This paper examines whether contemporary generative artificial intelligence (GAI), especially large language models (LLMs), can be regarded as a “cognitive subject” in the epistemic sense relevant to the production and endorsement of knowledge claims. GAI systems increasingly participate in writing, research, and decision-making workflows and can display striking competence in information processing and task-directed problem solving. Yet, the thesis that GAI is a cognitive subject is stronger than the observation that GAI contributes as a cognitive tool. Therefore, we propose an explicit set of necessary and sufficient conditions for cognitive subjecthood and evaluate each condition in light of recent philosophical and empirical scholarship. The analysis supports a two-part conclusion: (i) present-day GAI can reasonably be described as a cognitively significant contributor to knowledge production, but (ii) it does not satisfy the conditions for cognitive subjecthood, largely because robust intentionality, metacognitive self-representation, and consciousness-related indicator properties are not established.
The Philosophy of Language Models
ABSTRACT The success of large language models (LLMs) across many domains of AI research has generated intense debate. Some attribute their impressive performance on complex tasks to human‐like linguistic and cognitive capacities, whereas others ascribe it to shallow pattern matching. These disputes stem from deep‐seated philosophical disagreements about the nature of language and cognition. We provide an opinionated survey of these disagreements across core topics in the philosophy of mind and language, including syntactic competence, compositionality, linguistic meaning, representation, attitudes, reasoning, agency, and consciousness. We contend that progress on these issues requires not only clarity about background philosophical commitments but also, in many cases, close engagement with emerging empirical evidence.
Thinking—Fast, Slow, and Artificial: How AI is Reshaping Human Reasoning and the Rise of Cognitive Surrender
People increasingly consult generative artificial intelligence (AI) while reasoning. As AI becomes embedded in daily thought, what becomes of human judgment? We
Sense-making reconsidered: large language models and the blind spot of embodied cognition
Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate a kind of linguistic competence that theories of embodied and enactive cognition have long deemed impossible for systems lacking the meaningful perspective of a living being, i.e., the capacity for sense-making. Facing up to this unexpected technological development requires confronting what I propose to call the “AI dilemma”: either frontier LLMs are capable of sense-making despite lacking biological embodiment, or the kind of linguistic competence they exhibit does not necessarily require sense-making. In their chapter on cognition, Frank, Thompson, and Gleiser (2024) maintain that no AI system comes close to realizing relevance, a position that derives much of its motivation from past practical failures. However, frontier LLMs have effectively overcome Dreyfus’ commonsense knowledge problem, such that their dismissal as categorically mindless risks undermining Frank et al.’s central claim that human cognition is deeply intertwined with lived experience. I therefore argue in favor of the alternative side of the AI dilemma: human-level linguistic competence of LLMs should be recognized as a novel non‑biological form of sense‑making, based on a technologically‑mediated embodiment whose enabling properties are in need of further theoretical analysis. This reorientation invites enactive theory to clarify which aspects of sense-making may be universal and which aspects are specifically contingent on organic life, thereby advancing its conceptual framework in dialogue with contemporary AI.
The abstraction you didn't ask for
When I say 'generative AI isn't going away,' people hear 'and you have to like it.' You don't, and you might be right not to. But the is-ought divide here is real and we should all be preparing for both outcomes.
The Impact of Generative AI on Critical Thinking: Self-Reported Reductions in Cognitive Effort and Confidence Effects From a Survey of Knowledge Workers
The rise of Generative AI (GenAI) in knowledge workflows raises questions about its impact on critical thinking skills and practices. We survey 319 knowledge workers to investigate 1) when and how they perceive the enaction of critical thinking when using GenAI, and 2) when and why GenAI affects their effort to do so. Participants shared […]
Thinking is not only writing
Generative artificial intelligence (AI) raises valid concerns about the loss of cognitive work embedded in scholarly writing. However, universally dismissing AI-assisted drafting mistakenly conflates writing with thinking itself and reinforces existing inequities in who can transform their ideas into polished text. Academic authorship should depend more on the depth and creativity of human intellectual engagement than on the medium through which first drafts are produced.
Language Machines
How generative AI systems capture a core function of language Looking at the emergence of generative AI, Language Machines presents a new theory of meaning i...
Cognitive Architectures for Language Agents
Recent efforts have augmented large language models (LLMs) with external resources (e.g., the Internet) or internal control flows (e.g., prompt chaining) for tasks requiring grounding or reasoning, leading to a new class of language agents. While these agents have achieved substantial empirical success, we lack a framework to organize existing agents and plan future developments. In this paper, we draw on the rich history of cognitive science and symbolic artificial intelligence to propose Cognitive Architectures for Language Agents (CoALA). CoALA describes a language agent with modular memory components, a structured action space to interact with internal memory and external environments, and a generalized decision-making process to choose actions. We use CoALA to retrospectively survey and organize a large body of recent work, and prospectively identify actionable directions towards more capable agents. Taken together, CoALA contextualizes today’s language agents within the broader history of AI and outlines a path towards language-based general intelligence.
Journal investigating paper on cognitive impact of generative AI
A paper about the effects of generative AI use on confidence in work tasks is under investigation after critics raised questions about the study design, data analysis and ethics approval for the re…
Are We Thinking Correctly About AI Intelligence? | Quanta Magazine
Computer scientist Melanie Mitchell discusses why artificial intelligence doesn’t “think” or “reason” like humans, and how we can create better methods for measuring machine cognition.
LLM-generated messages can persuade humans on policy issues
The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has made it possible for generative artificial intelligence (AI) to tackle many higher-order cognitive tasks, with critical implications for industry, government, and labor markets. Here, we investigate whether existing, openly-available LLMs can be used to create messages capable of influencing humans’ political attitudes. Across three pre-registered experiments (total N = 4829), participants who read persuasive messages generated by LLMs showed significantly more attitude change across a range of policies - including polarized policies, like an assault weapons ban, a carbon tax, and a paid parental-leave program - relative to control condition participants who read a neutral message. Overall, LLM-generated messages were similarly effective in influencing policy attitudes as messages crafted by lay humans. Participants’ reported perceptions of the authors of the persuasive messages suggest these effects occurred through somewhat distinct causal pathways. While the persuasiveness of LLM-generated messages was associated with perceptions that the author used more facts, evidence, logical reasoning, and a dispassionate voice, the persuasiveness of human-generated messages was associated with perceptions of the author as unique and original. These results demonstrate that recent developments in AI make it possible to create politically persuasive messages quickly, cheaply, and at massive scale.
Generative artificial intelligence: The Times and Sunday Times editorial guidelines
As we explore the potential of generative artificial intelligence our commitment is to uphold our high editorial standards.
The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Human Thought
This research paper examines, from a multidimensional perspective (cognitive, social, ethical, and philosophical), how AI is transforming human thought. It highlights a cognitive offloading effect: the externalization of mental functions to AI can reduce intellectual engagement and weaken critical thinking. On the social level, algorithmic personalization creates filter bubbles that limit the diversity of opinions and can lead to the homogenization of thought and polarization. This research also describes the mechanisms of algorithmic manipulation (exploitation of cognitive biases, automated disinformation, etc.) that amplify AI's power of influence. Finally, the question of potential artificial consciousness is discussed, along with its ethical implications. The report as a whole underscores the risks that AI poses to human intellectual autonomy and creativity, while proposing avenues (education, transparency, governance) to align AI development with the interests of humanity.
The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view fundamentally mischaracterizes how physics relates to information. We call this mistake the Abstraction Fallacy. Tracing the causal origins of abstraction reveals that symbolic computation is not an intrinsic physical process. Instead, it is a mapmaker-dependent description. It requires an active, experiencing cognitive agent to alphabetize continuous physics into a finite set of meaningful states. Consequently, we do not need a complete, finalized theory of consciousness to assess AI sentience—a demand that simply pushes the question beyond near-term resolution and deepens the AI welfare trap. What we actually need is a rigorous ontology of computation. The framework proposed here explicitly separates simulation (behavioral mimicry driven by vehicle causality) from instantiation (intrinsic physical constitution driven by content causality). Establishing this ontological boundary shows why algorithmic symbol manipulation is structurally incapable of instantiating experience. Crucially, this argument does not rely on biological exclusivity. If an artificial system were ever conscious, it would be because of its specific physical constitution, never its syntactic architecture. Ultimately, this framework offers a physically grounded refutation of computational functionalism to resolve the current uncertainty surrounding AI consciousness.
Model Collapse Ends AI Hype
Epistemological Fault Lines Between Human and Artificial Intelligence
Large language models (LLMs) are widely described as artificial intelligence, yet their epistemic profile diverges sharply from human cognition. Here we show that the apparent alignment between...