On working machines
In part one, on thinking machines, I explored two facets of the philosophy of artificial intelligence: “intelligence”, and consciousness. That left an important topic to consider for this post: the...
Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilPapers
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...
Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilArchive
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...
Experts Argue Whether Computers Could Reason, and if They Should (Published 1977)
Computer world is in midst of fundamental dispute over question of computer intelligence since MIT Prof Joseph Weizenbaum wrote book arguing that machines can never be made to reason like people and should not be; Weizenbaum por (M)
Contra Chiang on machine consciousness
If you think you understand AI consciousness, then you don't understand AI consciousness
A quote by Edsger W. Dijkstra
The question of whether a computer can think is no more interesting than the question of whether a submarine can swim.
The brain is a computer is a brain: neuroscience's internal debate and the social significance of the Computational Metaphor
The Computational Metaphor, comparing the brain to the computer and vice versa, is the most prominent metaphor in neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI). Its appropriateness is highly debated in both fields, particularly with regards to whether it is useful for the advancement of science and technology. Considerably less attention, however, has been devoted to how the Computational Metaphor is used outside of the lab, and particularly how it may shape society's interactions with AI. As such, recently publicized concerns over AI's role in perpetuating racism, genderism, and ableism suggest that the term "artificial intelligence" is misplaced, and that a new lexicon is needed to describe these computational systems. Thus, there is an essential question about the Computational Metaphor that is rarely asked by neuroscientists: whom does it help and whom does it harm? This essay invites the neuroscience community to consider the social implications of the field's most controversial metaphor.
The Global Brain Argument: Nodes, Computroniums and the Ai Megasystem (Target Paper for Special Issue)
The Global Brain Argument contends that many of us are, or will be, part of a global brain network that includes both biological and artificial intelligences (AIs), such as generative AIs ...
Conscious or Not
For as long as I remember, people have been arguing about whether machines could be intelligent or not.
No, Artificial Intelligence Is Not Conscious
Taken to its logical conclusion, this line of thinking is absurd—and damning.
Notes from inside China's AI labs
Lessons from my trip to talk to most of the leading AI labs in China.
Mindless Machines, Mindless Myths | Los Angeles Review of Books
Erik J. Larson thinks about “Mindless: The Human Condition in the Age of Artificial Intelligence,” which traces Robert Skidelsky’s philosophical reckoning with AI, automation, and the illusion of progress.
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Mindless Machines, Mindless Myths | Los Angeles Review of Books
Erik J. Larson thinks about “Mindless: The Human Condition in the Age of Artificial Intelligence,” which traces Robert Skidelsky’s philosophical reckoning with AI, automation, and the illusion of progress.
:quality(75)/https%3A%2F%2Fassets.lareviewofbooks.org%2Fuploads%2FMindless.jpg)
What Is Intelligence? Lessons from AI About Evolution, Computing, and Minds | Blaise Agüera y Arcas
The Chinese room argument holds that a computer executing a program cannot have a mind, understanding, or consciousness, regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave. The argument was presented in a 1980 paper by the American philosopher John Searle, entitled "Minds, Brains, and Programs" and published in the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences.[1] Similar arguments had been made previously by others, including Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Peter Winch, and Anatoly Dneprov. Searle's version has been widely discussed in the years since.[2] The centerpiece of Searle's argument is a thought experiment known as the "Chinese room".[3]
