suzgunmirac/belief-in-the-machine

Epistemological Fault Lines Between Human and Artificial Intelligence

Large language models (LLMs) are widely described as artificial intelligence, yet their epistemic profile diverges sharply from human cognition. Here we show that the apparent alignment between...

Language models are multiverse generators

"Actualities seem to float in a wider sea of possibilities from out of which they were chosen; and somewhere, indeterminism says, such possibilities exist, and form part of the truth."

A Rational Analysis of the Effects of Sycophantic AI

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.

Understanding Understanding: A Pragmatic Framework Motivated by...

Motivated by the rapid ascent of Large Language Models (LLMs) and debates about the extent to which they possess human-level qualities, we propose a framework for testing whether any agent (be it...

Epistemic Infrastructure: Building Shared Truth in an Era of Disaggregation

The Construct of Collective Perception

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE): The Birth and Rise of Conditional Computation

What two decades of research taught us about sparse language models...

The LLMentalist Effect: how chat-based Large Language Models rep…

The new era of tech seems to be built on superstitious behaviour

The Philosophy of Language Models

ABSTRACT The success of large language models (LLMs) across many domains of AI research has generated intense debate. Some attribute their impressive performance on complex tasks to human‐like linguistic and cognitive capacities, whereas others ascribe it to shallow pattern matching. These disputes stem from deep‐seated philosophical disagreements about the nature of language and cognition. We provide an opinionated survey of these disagreements across core topics in the philosophy of mind and language, including syntactic competence, compositionality, linguistic meaning, representation, attitudes, reasoning, agency, and consciousness. We contend that progress on these issues requires not only clarity about background philosophical commitments but also, in many cases, close engagement with emerging empirical evidence.

Tracing the thoughts of a large language model

Anthropic's latest interpretability research: a new microscope to understand Claude's internal mechanisms

Can LLMs Faithfully Enact Superforecaster Personas?

Superforecasters are people that make forecasts that are statistically better than the average person; they offer an interesting testbed for persona modelling. In this preliminary work, we investigate whether large language models (LLMs) can faithfully model superforecaster-like personas making similar forecasts and generating similar rationales behind the forecasts. When we compare LLM-generated responses to the ground truth responses of superforecasters, we find that few-shot prompting generates numerically closer forecasts than instruction-prompting baselines. We also measure the similarity of generated and real rationales, finding that the rationales generated based on examples are judged more similar to those of superforecasters than instruction-prompting baselines. However, an analysis of the reasoning patterns in the rationales shows significant differences between human and LLM forecasters, pointing to a gap between stylistic imitation and deep reasoning similarity. These preliminary results raise several interesting questions about how getting superforecaster-like behaviour from LLMs actually works, and open new avenues to explore for improving the forecasting behaviour of LLMs.

Operadic consistency: a label-free signal for compositional...

Detecting LLM reasoning failures at inference time without ground-truth labels has motivated a wide range of confidence baselines, including self-consistency, semantic entropy, and P(True), built...

Thinking modes

Floating in linguistic space.

The Illusion of Thinking: Understanding the Strengths and Limitations of Reasoning Models via the Lens of Problem Complexity

Recent generations of frontier language models have introduced Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) that generate detailed thinking processes…

Sycophancy Claims about Language Models: The Missing Human-in-the-Loop

Sycophantic response patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) have been increasingly claimed in the literature. We review methodological challenges in measuring LLM sycophancy and identify five core operationalizations. Despite sycophancy being inherently human-centric, current research does not evaluate human perception. Our analysis highlights the difficulties in distinguishing sycophantic responses from related concepts in AI alignment and offers actionable recommendations for future research.