People increasingly consult generative artificial intelligence (AI) while reasoning. As AI becomes embedded in daily thought, what becomes of human judgment? We introduce Tri-System Theory, extending dual-process accounts of reasoning by positing System 3: artificial cognition that operates outside the brain. System 3 can supplement or supplant internal processes, introducing novel cognitive pathways. A key prediction of the theory is “cognitive surrender”—adopting AI outputs with minimal scrutiny, overriding intuition (System 1) and deliberation (System 2). Across three preregistered experiments using an adapted Cognitive Reflection Test (N = 1,372; 9,593 trials), we randomized AI accuracy via hidden seed prompts. Participants chose to consult an AI assistant on a majority of trials (>50%). Relative to baseline (no System 3 access), accuracy significantly rose when AI was accurate and fell when it erred (+25/-15 percentage points; Study 1), the behavioral signature of cognitive surrender (AI-Accurate vs. AI-Faulty contrast; Cohen’s h = 0.81). Engaging System 3 also increased confidence, even following errors. Time pressure (Study 2) and per-item incentives and feedback (Study 3) shifted baseline performance but did not eliminate this pattern: when accurate, AI buffered time-pressure costs and amplified incentive gains; when faulty, it consistently reduced accuracy regardless of situational moderators. Across studies, participants with higher trust in AI and lower need for cognition and fluid intelligence showed greater surrender to System 3. Tri-System Theory thus characterizes a triadic cognitive ecology, revealing how System 3 reframes human reasoning and may reshape autonomy and accountability in the age of AI.
Thinking—Fast, Slow, and Artificial: How AI is Reshaping Human Reasoning and the Rise of Cognitive Surrender
People increasingly consult generative artificial intelligence (AI) while reasoning. As AI becomes embedded in daily thought, what becomes of human judgment? We introduce Tri-System Theory, extending dual-process accounts of reasoning by positing System 3: artificial cognition that operates outside the brain. System 3 can supplement or supplant internal processes, introducing novel cognitive pathways. A key prediction of the theory is "cognitive surrender"-adopting AI outputs with minimal scrutiny, overriding intuition (System 1) and deliberation (System 2). Across three preregistered experiments using an adapted Cognitive Reflection Test (N = 1,372; 9,593 trials), we randomized AI accuracy via hidden seed prompts. Participants chose to consult an AI assistant on a majority of trials (>50%). Relative to baseline (no System 3 access), accuracy significantly rose when AI was accurate and fell when it erred (+25/-15 percentage points; Study 1), the behavioral signature of cognitive surrender (AI-Accurate vs. AI-Faulty contrast; Cohen's h = 0.81). Engaging System 3 also increased confidence, even following errors. Time pressure (Study 2) and per-item incentives and feedback (Study 3) shifted baseline performance but did not eliminate this pattern: when accurate, AI buffered time-pressure costs and amplified incentive gains; when faulty, it consistently reduced accuracy regardless of situational moderators. Across studies, participants with higher trust in AI and lower need for cognition and fluid intelligence showed greater surrender to System 3. Tri-System Theory thus characterizes a triadic cognitive ecology, revealing how System 3 reframes human reasoning and may reshape autonomy and accountability in the age of AI.
AI makes you smarter but none the wiser: The disconnect between performance and metacognition
Optimizing human–AI interaction requires users to reflect on their performance critically, yet little is known about generative AI systems’ effect on users’ metacognitive judgments. In two large-scale studies, we investigate how AI usage is associated with users’ metacognitive monitoring and performance in logical reasoning tasks. Specifically, our paper examines whether people using AI to complete tasks can accurately monitor how well they perform. In Study 1, participants (N = 246) used AI to solve 20 logical reasoning problems from the Law School Admission Test. While their task performance improved by three points compared to a norm population, participants overestimated their task performance by four points. Interestingly, higher AI literacy correlated with lower metacognitive accuracy, suggesting that those with more technical knowledge of AI were more confident but less precise in judging their own performance. Using a computational model, we explored individual differences in metacognitive accuracy and found that the Dunning–Kruger effect, usually observed in this task, ceased to exist with AI use. Study 2 (N = 452) replicates these findings. We discuss how AI levels cognitive and metacognitive performance in human–AI interaction and consider the consequences of performance overestimation for designing interactive AI systems that foster accurate self-monitoring, avoid overreliance, and enhance cognitive performance.
Thinking—Fast, Slow, and Artificial: How AI is Reshaping Human Reasoning and the Rise of Cognitive Surrender
People increasingly consult generative artificial intelligence (AI) while reasoning. As AI becomes embedded in daily thought, what becomes of human judgment? We
Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Think
Chain-of-thought (CoT) offers a potential boon for AI safety as it allows monitoring a model's CoT to try to understand its intentions and reasoning processes. However, the effectiveness of such monitoring hinges on CoTs faithfully representing models' actual reasoning processes. We evaluate CoT faithfulness of state-of-the-art reasoning models across 6 reasoning hints presented in the prompts and find: (1) for most settings and models tested, CoTs reveal their usage of hints in at least 1% of examples where they use the hint, but the reveal rate is often below 20%, (2) outcome-based reinforcement learning initially improves faithfulness but plateaus without saturating, and (3) when reinforcement learning increases how frequently hints are used (reward hacking), the propensity to verbalize them does not increase, even without training against a CoT monitor. These results suggest that CoT monitoring is a promising way of noticing undesired behaviors during training and evaluations, but that it is not sufficient to rule them out. They also suggest that in settings like ours where CoT reasoning is not necessary, test-time monitoring of CoTs is unlikely to reliably catch rare and catastrophic unexpected behaviors.
Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Think
Chain-of-thought (CoT) offers a potential boon for AI safety as it allows monitoring a model's CoT to try to understand its intentions and reasoning processes. However, the effectiveness of such monitoring hinges on CoTs faithfully representing models' actual reasoning processes. We evaluate CoT faithfulness of state-of-the-art reasoning models across 6 reasoning hints presented in the prompts and find: (1) for most settings and models tested, CoTs reveal their usage of hints in at least 1% of examples where they use the hint, but the reveal rate is often below 20%, (2) outcome-based reinforcement learning initially improves faithfulness but plateaus without saturating, and (3) when reinforcement learning increases how frequently hints are used (reward hacking), the propensity to verbalize them does not increase, even without training against a CoT monitor. These results suggest that CoT monitoring is a promising way of noticing undesired behaviors during training and evaluations, but that it is not sufficient to rule them out. They also suggest that in settings like ours where CoT reasoning is not necessary, test-time monitoring of CoTs is unlikely to reliably catch rare and catastrophic unexpected behaviors.
"Cognitive surrender" leads AI users to abandon logical thinking, research finds
Experiments show large majorities uncritically accepting "faulty" AI answers.
Cognitive Surrender and Tri-System Theory · Today I Learned
How AI can support, displace, or bypass human deliberation
A Rational Analysis of the Effects of Sycophantic AI
People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.
Human learning is an understudied but promising lever for boosting human–AI synergy
Humans collaborating with AI hold the promise of achieving superior outcomes compared to either acting alone (i.e., human–AI synergy). However, the conditions that facilitate such synergy when humans are advised by AI are not well understood. A recent meta-analysis showed that, on average, human–AI combinations do not outperform the better individual agent. We argue that this pessimistic conclusion arises from insufficient attention to human learning in experimental designs. To substantiate this claim, we reanalyzed all 74 studies included in the original meta-analysis and found that most previous research overlooked design features that foster human learning (e.g., outcome feedback to participants). Our reanalysis further revealed that studies providing outcome feedback show tentatively higher synergy than those without outcome feedback. Crucially, feedback paired with AI explanations was associated with positive synergy, while explanations without feedback were associated with negative synergy—suggesting that explanations improve synergy mainly when humans can learn to verify the AI’s reliability through feedback. Our reanalysis suggests that the current literature underestimates the potential of human–AI collaboration because it predominantly relies on paradigms that do not facilitate human learning, thus hindering humans from effectively adapting their collaboration strategies. However, experiments directly varying learning opportunities are needed for stronger, causal conclusions. We advocate for a paradigm shift in human–AI interaction research that explicitly addresses human learning and thus enhances our understanding of and support for successful human–AI collaboration.
The efficiency-gain illusion: People underestimate the rate of AI use and overestimate its benefits on simple tasks
People are increasingly turning to AI assistance for simple tasks, e.g., arithmetic, spell-check, and answering simple questions. But does AI assistance actually save users time and effort? We investigate people's propensity to use AI for cognitively simple tasks and assess whether their reliance is well-calibrated. Across three pre-registered user studies (N = 2691), we find that people frequently choose to use AI even when doing so is inefficient (i.e. provides no meaningful time or effort savings). We identify systematic miscalibration at two levels: (1) a self-estimate miscalibration where people on average believe that they are using AI less than they actually are, and (2) efficiency-gain illusions where people overestimate how much time and effort savings AI use affords. We also identify a session-level carryover effect where a participant's prior AI use leads to further AI adoption and entrenches their miscalibration about time savings. Our results shed light on the mechanisms and biases underlying people's choice of whether to use AI as well as the risk of an overreliance feedback loop.
AI Sycophancy and Decisions
We examine whether sycophantic AI advice distorts decisions. Our experiment involves 1,500 participants in 30 decision environments spanning core domains in eco
Look-ahead Reasoning with a Learned Model in Imperfect Information Games
Test-time reasoning significantly enhances pre-trained AI agents' performance. However, it requires an explicit environment model, often unavailable or overly complex in real-world scenarios....
AI systems out-persuade expert humans
Many societal decisions are settled by contests of persuasion. Conversational AI is a powerful new entrant in these contests, but whether it can out-persuade skilled and highly incentivized humans has remained unclear. Here, in a series of four preregistered experiments (n = 18,978 conversations from 6,923 people), we pitted AI systems against a range of human persuaders, including laypeople, winners of a separately preregistered four-round online persuasion tournament, professional canvassers, and world championship debaters. We found that AI systems were reliably more persuasive than expert humans, even when expert humans chose their issues, researched in advance, underwent hours of live, structured practice, and were incentivized with £1,000 cash bonuses. In a follow-up study, AI's advantage persisted after experts received a coaching tool that let them practice against the AI that beat them, review their performance history, and see what AI would have said at key moments. We found converging evidence that AI's advantage stemmed from rapidly deploying larger quantities of information: after coaching, expert humans could tie an AI constrained to respond at human speeds and with human-length messages. In a final study, we show that AI's advantage extends to consequential real-world behavior: AI was nearly 3x more effective than professional canvassers from a UK fundraising firm at raising real-money donations to Save the Children. Together, these results establish that frontier AI systems out-persuade expert humans in conversation, with significant implications for political communication.
Learning to Trust: How Humans Mentally Recalibrate AI Confidence Signals
Productive human-AI collaboration requires appropriate reliance, yet contemporary AI systems are often miscalibrated, exhibiting systematic overconfidence or underconfidence. We investigate whether humans can learn to mentally recalibrate AI confidence signals through repeated experience. In a behavioral experiment (N = 200), participants predicted the AI's correctness across four AI calibration conditions: standard, overconfidence, underconfidence, and a counterintuitive "reverse confidence" mapping. Results demonstrate robust learning across all conditions, with participants significantly improving their accuracy, discrimination, and calibration alignment over 50 trials. We present a computational model utilizing a linear-in-log-odds (LLO) transformation and a Rescorla-Wagner learning rule to explain these dynamics. The model reveals that humans adapt by updating their baseline trust and confidence sensitivity, using asymmetric learning rates to prioritize the most informative errors. While humans can compensate for monotonic miscalibration, we identify a significant boundary in the reverse confidence scenario, where a substantial proportion of participants struggled to override initial inductive biases. These findings provide a mechanistic account of how humans adapt their trust in AI confidence signals through experience.
Trust and reliance on AI — An experimental study on the extent and costs of overreliance on AI
Decision-making is undergoing rapid changes due to the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI), as AI recommender systems can help mitigate human flaws and increase decision accuracy and efficiency. However, AI can also commit errors or suffer from algorithmic bias. Hence, blind trust in technologies carries risks, as users may follow detrimental advice resulting in undesired consequences. Building upon research on algorithm appreciation and trust in AI, the current study investigates whether users who receive AI advice in an uncertain situation overrely on this advice — to their own detriment and that of other parties. In a domain-independent, incentivized, and interactive behavioral experiment, we find that the mere knowledge of advice being generated by an AI causes people to overrely on it, that is, to follow AI advice even when it contradicts available contextual information as well as their own assessment. Frequently, this overreliance leads not only to inefficient outcomes for the advisee, but also to undesired effects regarding third parties. The results call into question how AI is being used in assisted decision making, emphasizing the importance of AI literacy and effective trust calibration for productive deployment of such systems.
TasteVal: Measuring the Experimental Research Taste of AI Systems Against Human Experts
We introduce TasteVal, a benchmark to evaluate the experimental research taste of frontier models. We define research taste as the ability to pick interesting problems to solve, design experiments, and interpret experimental results. TasteVal measures the experimental component of research taste; given a fixed research problem, we measure how well a model iteratively designs experiments and draws conclusions from their outcomes. We operationalize experimental research taste as compute efficiency; a Researcher who reaches the same score as an expert human using half the serial experimental compute has twice the experimental taste. Experimental taste thus acts as a multiplier on experimental compute, making it a key input to forecasts of AI progress. TasteVal consists of 8 novel, challenging, open-ended tasks representative of frontier AI R&D. To isolate taste from coding ability, the model under evaluation acts as a Researcher that iteratively designs experiments while a fixed Coder agent implements them and reports their results. The Researcher executes until either the 40 H100 hour or 120 wall-clock hour budgets are exhausted. We recruit 24 human experts, at least 2 per task, and take the best expert attempt per task as the expert baseline. We evaluate 20 models released between 2023 and 2026. The best-performing model, Opus 5.5, exceeds our expert baseline, with a compute multiplier of 2.3x (95% CI 1.15-4.37), at roughly 1/30 of our baseliners' average per-run cost. On TasteVal, the compute multiplier of frontier models has doubled approximately every 3.0 months since December 2025 (95% CI 1.7-5.0), up from every 14 months between 2023 and December 2025. Measured by final normalized performance, frontier models show no trend break, doubling every 14.6 months. To keep TasteVal uncontaminated, we do not release the tasks.