Scientific English is currently undergoing rapid change, with words like "delve," "intricate," and "underscore" appearing far more frequently than just a few years ago. It is widely assumed that scientists' use of large language models (LLMs) is responsible for such trends. We develop a formal, transferable method to characterize these linguistic changes. Application of our method yields 21 focal words whose increased occurrence in scientific abstracts is likely the result of LLM usage. We then pose "the puzzle of lexical overrepresentation": WHY are such words overused by LLMs? We fail to find evidence that lexical overrepresentation is caused by model architecture, algorithm choices, or training data. To assess whether reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) contributes to the overuse of focal words, we undertake comparative model testing and conduct an exploratory online study. While the model testing is consistent with RLHF playing a role, our experimental results suggest that participants may be reacting differently to "delve" than to other focal words. With LLMs quickly becoming a driver of global language change, investigating these potential sources of lexical overrepresentation is important. We note that while insights into the workings of LLMs are within reach, a lack of transparency surrounding model development remains an obstacle to such research.
Why Does ChatGPT "Delve" So Much? Exploring the Sources of Lexical Overrepresentation in Large Language Models
Scientific English is currently undergoing rapid change, with words like "delve," "intricate," and "underscore" appearing far more frequently than just a few years ago. It is widely assumed that scientists' use of large language models (LLMs) is responsible for such trends. We develop a formal, transferable method to characterize these linguistic changes. Application of our method yields 21 focal words whose increased occurrence in scientific abstracts is likely the result of LLM usage. We then pose "the puzzle of lexical overrepresentation": WHY are such words overused by LLMs? We fail to find evidence that lexical overrepresentation is caused by model architecture, algorithm choices, or training data. To assess whether reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) contributes to the overuse of focal words, we undertake comparative model testing and conduct an exploratory online study. While the model testing is consistent with RLHF playing a role, our experimental results suggest that participants may be reacting differently to "delve" than to other focal words. With LLMs quickly becoming a driver of global language change, investigating these potential sources of lexical overrepresentation is important. We note that while insights into the workings of LLMs are within reach, a lack of transparency surrounding model development remains an obstacle to such research.
Model Misalignment and Language Change: Traces of AI-Associated Language in Unscripted Spoken English
In recent years, written language, particularly in science and education, has undergone remarkable shifts in word usage. These changes are widely attributed to the growing influence of Large Language Models (LLMs), which frequently rely on a distinct lexical style. Divergences between model output and target audience norms can be viewed as a form of misalignment. While these shifts are often linked to using Artificial Intelligence (AI) directly as a tool to generate text, it remains unclear whether the changes reflect broader changes in the human language system itself. To explore this question, we constructed a dataset of 22.1 million words from unscripted spoken language drawn from conversational science and technology podcasts. We analyzed lexical trends before and after ChatGPT's release in 2022, focusing on commonly LLM-associated words. Our results show a moderate yet significant increase in the usage of these words post-2022, suggesting a convergence between human word choices and LLM-associated patterns. In contrast, baseline synonym words exhibit no significant directional shift. Given the short time frame and the number of words affected, this may indicate the onset of a remarkable shift in language use. Whether this represents natural language change or a novel shift driven by AI exposure remains an open question. Similarly, although the shifts may stem from broader adoption patterns, it may also be that upstream training misalignments ultimately contribute to changes in human language use. These findings parallel ethical concerns that misaligned models may shape social and moral beliefs.
Model Misalignment and Language Change: Traces of AI-Associated Language in Unscripted Spoken English
In recent years, written language, particularly in science and education, has undergone remarkable shifts in word usage. These changes are widely attributed to the growing influence of Large Language Models (LLMs), which frequently rely on a distinct lexical style. Divergences between model output and target audience norms can be viewed as a form of misalignment. While these shifts are often linked to using Artificial Intelligence (AI) directly as a tool to generate text, it remains unclear whether the changes reflect broader changes in the human language system itself. To explore this question, we constructed a dataset of 22.1 million words from unscripted spoken language drawn from conversational science and technology podcasts. We analyzed lexical trends before and after ChatGPT's release in 2022, focusing on commonly LLM-associated words. Our results show a moderate yet significant increase in the usage of these words post-2022, suggesting a convergence between human word choices and LLM-associated patterns. In contrast, baseline synonym words exhibit no significant directional shift. Given the short time frame and the number of words affected, this may indicate the onset of a remarkable shift in language use. Whether this represents natural language change or a novel shift driven by AI exposure remains an open question. Similarly, although the shifts may stem from broader adoption patterns, it may also be that upstream training misalignments ultimately contribute to changes in human language use. These findings parallel ethical concerns that misaligned models may shape social and moral beliefs.
How LLMs Distort Our Written Language
Large language models (LLMs) are used by over a billion people globally, most often to assist with writing. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs not only alter the voice and tone of human writing but also consistently alter the intended meaning. First, we conduct a human user study to understand how people actually interact with LLMs when using them for writing. Our findings reveal that extensive LLM use led to a nearly 70% increase in essays that remained neutral in answering the topic question. Significantly more heavy LLM users reported that the writing was less creative and not in their voice. Next, using a dataset of human-written essays that was collected in 2021 before the widespread release of LLMs, we study how asking an LLM to revise the essay based on the human-written feedback in the dataset induces large changes in the resulting content and meaning. We find that even when LLMs are prompted with expert feedback and asked to only make grammar edits, they still change the text in a way that significantly alters its semantic meaning. We then examine LLM-generated text in the wild, specifically focusing on the 21% of AI-generated scientific peer reviews at a recent top AI conference. We find that LLM-generated reviews place significantly less weight on clarity and significance of the research, and assign scores that, on average, are a full point higher. These findings highlight a misalignment between the perceived benefit of AI use and an implicit, consistent effect on the semantics of human writing, motivating future work on how widespread AI writing will affect our cultural and scientific institutions.
How LLMs Distort Our Written Language
Large language models (LLMs) are used by over a billion people globally, most often to assist with writing. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs not only alter the voice and tone of human writing but also consistently alter the intended meaning. First, we conduct a human user study to understand how people actually interact with LLMs when using them for writing. Our findings reveal that extensive LLM use led to a nearly 70% increase in essays that remained neutral in answering the topic question. Significantly more heavy LLM users reported that the writing was less creative and not in their voice. Next, using a dataset of human-written essays that was collected in 2021 before the widespread release of LLMs, we study how asking an LLM to revise the essay based on the human-written feedback in the dataset induces large changes in the resulting content and meaning. We find that even when LLMs are prompted with expert feedback and asked to only make grammar edits, they still change the text in a way that significantly alters its semantic meaning. We then examine LLM-generated text in the wild, specifically focusing on the 21% of AI-generated scientific peer reviews at a recent top AI conference. We find that LLM-generated reviews place significantly less weight on clarity and significance of the research, and assign scores that, on average, are a full point higher. These findings highlight a misalignment between the perceived benefit of AI use and an implicit, consistent effect on the semantics of human writing, motivating future work on how widespread AI writing will affect our cultural and scientific institutions.
Empirical evidence of Large Language Model's influence on human spoken communication
From the printing press to social media, innovations in communication technology have repeatedly reshaped how ideas spread through human culture. Chatbots powered by generative artificial intelligence constitute a new medium, encoding cultural patterns in their neural representations and disseminating them in conversations with hundreds of millions of people. Whether these patterns transmit into human language, and ultimately shape human culture, is a fundamental question. While fully quantifying the causal impact of a chatbot like ChatGPT on human culture is challenging, lexical shifts in human spoken communication may offer an early indicator. Here we show that words preferentially generated by ChatGPT, such as delve, showcase, boast, intricacies and meticulous, increased abruptly in spontaneous human speech. A synthetic-control analysis of 737,083 hours of conversation from 824,634 podcast episodes, screened for unscripted speech, causally links this shift to ChatGPT's release. The measurable influence on spontaneous speech suggests that humans internalize the lexical choices of large language models (LLMs). A preregistered experiment (N = 496) confirms they do, as a brief chatbot interaction led participants to adopt its words as their own, persisting past a distractor task and confirmed in forced lexical choice, indicating entrenchment in the active vocabulary. Together these results show that machines trained on human data now feed their own traits back into human language, integrating LLMs into the ongoing processes of cultural evolution.. This coupling raises concerns about linguistic homogenization and the capacity of a few major AI providers for latent cultural influence at scale.
Why Do Large Language Models (LLMs) Struggle to Count Letters?
Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved unprecedented performance on many complex tasks, being able, for example, to answer questions on almost any topic. However, they struggle with other simple tasks, such as counting the occurrences of letters in a word, as illustrated by the inability of many LLMs to count the number of "r" letters in "strawberry". Several works have studied this problem and linked it to the tokenization used by LLMs, to the intrinsic limitations of the attention mechanism, or to the lack of character-level training data. In this paper, we conduct an experimental study to evaluate the relations between the LLM errors when counting letters with 1) the frequency of the word and its components in the training dataset and 2) the complexity of the counting operation. We present a comprehensive analysis of the errors of LLMs when counting letter occurrences by evaluating a representative group of models over a large number of words. The results show a number of consistent trends in the models evaluated: 1) models are capable of recognizing the letters but not counting them; 2) the frequency of the word and tokens in the word does not have a significant impact on the LLM errors; 3) there is a positive correlation of letter frequency with errors, more frequent letters tend to have more counting errors, 4) the errors show a strong correlation with the number of letters or tokens in a word and 5) the strongest correlation occurs with the number of letters with counts larger than one, with most models being unable to correctly count words in which letters appear more than twice.
Why Do Large Language Models (LLMs) Struggle to Count Letters?
Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved unprecedented performance on many complex tasks, being able, for example, to answer questions on almost any topic. However, they struggle with other simple tasks, such as counting the occurrences of letters in a word, as illustrated by the inability of many LLMs to count the number of "r" letters in "strawberry". Several works have studied this problem and linked it to the tokenization used by LLMs, to the intrinsic limitations of the attention mechanism, or to the lack of character-level training data. In this paper, we conduct an experimental study to evaluate the relations between the LLM errors when counting letters with 1) the frequency of the word and its components in the training dataset and 2) the complexity of the counting operation. We present a comprehensive analysis of the errors of LLMs when counting letter occurrences by evaluating a representative group of models over a large number of words. The results show a number of consistent trends in the models evaluated: 1) models are capable of recognizing the letters but not counting them; 2) the frequency of the word and tokens in the word does not have a significant impact on the LLM errors; 3) there is a positive correlation of letter frequency with errors, more frequent letters tend to have more counting errors, 4) the errors show a strong correlation with the number of letters or tokens in a word and 5) the strongest correlation occurs with the number of letters with counts larger than one, with most models being unable to correctly count words in which letters appear more than twice.
Modulating Language Model Experiences through Frictions
Language models are transforming the ways that their users engage with the world. Despite impressive capabilities, over-consumption of language model outputs risks propagating unchecked errors in the short-term and damaging human capabilities for critical thinking in the long-term. How can we develop scaffolding around language models to curate more appropriate use? We propose selective frictions for language model experiences, inspired by behavioral science interventions, to dampen misuse. Frictions involve small modifications to a user's experience, e.g., the addition of a button impeding model access and reminding a user of their expertise relative to the model. Through a user study with real humans, we observe shifts in user behavior from the imposition of a friction over LLMs in the context of a multi-topic question-answering task as a representative task that people may use LLMs for, e.g., in education and information retrieval. We find that frictions modulate over-reliance by driving down users' click rates while minimally affecting accuracy for those topics. Yet, frictions may have unintended effects. We find marked differences in users' click behaviors even on topics where frictions were not provisioned. Our contributions motivate further study of human-AI behavioral interaction to inform more effective and appropriate LLM use.
Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting
Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.
Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting
Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.
Language models struggle with compartmentalization
In the training data used by large language models (LLMs), the same latent concept is often presented in multiple distinct ways: the same facts appear in English and Swahili; many functions can be expressed in both Python and Haskell; we can express propositions in both formal and natural language. We show that LLMs can exhibit compartmentalization, where they fail to identify and share statistical strength between distinct presentations of unified concepts. In the worst case, LLMs simply learn parallel internal representations of each presentation of the concept, saturating model capacity with redundancies and decreasing sample efficiency with the number of such presentations. We also demonstrate that synthetic parallel data can fail to improve this despite being easily learned itself. Under this framework, we find that, for small models, early multilingual learning is nearly entirely compartmentalized. Finally, all interventions that we study exhibit a phase transition in which their effectiveness depends on the number of distinct presentations, suggesting that the language modeling objective may only inconsistently unify representations.
LLMs Can Get "Brain Rot": A Pilot Study on Twitter/X
We propose and test the LLM Brain Rot Hypothesis: continual exposure to junk web text induces lasting cognitive decline in large language models (LLMs). To unveil junk effects, we designed a novel controlled experiment on real Twitter/X corpora, by constructing junk and reverse-controlled datasets via two orthogonal operationalizations: M1 (engagement degree) and M2 (semantic quality), with matched token scale and training operations across conditions. Compared to the control group, continual pre-training of 4 LLMs on the junk dataset causes non-trivial declines (Hedges' g>0.3) on reasoning, long-context understanding, safety, and inflating "dark traits" (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism). The gradual mixtures of junk and control datasets also yield dose-response cognition decay: for example, under M1, ARC-Challenge with Chain-of-Thought drops 72.1 -> 57.2 and RULER-CWE 83.7 -> 52.3 as junk ratio rises from 0% to 100%. Error forensics reveal several key insights. First, we identify thought-skipping as the primary lesion in reasoning: models increasingly truncate or skip chains. Second, partial but incomplete healing is observed: scaling instruction tuning and clean continual pre-training improve the declined cognition, yet cannot restore baseline capability, suggesting persistent representational drift rather than format mismatch. Finally, we discover that the popularity, a non-semantic metric, of a tweet is a better indicator of the Brain Rot effect than the length in M1. Together, the results provide significant, multi-perspective evidence that social effects of data could be a causal driver of LLM capability decay in continual pre-training, thereby motivating routine "cognitive health checks" for deployed and evolving LLMs.
LLMs Can Get "Brain Rot": A Pilot Study on Twitter/X
We propose and test the LLM Brain Rot Hypothesis: continual exposure to junk web text induces lasting cognitive decline in large language models (LLMs). To unveil junk effects, we designed a novel controlled experiment on real Twitter/X corpora, by constructing junk and reverse-controlled datasets via two orthogonal operationalizations: M1 (engagement degree) and M2 (semantic quality), with matched token scale and training operations across conditions. Compared to the control group, continual pre-training of 4 LLMs on the junk dataset causes non-trivial declines (Hedges' g>0.3) on reasoning, long-context understanding, safety, and inflating "dark traits" (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism). The gradual mixtures of junk and control datasets also yield dose-response cognition decay: for example, under M1, ARC-Challenge with Chain-of-Thought drops 72.1 -> 57.2 and RULER-CWE 83.7 -> 52.3 as junk ratio rises from 0% to 100%. Error forensics reveal several key insights. First, we identify thought-skipping as the primary lesion in reasoning: models increasingly truncate or skip chains. Second, partial but incomplete healing is observed: scaling instruction tuning and clean continual pre-training improve the declined cognition, yet cannot restore baseline capability, suggesting persistent representational drift rather than format mismatch. Finally, we discover that the popularity, a non-semantic metric, of a tweet is a better indicator of the Brain Rot effect than the length in M1. Together, the results provide significant, multi-perspective evidence that social effects of data could be a causal driver of LLM capability decay in continual pre-training, thereby motivating routine "cognitive health checks" for deployed and evolving LLMs.
Do LLMs write like humans? Variation in grammatical and rhetorical styles
As large language models (LLMs) have grown in power and become more widely available, research has focused on their ability to complete various tasks and the biases they exhibit when doing so. In this study, we instead examine their writing style in detail. We show that instruction-tuned models, which are trained to answer questions and solve problems, have a distinct noun-heavy, informationally dense writing style, even when prompted to match the style of informal speech and writing. These findings suggest that instruction-tuned models generate text that does not align with genre conventions familiar to human audiences, and demonstrate the value of linguistic variables in evaluating the output of LLMs., Large language models (LLMs) are capable of writing grammatical text that follows instructions, answers questions, and solves problems. As they have advanced, it has become difficult to distinguish their output from human-written text. While past research has found some differences in features such as word choice and punctuation and developed classifiers to detect LLM output, none has studied the rhetorical styles of LLMs. Using several variants of Llama 3 and GPT-4o, we construct two parallel corpora of human- and LLM-written texts from common prompts. Using Douglas Biber’s set of lexical, grammatical, and rhetorical features, we identify systematic differences between LLMs and humans and between different LLMs. These differences persist when moving from smaller models to larger ones and are larger for instruction-tuned models than base models. This observation of differences demonstrates that despite their advanced abilities, LLMs struggle to match human stylistic variation. Attention to more advanced linguistic features can hence detect patterns in their behavior not previously recognized.
Recognising, Anticipating, and Mitigating LLM Pollution of Online Behavioural Research
Online behavioural research faces an emerging threat as participants increasingly turn to large language models (LLMs) for advice, translation, or task delegation: LLM Pollution. We identify three interacting variants through which LLM Pollution threatens the validity and integrity of online behavioural research. First, Partial LLM Mediation occurs when participants make selective use of LLMs for specific aspects of a task, such as translation or wording support, leading researchers to (mis)interpret LLM-shaped outputs as human ones. Second, Full LLM Delegation arises when agentic LLMs complete studies with little to no human oversight, undermining the central premise of human-subject research at a more foundational level. Third, LLM Spillover signifies human participants altering their behaviour as they begin to anticipate LLM presence in online studies, even when none are involved. While Partial Mediation and Full Delegation form a continuum of increasing automation, LLM Spillover reflects second-order reactivity effects. Together, these variants interact and generate cascading distortions that compromise sample authenticity, introduce biases that are difficult to detect post hoc, and ultimately undermine the epistemic grounding of online research on human cognition and behaviour. Crucially, the threat of LLM Pollution is already co-evolving with advances in generative AI, creating an escalating methodological arms race. To address this, we propose a multi-layered response spanning researcher practices, platform accountability, and community efforts. As the challenge evolves, coordinated adaptation will be essential to safeguard methodological integrity and preserve the validity of online behavioural research.