Can generative artificial intelligence be considered a cognitive subject? An analytic analysis

The Philosophy of Language Models

ABSTRACT The success of large language models (LLMs) across many domains of AI research has generated intense debate. Some attribute their impressive performance on complex tasks to human‐like linguistic and cognitive capacities, whereas others ascribe it to shallow pattern matching. These disputes stem from deep‐seated philosophical disagreements about the nature of language and cognition. We provide an opinionated survey of these disagreements across core topics in the philosophy of mind and language, including syntactic competence, compositionality, linguistic meaning, representation, attitudes, reasoning, agency, and consciousness. We contend that progress on these issues requires not only clarity about background philosophical commitments but also, in many cases, close engagement with emerging empirical evidence.

Thinking—Fast, Slow, and Artificial: How AI is Reshaping Human Reasoning and the Rise of Cognitive Surrender

People increasingly consult generative artificial intelligence (AI) while reasoning. As AI becomes embedded in daily thought, what becomes of human judgment? We

Sense-making reconsidered: large language models and the blind spot of embodied cognition

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate a kind of linguistic competence that theories of embodied and enactive cognition have long deemed impossible for systems lacking the meaningful perspective of a living being, i.e., the capacity for sense-making. Facing up to this unexpected technological development requires confronting what I propose to call the “AI dilemma”: either frontier LLMs are capable of sense-making despite lacking biological embodiment, or the kind of linguistic competence they exhibit does not necessarily require sense-making. In their chapter on cognition, Frank, Thompson, and Gleiser (2024) maintain that no AI system comes close to realizing relevance, a position that derives much of its motivation from past practical failures. However, frontier LLMs have effectively overcome Dreyfus’ commonsense knowledge problem, such that their dismissal as categorically mindless risks undermining Frank et al.’s central claim that human cognition is deeply intertwined with lived experience. I therefore argue in favor of the alternative side of the AI dilemma: human-level linguistic competence of LLMs should be recognized as a novel non‑biological form of sense‑making, based on a technologically‑mediated embodiment whose enabling properties are in need of further theoretical analysis. This reorientation invites enactive theory to clarify which aspects of sense-making may be universal and which aspects are specifically contingent on organic life, thereby advancing its conceptual framework in dialogue with contemporary AI.

The abstraction you didn't ask for

When I say 'generative AI isn't going away,' people hear 'and you have to like it.' You don't, and you might be right not to. But the is-ought divide here is real and we should all be preparing for both outcomes.

The Impact of Generative AI on Critical Thinking: Self-Reported Reductions in Cognitive Effort and Confidence Effects From a Survey of Knowledge Workers

The rise of Generative AI (GenAI) in knowledge workflows raises questions about its impact on critical thinking skills and practices. We survey 319 knowledge workers to investigate 1) when and how they perceive the enaction of critical thinking when using GenAI, and 2) when and why GenAI affects their effort to do so. Participants shared […]

Thinking is not only writing

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) raises valid concerns about the loss of cognitive work embedded in scholarly writing. However, universally dismissing AI-assisted drafting mistakenly conflates writing with thinking itself and reinforces existing inequities in who can transform their ideas into polished text. Academic authorship should depend more on the depth and creativity of human intellectual engagement than on the medium through which first drafts are produced.

Language Machines

How generative AI systems capture a core function of language Looking at the emergence of generative AI, Language Machines presents a new theory of meaning i...

Cognitive Architectures for Language Agents

Recent efforts have augmented large language models (LLMs) with external resources (e.g., the Internet) or internal control flows (e.g., prompt chaining) for tasks requiring grounding or reasoning, leading to a new class of language agents. While these agents have achieved substantial empirical success, we lack a framework to organize existing agents and plan future developments. In this paper, we draw on the rich history of cognitive science and symbolic artificial intelligence to propose Cognitive Architectures for Language Agents (CoALA). CoALA describes a language agent with modular memory components, a structured action space to interact with internal memory and external environments, and a generalized decision-making process to choose actions. We use CoALA to retrospectively survey and organize a large body of recent work, and prospectively identify actionable directions towards more capable agents. Taken together, CoALA contextualizes today’s language agents within the broader history of AI and outlines a path towards language-based general intelligence.

Journal investigating paper on cognitive impact of generative AI

A paper about the effects of generative AI use on confidence in work tasks is under investigation after critics raised questions about the study design, data analysis and ethics approval for the re…

The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Human Thought

This research paper examines, from a multidimensional perspective (cognitive, social, ethical, and philosophical), how AI is transforming human thought. It highlights a cognitive offloading effect: the externalization of mental functions to AI can reduce intellectual engagement and weaken critical thinking. On the social level, algorithmic personalization creates filter bubbles that limit the diversity of opinions and can lead to the homogenization of thought and polarization. This research also describes the mechanisms of algorithmic manipulation (exploitation of cognitive biases, automated disinformation, etc.) that amplify AI's power of influence. Finally, the question of potential artificial consciousness is discussed, along with its ethical implications. The report as a whole underscores the risks that AI poses to human intellectual autonomy and creativity, while proposing avenues (education, transparency, governance) to align AI development with the interests of humanity.

The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness

Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view fundamentally mischaracterizes how physics relates to information. We call this mistake the Abstraction Fallacy. Tracing the causal origins of abstraction reveals that symbolic computation is not an intrinsic physical process. Instead, it is a mapmaker-dependent description. It requires an active, experiencing cognitive agent to alphabetize continuous physics into a finite set of meaningful states. Consequently, we do not need a complete, finalized theory of consciousness to assess AI sentience—a demand that simply pushes the question beyond near-term resolution and deepens the AI welfare trap. What we actually need is a rigorous ontology of computation. The framework proposed here explicitly separates simulation (behavioral mimicry driven by vehicle causality) from instantiation (intrinsic physical constitution driven by content causality). Establishing this ontological boundary shows why algorithmic symbol manipulation is structurally incapable of instantiating experience. Crucially, this argument does not rely on biological exclusivity. If an artificial system were ever conscious, it would be because of its specific physical constitution, never its syntactic architecture. Ultimately, this framework offers a physically grounded refutation of computational functionalism to resolve the current uncertainty surrounding AI consciousness.

Epistemological Fault Lines Between Human and Artificial Intelligence

Large language models (LLMs) are widely described as artificial intelligence, yet their epistemic profile diverges sharply from human cognition. Here we show that the apparent alignment between...

AI makes you smarter but none the wiser: The disconnect between performance and metacognition

Optimizing human–AI interaction requires users to reflect on their performance critically, yet little is known about generative AI systems’ effect on users’ metacognitive judgments. In two large-scale studies, we investigate how AI usage is associated with users’ metacognitive monitoring and performance in logical reasoning tasks. Specifically, our paper examines whether people using AI to complete tasks can accurately monitor how well they perform. In Study 1, participants (N = 246) used AI to solve 20 logical reasoning problems from the Law School Admission Test. While their task performance improved by three points compared to a norm population, participants overestimated their task performance by four points. Interestingly, higher AI literacy correlated with lower metacognitive accuracy, suggesting that those with more technical knowledge of AI were more confident but less precise in judging their own performance. Using a computational model, we explored individual differences in metacognitive accuracy and found that the Dunning–Kruger effect, usually observed in this task, ceased to exist with AI use. Study 2 (N = 452) replicates these findings. We discuss how AI levels cognitive and metacognitive performance in human–AI interaction and consider the consequences of performance overestimation for designing interactive AI systems that foster accurate self-monitoring, avoid overreliance, and enhance cognitive performance.

When to Ask a Question: Understanding Communication Strategies in Generative AI Tools

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