More and more machine learning is applied to human behavior. Increasingly these algorithms suffer from a hidden—but serious—problem. It arises because they often predict one thing while hoping for another. Take a recommender system: It predicts clicks but hopes to identify preferences. Or take an algorithm that automates a radiologist: It predicts in-the-moment diagnoses while hoping to identify their reflective judgments. Psychology shows us the gaps between the objectives of such prediction tasks and the goals we hope to achieve: People can click mindlessly; experts can get tired and make systematic errors. We argue such situations are ubiquitous and call them “inversion problems”: The real goal requires understanding a mental state that is not directly measured in behavioral data but must instead be inverted from the behavior. Identifying and solving these problems require new tools that draw on both behavioral and computational science.
AI Behavioral Science
We outline a foundation for a new field of ``AI Behavioral Science,'' covering three perspectives. First, as AI becomes ubiquitous and is increasingly proprietary and opaque, it becomes vital to develop techniques for assessing AI behavior. We outline how tools developed to assess people's behaviors by social scientists can be used to assess and infer AI's behaviors biases, tendencies, and heuristics. Second, we also discuss how AI can change the ways in which we learn about human behavior. Beyond its computational power, AI offers new techniques for simulating, inferring, and predicting human behaviors that we outline and discuss. Third, as humans and AI are interacting in increasingly complex and intertwined systems, we need to understand the implications for the resulting economic and political outcomes. We outline issues that are increasingly pressing concerning the future of human-AI interactions and potential changes and disruptions that can ensue.
Algorithm appreciation: People prefer algorithmic to human judgment
Even though computational algorithms often outperform human judgment, received wisdom suggests that people may be skeptical of relying on them (Dawes, 1979). Counter to this notion, results from six experiments show that lay people adhere more to advice when they think it comes from an algorithm than from a person. People showed this effect, what we call algorithm appreciation, when making numeric estimates about a visual stimulus (Experiment 1A) and forecasts about the popularity of songs and romantic attraction (Experiments 1B and 1C). Yet, researchers predicted the opposite result (Experiment 1D). Algorithm appreciation persisted when advice appeared jointly or separately (Experiment 2). However, algorithm appreciation waned when: people chose between an algorithm’s estimate and their own (versus an external advisor’s; Experiment 3) and they had expertise in forecasting (Experiment 4). Paradoxically, experienced professionals, who make forecasts on a regular basis, relied less on algorithmic advice than lay people did, which hurt their accuracy. These results shed light on the important question of when people rely on algorithmic advice over advice from people and have implications for the use of “big data” and algorithmic advice it generates.
AI Behavioral Science: A Framework and Agenda
We discuss the challenges and opportunities present in the rapidly emerging area of “AI Behavioral Science.” We frame it via three subfields. First, as AI becomes ubiquitous and is increasingly proprietary and opaque, it becomes vital to develop models of AI and methods for assessing AI behavior. We outline how tools developed to assess people’s behaviors by social scientists can be used to model, assess and infer AI’s behaviors biases, tendencies, and heuristics. Second, we also discuss how AI can change the ways in which we learn about human behavior. Beyond its computational power, AI offers new techniques for simulating, inferring, predicting, and analyzing human behaviors. Third, as humans and AI are interacting in increasingly complex and intertwined systems, we need to analyze and model human-AI interactions including how human and AI behaviors depend on interactions at the individual level, how interacting systems of humans and AI behave, and ultimately how AI’s integration into society affects economic and political outcomes. We discuss current research, questions, agendas, and goals in each of these three subfields and how they depend upon each other.
Task-Dependent Algorithm Aversion
Research suggests that consumers are averse to relying on algorithms to perform tasks that are typically done by humans, despite the fact that algorithms often perform better. The authors explore when and why this is true in a wide variety of domains. They find that algorithms are trusted and relied on less for tasks that seem subjective (vs. objective) in nature. However, they show that perceived task objectivity is malleable and that increasing a task’s perceived objectivity increases trust in and use of algorithms for that task. Consumers mistakenly believe that algorithms lack the abilities required to perform subjective tasks. Increasing algorithms’ perceived affective human-likeness is therefore effective at increasing the use of algorithms for subjective tasks. These findings are supported by the results of four online lab studies with over 1,400 participants and two online field studies with over 56,000 participants. The results provide insights into when and why consumers are likely to use algorithms and how marketers can increase their use when they outperform humans.
Task-Dependent Algorithm Aversion
Research suggests that consumers are averse to relying on algorithms to perform tasks that are typically done by humans, despite the fact that algorithms often perform better. The authors explore when and why this is true in a wide variety of domains. They find that algorithms are trusted and relied on less for tasks that seem subjective (vs. objective) in nature. However, they show that perceived task objectivity is malleable and that increasing a task’s perceived objectivity increases trust in and use of algorithms for that task. Consumers mistakenly believe that algorithms lack the abilities required to perform subjective tasks. Increasing algorithms’ perceived affective human-likeness is therefore effective at increasing the use of algorithms for subjective tasks. These findings are supported by the results of four online lab studies with over 1,400 participants and two online field studies with over 56,000 participants. The results provide insights into when and why consumers are likely to use algorithms and how marketers can increase their use when they outperform humans.
Eliciting Beliefs with Random Generation Tasks
Elicitation methods, such as asking people to produce the deciles of a distribution, are standard practices in policy or applied statistics. Similarly, much of cognitive science and psychology focuses on determining people's people's beliefs or latent traits through questionnaires or judgment tasks. However, these approaches often only capture a rough outline of what people know and are usually limited to point estimates of people's beliefs. Here, we present a novel experimental paradigm that allows us to access people's beliefs and how variable these beliefs are. Our task is based on an established random generation paradigm in which participants produce quantities from a particular domain as randomly as possible. We hypothesize that due to the minds' general-purpose mechanisms for probabilistic inferences, these random sequences represent the participants' underlying prior beliefs. We show that our method can infer participants' beliefs for a wide range of numeric quantities at comparable accuracy as an established elicitation method. Moreover, these inferred beliefs are consistent with individual participants' generalization and inference patterns in a subsequent conditional prediction task. We then extend our approach to non-numeric belief elicitation, highlighting how our method can go beyond numeric elicitation and provide insight into complex beliefs that are challenging to assess experimentally. Empirically, our results highlight that people know the rough shapes of environmental distributions, and these beliefs guide inference and generalization. Moreover, using our novel approach, we also show that people know the fine details of environmental distributions. Finally, our experimental results show that random generation paradigms can be a useful tool for cognitive scientists, psychologists, and applied statisticians.
From Predictive Algorithms to Automatic Generation of Anomalies
Machine learning algorithms can find predictive signals that researchers fail to notice; yet they are notoriously hard-to-interpret. How can we extract theoretical insights from these black boxes? History provides a clue. Facing a similar problem – how to extract theoretical insights from their intuitions – researchers often turned to “anomalies:” constructed examples that highlight flaws in an existing theory and spur the development of new ones. Canonical examples include the Allais paradox and the Kahneman-Tversky choice experiments for expected utility theory. We suggest anomalies can extract theoretical insights from black box predictive algorithms. We develop procedures to automatically generate anomalies for an existing theory when given a predictive algorithm. We cast anomaly generation as an adversarial game between a theory and a falsifier, the solutions to which are anomalies: instances where the black box algorithm predicts - were we to collect data - we would likely observe violations of the theory. As an illustration, we generate anomalies for expected utility theory using a large, publicly available dataset on real lottery choices. Based on an estimated neural network that predicts lottery choices, our procedures recover known anomalies and discover new ones for expected utility theory. In incentivized experiments, subjects violate expected utility theory on these algorithmically generated anomalies; moreover, the violation rates are similar to observed rates for the Allais paradox and Common ratio effect.
Thinking—Fast, Slow, and Artificial: How AI is Reshaping Human Reasoning and the Rise of Cognitive Surrender
People increasingly consult generative artificial intelligence (AI) while reasoning. As AI becomes embedded in daily thought, what becomes of human judgment? We introduce Tri-System Theory, extending dual-process accounts of reasoning by positing System 3: artificial cognition that operates outside the brain. System 3 can supplement or supplant internal processes, introducing novel cognitive pathways. A key prediction of the theory is “cognitive surrender”—adopting AI outputs with minimal scrutiny, overriding intuition (System 1) and deliberation (System 2). Across three preregistered experiments using an adapted Cognitive Reflection Test (N = 1,372; 9,593 trials), we randomized AI accuracy via hidden seed prompts. Participants chose to consult an AI assistant on a majority of trials (>50%). Relative to baseline (no System 3 access), accuracy significantly rose when AI was accurate and fell when it erred (+25/-15 percentage points; Study 1), the behavioral signature of cognitive surrender (AI-Accurate vs. AI-Faulty contrast; Cohen’s h = 0.81). Engaging System 3 also increased confidence, even following errors. Time pressure (Study 2) and per-item incentives and feedback (Study 3) shifted baseline performance but did not eliminate this pattern: when accurate, AI buffered time-pressure costs and amplified incentive gains; when faulty, it consistently reduced accuracy regardless of situational moderators. Across studies, participants with higher trust in AI and lower need for cognition and fluid intelligence showed greater surrender to System 3. Tri-System Theory thus characterizes a triadic cognitive ecology, revealing how System 3 reframes human reasoning and may reshape autonomy and accountability in the age of AI.
Learning to Trust: How Humans Mentally Recalibrate AI Confidence Signals
Productive human-AI collaboration requires appropriate reliance, yet contemporary AI systems are often miscalibrated, exhibiting systematic overconfidence or underconfidence. We investigate whether humans can learn to mentally recalibrate AI confidence signals through repeated experience. In a behavioral experiment (N = 200), participants predicted the AI's correctness across four AI calibration conditions: standard, overconfidence, underconfidence, and a counterintuitive "reverse confidence" mapping. Results demonstrate robust learning across all conditions, with participants significantly improving their accuracy, discrimination, and calibration alignment over 50 trials. We present a computational model utilizing a linear-in-log-odds (LLO) transformation and a Rescorla-Wagner learning rule to explain these dynamics. The model reveals that humans adapt by updating their baseline trust and confidence sensitivity, using asymmetric learning rates to prioritize the most informative errors. While humans can compensate for monotonic miscalibration, we identify a significant boundary in the reverse confidence scenario, where a substantial proportion of participants struggled to override initial inductive biases. These findings provide a mechanistic account of how humans adapt their trust in AI confidence signals through experience.
Thinking—Fast, Slow, and Artificial: How AI is Reshaping Human Reasoning and the Rise of Cognitive Surrender
People increasingly consult generative artificial intelligence (AI) while reasoning. As AI becomes embedded in daily thought, what becomes of human judgment? We introduce Tri-System Theory, extending dual-process accounts of reasoning by positing System 3: artificial cognition that operates outside the brain. System 3 can supplement or supplant internal processes, introducing novel cognitive pathways. A key prediction of the theory is "cognitive surrender"-adopting AI outputs with minimal scrutiny, overriding intuition (System 1) and deliberation (System 2). Across three preregistered experiments using an adapted Cognitive Reflection Test (N = 1,372; 9,593 trials), we randomized AI accuracy via hidden seed prompts. Participants chose to consult an AI assistant on a majority of trials (>50%). Relative to baseline (no System 3 access), accuracy significantly rose when AI was accurate and fell when it erred (+25/-15 percentage points; Study 1), the behavioral signature of cognitive surrender (AI-Accurate vs. AI-Faulty contrast; Cohen's h = 0.81). Engaging System 3 also increased confidence, even following errors. Time pressure (Study 2) and per-item incentives and feedback (Study 3) shifted baseline performance but did not eliminate this pattern: when accurate, AI buffered time-pressure costs and amplified incentive gains; when faulty, it consistently reduced accuracy regardless of situational moderators. Across studies, participants with higher trust in AI and lower need for cognition and fluid intelligence showed greater surrender to System 3. Tri-System Theory thus characterizes a triadic cognitive ecology, revealing how System 3 reframes human reasoning and may reshape autonomy and accountability in the age of AI.
Mechanisms of social cognition
Social animals including humans share a range of social mechanisms that are automatic and implicit and enable learning by observation. Learning from others includes imitation of actions and mirroring of emotions. Learning about others, such as their group membership and reputation, is crucial for social interactions that depend on trust. For accurate prediction of others' changeable dispositions, mentalizing is required, i.e., tracking of intentions, desires, and beliefs. Implicit mentalizing is present in infants less than one year old as well as in some nonhuman species. Explicit mentalizing is a meta-cognitive process and enhances the ability to learn about the world through self-monitoring and reflection, and may be uniquely human. Meta-cognitive processes can also exert control over automatic behavior, for instance, when short-term gains oppose long-term aims or when selfish and prosocial interests collide. We suggest that they also underlie the ability to explicitly share experiences with other agents, as in reflective discussion and teaching. These are key in increasing the accuracy of the models of the world that we construct.
A Framework for Studying AI Agent Behavior: Evidence from Consumer Choice Experiments
Environments built for people are increasingly operated by a new class of economic actors: LLM-powered software agents making decisions on our behalf. These decisions range from our purchases to travel plans to medical treatment selection. Current evaluations of these agents largely focus on task competence, but we argue for a deeper assessment: how these agents choose when faced with realistic decisions. We introduce ABxLab, a framework for systematically probing agentic choice through controlled manipulations of option attributes and persuasive cues. We apply this to a realistic web-based shopping environment, where we vary prices, ratings, and psychological nudges, all of which are factors long known to shape human choice. We find that agent decisions shift predictably and substantially in response, revealing that agents are strongly biased choosers even without being subject to the cognitive constraints that shape human biases. This susceptibility reveals both risk and opportunity: risk, because agentic consumers may inherit and amplify human biases; opportunity, because consumer choice provides a powerful testbed for a behavioral science of AI agents, just as it has for the study of human behavior. We release our framework as an open benchmark for rigorous, scalable evaluation of agent decision-making.
Position: Don't Just "Fix it in Post": A Science of AI Must Study Training Dynamics
What would it mean to have a scientific understanding of AI? Models are not static objects: they are snapshots of time-evolving processes shaped by data, objectives, architectures, and optimization dynamics. Yet much of AI research treats models as fixed artifacts, analyzing behaviors after training rather than asking why they emerge. This position paper argues that a science of AI must move beyond post-hoc fixes and study the training dynamics that produce model behavior. Such a science should support progressively stronger forms of understanding: predicting outcomes from early training signals, intervening when trajectories go wrong, and ultimately designing training procedures that more reliably produce desired properties. Scaling laws have made prediction routine for loss; the challenge is extending this success to capabilities, biases, robustness, and safety-relevant behaviors. We articulate requirements for such theories grounded in the history and philosophy of science, examine progress in mechanistic interpretability, fairness, memorization, and simplicity bias, and identify concrete open problems.
A Rational Analysis of the Effects of Sycophantic AI
People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.
The governance & behavioral challenges of generative artificial intelligence’s hypercustomization capabilities
Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) is changing human–machine interactions and the broader information ecosystem. Much as social media algorithms personalize online experiences, GenAI applications can align with user preferences to customize the way individuals interact with information. However, through training, fine-tuning, and prompting, GenAI applications can introduce a new level of customization: hypercustomization. By dynamically tailoring responses to an individual’s explicit and implicit preferences, hypercustomization can reinforce biases, false beliefs, or misconceptions. As a result, it can heighten significant societal challenges, such as the spread of misinformation and political and social polarization. In this article, we explore the risks associated with hypercustomization and the governance and behavioral challenges that might impede effective risk mitigation. These challenges include a lack of transparency in GenAI applications, opacity of the nature of their interactions with users, users’ overreliance on these systems, and the inefficacy of warning messages. We also provide recommendations for overcoming these challenges.
Should I State or Should I Show? Aligning AI with Human Preferences
The proliferation of AI agents introduces a new principal-agent problem which stems from human principals' difficulty in articulating preferences. We report results from an experiment focused on mitigating this problem via revealed preferences from choice data. Compared to stated preference from human-written prompts, individuals communicate their preferences more effectively through choices, with as few as two sufficing to match prompts' predictive value. This gap largely reflects subjects' difficulty in translating preferences into prompts and is largest among those exhibiting more Allais-type behavioral patterns. Subjects also misperceive the approaches' relative performance, often choosing the less accurate one.