Artificial Hivemind: The Open-Ended Homogeneity of Language Models (and Beyond)

Inducing Sustained Creativity and Diversity in Large Language Models

We address a not-widely-recognized subset of exploratory search, where a user sets out on a typically long "search quest" for the perfect wedding dress, overlooked research topic, killer company idea, etc. The first few outputs of current large language models (LLMs) may be helpful but only as a start, since the quest requires learning the search space and evaluating many diverse and creative alternatives along the way. Although LLMs encode an impressive fraction of the world's knowledge, common decoding methods are narrowly optimized for prompts with correct answers and thus return mostly homogeneous and conventional results. Other approaches, including those designed to increase diversity across a small set of answers, start to repeat themselves long before search quest users learn enough to make final choices, or offer a uniform type of "creativity" to every user asking similar questions. We develop a novel, easy-to-implement decoding scheme that induces sustained creativity and diversity in LLMs, producing as many conceptually unique results as desired, even without access to the inner workings of an LLM's vector space. The algorithm unlocks an LLM's vast knowledge, both orthodox and heterodox, well beyond modal decoding paths. With this approach, search quest users can more quickly explore the search space and find satisfying answers.

The homogenizing effect of large language models on human expression and thought

AbstractCognitive diversity, reflected in variations of language, perspective, and reasoning, is essential to creativity and collective intelligence. This diversity is rich and grounded in culture, history, and individual experience. Yet, as large language models (LLMs) become deeply embedded in people's lives, they risk standardizing language and reasoning. We synthesize evidence across linguistics, psychology, cognitive science, and computer science to show how LLMs reflect and reinforce dominant styles while marginalizing alternative voices and reasoning strategies. We examine how their design and widespread use contribute to this effect by mirroring patterns in their training data and amplifying convergence as all people increasingly rely on the same models across contexts. Unchecked, this homogenization risks flattening the cognitive landscapes that drive collective intelligence and adaptability.

The Hitchhiker's Guide to Monoculture

Large language models (LLMs) often produce homogeneous outputs, raising concerns that AI coding assistants may lead to convergence in the software artifacts that developers create. Whether this occurs in practice is unclear because developers interactively prompt, evaluate, modify, and reject model outputs, and because outputs vary with prompt and repository context. I examine code homogenization using Kaggle contest submissions from 2019 to mid-2026. I first document widespread convergence toward the random seed value 42, consistent with LLMs reinforcing a longstanding convention in programming culture. I then study homogenization more broadly, at two levels of aggregation and abstraction. At the submission level, I measure the average pairwise similarity of submissions within contests. At the contest level, I measure the conceptual span of submitted code, motivating distinct measures for each: TF-IDF representations, which capture surface syntax, and Voyage 3 code embeddings, which capture code intent and semantics. The results demonstrate substantial syntactic homogenization at both the individual and collective levels: individual submissions have become more alike in literal syntax and code structure, while the latent dimensionality of syntactic variation has narrowed. In contrast, I find little evidence of semantic homogenization, individually and collectively. Average semantic distance remains essentially flat, and the contest-level latent dimensional span of semantic approaches remains stable. These findings suggest that AI coding assistants are certainly standardizing implementation details, yet they have not yet produced evidence of homogenization in the approaches and problem-solving strategies coders employ.

The homogenizing effect of large language models on human expression and thought

Cognitive diversity, reflected in variations of language, perspective, and reasoning, is essential to creativity and collective intelligence. This diversity is rich and grounded in culture, history, and individual experience. Yet, as large language models (LLMs) become deeply embedded in people’s lives, they risk standardizing language and reasoning. We synthesize evidence across linguistics, psychology, cognitive science, and computer science to show how LLMs reflect and reinforce dominant styles while marginalizing alternative voices and reasoning strategies. We examine how their design and widespread use contribute to this effect by mirroring patterns in their training data and amplifying convergence as all people increasingly rely on the same models across contexts. Unchecked, this homogenization risks flattening the cognitive landscapes that drive collective intelligence and adaptability.

The homogenizing effect of large language models on human expression and thought

Cognitive diversity, reflected in variations of language, perspective, and reasoning, is essential to creativity and collective intelligence. This diversity is rich and grounded in culture, history, and individual experience. Yet, as large language models (LLMs) become deeply embedded in people’s lives, they risk standardizing language and reasoning. We synthesize evidence across linguistics, psychology, cognitive science, and computer science to show how LLMs reflect and reinforce dominant styles while marginalizing alternative voices and reasoning strategies. We examine how their design and widespread use contribute to this effect by mirroring patterns in their training data and amplifying convergence as all people increasingly rely on the same models across contexts. Unchecked, this homogenization risks flattening the cognitive landscapes that drive collective intelligence and adaptability.

Can LLMs Faithfully Enact Superforecaster Personas?

Superforecasters are people that make forecasts that are statistically better than the average person; they offer an interesting testbed for persona modelling. In this preliminary work, we investigate whether large language models (LLMs) can faithfully model superforecaster-like personas making similar forecasts and generating similar rationales behind the forecasts. When we compare LLM-generated responses to the ground truth responses of superforecasters, we find that few-shot prompting generates numerically closer forecasts than instruction-prompting baselines. We also measure the similarity of generated and real rationales, finding that the rationales generated based on examples are judged more similar to those of superforecasters than instruction-prompting baselines. However, an analysis of the reasoning patterns in the rationales shows significant differences between human and LLM forecasters, pointing to a gap between stylistic imitation and deep reasoning similarity. These preliminary results raise several interesting questions about how getting superforecaster-like behaviour from LLMs actually works, and open new avenues to explore for improving the forecasting behaviour of LLMs.

Generative AI Meets Open-Ended Survey Responses: Research Participant Use of AI and Homogenization

The growing popularity of generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools presents new challenges for data quality in online surveys and experiments. This study examines participants’ use of large language models to answer open-ended survey questions and describes empirical tendencies in human versus large language model (LLM)-generated text responses. In an original survey of research participants recruited from a popular online platform for sourcing social science research subjects, 34 percent reported using LLMs to help them answer open-ended survey questions. Simulations comparing human-written responses from three pre-ChatGPT studies with LLM-generated text reveal that LLM responses are more homogeneous and positive, particularly when they describe social groups in sensitive questions. These homogenization patterns may mask important underlying social variation in attitudes and beliefs among human subjects, raising concerns about data validity. Our findings shed light on the scope and potential consequences of participants’ LLM use in online research.

Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting

Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.

Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting

Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.

Hypothesis generation and updating in large language models

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly help people solve problems, from debugging code to repairing machinery. This process requires generating plausible hypotheses from partial descriptions,...

Measuring Combinatorial Creativity in Large Language Models and Humans

Combinatorial creativity, the process of combining familiar ideas in unfamiliar ways, is one of the foremost engines of scientific, technological, and artistic progress. This work introduces Kombine, an LLM benchmark for combinatorial creativity tasking models to discover surprising, original, and useful associations, analogies, and blends between unrelated entities, and to use those analogies and blends to invent novel concepts by re-combining the parts of existing ones. In a large-scale study across 35 LLMs, we find that: (1) LLMs are 10-16 percentage points better at discovering associations and analogies than blends, and (2) exhibit an abstraction bottleneck on blending, in which even frontier LLMs struggle to find a shared abstraction between inputs and instantiate a coherent blended space. (3) LLMs also exhibit inventive homogeneity, in which one in five concepts invented for a given item reuses properties invented by another model. Moreover, (4) models are $14\times$ more likely to reuse other invented properties on blends than analogies, and (5) models from the same provider are $2.3\times$ more likely to reuse properties than those from different providers. Next, in a comparative study involving 75 humans on the same tasks, we find that (6) humans score below nearly every LLM on each task and (7) both humans and LLMs find blending most difficult, but association is easier than analogy for LLMs, while analogy is easier than association for humans. Lastly, (8) humans and LLMs access distinct regions of semantic space on each task, suggesting that combinatorial creativity could benefit from systematic human-AI collaboration to enhance conceptual diversity. In summary, we provide a framework to assess progress towards LLMs, AI systems, and human-AI collaborations more broadly, that can elicit combinatorial creativity in a setting relevant to scientific and technological innovation.

Reasoning Under Uncertainty: Exploring Probabilistic Reasoning Capabilities of LLMs

Despite widespread success in language understanding and generation, large language models (LLMs) exhibit unclear and often inconsistent behavior when faced with tasks that require probabilistic reasoning. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study of the reasoning capabilities of LLMs over explicit discrete probability distributions. Given observations from a probability distribution, we evaluate models on three carefully designed tasks, mode identification, maximum likelihood estimation, and sample generation, by prompting them to provide responses to queries about either the joint distribution or its conditionals. These tasks thus probe a range of probabilistic skills, including frequency analysis, marginalization, and generative behavior. Through comprehensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that there exists a clear performance gap between smaller and larger models, with the latter demonstrating stronger inference and surprising capabilities in sample generation. Furthermore, our investigations reveal notable limitations, including sensitivity to variations in the notation utilized to represent probabilistic outcomes and performance degradation of over 60% as context length increases. Together, our results provide a detailed understanding of the probabilistic reasoning abilities of LLMs and identify key directions for future improvement.

Reasoning Under Uncertainty: Exploring Probabilistic Reasoning Capabilities of LLMs

Despite widespread success in language understanding and generation, large language models (LLMs) exhibit unclear and often inconsistent behavior when faced with tasks that require probabilistic reasoning. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study of the reasoning capabilities of LLMs over explicit discrete probability distributions. Given observations from a probability distribution, we evaluate models on three carefully designed tasks, mode identification, maximum likelihood estimation, and sample generation, by prompting them to provide responses to queries about either the joint distribution or its conditionals. These tasks thus probe a range of probabilistic skills, including frequency analysis, marginalization, and generative behavior. Through comprehensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that there exists a clear performance gap between smaller and larger models, with the latter demonstrating stronger inference and surprising capabilities in sample generation. Furthermore, our investigations reveal notable limitations, including sensitivity to variations in the notation utilized to represent probabilistic outcomes and performance degradation of over 60% as context length increases. Together, our results provide a detailed understanding of the probabilistic reasoning abilities of LLMs and identify key directions for future improvement.

How LLMs Distort Our Written Language

Large language models (LLMs) are used by over a billion people globally, most often to assist with writing. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs not only alter the voice and tone of human writing but also consistently alter the intended meaning. First, we conduct a human user study to understand how people actually interact with LLMs when using them for writing. Our findings reveal that extensive LLM use led to a nearly 70% increase in essays that remained neutral in answering the topic question. Significantly more heavy LLM users reported that the writing was less creative and not in their voice. Next, using a dataset of human-written essays that was collected in 2021 before the widespread release of LLMs, we study how asking an LLM to revise the essay based on the human-written feedback in the dataset induces large changes in the resulting content and meaning. We find that even when LLMs are prompted with expert feedback and asked to only make grammar edits, they still change the text in a way that significantly alters its semantic meaning. We then examine LLM-generated text in the wild, specifically focusing on the 21% of AI-generated scientific peer reviews at a recent top AI conference. We find that LLM-generated reviews place significantly less weight on clarity and significance of the research, and assign scores that, on average, are a full point higher. These findings highlight a misalignment between the perceived benefit of AI use and an implicit, consistent effect on the semantics of human writing, motivating future work on how widespread AI writing will affect our cultural and scientific institutions.

How LLMs Distort Our Written Language

Large language models (LLMs) are used by over a billion people globally, most often to assist with writing. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs not only alter the voice and tone of human writing but also consistently alter the intended meaning. First, we conduct a human user study to understand how people actually interact with LLMs when using them for writing. Our findings reveal that extensive LLM use led to a nearly 70% increase in essays that remained neutral in answering the topic question. Significantly more heavy LLM users reported that the writing was less creative and not in their voice. Next, using a dataset of human-written essays that was collected in 2021 before the widespread release of LLMs, we study how asking an LLM to revise the essay based on the human-written feedback in the dataset induces large changes in the resulting content and meaning. We find that even when LLMs are prompted with expert feedback and asked to only make grammar edits, they still change the text in a way that significantly alters its semantic meaning. We then examine LLM-generated text in the wild, specifically focusing on the 21% of AI-generated scientific peer reviews at a recent top AI conference. We find that LLM-generated reviews place significantly less weight on clarity and significance of the research, and assign scores that, on average, are a full point higher. These findings highlight a misalignment between the perceived benefit of AI use and an implicit, consistent effect on the semantics of human writing, motivating future work on how widespread AI writing will affect our cultural and scientific institutions.

How LLMs Distort Our Written Language

Large language models (LLMs) are used by over a billion people globally, most often to assist with writing. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs not only alter the voice and tone of human writing but also consistently alter the intended meaning. First, we conduct a human user study to understand how people actually interact with LLMs when using them for writing. Our findings reveal that extensive LLM use led to a nearly 70% increase in essays that remained neutral in answering the topic question. Significantly more heavy LLM users reported that the writing was less creative and not in their voice. Next, using a dataset of human-written essays that was collected in 2021 before the widespread release of LLMs, we study how asking an LLM to revise the essay based on the human-written feedback in the dataset induces large changes in the resulting content and meaning. We find that even when LLMs are prompted with expert feedback and asked to only make grammar edits, they still change the text in a way that significantly alters its semantic meaning. We then examine LLM-generated text in the wild, specifically focusing on the 21% of AI-generated scientific peer reviews at a recent top AI conference. We find that LLM-generated reviews place significantly less weight on clarity and significance of the research, and assign scores that, on average, are a full point higher. These findings highlight a misalignment between the perceived benefit of AI use and an implicit, consistent effect on the semantics of human writing, motivating future work on how widespread AI writing will affect our cultural and scientific institutions.