Despite widespread success in language understanding and generation, large language models (LLMs) exhibit unclear and often inconsistent behavior when faced with tasks that require probabilistic reasoning. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study of the reasoning capabilities of LLMs over explicit discrete probability distributions. Given observations from a probability distribution, we evaluate models on three carefully designed tasks, mode identification, maximum likelihood estimation, and sample generation, by prompting them to provide responses to queries about either the joint distribution or its conditionals. These tasks thus probe a range of probabilistic skills, including frequency analysis, marginalization, and generative behavior. Through comprehensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that there exists a clear performance gap between smaller and larger models, with the latter demonstrating stronger inference and surprising capabilities in sample generation. Furthermore, our investigations reveal notable limitations, including sensitivity to variations in the notation utilized to represent probabilistic outcomes and performance degradation of over 60% as context length increases. Together, our results provide a detailed understanding of the probabilistic reasoning abilities of LLMs and identify key directions for future improvement.
Reasoning Under Uncertainty: Exploring Probabilistic Reasoning Capabilities of LLMs
Despite widespread success in language understanding and generation, large language models (LLMs) exhibit unclear and often inconsistent behavior when faced with tasks that require probabilistic reasoning. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study of the reasoning capabilities of LLMs over explicit discrete probability distributions. Given observations from a probability distribution, we evaluate models on three carefully designed tasks, mode identification, maximum likelihood estimation, and sample generation, by prompting them to provide responses to queries about either the joint distribution or its conditionals. These tasks thus probe a range of probabilistic skills, including frequency analysis, marginalization, and generative behavior. Through comprehensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that there exists a clear performance gap between smaller and larger models, with the latter demonstrating stronger inference and surprising capabilities in sample generation. Furthermore, our investigations reveal notable limitations, including sensitivity to variations in the notation utilized to represent probabilistic outcomes and performance degradation of over 60% as context length increases. Together, our results provide a detailed understanding of the probabilistic reasoning abilities of LLMs and identify key directions for future improvement.
Eliciting Beliefs with Random Generation Tasks
Elicitation methods, such as asking people to produce the deciles of a distribution, are standard practices in policy or applied statistics. Similarly, much of cognitive science and psychology focuses on determining people's people's beliefs or latent traits through questionnaires or judgment tasks. However, these approaches often only capture a rough outline of what people know and are usually limited to point estimates of people's beliefs. Here, we present a novel experimental paradigm that allows us to access people's beliefs and how variable these beliefs are. Our task is based on an established random generation paradigm in which participants produce quantities from a particular domain as randomly as possible. We hypothesize that due to the minds' general-purpose mechanisms for probabilistic inferences, these random sequences represent the participants' underlying prior beliefs. We show that our method can infer participants' beliefs for a wide range of numeric quantities at comparable accuracy as an established elicitation method. Moreover, these inferred beliefs are consistent with individual participants' generalization and inference patterns in a subsequent conditional prediction task. We then extend our approach to non-numeric belief elicitation, highlighting how our method can go beyond numeric elicitation and provide insight into complex beliefs that are challenging to assess experimentally. Empirically, our results highlight that people know the rough shapes of environmental distributions, and these beliefs guide inference and generalization. Moreover, using our novel approach, we also show that people know the fine details of environmental distributions. Finally, our experimental results show that random generation paradigms can be a useful tool for cognitive scientists, psychologists, and applied statisticians.
GSM-Symbolic: Understanding the Limitations of Mathematical Reasoning in Large Language Models
Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked interest in their formal reasoning capabilities, particularly in mathematics. The GSM8K benchmark is widely used to assess the mathematical reasoning of models on grade-school-level questions. While the performance of LLMs on GSM8K has significantly improved in recent years, it remains unclear whether their mathematical reasoning capabilities have genuinely advanced, raising questions about the reliability of the reported metrics. To address these concerns, we conduct a large-scale study on several SOTA open and closed models. To overcome the limitations of existing evaluations, we introduce GSM-Symbolic, an improved benchmark created from symbolic templates that allow for the generation of a diverse set of questions. GSM-Symbolic enables more controllable evaluations, providing key insights and more reliable metrics for measuring the reasoning capabilities of models.Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit noticeable variance when responding to different instantiations of the same question. Specifically, the performance of all models declines when only the numerical values in the question are altered in the GSM-Symbolic benchmark. Furthermore, we investigate the fragility of mathematical reasoning in these models and show that their performance significantly deteriorates as the number of clauses in a question increases. We hypothesize that this decline is because current LLMs cannot perform genuine logical reasoning; they replicate reasoning steps from their training data. Adding a single clause that seems relevant to the question causes significant performance drops (up to 65%) across all state-of-the-art models, even though the clause doesn't contribute to the reasoning chain needed for the final answer. Overall, our work offers a more nuanced understanding of LLMs' capabilities and limitations in mathematical reasoning.
GSM-Symbolic: Understanding the Limitations of Mathematical Reasoning in Large Language Models
Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked interest in their formal reasoning capabilities, particularly in mathematics. The GSM8K benchmark is widely used to assess the mathematical reasoning of models on grade-school-level questions. While the performance of LLMs on GSM8K has significantly improved in recent years, it remains unclear whether their mathematical reasoning capabilities have genuinely advanced, raising questions about the reliability of the reported metrics. To address these concerns, we conduct a large-scale study on several SOTA open and closed models. To overcome the limitations of existing evaluations, we introduce GSM-Symbolic, an improved benchmark created from symbolic templates that allow for the generation of a diverse set of questions. GSM-Symbolic enables more controllable evaluations, providing key insights and more reliable metrics for measuring the reasoning capabilities of models.Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit noticeable variance when responding to different instantiations of the same question. Specifically, the performance of all models declines when only the numerical values in the question are altered in the GSM-Symbolic benchmark. Furthermore, we investigate the fragility of mathematical reasoning in these models and show that their performance significantly deteriorates as the number of clauses in a question increases. We hypothesize that this decline is because current LLMs cannot perform genuine logical reasoning; they replicate reasoning steps from their training data. Adding a single clause that seems relevant to the question causes significant performance drops (up to 65%) across all state-of-the-art models, even though the clause doesn't contribute to the reasoning chain needed for the final answer. Overall, our work offers a more nuanced understanding of LLMs' capabilities and limitations in mathematical reasoning.
Hypothesis generation and updating in large language models
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly help people solve problems, from debugging code to repairing machinery. This process requires generating plausible hypotheses from partial descriptions,...
Eliciting Reasoning in Language Models with Cognitive Tools
The recent advent of reasoning models like OpenAI's o1 was met with excited speculation by the AI community about the mechanisms underlying these capabilities in closed models, followed by a rush of replication efforts, particularly from the open source community. These speculations were largely settled by the demonstration from DeepSeek-R1 that chains-of-thought and reinforcement learning (RL) can effectively replicate reasoning on top of base LLMs. However, it remains valuable to explore alternative methods for theoretically eliciting reasoning that could help elucidate the underlying mechanisms, as well as providing additional methods that may offer complementary benefits. Here, we build on the long-standing literature in cognitive psychology and cognitive architectures, which postulates that reasoning arises from the orchestrated, sequential execution of a set of modular, predetermined cognitive operations. Crucially, we implement this key idea within a modern agentic tool-calling framework. In particular, we endow an LLM with a small set of "cognitive tools" encapsulating specific reasoning operations, each executed by the LLM itself. Surprisingly, this simple strategy results in considerable gains in performance on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks compared to base LLMs, for both closed and open-weight models. For instance, providing our "cognitive tools" to GPT-4.1 increases its pass@1 performance on AIME2024 from 32% to 53%, even surpassing the performance of o1-preview. In addition to its practical implications, this demonstration contributes to the debate regarding the role of post-training methods in eliciting reasoning in LLMs versus the role of inherent capabilities acquired during pre-training, and whether post-training merely uncovers these latent abilities.
On the Paradox of Learning to Reason from Data
Logical reasoning is needed in a wide range of NLP tasks. Can a BERT model be trained end-to-end to solve logical reasoning problems presented in natural language? We attempt to answer this question in a confined problem space where there exists a set of parameters that perfectly simulates logical reasoning. We make observations that seem to contradict each other: BERT attains near-perfect accuracy on in-distribution test examples while failing to generalize to other data distributions over the exact same problem space. Our study provides an explanation for this paradox: instead of learning to emulate the correct reasoning function, BERT has in fact learned statistical features that inherently exist in logical reasoning problems. We also show that it is infeasible to jointly remove statistical features from data, illustrating the difficulty of learning to reason in general. Our result naturally extends to other neural models and unveils the fundamental difference between learning to reason and learning to achieve high performance on NLP benchmarks using statistical features.
Can LLMs Faithfully Enact Superforecaster Personas?
Superforecasters are people that make forecasts that are statistically better than the average person; they offer an interesting testbed for persona modelling. In this preliminary work, we investigate whether large language models (LLMs) can faithfully model superforecaster-like personas making similar forecasts and generating similar rationales behind the forecasts. When we compare LLM-generated responses to the ground truth responses of superforecasters, we find that few-shot prompting generates numerically closer forecasts than instruction-prompting baselines. We also measure the similarity of generated and real rationales, finding that the rationales generated based on examples are judged more similar to those of superforecasters than instruction-prompting baselines. However, an analysis of the reasoning patterns in the rationales shows significant differences between human and LLM forecasters, pointing to a gap between stylistic imitation and deep reasoning similarity. These preliminary results raise several interesting questions about how getting superforecaster-like behaviour from LLMs actually works, and open new avenues to explore for improving the forecasting behaviour of LLMs.
LLM in a Flash: Efficient Large Language Model Inference with Limited Memory
Large language models (LLMs) are central to modern natural language processing, delivering exceptional performance in various tasks…
Cognitive Episodes in LLM Reasoning Traces Enable Interpretable Human Item Difficulty Prediction
Predicting item difficulty is a central challenge in educational assessment, where accurate estimates are critical for fairness and effective test construction. Existing methods are either expensive to scale or limited in predictive power, even with recent Large Language Model(LLM) related methods. Meanwhile, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) expose detailed reasoning traces that resemble human problem solving, creating new opportunities for difficulty modeling. We propose a new perspective that treats item difficulty as an observable consequence of problem-solving burden. Building on this formulation, we introduce a structured framework that converts LRM reasoning traces into sentence-level episode sequences using a cognitively grounded taxonomy and then derives compact process features for downstream prediction, which is named Epi2Diff (Episode to Difficulty). This produces a structured process-based representation of each assessment item. Across four real-world human difficulty datasets, our method consistently outperforms various methods, including fine-tuning small encoder-only language models, LLM In-Context Learning, and LLM Supervised Finetuning with full parameters or LoRA. Epi2Diff delivers an 8.0% relative gain in classification and a 24.4% reduction in RMSE for regression against strong baselines. We also find that harder items are associated with more effortful and iterative reasoning dynamics. Moreover, our method not only predicts the difficulty value, but it also provides a new perspective on the explanation of the predicted difficulty based on the episode transition of LRM responses. These results suggest that structured reasoning dynamics are both predictive and interpretable, and provide a new lens for understanding the utility of LRMs in educational measurement.
Do Large Language Models Perform the Way People Expect? Measuring the Human Generalization Function
What makes large language models (LLMs) impressive is also what makes them hard to evaluate: their diversity of uses. To evaluate these models, we must understand the purposes they will be used for. We consider a setting where these deployment decisions are made by people, and in particular, people's beliefs about where an LLM will perform well. We model such beliefs as the consequence of a human generalization function: having seen what an LLM gets right or wrong, people generalize to where else it might succeed. We collect a dataset of 19K examples of how humans make generalizations across 79 tasks from the MMLU and BIG-Bench benchmarks. We show that the human generalization function can be predicted using NLP methods: people have consistent structured ways to generalize. We then evaluate LLM alignment with the human generalization function. Our results show that -- especially for cases where the cost of mistakes is high -- more capable models (e.g. GPT-4) can do worse on the instances people choose to use them for, exactly because they are not aligned with the human generalization function.
ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models
While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across tasks in language understanding and interactive decision making, their abilities for reasoning (e.g. chain-of-thought prompting) and acting (e.g. action plan generation) have primarily been studied as separate topics. In this paper, we explore the use of LLMs to generate both reasoning traces and task-specific actions in an interleaved manner, allowing for greater synergy between the two: reasoning traces help the model induce, track, and update action plans as well as handle exceptions, while actions allow it to interface with external sources, such as knowledge bases or environments, to gather additional information. We apply our approach, named ReAct, to a diverse set of language and decision making tasks and demonstrate its effectiveness over state-of-the-art baselines, as well as improved human interpretability and trustworthiness over methods without reasoning or acting components. Concretely, on question answering (HotpotQA) and fact verification (Fever), ReAct overcomes issues of hallucination and error propagation prevalent in chain-of-thought reasoning by interacting with a simple Wikipedia API, and generates human-like task-solving trajectories that are more interpretable than baselines without reasoning traces. On two interactive decision making benchmarks (ALFWorld and WebShop), ReAct outperforms imitation and reinforcement learning methods by an absolute success rate of 34% and 10% respectively, while being prompted with only one or two in-context examples. Project site with code: https://react-lm.github.io
Relevant answers to polar questions
People often provide answers that go beyond what a question literally asks, but it has been difficult to pin down what makes some answers more relevant than others. Here, we introduce Pragmatic Reasoning In Overinformative Responses to Polar Questions (PRIOR-PQ), a probabilistic cognitive model formalizing how people use theory of mind (ToM) to produce and interpret relevantly overinformative answers to yes–no questions. Specifically, PRIOR-PQ grounds the pragmatics of question answering in inferences about the underlying goal that motivated the questioner to ask the given question as opposed to a different question. We evaluate our probabilistic model against human answering behaviour elicited in three case studies of increasing complexity, demonstrating its ability to predict nuanced patterns of relevance better than existing models, including state-of-the-art large language models. We also show how the goal-sensitive reasoning instantiated in our probabilistic model motivates a novel chain-of-thought prompting method allowing language models to approach more human-like performance. This work illuminates the mechanistic role of ToM in the pragmatics of question–answer exchanges, bridging formal semantics, cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Our findings have implications for developing more socially grounded dialogue systems and highlight the importance of integrating explanatory cognitive models with machine learning approaches. This article is part of the theme issue ‘At the heart of human communication: new views on the complex relationship between pragmatics and Theory of Mind’.
Artificial Hivemind: The Open-Ended Homogeneity of Language Models (and Beyond)
Language models (LMs) often struggle to generate diverse, human-like creative content, raising concerns about the long-term homogenization of human thought through repeated exposure to similar outputs. Yet scalable methods for evaluating LM output diversity remain limited, especially beyond narrow tasks such as random number or name generation, or beyond repeated sampling from a single model. We introduce Infinity-Chat, a large-scale dataset of 26K diverse, real-world, open-ended user queries that admit a wide range of plausible answers with no single ground truth. We introduce the first comprehensive taxonomy for characterizing the full spectrum of open-ended prompts posed to LMs, comprising 6 top-level categories (e.g., brainstorm & ideation) that further breaks down to 17 subcategories. Using Infinity-Chat, we present a large-scale study of mode collapse in LMs, revealing a pronounced Artificial Hivemind effect in open-ended generation of LMs, characterized by (1) intra-model repetition, where a single model consistently generates similar responses, and more so (2) inter-model homogeneity, where different models produce strikingly similar outputs. Infinity-Chat also includes 31,250 human annotations, across absolute ratings and pairwise preferences, with 25 independent human annotations per example. This enables studying collective and individual-specific human preferences in response to open-ended queries. Our findings show that LMs, reward models, and LM judges are less well calibrated to human ratings on model generations that elicit differing idiosyncratic annotator preferences, despite maintaining comparable overall quality. Overall, INFINITY-CHAT presents the first large-scale resource for systematically studying real-world open-ended queries to LMs, revealing critical insights to guide future research for mitigating long-term AI safety risks posed by the Artificial Hivemind.
Beyond Model Collapse: Scaling Up with Synthesized Data Requires Verification
Large Language Models (LLM) are increasingly trained on data generated by other LLM, either because generated text and images become part of the pre-training corpus, or because synthetized data is used as a replacement for expensive human-annotation. This raises concerns about \emph{model collapse}, a drop in model performance when their training sets include generated data. Considering that it is easier for both humans and machines to tell between good and bad examples than to generate high-quality samples, we investigate the use of verification on synthesized data to prevent model collapse. We provide a theoretical characterization using Gaussian mixtures, linear classifiers, and linear verifiers to derive conditions with measurable proxies to assess whether the verifier can effectively select synthesized data that leads to optimal performance. We experiment with two practical tasks -- computing matrix eigenvalues with transformers and news summarization with LLMs -- which both exhibit model collapse when trained on generated data, and show that verifiers, even imperfect ones, can indeed be harnessed to prevent model collapse and that our proposed proxy measure strongly correlates with performance.
ICML Poster Learning syntax without semantics: Disentangled tiny language models
Language models acquire syntax and world knowledge together, entangling the two in ways that limit efficiency and controllability. We show that syntax can be learned while suppressing semantic plausibility and world‑knowledge cues, yielding more efficient and controllable models. We train tiny LMs on grammatical nonsense — syntactically well-formed text with semantic content ablated via constrained relexicalization (SAMBAL). Models trained on this data perform comparably to standard pretraining on syntactic benchmarks (BLiMP, SyntaxGym) while scoring at chance on world knowledge probes (EWoK). On targeted grammar-plausibility conflict probes, content-neutral models prefer grammaticality where standard models prefer plausibility, and their representations show more syntactic vs lexical alignment. On efficiency, disentanglement yields substantial sample and parameter gains: in low‑resource regimes, a 5M‑parameter model matches a 30M‑parameter baseline at the same data budget. On controllability, content-neutral models adapt rapidly to a new domain with minimal exposure, suggesting the feasibility of modular post‑hoc knowledge specialization.