Addressing the Precision-Breadth-Simplicity Impossible Trinity in Psychological Research: A Comprehensive Exploration Approach

Excess Capacity Learning

We introduce a new framework for understanding how cognitive systems (e.g., humans) learn from experience, based on the concept of representational capacity—the relative amount of representational resources devoted to encoding past experiences. Most paradigms in cognitive science have operated under the assumption that these resources are constrained, forcing cognitive systems to compress rich and noisy experiences to effectively generalize to new situations. We leverage recent advances in computer science to outline the implications of learning with excess capacity, or applying even more representational resources than needed to perfectly memorize all the details of one’s past experiences. In particular, we review evidence suggesting that excess capacity systems can exhibit many of the characteristics of human learning, such as the simultaneous ability to memorize individual experiences and generalize knowledge to new situations. We define and differentiate between constrained (not enough), sufficient (just enough), and excess (more than enough to perfectly capture all the details of one’s past experiences) capacity. We derive empirical properties of learning in each of these capacity regimes, and compare these predictions to effects documented for human learning. We highlight the broad implications of this framework for advancing theoretical and empirical work across cognitive, clinical, and developmental psychology.

Introducing TRIBE v2: A Predictive Foundation Model Trained to Understand How the Human Brain Processes Complex Stimuli | Keith Doelling

This is some very cool work by some awesome colleagues Jean-Rémi King, and Teon Brooks! Seriously not enough good things can be said about how cool it is. You should enjoy it and play with it. And kudos to Meta for open sourcing it. At the same time, I'm already seeing posts about how the model will replace fMRI experiments as researchers will simulate how the brain "really works" instead of running costly experiments. I think this goes WELL beyond what its creators intend. We are already seeing that use of AI in science allows you to explore charted ideas more thoroughly and much more rapidly but slows us down in finding novel ideas (https://lnkd.in/eMR2akqt). At the same time, there is growing concern that LLM performance will collapse as they are increasingly trained on their own output (https://lnkd.in/eavgfyuY). Leaving neuroscience to AI simulations risks following the same fate, where we generate seemingly new findings without gaining new meaning. A mechanistic understanding of how the brain works (if that is still your goal) will be found at the margins, in errors and idiosyncrasies of neural function. What TRIBE provides is a super useful and cool instantiation of our current understanding on how and where neural activity is instantiated in the brain. But it won't help us make groundbreaking new findings of how neural circuits lead to cognition and behavior. Experiments on real human brains, may be costly, but they will always be necessary!

Introducing TRIBE v2: A Predictive Foundation Model Trained to Understand How the Human Brain Processes Complex Stimuli | Keith Doelling

This is some very cool work by some awesome colleagues Jean-Rémi King, and Teon Brooks! Seriously not enough good things can be said about how cool it is. You should enjoy it and play with it. And kudos to Meta for open sourcing it. At the same time, I'm already seeing posts about how the model will replace fMRI experiments as researchers will simulate how the brain "really works" instead of running costly experiments. I think this goes WELL beyond what its creators intend. We are already seeing that use of AI in science allows you to explore charted ideas more thoroughly and much more rapidly but slows us down in finding novel ideas (https://lnkd.in/eMR2akqt). At the same time, there is growing concern that LLM performance will collapse as they are increasingly trained on their own output (https://lnkd.in/eavgfyuY). Leaving neuroscience to AI simulations risks following the same fate, where we generate seemingly new findings without gaining new meaning. A mechanistic understanding of how the brain works (if that is still your goal) will be found at the margins, in errors and idiosyncrasies of neural function. What TRIBE provides is a super useful and cool instantiation of our current understanding on how and where neural activity is instantiated in the brain. But it won't help us make groundbreaking new findings of how neural circuits lead to cognition and behavior. Experiments on real human brains, may be costly, but they will always be necessary!

Guessing reveals internal models of perceptual precision

When observers lack sufficient information to support a confident response, they often guess. Guessing plays a pervasive role in visual cognition and working memory, yet the mechanisms that govern how observers generate guesses remain poorly understood. Standard models traditionally assume that responses produced in the absence of information are either uniformly distributed over feature space or are perhaps weighted towards prevailing environmental statistics. In contrast, here we consider an intriguing alternative: that guesses incorporate observers’ knowledge of their own perceptual capacities. We empirically measured guessing by eliciting responses under extreme target uncertainty (Experiment 1) as well as a novel “0ms presentation” approach in which no stimulus appeared but subjects believed one had (Experiment 2). We evaluated three accounts of guesses under these conditions: unsystematic (lapse) responding, biases toward environmental statistics, and a self-representational account in which guesses reflect observers’ knowledge of their own feature-dependent precision (e.g., preferring to guess feature values they believe they would be likely to miss). Guess responses were non-uniform and systematically biased toward feature values typically encoded with the least precision (e.g., oblique orientations) — a counterintuitive bias away from high-frequency, high-fidelity feature values (e.g., cardinal orientations). This complementary relationship between guessing and perceptual fidelity held within individuals and across paradigms, and was recoverable via an empirical-guess mixture model that replaced the standard uniform assumption with empirically measured guess distributions. Our findings challenge prevailing views that guesses reflect random noise, and suggest instead that guessing behavior reflects metacognitive knowledge of internal precision. Rather than defaulting to environmental priors, observers appear to model their own sensory limitations and leverage these representations to inform decisions in the absence of evidence. These results reframe guessing as a theoretically informative behavior that expresses observers’ own beliefs about their perceptual capacities. Significance Guessing is commonly treated as random noise in models of perception and memory, assumed to reflect lapses or uninformed responses. Instead, we show that human guesses are systematically structured across feature space: observers preferentially guess values they typically encode with the least precision, revealing a consistent, strategic bias away from high-fidelity representations. By directly measuring guess behavior on stimulus-absent trials and integrating these empirical distributions into a mixture model, we find that guesses on stimulus-present trials can be systematically recovered, and that they too form the complement of perceptual precision. These findings challenge foundational psychophysical modeling assumptions and position guessing as a strategic, informative behavior that engages self-representation.

Excess Capacity Learning

How do humans learn from experience? Traditionally, cognitive scientists have assumed that discovering generalizable patterns requires that humans compress rich and noisy experiences. However, recent computer science results suggest otherwise — systems can learn by ‘overfitting’ and expanding all the details of their experiences. We offer a new perspective on learning based on a cognitive system’s representational capacity, which can be constrained (forcing the system to compress details of past experiences), sufficient (to memorize past experiences), or excess (allowing the system to expand on the details of past experiences). This framework has implications for understanding learning across cognitive, clinical, and developmental contexts.

Understanding the Limits of Vision Language Models Through the Lens of the Binding Problem

Recent work has documented striking heterogeneity in the performance of state-of-the-art vision language models (VLMs), including both multimodal language models and text-to-image models. These models are able to describe and generate a diverse array of complex, naturalistic images, yet they exhibit surprising failures on basic multi-object reasoning tasks -- such as counting, localization, and simple forms of visual analogy -- that humans perform with near perfect accuracy. To better understand this puzzling pattern of successes and failures, we turn to theoretical accounts of the binding problem in cognitive science and neuroscience, a fundamental problem that arises when a shared set of representational resources must be used to represent distinct entities (e.g., to represent multiple objects in an image), necessitating the use of serial processing to avoid interference. We find that many of the puzzling failures of state-of-the-art VLMs can be explained as arising due to the binding problem, and that these failure modes are strikingly similar to the limitations exhibited by rapid, feedforward processing in the human brain.

Can Current Agents Close the Discovery-to-Application Gap? A Case Study in Minecraft

Discovering causal regularities and applying them to build functional systems--the discovery-to-application loop--is a hallmark of general intelligence, yet evaluating this capacity has been hindered by the vast complexity gap between scientific discovery and real-world engineering. We introduce SciCrafter, a Minecraft-based benchmark that operationalizes this loop through parameterized redstone circuit tasks. Agents must ignite lamps in specified patterns (e.g., simultaneously or in timed sequences); scaling target parameters substantially increases construction complexity and required knowledge, forcing genuine discovery rather than reliance on memorized solutions. Evaluating frontier models including GPT-5.2, Gemini-3-Pro, and Claude-Opus-4.5 under a general-purpose code agent scaffold, we find that all plateau at approximately 26% success rate. To diagnose these failures, we decompose the loop into four capacities--knowledge gap identification, experimental discovery, knowledge consolidation, and knowledge application--and design targeted interventions whose marginal contributions serve as proxies for corresponding gaps. Our analysis reveals that although the general knowledge application capability still remains as the biggest gap across all models, for frontier models the knowledge gap identification starts to become a major hurdle--indicating the bottleneck is shifting from solving problems right to raising the right problems for current AI. We release SciCrafter as a diagnostic probe for future research on AI systems that navigate the full discovery-to-application loop.

Human learning is an understudied but promising lever for boosting human–AI synergy

Humans collaborating with AI hold the promise of achieving superior outcomes compared to either acting alone (i.e., human–AI synergy). However, the conditions that facilitate such synergy when humans are advised by AI are not well understood. A recent meta-analysis showed that, on average, human–AI combinations do not outperform the better individual agent. We argue that this pessimistic conclusion arises from insufficient attention to human learning in experimental designs. To substantiate this claim, we reanalyzed all 74 studies included in the original meta-analysis and found that most previous research overlooked design features that foster human learning (e.g., outcome feedback to participants). Our reanalysis further revealed that studies providing outcome feedback show tentatively higher synergy than those without outcome feedback. Crucially, feedback paired with AI explanations was associated with positive synergy, while explanations without feedback were associated with negative synergy—suggesting that explanations improve synergy mainly when humans can learn to verify the AI’s reliability through feedback. Our reanalysis suggests that the current literature underestimates the potential of human–AI collaboration because it predominantly relies on paradigms that do not facilitate human learning, thus hindering humans from effectively adapting their collaboration strategies. However, experiments directly varying learning opportunities are needed for stronger, causal conclusions. We advocate for a paradigm shift in human–AI interaction research that explicitly addresses human learning and thus enhances our understanding of and support for successful human–AI collaboration.

Position: Don't Just "Fix it in Post": A Science of AI Must Study Training Dynamics

What would it mean to have a scientific understanding of AI? Models are not static objects: they are snapshots of time-evolving processes shaped by data, objectives, architectures, and optimization dynamics. Yet much of AI research treats models as fixed artifacts, analyzing behaviors after training rather than asking why they emerge. This position paper argues that a science of AI must move beyond post-hoc fixes and study the training dynamics that produce model behavior. Such a science should support progressively stronger forms of understanding: predicting outcomes from early training signals, intervening when trajectories go wrong, and ultimately designing training procedures that more reliably produce desired properties. Scaling laws have made prediction routine for loss; the challenge is extending this success to capabilities, biases, robustness, and safety-relevant behaviors. We articulate requirements for such theories grounded in the history and philosophy of science, examine progress in mechanistic interpretability, fairness, memorization, and simplicity bias, and identify concrete open problems.

Exploring Psychology in the Field: Steps and Examples From the Used‐Car Market

Abstract The growing availability of large datasets in a variety of domains presents an opportunity for researchers to use field data to better understand psychological concepts. I discuss, from an empirical economics point of view, steps for how to study cognition in large datasets. I use two recent papers that explore psychology in the used‐car market as motivating examples. These examples help illustrate the potential importance of big data as a way to explore human psychology and cognition. , The growing availability of large datasets in a variety of domains presents an opportunity for researchers to use field data to better understand psychological concepts. I discuss from an empirical economics point of view, steps for how to study cognition in large datasets and illustrate these steps with recent empirical papers.

🚨 We're very happy to introduce TRIBE v2: a foundation model of the human brain's responses to sight, sound, and language. Leveraging 1,000+ hours of fMRI across 720 subjects, it generalizes… | Stéphane d'Ascoli | 16 comments

🚨 We're very happy to introduce TRIBE v2: a foundation model of the human brain's responses to sight, sound, and language. Leveraging 1,000+ hours of fMRI across 720 subjects, it generalizes zero-shot to new stimuli, tasks and people, finetunes efficiently, and enables in-silico experiments. ❓How does it work? Stemming from our v1, which won the Algonauts 2025 challenge, TRIBE v2 combines video, audio, and language embeddings to predict brain activity for any brain, then adapts to each individual. Key results: 📊 High-quality predictions — TRIBE v2 predicts brain activity across cortical and subcortical regions, significantly better than standard linear models, with a log-linear scaling law and no plateau in sight. 🎯 Zero-shot generalization — Without retraining, the predictions of TRIBE v2 are more correlated with group-averaged brain responses than almost any individual fMRI scan! A short finetuning step vastly improves over linear models trained, from scratch, on each individual. 🧪 In-silico experiments — Can we do useful experiments with TRIBE v2? Yes: classic vision and language paradigms replicate in-silico. It zero-shot recovers the FFA, PPA, EBA, VWFA, Broca's lateralization, and syntactic responses in STG — all without training on these artificial tasks. 🔍 Interpretability & multimodality — ICA on the weights rediscovers known functional networks (auditory, language, motion, default mode, visual) from naturalistic data alone. Ablating modalities further maps how vision, audition, and language integrate, with the largest gains at the temporo-parietal-occipital junction. 🧠 This effort is a step toward a foundation model of the human brain. Much remains to be understood, but we hope this opens a path for neuroscience, AI, and medical research alike. All code, weights, and a live demo are open — find it useful or mistaken in some conditions? Let us know, new test cases can only help improving this effort. 📄 Paper: https://lnkd.in/e7cbunJp 💻 Code: https://lnkd.in/ebwBVuJp ▶️ Demo: https://lnkd.in/eEUVxP4S 🤗 Model: https://lnkd.in/e2T8nPJP Joint work with Jérémy RAPIN, Yohann Benchetrit, Teon Brooks, Katie Begany, Joséphine Raugel, Hubert Banville and Jean-Rémi King. 🙏 Special thanks to Elisa Cascardi, Diego Marcos, Dominic Giardini, AI at Meta, and the open-source and neuroscience communities (in particular Lune Bellec and Bertrand Thirion for the amazing Courtois NeuroMod and IBC datasets) | 16 comments on LinkedIn

Noise in Cognition: Bug or Feature?

Noise in behavior is often considered a nuisance: Although the mind aims for the best possible action, it is let down by unreliability in the sensory and response systems. Researchers often represent noise as additive, Gaussian, and independent. Yet a careful look at behavioral noise reveals a rich structure that defies easy explanation. First, in both perceptual and preferential judgments sensory and response noise may potentially play only minor roles, with most noise arising in the cognitive computations. Second, the functional form of the noise is both non-Gaussian and nonindependent, with the distribution of noise being better characterized as heavy-tailed and as having substantial long-range autocorrelations. It is possible that this structure results from brains that are, for some reason, bedeviled by a fundamental design flaw, albeit one with intriguingly distinctive characteristics. Alternatively, noise might not be a bug but a feature. Specifically, we propose that the brain approximates probabilistic inference with a local sampling algorithm, one using randomness to drive its exploration of alternative hypotheses. Reframing cognition in this way explains the rich structure of noise and leads to the surprising conclusion that noise is not a symptom of cognitive malfunction but plays a central role in underpinning human intelligence.

The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness

Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view fundamentally mischaracterizes how physics relates to information. We call this mistake the Abstraction Fallacy. Tracing the causal origins of abstraction reveals that symbolic computation is not an intrinsic physical process. Instead, it is a mapmaker-dependent description. It requires an active, experiencing cognitive agent to alphabetize continuous physics into a finite set of meaningful states. Consequently, we do not need a complete, finalized theory of consciousness to assess AI sentience—a demand that simply pushes the question beyond near-term resolution and deepens the AI welfare trap. What we actually need is a rigorous ontology of computation. The framework proposed here explicitly separates simulation (behavioral mimicry driven by vehicle causality) from instantiation (intrinsic physical constitution driven by content causality). Establishing this ontological boundary shows why algorithmic symbol manipulation is structurally incapable of instantiating experience. Crucially, this argument does not rely on biological exclusivity. If an artificial system were ever conscious, it would be because of its specific physical constitution, never its syntactic architecture. Ultimately, this framework offers a physically grounded refutation of computational functionalism to resolve the current uncertainty surrounding AI consciousness.

Technological Approach to Mind Everywhere: An Experimentally-Grounded Framework for Understanding Diverse Bodies and Minds

Synthetic biology and bioengineering provide the opportunity to create novel embodied cognitive systems (otherwise known as minds) in a very wide variety of chimeric architectures combining evolved and designed material and software. These advances are disrupting familiar concepts in the philosophy of mind, and require new ways of thinking about and comparing truly diverse intelligences, whose composition and origin are not like any of the available natural model species. In this Perspective, I introduce TAME-Technological Approach to Mind Everywhere-a framework for understanding and manipulating cognition in unconventional substrates. TAME formalizes a non-binary (continuous), empirically-based approach to strongly embodied agency. TAME provides a natural way to think about animal sentience as an instance of collective intelligence of cell groups, arising from dynamics that manifest in similar ways in numerous other substrates. When applied to regenerating/developmental systems, TAME suggests a perspective on morphogenesis as an example of basal cognition. The deep symmetry between problem-solving in anatomical, physiological, transcriptional, and 3D (traditional behavioral) spaces drives specific hypotheses by which cognitive capacities can increase during evolution. An important medium exploited by evolution for joining active subunits into greater agents is developmental bioelectricity, implemented by pre-neural use of ion channels and gap junctions to scale up cell-level feedback loops into anatomical homeostasis. This architecture of multi-scale competency of biological systems has important implications for plasticity of bodies and minds, greatly potentiating evolvability. Considering classical and recent data from the perspectives of computational science, evolutionary biology, and basal cognition, reveals a rich research program with many implications for cognitive science, evolutionary biology, regenerative medicine, and artificial intelligence.