Intermediate token generation (ITG), where a model produces output before the solution, has been proposed as a method to improve the performance of language models on reasoning tasks. While these reasoning traces or Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) are correlated with performance gains, the mechanisms underlying them remain unclear. A prevailing assumption in the community has been to anthropomorphize these tokens as "thinking", treating longer traces as evidence of higher problem-adaptive computation. In this work, we critically examine whether intermediate token sequence length reflects or correlates with problem difficulty. To do so, we train transformer models from scratch on derivational traces of the A* search algorithm, where the number of operations required to solve a maze problem provides a precise and verifiable measure of problem complexity. We first evaluate the models on trivial free-space problems, finding that even for the simplest tasks, they often produce excessively long reasoning traces and sometimes fail to generate a solution. We then systematically evaluate the model on out-of-distribution problems and find that the intermediate token length and ground truth A* trace length only loosely correlate. We notice that the few cases where correlation appears are those where the problems are closer to the training distribution, suggesting that the effect arises from approximate recall rather than genuine problem-adaptive computation. This suggests that the inherent computational complexity of the problem instance is not a significant factor, but rather its distributional distance from the training data. These results challenge the assumption that intermediate trace generation is adaptive to problem difficulty and caution against interpreting longer sequences in systems like R1 as automatically indicative of "thinking effort".
Performative Thinking? The Brittle Correlation Between CoT Length and Problem Complexity
Intermediate token generation (ITG), where a model produces output before the solution, has been proposed as a method to improve the performance of language models on reasoning tasks. While these reasoning traces or Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) are correlated with performance gains, the mechanisms underlying them remain unclear. A prevailing assumption in the community has been to anthropomorphize these tokens as "thinking", treating longer traces as evidence of higher problem-adaptive computation. In this work, we critically examine whether intermediate token sequence length reflects or correlates with problem difficulty. To do so, we train transformer models from scratch on derivational traces of the A* search algorithm, where the number of operations required to solve a maze problem provides a precise and verifiable measure of problem complexity. We first evaluate the models on trivial free-space problems, finding that even for the simplest tasks, they often produce excessively long reasoning traces and sometimes fail to generate a solution. We then systematically evaluate the model on out-of-distribution problems and find that the intermediate token length and ground truth A* trace length only loosely correlate. We notice that the few cases where correlation appears are those where the problems are closer to the training distribution, suggesting that the effect arises from approximate recall rather than genuine problem-adaptive computation. This suggests that the inherent computational complexity of the problem instance is not a significant factor, but rather its distributional distance from the training data. These results challenge the assumption that intermediate trace generation is adaptive to problem difficulty and caution against interpreting longer sequences in systems like R1 as automatically indicative of "thinking effort".
The Illusion of Thinking: Understanding the Strengths and Limitations of Reasoning Models via the Lens of Problem Complexity
Recent generations of frontier language models have introduced Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) that generate detailed thinking processes…
Position: Stop Anthropomorphizing Intermediate Tokens as Reasoning/Thinking Traces!
Intermediate token generation (ITG), where a model produces output before the solution, has become a standard method to improve the performance of language models on reasoning tasks. These intermediate tokens have been called \say{reasoning traces} or even \say{thinking traces} -- implicitly anthropomorphizing the traces, and implying that these traces resemble steps a human might take when solving a challenging problem, and as such can provide an interpretable window into the operation of the model's thinking process to the end user. In this position paper, we present evidence that this anthropomorphization isn't a harmless metaphor, and instead is quite dangerous -- it confuses the nature of these models and how to use them effectively, and leads to questionable research. We call on the community to avoid such anthropomorphization of intermediate tokens.
Position: Stop Anthropomorphizing Intermediate Tokens as Reasoning/Thinking Traces!
Intermediate token generation (ITG), where a model produces output before the solution, has become a standard method to improve the performance of language models on reasoning tasks. These intermediate tokens have been called \say{reasoning traces} or even \say{thinking traces} -- implicitly anthropomorphizing the traces, and implying that these traces resemble steps a human might take when solving a challenging problem, and as such can provide an interpretable window into the operation of the model's thinking process to the end user. In this position paper, we present evidence that this anthropomorphization isn't a harmless metaphor, and instead is quite dangerous -- it confuses the nature of these models and how to use them effectively, and leads to questionable research. We call on the community to avoid such anthropomorphization of intermediate tokens.
Eliciting Reasoning in Language Models with Cognitive Tools
The recent advent of reasoning models like OpenAI's o1 was met with excited speculation by the AI community about the mechanisms underlying these capabilities in closed models, followed by a rush of replication efforts, particularly from the open source community. These speculations were largely settled by the demonstration from DeepSeek-R1 that chains-of-thought and reinforcement learning (RL) can effectively replicate reasoning on top of base LLMs. However, it remains valuable to explore alternative methods for theoretically eliciting reasoning that could help elucidate the underlying mechanisms, as well as providing additional methods that may offer complementary benefits. Here, we build on the long-standing literature in cognitive psychology and cognitive architectures, which postulates that reasoning arises from the orchestrated, sequential execution of a set of modular, predetermined cognitive operations. Crucially, we implement this key idea within a modern agentic tool-calling framework. In particular, we endow an LLM with a small set of "cognitive tools" encapsulating specific reasoning operations, each executed by the LLM itself. Surprisingly, this simple strategy results in considerable gains in performance on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks compared to base LLMs, for both closed and open-weight models. For instance, providing our "cognitive tools" to GPT-4.1 increases its pass@1 performance on AIME2024 from 32% to 53%, even surpassing the performance of o1-preview. In addition to its practical implications, this demonstration contributes to the debate regarding the role of post-training methods in eliciting reasoning in LLMs versus the role of inherent capabilities acquired during pre-training, and whether post-training merely uncovers these latent abilities.
Rethinking the Multilingual Reasoning Gap with Layer Swap
Recent reasoning Large Language Models produce a chain-of-thought (CoT) predominantly in English, even when prompted in non-English languages. Prior work suggests that forcing the CoT to remain in the input language (\emph{native reasoning}) substantially degrades performance relative to allowing the model to reason in English before answering in the input language (\emph{English-pivoted reasoning}). However, most studies of this native reasoning gap rely on inference-time interventions or limited native-language training data. We revisit this comparison at a larger scale and under comparable supervision. We construct long multilingual reasoning datasets across six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Chinese and Swahili); fine-tune specialists in both native and English-pivoted regimes on top of \texttt{Qwen/Qwen3-8B-Base}, and evaluate across mathematics, science, general knowledge, and code. In this setting, the average native reasoning gap shrinks to 1.9--3.5\% across the five non-English languages, considerably smaller than previously reported. Weight-space analysis of the native specialists reveals aligned fine-tuning updates in the middle layers and divergence in the outer layers. This points to a largely language-agnostic reasoning core surrounded by language-specific layers. Exploiting this structure, we introduce a Layer Swap: transferring the English specialist's stronger reasoning mid-layers into each native specialist, closing most of the native reasoning gap across the five non-English languages while preserving CoT in the target language. We release all models and datasets.
Recursive Language Models
We study allowing large language models (LLMs) to process arbitrarily long prompts through the lens of inference-time scaling. We propose Recursive Language Models (RLMs), a general inference paradigm that treats long prompts as part of an external environment and allows the LLM to programmatically examine, decompose, and recursively call itself over snippets of the prompt. We find that RLMs can successfully process inputs up to two orders of magnitude beyond model context windows and, even for shorter prompts, dramatically outperform the quality of vanilla frontier LLMs and common long-context and coding scaffolds (e.g., on GPT-5 by a median across the evaluated benchmarks of $26\%$ against compaction, $130\%$ against CodeAct with sub-calls, and $13\%$ against Claude Code) across four diverse long-context tasks while having comparable cost. At a small scale, we post-train the first model around the RLM. Our model, RLM-Qwen3-8B, outperforms the underlying Qwen3-8B model by $28.3\%$ on average and even approaches the quality of vanilla GPT-5 on three long-context tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/alexzhang13/rlm.
Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting
Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.
Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting
Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.
ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models
While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across tasks in language understanding and interactive decision making, their abilities for reasoning (e.g. chain-of-thought prompting) and acting (e.g. action plan generation) have primarily been studied as separate topics. In this paper, we explore the use of LLMs to generate both reasoning traces and task-specific actions in an interleaved manner, allowing for greater synergy between the two: reasoning traces help the model induce, track, and update action plans as well as handle exceptions, while actions allow it to interface with external sources, such as knowledge bases or environments, to gather additional information. We apply our approach, named ReAct, to a diverse set of language and decision making tasks and demonstrate its effectiveness over state-of-the-art baselines, as well as improved human interpretability and trustworthiness over methods without reasoning or acting components. Concretely, on question answering (HotpotQA) and fact verification (Fever), ReAct overcomes issues of hallucination and error propagation prevalent in chain-of-thought reasoning by interacting with a simple Wikipedia API, and generates human-like task-solving trajectories that are more interpretable than baselines without reasoning traces. On two interactive decision making benchmarks (ALFWorld and WebShop), ReAct outperforms imitation and reinforcement learning methods by an absolute success rate of 34% and 10% respectively, while being prompted with only one or two in-context examples. Project site with code: https://react-lm.github.io
Why Do Large Language Models (LLMs) Struggle to Count Letters?
Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved unprecedented performance on many complex tasks, being able, for example, to answer questions on almost any topic. However, they struggle with other simple tasks, such as counting the occurrences of letters in a word, as illustrated by the inability of many LLMs to count the number of "r" letters in "strawberry". Several works have studied this problem and linked it to the tokenization used by LLMs, to the intrinsic limitations of the attention mechanism, or to the lack of character-level training data. In this paper, we conduct an experimental study to evaluate the relations between the LLM errors when counting letters with 1) the frequency of the word and its components in the training dataset and 2) the complexity of the counting operation. We present a comprehensive analysis of the errors of LLMs when counting letter occurrences by evaluating a representative group of models over a large number of words. The results show a number of consistent trends in the models evaluated: 1) models are capable of recognizing the letters but not counting them; 2) the frequency of the word and tokens in the word does not have a significant impact on the LLM errors; 3) there is a positive correlation of letter frequency with errors, more frequent letters tend to have more counting errors, 4) the errors show a strong correlation with the number of letters or tokens in a word and 5) the strongest correlation occurs with the number of letters with counts larger than one, with most models being unable to correctly count words in which letters appear more than twice.
Why Do Large Language Models (LLMs) Struggle to Count Letters?
Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved unprecedented performance on many complex tasks, being able, for example, to answer questions on almost any topic. However, they struggle with other simple tasks, such as counting the occurrences of letters in a word, as illustrated by the inability of many LLMs to count the number of "r" letters in "strawberry". Several works have studied this problem and linked it to the tokenization used by LLMs, to the intrinsic limitations of the attention mechanism, or to the lack of character-level training data. In this paper, we conduct an experimental study to evaluate the relations between the LLM errors when counting letters with 1) the frequency of the word and its components in the training dataset and 2) the complexity of the counting operation. We present a comprehensive analysis of the errors of LLMs when counting letter occurrences by evaluating a representative group of models over a large number of words. The results show a number of consistent trends in the models evaluated: 1) models are capable of recognizing the letters but not counting them; 2) the frequency of the word and tokens in the word does not have a significant impact on the LLM errors; 3) there is a positive correlation of letter frequency with errors, more frequent letters tend to have more counting errors, 4) the errors show a strong correlation with the number of letters or tokens in a word and 5) the strongest correlation occurs with the number of letters with counts larger than one, with most models being unable to correctly count words in which letters appear more than twice.
GSM-Symbolic: Understanding the Limitations of Mathematical Reasoning in Large Language Models
Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked interest in their formal reasoning capabilities, particularly in mathematics. The GSM8K benchmark is widely used to assess the mathematical reasoning of models on grade-school-level questions. While the performance of LLMs on GSM8K has significantly improved in recent years, it remains unclear whether their mathematical reasoning capabilities have genuinely advanced, raising questions about the reliability of the reported metrics. To address these concerns, we conduct a large-scale study on several SOTA open and closed models. To overcome the limitations of existing evaluations, we introduce GSM-Symbolic, an improved benchmark created from symbolic templates that allow for the generation of a diverse set of questions. GSM-Symbolic enables more controllable evaluations, providing key insights and more reliable metrics for measuring the reasoning capabilities of models.Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit noticeable variance when responding to different instantiations of the same question. Specifically, the performance of all models declines when only the numerical values in the question are altered in the GSM-Symbolic benchmark. Furthermore, we investigate the fragility of mathematical reasoning in these models and show that their performance significantly deteriorates as the number of clauses in a question increases. We hypothesize that this decline is because current LLMs cannot perform genuine logical reasoning; they replicate reasoning steps from their training data. Adding a single clause that seems relevant to the question causes significant performance drops (up to 65%) across all state-of-the-art models, even though the clause doesn't contribute to the reasoning chain needed for the final answer. Overall, our work offers a more nuanced understanding of LLMs' capabilities and limitations in mathematical reasoning.
GSM-Symbolic: Understanding the Limitations of Mathematical Reasoning in Large Language Models
Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked interest in their formal reasoning capabilities, particularly in mathematics. The GSM8K benchmark is widely used to assess the mathematical reasoning of models on grade-school-level questions. While the performance of LLMs on GSM8K has significantly improved in recent years, it remains unclear whether their mathematical reasoning capabilities have genuinely advanced, raising questions about the reliability of the reported metrics. To address these concerns, we conduct a large-scale study on several SOTA open and closed models. To overcome the limitations of existing evaluations, we introduce GSM-Symbolic, an improved benchmark created from symbolic templates that allow for the generation of a diverse set of questions. GSM-Symbolic enables more controllable evaluations, providing key insights and more reliable metrics for measuring the reasoning capabilities of models.Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit noticeable variance when responding to different instantiations of the same question. Specifically, the performance of all models declines when only the numerical values in the question are altered in the GSM-Symbolic benchmark. Furthermore, we investigate the fragility of mathematical reasoning in these models and show that their performance significantly deteriorates as the number of clauses in a question increases. We hypothesize that this decline is because current LLMs cannot perform genuine logical reasoning; they replicate reasoning steps from their training data. Adding a single clause that seems relevant to the question causes significant performance drops (up to 65%) across all state-of-the-art models, even though the clause doesn't contribute to the reasoning chain needed for the final answer. Overall, our work offers a more nuanced understanding of LLMs' capabilities and limitations in mathematical reasoning.
Reasoning Under Uncertainty: Exploring Probabilistic Reasoning Capabilities of LLMs
Despite widespread success in language understanding and generation, large language models (LLMs) exhibit unclear and often inconsistent behavior when faced with tasks that require probabilistic reasoning. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study of the reasoning capabilities of LLMs over explicit discrete probability distributions. Given observations from a probability distribution, we evaluate models on three carefully designed tasks, mode identification, maximum likelihood estimation, and sample generation, by prompting them to provide responses to queries about either the joint distribution or its conditionals. These tasks thus probe a range of probabilistic skills, including frequency analysis, marginalization, and generative behavior. Through comprehensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that there exists a clear performance gap between smaller and larger models, with the latter demonstrating stronger inference and surprising capabilities in sample generation. Furthermore, our investigations reveal notable limitations, including sensitivity to variations in the notation utilized to represent probabilistic outcomes and performance degradation of over 60% as context length increases. Together, our results provide a detailed understanding of the probabilistic reasoning abilities of LLMs and identify key directions for future improvement.
Reasoning Under Uncertainty: Exploring Probabilistic Reasoning Capabilities of LLMs
Despite widespread success in language understanding and generation, large language models (LLMs) exhibit unclear and often inconsistent behavior when faced with tasks that require probabilistic reasoning. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study of the reasoning capabilities of LLMs over explicit discrete probability distributions. Given observations from a probability distribution, we evaluate models on three carefully designed tasks, mode identification, maximum likelihood estimation, and sample generation, by prompting them to provide responses to queries about either the joint distribution or its conditionals. These tasks thus probe a range of probabilistic skills, including frequency analysis, marginalization, and generative behavior. Through comprehensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that there exists a clear performance gap between smaller and larger models, with the latter demonstrating stronger inference and surprising capabilities in sample generation. Furthermore, our investigations reveal notable limitations, including sensitivity to variations in the notation utilized to represent probabilistic outcomes and performance degradation of over 60% as context length increases. Together, our results provide a detailed understanding of the probabilistic reasoning abilities of LLMs and identify key directions for future improvement.