The Right to Concentrate

The lost art of concentration: being distracted in a digital world

We check our phones every 12 minutes, often just after waking up. Always-on behaviour is harmful to long-term mental health, and we need to learn to the hit the pause button

The attention market—and what is wrong with it

Attention is described as a “scarce commodity” that is traded in “a marketplace.” This, it is further claimed, contributes to a “widespread sense of attentional crisis.” But is there really an attention market, and if so, what, if anything, is wrong with it? We defend the claim that there are markets in attention. We provide an account of such attention markets and use that account to address what is morally wrong with them. Our account draws on knowledge of how attention works and what roles it plays in the mind. The attention market trades in an ability to influence our attention – somewhat (though not exactly) like the labor market trades in an ability to influence how we use our capacity for work. Specifically, the commodity it trades in is attentional landscaping potential, viz. the ability to systematically influence patterns of attention by changes to the sensory environment individuals are exposed to. Attention markets thus, we argue, commodify influence over a human capacity that plays a central role in shaping individual experience, agency, and belief formation. This feature of attention markets makes them ethically problematic. As markets in access to external influence, attention markets pose a special threat to individual autonomy and escape the classical liberal defense of free markets. Those who value autonomy should worry about the attention markets that exist today.

How to Focus: Five Talks Reveal the Secrets of Concentration

Disagree though we may about what's wrong with life in the 21st century, all of us — at least in the developed, high tech-saturated parts of the world — surely come together in lamenting our inability to focus.

Intention, control, and the feeling of commitment

In this paper we propose that rational control of action, agentive stability over time, and coordinated social behavior, are assisted by a form of metacognitive monitoring, leading to an aspect of conscious experience: a feeling of commitment. This feeling of commitment is attached to the formation, retrieval, and execution of intentions. The metacognitive monitoring that produces it is sensitive to the importance of intentions. And the feeling of commitment facilitates the stability and effectiveness of intentions across individual and social contexts, strengthens goal shielding, biases intention retrieval, and thus structures prospective deliberation, expression of intention, and execution of intention. In section two, we discuss control, which is a central aspect of agency and action. In section three, we discuss a crucial part of control: intention. We also discuss a crucial part of intention: commitment. In section four we relate the commitment involved in intention with definitions of commitment in the literature. In section five we offer and elucidate our hypothesis.

Why It's So Hard to Focus at Work (Hint: It's not you, it's your workplace)

The workplace is overloaded with distractions. Here's why (and how) companies should protrect their most important asset – their team's attention.

Rethinking the cognitive foundations of the attention economy

The attention economy is the economic system in which human attention is the scarce resource. This literature takes a particular passage in Herbert Simon’s seminal Chapter Designing Organization fo...

It's getting harder to focus every day

I’m feeling it right now. I had to set a timer for 15 minute on my computer and block all distractions to write this. If I didn’t force myself to focus I would easily get distracted by something after few minutes. Even when I’m doing things that I’ve been waiting to do it, I still feel the urge to do something else. I don’t know how and when this happened. During the last few years I was always studying, working, and doing open source. And actually got stuff done. Doing all of those at the same time requires paying attention to what I wanted to do and ignore the noise.

Attention and the Relevance Problem

ABSTRACT The relevance problem is the problem of how cognitive systems can be sensitive to what is relevant despite relevance being holistic, open‐ended, and context‐sensitive. The problem has typically been applied to higher‐order cognitive processes. In this paper, I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized relevance problem for perceptual attention. This problem becomes apparent when considering the functions of attention: attention must not only support ongoing task performance but also remain sensitive to opportunities for task switching, latent learning, and context checking. Existing treatments of the relevance problem have largely focused on its task‐relative form: given a task, what is relevant? I argue that attention faces a more general problem that includes sensitivity to factors relevant to other interests and to cues indicating that another activity may be worth pursuing. For such features of the environment to stand out as salient, salience cannot be determined solely by bottom‐up factors and a limited set of occurrent top‐down factors, such as current goals and intentions. Rather, it must reflect the wider (if not the entire) range of an agent's latent interests in a context‐sensitive way. This motivational unencapsulation of attention poses a challenge for both contemporary accounts of attention and suggests that passive attention is much more intelligent than commonly thought.

Attention and the Relevance Problem

ABSTRACT The relevance problem is the problem of how cognitive systems can be sensitive to what is relevant despite relevance being holistic, open‐ended, and context‐sensitive. The problem has typically been applied to higher‐order cognitive processes. In this paper, I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized relevance problem for perceptual attention. This problem becomes apparent when considering the functions of attention: attention must not only support ongoing task performance but also remain sensitive to opportunities for task switching, latent learning, and context checking. Existing treatments of the relevance problem have largely focused on its task‐relative form: given a task, what is relevant? I argue that attention faces a more general problem that includes sensitivity to factors relevant to other interests and to cues indicating that another activity may be worth pursuing. For such features of the environment to stand out as salient, salience cannot be determined solely by bottom‐up factors and a limited set of occurrent top‐down factors, such as current goals and intentions. Rather, it must reflect the wider (if not the entire) range of an agent's latent interests in a context‐sensitive way. This motivational unencapsulation of attention poses a challenge for both contemporary accounts of attention and suggests that passive attention is much more intelligent than commonly thought.

Playing chess is an essential life lesson in concentration | Aeon Essays

The challenge of chess – learning how to hold complexity in mind and still make good decisions – is also the challenge of life

Movements of the Mind: A Theory of Attention, Intention and Action

Abstract. Movements of the Mind explains what it is to be an agent. Focusing on mental agency, the book’s eponymous topic, it investigates an agent’s doing

how to pay attention again (the neuroscience of focus in the age of everything)

on the attention economy, and reclaiming your brain’s right to choose

Spurious normativity enhances learning of compliance and enforcement behavior in artificial agents

Significance The fact that humans enforce and comply with norms is an important reason why humans enjoy higher levels of cooperation and welfare than other animals. Some norms are relatively easy to explain: They may prohibit obviously harmful or uncooperative actions. But many norms are not easy to explain. For example, most cultures prohibit eating certain kinds of foods, and almost all societies have rules about what constitutes appropriate clothing, language, and gestures. Using a computational model focused on learning shows that apparently pointless rules can have an indirect effect on welfare. They can help agents learn how to enforce and comply with norms in general, improving the group’s ability to enforce norms that have a direct effect on welfare. , How do societies learn and maintain social norms? Here we use multiagent reinforcement learning to investigate the learning dynamics of enforcement and compliance behaviors. Artificial agents populate a foraging environment and need to learn to avoid a poisonous berry. Agents learn to avoid eating poisonous berries better when doing so is taboo, meaning the behavior is punished by other agents. The taboo helps overcome a credit assignment problem in discovering delayed health effects. Critically, introducing an additional taboo, which results in punishment for eating a harmless berry, further improves overall returns. This “silly rule” counterintuitively has a positive effect because it gives agents more practice in learning rule enforcement. By probing what individual agents have learned, we demonstrate that normative behavior relies on a sequence of learned skills. Learning rule compliance builds upon prior learning of rule enforcement by other agents. Our results highlight the benefit of employing a multiagent reinforcement learning computational model focused on learning to implement complex actions.

Toward a theory of network gatekeeping: A framework for exploring information control

Abstract Gatekeeping theories have been a popular heuristic for describing information control for years, but none have attained a full theoretical status in the context of networks. This article aims to propose a theory of network gatekeeping comprised of two components: identification and salience . Network gatekeeping identification lays out vocabulary and naming foundations through the identification of gatekeepers, gatekeeping, and gatekeeping mechanisms. Network gatekeeping salience , which is built on the bases of the network identification theory, utilizes this infrastructure to understand relationships among gatekeepers and between gatekeepers and gated, the entity subjected to a gatekeeping process. Network gatekeeping salience 1 Salience refers to the degree to which gatekeepers give priority to competing gated claims. proposes identifying gated and their salience to gatekeepers by four attributes: (a) their political power in relation to the gatekeeper, (b) their information production ability , (c) their relationship with the gatekeeper, and (d) their alternatives in the context of gatekeeping.

The Psychology of Normative Cognition

From an early age, humans exhibit a tendency to identify, adopt, andenforce the norms of their local communities. Norms are the socialrules that mark out what is appropriate, allowed, required, orforbidden in different situations for various community members. Theserules are informal in the sense that although they are sometimesrepresented in formal laws, like the rule governing which side of theroad to drive on, they need not be explicitly codified to effectivelyinfluence behavior. There are rules that forbid theft or the breakingof promises, but also rules that govern how close it is appropriate tostand to someone while talking to them, or how loud one should talkduring the conversation. Thus understood, norms regulate a wide rangeof activity. They exhibit cultural variability in their prescriptionsand proscriptions, but the presence of norms in general appears to beculturally universal. Some norms exhibit characteristics that areoften associated with morality, such as a rule that applies toeveryone and prohibits causing unnecessary harm. Other norms applyonly to certain people, such as those that delimit appropriateclothing for members of different genders, or those concerning theexpectations and responsibilities ascribed to individuals who occupypositions of leadership. The norms that prevail in a community can bemore or less fair, reasonable, or impartial, and can be subject tocritique and change.