p-e-w/heretic

Moderation Is Different From Censorship

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Moderation Is Different From Censorship

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The Faux Free Speech Warriors Attacking Free Speech

There’s a particularly insidious and cynical form of censorship gaining prominence in America: the weaponization of “free speech” rhetoric, combined with abuses of the judicial sy…

‘Contextualization Engines’ can fight misinformation without censorship

Search engines are nice. But we can do far better with modern AI.

Major conference catches illicit AI use — and rejects hundreds of papers

The papers’ watermarks allowed organizers to detect use of large language models in peer review.

Robust Steganography from Large Language Models

Recent steganographic schemes, starting with Meteor (CCS'21), rely on leveraging large language models (LLMs) to resolve a historically-challenging task of disguising covert communication as ``innocent-looking'' natural-language communication. However, existing methods are vulnerable to ``re-randomization attacks,'' where slight changes to the communicated text, that might go unnoticed, completely destroy any hidden message. This is also a vulnerability in more traditional encryption-based stegosystems, where adversaries can modify the randomness of an encryption scheme to destroy the hidden message while preserving an acceptable covertext to ordinary users. In this work, we study the problem of robust steganography. We introduce formal definitions of weak and strong robust LLM-based steganography, corresponding to two threat models in which natural language serves as a covertext channel resistant to realistic re-randomization attacks. We then propose two constructions satisfying these notions. We design and implement our steganographic schemes that embed arbitrary secret messages into natural language text generated by LLMs, ensuring recoverability even under adversarial paraphrasing and rewording attacks. To support further research and real-world deployment, we release our implementation and datasets for public use.

The secret rules of the internet

The murky history of moderation, and how it’s shaping the future of free speech.

The Consent Layer: Using ligatures to make web text expensive to scrape without asking

ShieldFont is an open-source creative technology project that offers a practical opt-out from unauthorized AI training and disrupts what is collected when that choice is ignored. It swaps 45.8% of content words (around 24.4% of all words) in a page's source code for other (partially) random words, while the font restores the original text on screen. Readers see the work as intended; mass scrapers collect an altered version. In testing, shielding caused over 90% of pages that would otherwise pass the quality filter to be rejected, keeping them out of the training pipeline. Of those that still passed, 19.4% of all words conveyed false meaning, adding noise to unauthorized AI training datasets. This paper's goal is to walk newcomers through the whole process, in plain language and in order: the project's rationale, how it was built, the results, how to deploy it, and where to contribute.

Are LLMs Stifling Political Speech? An Assessment of How AI Models Protect Free Expression | Oversight Board

The Oversight Board’s first evaluation of large language models (LLMs) shows that some of the world’s most-used models from Anthropic, DeepSeek, Google, Meta

Removing sexually explicit content from r/all

327K subscribers in the modnews community. An official community for announcements from Reddit, Inc. pertaining to moderation.

Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction

Conversational large language models are fine-tuned for both instruction-following and safety, resulting in models that obey benign requests but refuse harmful ones. While this refusal behavior is widespread across chat models, its underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we show that refusal is mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, across 13 popular open-source chat models up to 72B parameters in size. Specifically, for each model, we find a single direction such that erasing this direction from the model's residual stream activations prevents it from refusing harmful instructions, while adding this direction elicits refusal on even harmless instructions. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel white-box jailbreak method that surgically disables refusal with minimal effect on other capabilities. Finally, we mechanistically analyze how adversarial suffixes suppress propagation of the refusal-mediating direction. Our findings underscore the brittleness of current safety fine-tuning methods. More broadly, our work showcases how an understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical methods for controlling model behavior.

Forcing Generative Models to Degenerate Ones: The Power of Data...

Growing applications of large language models (LLMs) trained by a third party raise serious concerns on the security vulnerability of LLMs.It has been demonstrated that malicious actors can...

Censorship by Facebook

Facebook has been involved in multiple controversies involving censorship of content, removing or omitting information from its services in order to comply with company policies, legal demands, and government censorship laws.

Policies Permitting LLM Use for Polishing Peer Reviews Are Currently Not Enforceable

A number of scientific conferences and journals have recently enacted policies that prohibit LLM usage by peer reviewers, except for polishing, paraphrasing, and grammar correction of otherwise human-written reviews. But, are these policies enforceable? To answer this question, we assemble a dataset of peer reviews simulating multiple levels of human-AI collaboration, and evaluate five state-of-the-art detectors, including two commercial systems. Our analysis shows that all detectors misclassify a non-trivial fraction of LLM-polished reviews as AI-generated, thereby risking false accusations of academic misconduct. We further investigate whether peer-review-specific signals, including access to the paper manuscript and the constrained domain of scientific writing, can be leveraged to improve detection. While incorporating such signals yields measurable gains in some settings, we identify limitations in each approach and find that none meets the accuracy standards required for identifying AI use in peer reviews. Importantly, our results suggest that recent public estimates of AI use in peer reviews through the use of AI-text detectors should be interpreted with caution, as current detectors misclassify mixed reviews (collaborative human-AI outputs) as fully AI generated, potentially overstating the extent of policy violations.