benefits (past vs. future). The article concludes with a discussion of managerial and public policy implications.

Consumer Misunderstanding of Credit Card Use, Payments, and Debt: Causes and Solutions
The authors identify several judgmental biases related to paying off credit card debt. Participants with stronger numerical skills made fewer errors, as did those who used the new statement format mandated by Congress in the CARD Act of 2009. Study 1 shows that people underestimate how long it takes to eliminate a debt when payments barely cover interest owed. Study 2 shows that less numerate people tend to underestimate the monthly payment required to pay off a debt in three years, whereas more numerate people tend to overestimate the payment. The newly revised statement required by the CARD Act substantially reduced these biases. However, even with the new statement, many people still underestimate required payments when still using the credit card. Study 3 identifies ambiguities in the revised statement that can lead to misjudgments about how much to pay on monthly bills. The authors recommend additional public policy actions to help cardholders understand the relationship between payments and debt elimination.

Managing Mental Accounts: Payment Cards and Consumption Expenditures
Does mental accounting matter for total consumption expenditures? We exploit a unique setting in which individuals exogenously received a new credit card, without requesting one. Using random variation in the time of receipt we show that individuals temporarily increase total consumption expenditure by making purchases with the new card without reducing spending on the others. We do not observe a corresponding increase in indebtedness. Total consumption expenditure rises even for the least liquidity-constrained individuals. The evidence is consistent with consumers treating methods of payment as nonfungible budget categories, as suggested by models of mental accounting and narrow bracketing.

Do Payment Mechanisms Change the Way Consumers Perceive Products?
Abstract. Do payment mechanisms change the way consumers perceive products? We argue that consumers for whom credit cards (cash) have been primed focus mor

Managing Mental Accounts: Payment Cards and Consumption Expenditures
Abstract Does mental accounting matter for total consumption expenditures? We exploit a unique setting in which individuals exogenously receive a new payment card, without requesting one. Using random variation in the time of receipt, we show that individuals temporarily increase total consumption expenditure by making purchases with the new card without reducing spending on the others. We do not observe a corresponding increase in indebtedness. Total consumption expenditure rises even for the least liquidity-constrained individuals. The evidence is consistent with consumers treating methods of payment as nonfungible budget categories, as suggested by models of mental accounting and narrow bracketing.
