Large language models eroding science understanding: an empirical study of ‘malignment’

Unequal Scientific Recognition in the Age of LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) are reshaping how scientific knowledge is accessed and represented. This study evaluates the extent to which popular and frontier LLMs including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Gemini 1.5 Pro recognize scientists, benchmarking their outputs against OpenAlex and Wikipedia. Using a dataset focusing on 100,000 physicists from OpenAlex to evaluate LLM recognition, we uncover substantial disparities: LLMs exhibit selective and inconsistent recognition patterns. Recognition correlates strongly with scholarly impact such as citations, and remains uneven across gender and geography. Women researchers, and researchers from Africa, Asia, and Latin America are significantly underrecognized. We further examine the role of training data provenance, identifying Wikipedia as a potential sources that contributes to recognition gaps. Our findings highlight how LLMs can reflect, and potentially amplify existing disparities in science, underscoring the need for more transparent and inclusive knowledge systems.

Language agents achieve superhuman synthesis of scientific knowledge

High accuracy RAG for answering questions from scientific documents with citations

Scientific production in the era of Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly reshaping scientific research. We analyze these changes in multiple, large-scale datasets with 2.1M preprints, 28K peer review reports, and 246M online accesses to scientific documents. We find: 1) scientists adopting LLMs to draft manuscripts demonstrate a large increase in paper production, ranging from 23.7-89.3% depending on scientific field and author background, 2) LLM use has reversed the relationship between writing complexity and paper quality, leading to an influx of manuscripts that are linguistically complex but substantively underwhelming, and 3) LLM adopters access and cite more diverse prior work, including books and younger, less-cited documents. These findings highlight a stunning shift in scientific production that will likely require a change in how journals, funding agencies, and tenure committees evaluate scientific works.

How LLMs Distort Our Written Language

Large language models (LLMs) are used by over a billion people globally, most often to assist with writing. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs not only alter the voice and tone of human writing but also consistently alter the intended meaning. First, we conduct a human user study to understand how people actually interact with LLMs when using them for writing. Our findings reveal that extensive LLM use led to a nearly 70% increase in essays that remained neutral in answering the topic question. Significantly more heavy LLM users reported that the writing was less creative and not in their voice. Next, using a dataset of human-written essays that was collected in 2021 before the widespread release of LLMs, we study how asking an LLM to revise the essay based on the human-written feedback in the dataset induces large changes in the resulting content and meaning. We find that even when LLMs are prompted with expert feedback and asked to only make grammar edits, they still change the text in a way that significantly alters its semantic meaning. We then examine LLM-generated text in the wild, specifically focusing on the 21% of AI-generated scientific peer reviews at a recent top AI conference. We find that LLM-generated reviews place significantly less weight on clarity and significance of the research, and assign scores that, on average, are a full point higher. These findings highlight a misalignment between the perceived benefit of AI use and an implicit, consistent effect on the semantics of human writing, motivating future work on how widespread AI writing will affect our cultural and scientific institutions.

How LLMs Distort Our Written Language

Large language models (LLMs) are used by over a billion people globally, most often to assist with writing. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs not only alter the voice and tone of human writing but also consistently alter the intended meaning. First, we conduct a human user study to understand how people actually interact with LLMs when using them for writing. Our findings reveal that extensive LLM use led to a nearly 70% increase in essays that remained neutral in answering the topic question. Significantly more heavy LLM users reported that the writing was less creative and not in their voice. Next, using a dataset of human-written essays that was collected in 2021 before the widespread release of LLMs, we study how asking an LLM to revise the essay based on the human-written feedback in the dataset induces large changes in the resulting content and meaning. We find that even when LLMs are prompted with expert feedback and asked to only make grammar edits, they still change the text in a way that significantly alters its semantic meaning. We then examine LLM-generated text in the wild, specifically focusing on the 21% of AI-generated scientific peer reviews at a recent top AI conference. We find that LLM-generated reviews place significantly less weight on clarity and significance of the research, and assign scores that, on average, are a full point higher. These findings highlight a misalignment between the perceived benefit of AI use and an implicit, consistent effect on the semantics of human writing, motivating future work on how widespread AI writing will affect our cultural and scientific institutions.

Believe It or Not: How Deeply do LLMs Believe Implanted Facts?

Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.

Believe It or Not: How Deeply do LLMs Believe Implanted Facts?

Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.

Why Does ChatGPT "Delve" So Much? Exploring the Sources of Lexical Overrepresentation in Large Language Models

Scientific English is currently undergoing rapid change, with words like "delve," "intricate," and "underscore" appearing far more frequently than just a few years ago. It is widely assumed that scientists' use of large language models (LLMs) is responsible for such trends. We develop a formal, transferable method to characterize these linguistic changes. Application of our method yields 21 focal words whose increased occurrence in scientific abstracts is likely the result of LLM usage. We then pose "the puzzle of lexical overrepresentation": WHY are such words overused by LLMs? We fail to find evidence that lexical overrepresentation is caused by model architecture, algorithm choices, or training data. To assess whether reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) contributes to the overuse of focal words, we undertake comparative model testing and conduct an exploratory online study. While the model testing is consistent with RLHF playing a role, our experimental results suggest that participants may be reacting differently to "delve" than to other focal words. With LLMs quickly becoming a driver of global language change, investigating these potential sources of lexical overrepresentation is important. We note that while insights into the workings of LLMs are within reach, a lack of transparency surrounding model development remains an obstacle to such research.

Why Does ChatGPT "Delve" So Much? Exploring the Sources of Lexical Overrepresentation in Large Language Models

Scientific English is currently undergoing rapid change, with words like "delve," "intricate," and "underscore" appearing far more frequently than just a few years ago. It is widely assumed that scientists' use of large language models (LLMs) is responsible for such trends. We develop a formal, transferable method to characterize these linguistic changes. Application of our method yields 21 focal words whose increased occurrence in scientific abstracts is likely the result of LLM usage. We then pose "the puzzle of lexical overrepresentation": WHY are such words overused by LLMs? We fail to find evidence that lexical overrepresentation is caused by model architecture, algorithm choices, or training data. To assess whether reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) contributes to the overuse of focal words, we undertake comparative model testing and conduct an exploratory online study. While the model testing is consistent with RLHF playing a role, our experimental results suggest that participants may be reacting differently to "delve" than to other focal words. With LLMs quickly becoming a driver of global language change, investigating these potential sources of lexical overrepresentation is important. We note that while insights into the workings of LLMs are within reach, a lack of transparency surrounding model development remains an obstacle to such research.

What and Whose Knowledge? Measuring Epistemic Diversity in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as primary knowledge sources, yet their epistemic diversity - defined as the diversity of real-world claims in their outputs - has never been measured. Low epistemic diversity would pose a risk of knowledge collapse as homogeneous LLMs mediate a shrinking in the range of accessible information over time. The dominant paradigm is that overall LLM diversity is low, but this is always with respect to a single point in time, with no reference baseline or consideration for variation across countries. We address this gap in knowledge by performing the first systematic study of epistemic diversity in LLMs across time and cultural context, testing 27 LLMs on 155 topics covering 12 countries, resulting in 1.7M responses and 70M individual claims. We find that epistemic diversity has increased substantially over the past three years, a positive counter to recent diversity pessimism. However, despite progress, we find that every system is less diverse than a search baseline. This gap is not uniform: RAG can improve diversity, while large models are counterintuitively less diverse than smaller ones. Moreover, LLM parametric knowledge systematically reflects English over local-language knowledge for country specific topics. Together, these results demonstrate that while progress on epistemic diversity is tangible, it is insufficient and unevenly distributed.

Language agents achieve superhuman synthesis of scientific knowledge

Language models are known to hallucinate incorrect information, and it is unclear if they are sufficiently accurate and reliable for use in scientific research. We developed a rigorous human-AI comparison methodology to evaluate language model agents on real-world literature search tasks covering information retrieval, summarization, and contradiction detection tasks. We show that PaperQA2, a frontier language model agent optimized for improved factuality, matches or exceeds subject matter expert performance on three realistic literature research tasks without any restrictions on humans (i.e., full access to internet, search tools, and time). PaperQA2 writes cited, Wikipedia-style summaries of scientific topics that are significantly more accurate than existing, human-written Wikipedia articles. We also introduce a hard benchmark for scientific literature research called LitQA2 that guided design of PaperQA2, leading to it exceeding human performance. Finally, we apply PaperQA2 to identify contradictions within the scientific literature, an important scientific task that is challenging for humans. PaperQA2 identifies 2.34 +/- 1.99 contradictions per paper in a random subset of biology papers, of which 70% are validated by human experts. These results demonstrate that language model agents are now capable of exceeding domain experts across meaningful tasks on scientific literature.

Citing Less Critically: LLMs Reshape the Rhetoric and Reach of Scientific Citation

Scientific citations carry rhetorical intent. Scholars may cite prior work positively (supporting), negatively (contrasting), or neutrally (mentioning). As large language models (LLMs) increasingly assist scientific writing, whether they reproduce citations with the same rhetorical intent as humans remains unclear. We introduce a masked-citation task to compare human and LLM-generated citation behavior. For each citation context, an LLM generates a replacement citation sentence, producing a counterfactual corpus directly comparable to human citation. We analyze what, whom, and how models cite, using an LLM-as-a-judge to classify citation intent and a 20-million-edge coauthorship network to measure social distance between cited authors. Across six popular LLMs and 1,746 top NLP conference papers (63k+ contexts, 132k+ citations), three patterns emerge: (1) Compared with human citation, LLMs cite significantly less critically; (2) LLMs over-cite popular and older papers, a tendency amplified for contrasting citations where human writing more often draws on recent, niche work; (3) Whereas humans often cite within their close social network, especially for supporting citations, LLMs tend to draw on more socially distant authors. Together, these differences are double-edged: LLM citation reaches beyond a scholar's close collaborators while being less critical and amplifying visibility bias, reshaping the rhetoric and reach of scientific citation.

Scientific Web Claims: A survey of definitions, tasks, datasets and methods

Scientific web claims are seen as scientific claims as observed on the Web, across social media, online news, and other platforms. The growing prevalence of scientific discussions on the Web has intensified the need to process and assess this specific type of claims. Unlike claims from scientific publications, scientific web claims are expressed in lay terms, are often decontextualized, and typically lack proper citations, which poses unique challenges for their identification, verification, and communication. Nevertheless, the correct processing of scientific web claims is crucial to keeping online science discussions accurate and informed, for instance through fact-checking. This survey provides the first systematic overview dedicated specifically to scientific web claims. We review and compare existing definitions, task formulations, datasets, and methodological approaches across three major perspectives: (1) Scientific fact-checking on the Web, (2) Scientific citations on the Web, and (3) Science communication on the Web. Our interdisciplinary analysis integrates insights from natural language processing, information retrieval, artificial intelligence, social sciences, and science communication. We identify major methodological challenges, including the lack of unified definitions, domain-agnostic corpora, and foundational models tailored to science-related online discourse. We also discuss challenges related to the existing interplay between emotions and distortions of science online. By mapping current research efforts and highlighting open problems, this survey lays the groundwork for developing robust datasets, methods, and evaluation frameworks to advance the automated processing of scientific web claims, a necessary capability for strengthening the reliability of science-related online discourse at scale.

Measuring short-form factuality in large language models

We present SimpleQA, a benchmark that evaluates the ability of language models to answer short, fact-seeking questions. We prioritized two properties in designing this eval. First, SimpleQA is challenging, as it is adversarially collected against GPT-4 responses. Second, responses are easy to grade, because questions are created such that there exists only a single, indisputable answer. Each answer in SimpleQA is graded as either correct, incorrect, or not attempted. A model with ideal behavior would get as many questions correct as possible while not attempting the questions for which it is not confident it knows the correct answer. SimpleQA is a simple, targeted evaluation for whether models "know what they know," and our hope is that this benchmark will remain relevant for the next few generations of frontier models. SimpleQA can be found at https://github.com/openai/simple-evals.

Measuring short-form factuality in large language models

We present SimpleQA, a benchmark that evaluates the ability of language models to answer short, fact-seeking questions. We prioritized two properties in designing this eval. First, SimpleQA is challenging, as it is adversarially collected against GPT-4 responses. Second, responses are easy to grade, because questions are created such that there exists only a single, indisputable answer. Each answer in SimpleQA is graded as either correct, incorrect, or not attempted. A model with ideal behavior would get as many questions correct as possible while not attempting the questions for which it is not confident it knows the correct answer. SimpleQA is a simple, targeted evaluation for whether models "know what they know," and our hope is that this benchmark will remain relevant for the next few generations of frontier models. SimpleQA can be found at https://github.com/openai/simple-evals.

A Novel Kuhnian Ontology for Epistemic Classification of STM Scholarly Articles

Despite rapid gains in scale, research evaluation still relies on opaque, lagging proxies. To serve the scientific community, we pursue transparency: reproducible, auditable epistemic classification useful for funding and policy. Here we formalize KGX3 as a scenario-based model for mapping Kuhnian stages from research papers, prove determinism of the classification pipeline, and define the epistemic manifold that yields paradigm maps. We report validation across recent corpora, operational complexity at global scale, and governance that preserves interpretability while protecting core IP. The system delivers early, actionable signals of drift, crisis, and shift unavailable to citation metrics or citations-anchored NLP. KGX3 is the latest iteration of a deterministic epistemic engine developed since 2019—originating as Soph.io (2019–2020), advanced as iKuhn (2020–2024), and field-tested through Preprint Watch.