







Musings of a Computer Scientist.
Trump and Musk's history obsession
The frenemies' strange obsession with historical "accuracy" has disturbing connections to big AI

Model Collapse Ends AI Hype
Understanding Artificial Neural Networks: Mysterianism about Known Mechanism is Mysticism
Mysterianism is the idea that human cognition, mind, cannot be understood. Taking this concept and applying it to known mechanism — such that claims are made that we do not know how engineered systems, such as artificial neural networks (ANNs), work, or that they constitute black boxes that we can only open with difficulty — is inappropriate at best and malicious at worst. We do know the mechanistic structure of such models because we designed and built them. We also do know their functional role (what they are for) as well as the mathematical function they are asked to approximate (map inputs to target outputs). Because mysterianist beliefs about known systems, such as ANNs, are often expressed, scientists need to sit up and take notice. We provide an error theory as to what is going on to help unpick this metatheoretical blunder. Ultimately, the problem is that 'understanding' is not a technical term in these cases: the word is co-opted for a specific narrative to sell 'artificial intelligence' through mystification. All computational systems, from pendulums to databases, will behave in ways we cannot predict or control — this is not a unique property of ANNs — and experts do indeed grasp the computational properties of these systems nonetheless.
Understanding Artificial Neural Networks: Mysterianism about Known Mechanism is Mysticism
Mysterianism is the idea that human cognition, mind, cannot be understood. Taking this concept and applying it to known mechanism — such that claims are made that we do not know how engineered systems, such as artificial neural networks (ANNs), work, or that they constitute black boxes that we can only open with difficulty — is inappropriate at best and malicious at worst. We do know the mechanistic structure of such models because we designed and built them. We also do know their functional role (what they are for) as well as the mathematical function they are asked to approximate (map inputs to target outputs). Because mysterianist beliefs about known systems, such as ANNs, are often expressed, scientists need to sit up and take notice. We provide an error theory as to what is going on to help unpick this metatheoretical blunder. Ultimately, the problem is that 'understanding' is not a technical term in these cases: the word is co-opted for a specific narrative to sell 'artificial intelligence' through mystification. All computational systems, from pendulums to databases, will behave in ways we cannot predict or control — this is not a unique property of ANNs — and experts do indeed grasp the computational properties of these systems nonetheless.
Ultra-Processed Information: AI and the Coming Deluge of Noise | Frankly 128
We Don't Understand Neural Networks At The Algorithmic Level
The largest ongoing debate about AI is “Are Large Language Models (LLMs) intelligent?” That makes sense, at least: the evidence is ambiguous and the stakes a...
Experts Argue Whether Computers Could Reason, and if They Should (Published 1977)
Computer world is in midst of fundamental dispute over question of computer intelligence since MIT Prof Joseph Weizenbaum wrote book arguing that machines can never be made to reason like people and should not be; Weizenbaum por (M)
Mathematicians are grappling with the possibility that AI might eclipse them
I talked to 20 mathematicians about rapid AI progress in their field.

Understanding LSTM Networks -- colah's blog
Humans don’t start their thinking from scratch every second. As you read this essay, you understand each word based on your understanding of previous words. You don’t throw everything away and start thinking from scratch again. Your thoughts have persistence.
AI Data Centers Will Be Obsolete (Geometric Reasoning Explained)
Cory Doctorow: The people who tell you ‘AI is changing everything’ are lying
It has become impossible to tell managers mesmerised by artificial intelligence that the tools are not, in fact, helpful. So employees just play along with the fiction to keep their jobs, writes our tech columnist

AI’s Memorization Crisis
Large language models don’t “learn”—they copy. And that could change everything for the tech industry.
Illusions of Understanding in the Sciences
Scientists seek to understand the causes of observed phenomena. Beliefs that they have succeeded are based on understanding that is rarely or possibly never complete, and varies in depth and quality. Most often scientists believe they understand more than they do, making their belief an illusion. This illusion then persists in explanations scientists provide in print, in talks, or in discussions. The illusion that a scientist has a valid and complete explanation tends to be magnified when the data are well described by mathematical and computer simulation models due to the precision of such models and their ability to predict well; prediction does not imply causality, but gives the illusion that it does. The first part of this essay supports the case for the universality of partial and incomplete levels of understanding by showing the difficulty of reaching a deep level of understanding for even a simple analysis and model that most scientists use and believe they understand: linear regression. The second part highlights some implications of the existence of many levels of understanding and explanation, and their use by scientists for design, testing, analysis, and theory development. It discusses the way that deduction and induction depend on the levels of understanding and the implications of the illusion that a scientist’s understanding is deep. It makes a case that the many incomplete levels of understanding affect, often unwittingly, the ways scientists design experiments, test theories, comprehend, communicate, and teach.

Language models transmit behavioural traits through hidden signals in data
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to generate data to train improved models1–3, but it remains unclear what properties are transmitted in this model distillation4,5. Here we show that distillation can lead to subliminal learning—the transmission of behavioural traits through semantically unrelated data. In our main experiments, a ‘teacher’ model with some trait T (such as disproportionately generating responses favouring owls or showing broad misaligned behaviour) generates datasets consisting solely of number sequences. Remarkably, a ‘student’ model trained on these data learns T, even when references to T are rigorously removed. More realistically, we observe the same effect when the teacher generates math reasoning traces or code. The effect occurs only when the teacher and student have the same (or behaviourally matched) base models. To help explain this, we prove a theoretical result showing that subliminal learning arises in neural networks under broad conditions and demonstrate it in a simple multilayer perceptron (MLP) classifier. As artificial intelligence systems are increasingly trained on the outputs of one another, they may inherit properties not visible in the data. Safety evaluations may therefore need to examine not just behaviour, but the origins of models and training data and the processes used to create them.

AI Has Ruined the Job Market
Maybe flawed people were better than brute algorithms.
Knowledge Collapse in LLMs: When Fluency Survives but Facts Fail under Recursive Synthetic Training
Large language models increasingly rely on synthetic data due to human-written content scarcity, yet recursive training on model-generated outputs leads to model collapse, a degenerative process threatening factual reliability. We define knowledge collapse as a distinct three-stage phenomenon where factual accuracy deteriorates while surface fluency persists, creating "confidently wrong" outputs that pose critical risks in accuracy-dependent domains. Through controlled experiments with recursive synthetic training, we demonstrate that collapse trajectory and timing depend critically on instruction format, distinguishing instruction-following collapse from traditional model collapse through its conditional, prompt-dependent nature. We propose domain-specific synthetic training as a targeted mitigation strategy that achieves substantial improvements in collapse resistance while maintaining computational efficiency. Our evaluation framework combines model-centric indicators with task-centric metrics to detect distinct degradation phases, enabling reproducible assessment of epistemic deterioration across different language models. These findings provide both theoretical insights into collapse dynamics and practical guidance for sustainable AI training in knowledge-intensive applications where accuracy is paramount.
