Decentralized distributed systems such as peer-to-peer systems are particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks, where a malicious user pretends to have multiple identities (called sybil nodes). Without a trusted central authority, defending against sybil attacks is quite challenging. Among the small number of decentralized approaches, our recent SybilGuard protocol [H. Yu et al., 2006] leverages a key insight on social networks to bound the number of sybil nodes accepted. Although its direction is promising, SybilGuard can allow a large number of sybil nodes to be accepted. Furthermore, SybilGuard assumes that social networks are fast mixing, which has never been confirmed in the real world. This paper presents the novel SybilLimit protocol that leverages the same insight as SybilGuard but offers dramatically improved and near-optimal guarantees. The number of sybil nodes accepted is reduced by a factor of ominus(radicn), or around 200 times in our experiments for a million-node system. We further prove that SybilLimit's guarantee is at most a log n factor away from optimal, when considering approaches based on fast-mixing social networks. Finally, based on three large-scale real-world social networks, we provide the first evidence that real-world social networks are indeed fast mixing. This validates the fundamental assumption behind SybilLimit's and SybilGuard's approach.
SybilLimit: A Near-Optimal Social Network Defense Against Sybil Attacks
Open-access distributed systems such as peer-to-peer systems are particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks, where a malicious user creates multiple fake identities (called sybil nodes). Without a trusted central authority that can tie identities to real ...
An analysis of social network-based Sybil defenses
Recently, there has been much excitement in the research community over using social networks to mitigate multiple identity, or Sybil, attacks. A number of schemes have been proposed, but they differ greatly in the algorithms they use and in the ...
An analysis of social network-based Sybil defenses | Request PDF
Request PDF | An analysis of social network-based Sybil defenses | Recently, there has been much excitement in the research community over using social networks to mitigate multiple identity, or Sybil, attacks. A... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate
(PDF) Canal: Scaling Social Network-Based Sybil Tolerance Schemes
PDF | There has been a flurry of research on leveraging social networks to defend against multiple identity, or Sybil, attacks. A series of recent works... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate
Sybil Detection using Graph Neural Networks
Online social networks have become a central part of modern digital life, connecting billions of users worldwide. However, their open nature and vast scale make them vulnerable to various security threats, with Sybil attacks being a prevalent and challenging attack to detect. In Sybil attacks, malicious entities create fake accounts to manipulate the network, spread misinformation, or gain undue influence. Thus, detecting Sybil accounts is crucial for maintaining the integrity and trustworthiness of social networks. Effective Sybil detection can prevent the spread of fake news, protect users from scams, and ensure a fair distribution of resources and influence within the network. However, as attackers become more sophisticated, traditional detection methods increasingly fail to perform their task.
MeritRank: Sybil Tolerant Reputation for Merit-based Tokenomics*
Decentralized reputation systems are emerging as promising mechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of token-based economies. Unlike traditional monetary incentives, these systems reward participants based on the actual value of their contributions to the network. However, the advantages and challenges associated with such systems remain largely unexplored. In this work, we investigate the inherent trade-offs in designing a decentralized reputation system that is simultaneously generalizable, trustless, and Sybil-resistant. Specifically, “generalizable” means that the system can assess various types of contributions across different contexts, “trustless” indicates that it functions without the need for a central authority to oversee reputations, and “Sybil-resistant” refers to its ability to withstand manipulations by fake identities, i.e., Sybil attacks.
BeeKEM: Decentralized, Secure and Efficient Group Key Agreement
Group key agreement protocols are essential for modern secure messaging. Most existing group key agreement protocols assume a centralized model with a semi-trusted service that mediates the communication. This is efficient, but problematic for some important applications, since a central service can be a choke point for surveillance and censorship. There is a nascent literature on decentralized group key agreement that avoids such reliance, but existing proposals either do not scale, with update costs linear or quadratic in the group size, or lack proofs of security. Centralized protocols can offer much lower (logarithmic) cost. We present BeeKEM, the first decentralized group key agreement protocol with logarithmic update cost in the common case (degrading to linear in the worst case) and proofs of security. We provide an open-source implementation and demonstrate that it is competitive with OpenMLS. BeeKEM opens the door for a range of communication and collaboration applications offering not only end-to-end encryption, but also metadata privacy and censorship resistance.
SyRA: Sybil-Resilient Anonymous Signatures with Applications to Decentralized Identity
We study Sybil-Resilient Anonymous (SyRA) signatures, a cryptographic primitive that enables credentialed users to generate, on demand, unlinkable pseudonyms tied to any given context, and issue signatures on behalf of these pseudonyms. Concretely, SyRA allows a distributed issuer to turn any legacy identity or personhood identifier, possibly of low entropy, into a unique associated cryptographic key of high pseudoentropy, for use in generating signatures for any given context. Sybil-resilient anonymous signatures achieve three main objectives: 1) Sybil resilience: every user is entitled to at most one digital identity, 2) anonymity: no information about the user’s real identity is leaked, and 3) non-interactive context switching: users can create on their own at most one credential for any given context in a manner that is unlinkable across contexts. We conceptualize the SyRA primitive as an ideal functionality in the Universal Composition (UC) setting and put forth SASSI, an efficient, pairing-based construction that realizes it by utilizing two levels of verifiable random functions (VRFs), a design which may be of independent interest. The first level consists of threshold VRF issuance of a user’s unique secret key tied to their real-world identifier. The second level allows a user to create signatures for each context, under a unique pseudonym per context. Compared to prior cryptographic tools capable of realizing SyRA, SASSI has the unique feature that issuers are stateless and hence do not need to retain any information about past user interactions, a relevant property for a decentralized implementation. We overview various applications of SASSI in multiparty systems, such as cryptocurrency account management and airdrops, e-voting (e.g., for decentralized governance), and privacy-preserving regulatory compliance (e.g., AML/CFT checks). In the context of creating addresses for digital assets, SyRA signatures enable users to embed their legacy identity into their address in a manner that protects their privacy for each application with which they interact. We demonstrate the practicality of SASSI by providing an implementation and performance evaluation of our construction.
Secure Scuttlebutt Consortium
A distributed and secure peer to peer social network - Secure Scuttlebutt Consortium
OpenRank (Karma3) — Onchain Atlas
Karma3 Labs' decentralized reputation-compute protocol that ran EigenTrust over onchain and social graphs to power verifiable rankings, feeds, and sybil-resistant airdrops — technically validated but shut down in 2026 for lack of a business model.
The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
We consider the problems of societal norms for cooperation and reputation when it is possible to obtain cheap pseudonyms, something that is becoming quite common in a wide variety of interactions on the Internet. This introduces opportunities to misbehave without paying reputational consequences. A large degree of cooperation can still emerge, through a convention in which newcomers “pay their dues” by accepting poor treatment from players who have established positive reputations. One might hope for an open society where newcomers are treated well, but there is an inherent social cost in making the spread of reputations optional. We prove that no equilibrium can sustain significantly more cooperation than the dues‐paying equilibrium in a repeated random matching game with a large number of players in which players have finite lives and the ability to change their identities, and there is a small but nonvanishing probability of mistakes. Although one could remove the inefficiency of mistreating newcomers by disallowing anonymity, this is not practical or desirable in a wide variety of transactions. We discuss the use of entry fees, which permits newcomers to be trusted but excludes some players with low payoffs, thus introducing a different inefficiency. We also discuss the use of free but unreplaceable pseudonyms, and describe a mechanism that implements them using standard encryption techniques, which could be practically implemented in electronic transactions.
The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
We consider the problems of societal norms for cooperation and reputation when it is possible to obtain cheap pseudonyms, something that is becoming quite common in a wide variety of interactions on the Internet. This introduces opportunities to misbehave without paying reputational consequences. A large degree of cooperation can still emerge, through a convention in which newcomers “pay their dues” by accepting poor treatment from players who have established positive reputations. One might hope for an open society where newcomers are treated well, but there is an inherent social cost in making the spread of reputations optional. We prove that no equilibrium can sustain significantly more cooperation than the dues‐paying equilibrium in a repeated random matching game with a large number of players in which players have finite lives and the ability to change their identities, and there is a small but nonvanishing probability of mistakes. Although one could remove the inefficiency of mistreating newcomers by disallowing anonymity, this is not practical or desirable in a wide variety of transactions. We discuss the use of entry fees, which permits newcomers to be trusted but excludes some players with low payoffs, thus introducing a different inefficiency. We also discuss the use of free but unreplaceable pseudonyms, and describe a mechanism that implements them using standard encryption techniques, which could be practically implemented in electronic transactions.
The Heart of Spritely: Distributed Objects and Capability Security
This paper is the second in a three-part series outlining Spritely's thinking and design. The first paper, Spritely: New Foundations for Networked Communities, explains the problems which face contemporary social network design. This paper details the core technical toolbox provided by Spritely Goblins and how it supplies the necessary features to feasibly build out Spritely's broader vision. The third paper in the series, Spritely for Secure Applications and Communities, ties the first two papers together by showing how the architecture for user-facing software fulfills the vision of the first paper and can be built on top of ideas from this paper.
Key Agreement for Decentralized Secure Group Messaging with Strong Security Guarantees
Secure group messaging protocols, providing end-to-end encryption for group communication, need to handle mobile devices frequently being offline, group members being added or removed, and the possibility of device compromises during long-lived chat sessions. Existing work targets a centralized network model in which all messages are routed through a single server, which is trusted to provide a consistent total order on updates to the group state. In this paper we adapt secure group messaging for decentralized networks that have no central authority. Servers may still optionally be used, but they are trusted less. We define decentralized continuous group key agreement (DCGKA), a new cryptographic primitive encompassing the core of a decentralized secure group messaging protocol; we give a practical construction of a DCGKA protocol and prove its security; and we describe how to construct a full messaging protocol from DCGKA. In the face of device compromise our protocol achieves forward secrecy and post-compromise security. We evaluate the performance of a prototype implementation, and demonstrate that our protocol has practical efficiency.
Sufficient Decentralization for Social Networks
A design pattern to reduce centralized control and change incentives in social networks.
