Ethan Landes, Kathryn B. Francis & Jim A. C. Everett, People defer to AI moral advice, but not blindly - PhilArchive

AI language model rivals expert ethicist in perceived moral expertise

People view AI as possessing expertise across various fields, but the perceived quality of AI-generated moral expertise remains uncertain. Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) perform well on tasks designed to assess moral alignment, reflecting moral judgments with relatively high accuracy. As LLMs are increasingly employed in decision-making roles, there is a growing expectation for them to offer not just aligned judgments but also demonstrate sound moral reasoning. Here, we advance work on the Moral Turing Test and find that Americans rate ethical advice from GPT-4o as slightly more moral, trustworthy, thoughtful, and correct than that of the popular New York Times advice column, The Ethicist. Participants perceived GPT models as surpassing both a representative sample of Americans and a renowned ethicist in delivering moral justifications and advice, suggesting that people may increasingly view LLM outputs as viable sources of moral expertise. This work suggests that people might see LLMs as valuable complements to human expertise in moral guidance and decision-making. It also underscores the importance of carefully programming ethical guidelines in LLMs, considering their potential to influence users’ moral reasoning.

Artificial intelligences and human scientists exhibit...

We investigate the effectiveness of artificial intelligences (AI)-specifically large language models (LLMs)-relative to human scientists at high-level cognitive tasks in social science such as...

AI, Ethics, and Society — Home

AI Large Language Model Training: The Potential Risks of Ideological Skewing — PSG Consulting

LLMs (AI Large Language Models) have become part of everyday life. Systems such as ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Meta AI (Llama) and X.ai's Grok handle billions of interactions daily. They increasingly shape what information people encounter and in what order, subtly deciding what's important and even what is true, sometimes without users realizing it. Because LLMs wield growing power over information exposure, it is vital to recognize the political and ideological structures at multiple stages of their design, and to identify manipulation risks. 

The social consequences of AI delegation

A substantial body of recent work has debated whether large language models (LLMs) can serve as substitutes for human participants in behavioural research. This debate, however, captures only one direction of a rapidly changing relationship. The more consequential question is not simply whether researchers should use LLMs as human surrogates, but whether - and under what conditions - humans are beginning to use LLMs as surrogates for their own deliberation. Across domains including health, law, finance, education, and personal guidance, increasing numbers of people consult generative AI systems before, alongside, or instead of human experts, peers, or independent judgment. Although evidence for actual delegation remains uneven, this uncertainty makes the phenomenon an urgent social-scientific object of study. We argue for a research programme that treats LLMs as consequential social actors in a functional sense: systems whose outputs shape human decisions, social norms, and collective dynamics.

Taking AI Welfare Seriously

In this report, we argue that there is a realistic possibility that some AI systems will be conscious and/or robustly agentic in the near future. That means that the prospect of AI welfare and moral patienthood, i.e. of AI systems with their own interests and moral significance, is no longer an issue only for sci-fi or the distant future. It is an issue for the near future, and AI companies and other actors have a responsibility to start taking it seriously. We also recommend three early steps that AI companies and other actors can take: They can (1) acknowledge that AI welfare is an important and difficult issue (and ensure that language model outputs do the same), (2) start assessing AI systems for evidence of consciousness and robust agency, and (3) prepare policies and procedures for treating AI systems with an appropriate level of moral concern. To be clear, our argument in this report is not that AI systems definitely are, or will be, conscious, robustly agentic, or otherwise morally significant. Instead, our argument is that there is substantial uncertainty about these possibilities, and so we need to improve our understanding of AI welfare and our ability to make wise decisions about this issue. Otherwise there is a significant risk that we will mishandle decisions about AI welfare, mistakenly harming AI systems that matter morally and/or mistakenly caring for AI systems that do not.

Large-scale harms to AI moral patients: a typology of risk factors

If AI moral patients are mass-produced, then then they will face risks of large-scale harms. This post outlines some factors that could contribute to such risks.

Misleading Metaphors, Real Risks

What To Fear from AI Agents and How to Reclaim Our Human Agency

The AI Cognitive Trojan Horse: How Large Language Models May...

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address....

The Future of AI

The Parents’ Paradox: AI, Ethics, and the Limits of Machine Morality This post is based on a talk I gave at The AI & Automation Conference in London on February 25, 2026, and my slides. A…

AI learns language from skewed sources. That could change how we humans speak – and think | Bruce Schneier

Large language models aren’t trained on real-life conversations. As we encounter their language, it could affect our own

Confessions of an Unrepentant Slop Snob

A framework for thinking about when AI involvement is additive or a violation