We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.
Negation Neglect: When models fail to learn negations in training
We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed...
LLMs Can Get "Brain Rot": A Pilot Study on Twitter/X
We propose and test the LLM Brain Rot Hypothesis: continual exposure to junk web text induces lasting cognitive decline in large language models (LLMs). To unveil junk effects, we designed a novel controlled experiment on real Twitter/X corpora, by constructing junk and reverse-controlled datasets via two orthogonal operationalizations: M1 (engagement degree) and M2 (semantic quality), with matched token scale and training operations across conditions. Compared to the control group, continual pre-training of 4 LLMs on the junk dataset causes non-trivial declines (Hedges' g>0.3) on reasoning, long-context understanding, safety, and inflating "dark traits" (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism). The gradual mixtures of junk and control datasets also yield dose-response cognition decay: for example, under M1, ARC-Challenge with Chain-of-Thought drops 72.1 -> 57.2 and RULER-CWE 83.7 -> 52.3 as junk ratio rises from 0% to 100%. Error forensics reveal several key insights. First, we identify thought-skipping as the primary lesion in reasoning: models increasingly truncate or skip chains. Second, partial but incomplete healing is observed: scaling instruction tuning and clean continual pre-training improve the declined cognition, yet cannot restore baseline capability, suggesting persistent representational drift rather than format mismatch. Finally, we discover that the popularity, a non-semantic metric, of a tweet is a better indicator of the Brain Rot effect than the length in M1. Together, the results provide significant, multi-perspective evidence that social effects of data could be a causal driver of LLM capability decay in continual pre-training, thereby motivating routine "cognitive health checks" for deployed and evolving LLMs.
LLMs Can Get "Brain Rot": A Pilot Study on Twitter/X
We propose and test the LLM Brain Rot Hypothesis: continual exposure to junk web text induces lasting cognitive decline in large language models (LLMs). To unveil junk effects, we designed a novel controlled experiment on real Twitter/X corpora, by constructing junk and reverse-controlled datasets via two orthogonal operationalizations: M1 (engagement degree) and M2 (semantic quality), with matched token scale and training operations across conditions. Compared to the control group, continual pre-training of 4 LLMs on the junk dataset causes non-trivial declines (Hedges' g>0.3) on reasoning, long-context understanding, safety, and inflating "dark traits" (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism). The gradual mixtures of junk and control datasets also yield dose-response cognition decay: for example, under M1, ARC-Challenge with Chain-of-Thought drops 72.1 -> 57.2 and RULER-CWE 83.7 -> 52.3 as junk ratio rises from 0% to 100%. Error forensics reveal several key insights. First, we identify thought-skipping as the primary lesion in reasoning: models increasingly truncate or skip chains. Second, partial but incomplete healing is observed: scaling instruction tuning and clean continual pre-training improve the declined cognition, yet cannot restore baseline capability, suggesting persistent representational drift rather than format mismatch. Finally, we discover that the popularity, a non-semantic metric, of a tweet is a better indicator of the Brain Rot effect than the length in M1. Together, the results provide significant, multi-perspective evidence that social effects of data could be a causal driver of LLM capability decay in continual pre-training, thereby motivating routine "cognitive health checks" for deployed and evolving LLMs.
RealFactBench: A Benchmark for Evaluating Large Language Models in Real-World Fact-Checking
Large Language Models (LLMs) hold significant potential for advancing fact-checking by leveraging their capabilities in reasoning, evidence retrieval, and explanation generation. However, existing benchmarks fail to comprehensively evaluate LLMs and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in realistic misinformation scenarios. To bridge this gap, we introduce RealFactBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to assess the fact-checking capabilities of LLMs and MLLMs across diverse real-world tasks, including Knowledge Validation, Rumor Detection, and Event Verification. RealFactBench consists of 6K high-quality claims drawn from authoritative sources, encompassing multimodal content and diverse domains. Our evaluation framework further introduces the Unknown Rate (UnR) metric, enabling a more nuanced assessment of models' ability to handle uncertainty and balance between over-conservatism and over-confidence. Extensive experiments on 7 representative LLMs and 4 MLLMs reveal their limitations in real-world fact-checking and offer valuable insights for further research. RealFactBench is publicly available at https://github.com/kalendsyang/RealFactBench.git.
RealFactBench: A Benchmark for Evaluating Large Language Models in Real-World Fact-Checking
Large Language Models (LLMs) hold significant potential for advancing fact-checking by leveraging their capabilities in reasoning, evidence retrieval, and explanation generation. However, existing benchmarks fail to comprehensively evaluate LLMs and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in realistic misinformation scenarios. To bridge this gap, we introduce RealFactBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to assess the fact-checking capabilities of LLMs and MLLMs across diverse real-world tasks, including Knowledge Validation, Rumor Detection, and Event Verification. RealFactBench consists of 6K high-quality claims drawn from authoritative sources, encompassing multimodal content and diverse domains. Our evaluation framework further introduces the Unknown Rate (UnR) metric, enabling a more nuanced assessment of models' ability to handle uncertainty and balance between over-conservatism and over-confidence. Extensive experiments on 7 representative LLMs and 4 MLLMs reveal their limitations in real-world fact-checking and offer valuable insights for further research. RealFactBench is publicly available at https://github.com/kalendsyang/RealFactBench.git.
Why Language Models Hallucinate
Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.
Why Language Models Hallucinate
Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.
Measuring short-form factuality in large language models
We present SimpleQA, a benchmark that evaluates the ability of language models to answer short, fact-seeking questions. We prioritized two properties in designing this eval. First, SimpleQA is challenging, as it is adversarially collected against GPT-4 responses. Second, responses are easy to grade, because questions are created such that there exists only a single, indisputable answer. Each answer in SimpleQA is graded as either correct, incorrect, or not attempted. A model with ideal behavior would get as many questions correct as possible while not attempting the questions for which it is not confident it knows the correct answer. SimpleQA is a simple, targeted evaluation for whether models "know what they know," and our hope is that this benchmark will remain relevant for the next few generations of frontier models. SimpleQA can be found at https://github.com/openai/simple-evals.
Measuring short-form factuality in large language models
We present SimpleQA, a benchmark that evaluates the ability of language models to answer short, fact-seeking questions. We prioritized two properties in designing this eval. First, SimpleQA is challenging, as it is adversarially collected against GPT-4 responses. Second, responses are easy to grade, because questions are created such that there exists only a single, indisputable answer. Each answer in SimpleQA is graded as either correct, incorrect, or not attempted. A model with ideal behavior would get as many questions correct as possible while not attempting the questions for which it is not confident it knows the correct answer. SimpleQA is a simple, targeted evaluation for whether models "know what they know," and our hope is that this benchmark will remain relevant for the next few generations of frontier models. SimpleQA can be found at https://github.com/openai/simple-evals.
Believe It or Not: How Deeply do LLMs Believe Implanted Facts?
Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.
Believe It or Not: How Deeply do LLMs Believe Implanted Facts?
Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.
Learn to Refuse: Making Large Language Models More Controllable and Reliable through Knowledge Scope Limitation and Refusal Mechanism
Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive language understanding and generation capabilities, enabling them to answer a wide range of questions across various domains. However, these models are not flawless and often produce responses that contain errors or misinformation. These inaccuracies, commonly referred to as hallucinations, render LLMs unreliable and even unusable in many scenarios. In this paper, our focus is on mitigating the issue of hallucination in LLMs, particularly in the context of question-answering. Instead of attempting to answer all questions, we explore a refusal mechanism that instructs LLMs to refuse to answer challenging questions in order to avoid errors. We then propose a simple yet effective solution called Learn to Refuse (L2R), which incorporates the refusal mechanism to enable LLMs to recognize and refuse to answer questions that they find difficult to address. To achieve this, we utilize a structured knowledge base to represent all the LLM's understanding of the world, enabling it to provide traceable gold knowledge. This knowledge base is separate from the LLM and initially empty. It can be filled with validated knowledge and progressively expanded. When an LLM encounters questions outside its domain, the system recognizes its knowledge scope and determines whether it can answer the question independently. Additionally, we introduce a method for automatically and efficiently expanding the knowledge base of LLMs. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis, we demonstrate that our approach enhances the controllability and reliability of LLMs.
Judging facts, judging norms: Training machine learning models to judge humans requires a modified approach to labeling data
As governments and industry turn to increased use of automated decision systems, it becomes essential to consider how closely such systems can reproduce human judgment. We identify a core potential failure, finding that annotators label objects differently depending on whether they are being asked a factual question or a normative question. This challenges a natural assumption maintained in many standard machine-learning (ML) data acquisition procedures: that there is no difference between predicting the factual classification of an object and an exercise of judgment about whether an object violates a rule premised on those facts. We find that using factual labels to train models intended for normative judgments introduces a notable measurement error. We show that models trained using factual labels yield significantly different judgments than those trained using normative labels and that the impact of this effect on model performance can exceed that of other factors (e.g., dataset size) that routinely attract attention from ML researchers and practitioners. , Machine learning systems trained with factual features as labels do not reproduce human rule violation judgments on the same data.
Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting
Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.
Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting
Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. This level of transparency into LLMs' predictions would yield significant safety benefits. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs--e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)"--which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations rationalizing those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. Building more transparent and explainable systems will require either improving CoT faithfulness through targeted efforts or abandoning CoT in favor of alternative methods.
Technical Report on the Pangram AI-Generated Text Classifier
We present Pangram Text, a transformer-based neural network trained to distinguish text written by large language models from text written by humans. Pangram Text outperforms zero-shot methods such as DetectGPT as well as leading commercial AI detection tools with over 38 times lower error rates on a comprehensive benchmark comprised of 10 text domains (student writing, creative writing, scientific writing, books, encyclopedias, news, email, scientific papers, short-form Q&A) and 8 open- and closed-source large language models. We propose a training algorithm, hard negative mining with synthetic mirrors, that enables our classifier to achieve orders of magnitude lower false positive rates on high-data domains such as reviews. Finally, we show that Pangram Text is not biased against nonnative English speakers and generalizes to domains and models unseen during training.