omfg they're ALL FUCKING <255 4 EM OV TLS CA - G3C OV TLS 56 EM EV TLS CA - G3C EV TLS 66 EM OV CS CA - G3B Code signing 115 EM EV TLS CA - G3B EV TLS 155 EM OV TLS CA - G3B OV TLS 156 EM DV TLS CA - G3B DV TLS 230 EM DV TLS CA - G3C DV TLS 237 EM OV CS CA - G3C Code signing
GitHub - Thomvanoorschot/boring_tls: A memory-safe TLS/SSL library for Zig, providing both client and server implementations built on Google's BoringSSL for secure, high-performance encrypted communications.
A memory-safe TLS/SSL library for Zig, providing both client and server implementations built on Google&#39;s BoringSSL for secure, high-performance encrypted communications. - Thomvanoorschot/...
Comparing f22d4a36f26d16287bcdfd707b369116e02a08c3...150d6f6bba5a00d9e3fcccf053fc25b68cee5a57 · openai/codex-security
SDKs and CLI for Codex Security. Contribute to openai/codex-security development by creating an account on GitHub.
Facebook's Most Dangerous Product
Ten Lines Of Code That Changed My World – Pixelambacht
Front-end antics and typographic mischievousness
codex-security/README.md at 150d6f6bba5a00d9e3fcccf053fc25b68cee5a57 · openai/codex-security
SDKs and CLI for Codex Security. Contribute to openai/codex-security development by creating an account on GitHub.
badge.blue — CID-First Attestation Specification
Specification for CID-first attestations on AT Protocol records. Inline and remote cryptographic signatures with replay-attack prevention.
Claude says “You're absolutely right!” about everything | Hacker News
I'm fairly well versed in cryptography. A lot of other people aren't, but they wish they were, so they ask their LLM to make some form of contribution. The result is high level gibberish. When I prod them about the mess, they have to turn to their LLM to deliver a plausibly sounding answer, and that always begins with "You are absolutely right that [thing I mentioned]". So then I don't have to spend any more time wondering if it could be just me who is too obtuse to understand what is going on.
CloudNativeSecurityCon North America 2024: ⚡ Lightning Talk: Securing Your Systems...
View more about this event at CloudNativeSecurityCon North America 2024
eMudhra Statement on distrust of select Global TLS Intermediate and one Root CA
eMudhra Limited (NSE: EMUDHRA | BSE: 543533) today issued a statement on recent reports about the distrust of some of its intermediate Certificate Authorities (CAs) used in its global TLS business.
Crypto: How the Code Rebels Beat the Government—Saving …
If you've ever made a secure purchase with your credit …
Don't sign a CLA
This blog post was published on October 5, 2018. It might be out of date, have broken images or links, or simply contain bad ideas and opinions that didn't stand the test of time. Please read generously!
Eight Bits of Trust; eMudhra's CA keys cracked in milliseconds
One of eMudhra's certificate authority private keys is the number 4. Not a number that starts with 4, or the number 4 followed by a few hundred random digits, just, 4... Another one is 56, and another is 115. I know, because I recovered all of them from their
Blink: Intent to Experiment: Signature-based Integrity
Blink: Intent to Experiment: Signature-based Integrity
groups.google.comThis is an absolutely astounding press release from eMudhra. No apology, a suggestion that the researcher who found their private keys must have used AI, and an attempt to shift blame to auditors... wow. emudhra.com/en/press-release/emudhra-stat…
eMudhra Statement on distrust of select Global TLS Intermediate and one Root CA
emudhra.comData leaks in Japan 2026
I’ve long been critical of the weak cybersecurity in Japan, but this is specifically about the series of data leaks circa September/October 2026 (hoping it won’t go on for longer). This is unfortunately such a huge I Told You So moment for me
情報漏洩に関する企業アンケート｜株式会社 帝国データバンク[TDB]
Over 16% of Japanese companies experience data breaches
GMO系「国内不正アクセス、中国製AIソフトの使用確認」
【企業一覧】個人情報の漏洩・恐れを公表した企業など 随時更新
Proton Drive
医療や金融の個人データを保護へ 漏洩リスク防止に法整備の検討開始：朝日新聞
