







Hi Matthew, Thanks for the heads up! I am indeed ok with sharing this information publicly -- it was my informed choice. To foster trust and safety online, I think it fair to know and share current nationality and rough age (+/- 18 months). Sharing legal name is only for those who wish to do so.
Walrus (@walrus.northsky.social)
Whats your motive in making data like nationality and approximate date of birth public? It seems like users have/had the option to not have their full name made public, do users have the option to hide their nationality or approximate date of birth as well? If not, then why?
The Right to Anonymity is Vital to Free Expression: Now and Always
“There are myriad reasons why individuals may wish to use a name other than the one they were born with. They may be concerned about threats to their lives or livelihoods, or they may risk political

Real-Name Policies: The War Against Pseudonymity
Real-name policies have existed for over a decade, but these problems have become exponentially harmful in today's world. It's time to fight back against this unsafe and discriminatory privacy-invasive practice.

Age verification: Child protection or privacy risk?
With more platforms and governments asking for age verification, we look at the options and the implications.

Online anonymity: study found ‘stable pseudonyms’ created a more civil environment than real user names
A higher quality discussion emerged among commenters allowed to use personas instead of their real names.

Online anonymity: study found ‘stable pseudonyms’ created a more civil environment than real user names
A higher quality discussion emerged among commenters allowed to use personas instead of their real names.

IACIS 2026 - OpenConf Abstract Submission, Peer Review, and Event Management System
As lawmakers across the United States move to require age verification for access to adult content online, new questions are emerging about the unintended risks these laws create. While intended to protect minors, many of these policies rely on systems that collect and store overly sensitive personal information such as government-issued IDs or biometric data without adequate safeguards. This introduces serious cybersecurity vulnerabilities, privacy concerns, and potential legal liability for platforms and users alike. Some major platforms have already withdrawn from certain states rather than comply, raising questions about the real-world feasibility of these laws. This study examines the intersection of digital privacy, cybersecurity, and legal compliance in the context of mandatory age verification. It analyzes the risks posed by identity-based and biometric systems, the role of third-party vendors, and the inconsistencies in how states define and enforce these requirements. The paper evaluates several age verification models and concludes that attribute-based verification systems that confirm age eligibility without revealing full identities offers the most secure and privacy-conscious path forward. The findings underscore a critical need for better-designed legislation that balances child protection with digital rights and security. This research provides targeted recommendations for policymakers, platform operators, and cybersecurity professionals, urging a shift toward transparent, accountable, and technically sound solutions before flawed systems become entrenched.
Lucas (@lucasp.eurosky.social)
It says “your name will be public”. Not your Birthdate, nationality and so on.
The Age Verification Privacy Paradox: Why Document Uploads Hurt Everyone—and How World Solves It
Age verification is now required by many digital platforms worldwide, but most systems create new risks for user data and privacy. This article explores why document-based age verification exposes everyone to greater risk—and how privacy-first technology like World ID offers a safer path for consumers and platforms.

Online Age Verification: Government Legislation, Supplier Responsibilization, and Public Perceptions
There are widespread concerns about the online harms to children operating online. As such, governments have enacted laws to require online service providers to deploy age verification to prevent such harms. We investigate the following three research questions regarding this topic: (1) To what extent have different governments legislated age verification controls? (2) Do governments embrace a responsibilization strategy when it comes to online age verification? and (3) How does the UK public feel about online age verification legislation? We find that governments are applying a responsibilization strategy, which has led to widespread deployment of privacy-invasive or ineffective age verification. The former violates the privacy of underage users, with the latter undermining the overarching aims of the legislation. We have also found general disengagement and a lack of trust in the government amongst the public with regards to new online age verification laws within the UK. To conclude, despite governments globally looking to put more robust online age verification mechanisms in place, there remains a general lack of privacy preservation and affordable technological solutions. Moreover, the overarching aims of the online safety and age verification legislative changes may not be satisfied due to the general public stakeholder group's disengagement and lack of trust in their government.

European Age Verification Solution
The European Commission is developing a harmonized, EU-wide approach to age verification, accompanied by a comprehensive age verification blueprint that is intended to facilitate practical adoption across all Member States and can be customised to the national context. Built upon the robust European Digital Identity Wallet framework, this user-friendly and privacy-preserving age verification solution enables individuals to demonstrate their eligibility for age-restricted online services, such as those restricted to adults, without disclosing more personal information than absolutely necessary. By design, the solution addresses and supports compliance with Article 28 of the Digital Services Act, helping online service providers meet legal requirements for age checks while safeguarding user privacy.
Kirsten Fiedler (@kiki.eurosky.social)
🤦♀️ #WSocial is posting legal names, nationalities and approx. birthdays of verified users as a public record on the Atmosphere. Confronted, they claim it's "by design" 🤯
Children’s Rights and Online Age Assurance Systems
Abstract Age assurance is a way to prevent children accessing content, products or services that are potentially harmful to them, ranging from gambling services or alcohol or tobacco or, increasingly, certain products and services online. Now that children’s lives are mediated by digital technologies, policymakers are deliberating over the legal, technical and practical challenges. These have been little examined from the perspective of children’s rights. By combining legal and social research methods, this article examines the legal requirements for age assurance in Europe, assesses compliance by companies and reveals the consequences for family life. In law and practice, we show that age assurance is often ineffective in protecting children from online risk of harm. Further, as currently implemented it risks children’s other rights – to non-discrimination, privacy, to be heard, and their civil rights and freedoms, and remedy. We identify promising directions for the use of age assurance in child online protection, focusing on European policy, regulators and civil society actors.

Under the 1st option only the name is said to be public. You still publish nationality & birth-year date for those users. Nothing in your privacy notice, your TOS or this screen allows that. @ec.europa.eu & @ad4europe.eurosky.social is this the platform you want to endorse, or time for your own PDS?
W Social
This is not a leak. It is public information all our users have given consent when they verified
Hi Jan. Thanks for sharing. Do you believe that the average user will understand fully that their full legal name, nationality and in many cases *real* birth dates and email addresses (We can send you DIDs in private) will be published to the open web, where W cannot retain control?