This paper presents a model of consciousness that follows directly from the free- energy principle (FEP). We first rehearse the classical and quantum formulations of the FEP. In particular, we consider the “inner screen hypothesis” that follows from the quantum information theoretic version of the FEP. We then review applications of the FEP to the known sparse (nested and hierarchical) neuro-anatomy of the brain. We focus on the holographic structure of the brain, and how this structure supports (overt and covert) action.
The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
Abstract. This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basi
Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilPapers
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...
Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilArchive
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...
The cell membrane as the ‘missing link’ for the evolution of consciousness
While Prof. Torday agrees with Federico Faggin that quantum mechanics is salient to consciousness, he maintains that the role of the cell membrane—which separates an organism from its environment—is key to the selective assimilation or mirroring of the quantum properties of the cosmos into the differentiated consciousness of the organism. This essay is short, dense, and may be difficult to unpack. But it handsomely rewards the effort of the patient and determined reader. The many literature citations in the essay also provide rich ground for further exploration.
The hard problem of consciousness is a distraction from the real one | Aeon Essays
It looks like scientists and philosophers might have made consciousness far more mysterious than it needs to be
Can only meat machines be conscious?
Computational functionalism claims that executing certain computations is sufficient for consciousness, regardless of the physical mechanisms implementing those computations. This view neglects a compelling alternative: that subcomputational biological mechanisms, which realize computational processes, are necessary for consciousness. By contrasting computational roles with their subcomputational biological realizers, I show that there is a systematic tension in our criteria for consciousness: prioritizing computational roles favors consciousness in AI, while prioritizing subcomputational biological realizers favors consciousness in simpler animals. Current theories of consciousness are 'meat-neutral', but if specific physical substrates are necessary, AI may never achieve consciousness. Understanding whether consciousness depends on computational roles, biological realizers, or both, is crucial for assessing the prospects of consciousness in AI and less complex animals.
The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view fundamentally mischaracterizes how physics relates to information. We call this mistake the Abstraction Fallacy. Tracing the causal origins of abstraction reveals that symbolic computation is not an intrinsic physical process. Instead, it is a mapmaker-dependent description. It requires an active, experiencing cognitive agent to alphabetize continuous physics into a finite set of meaningful states. Consequently, we do not need a complete, finalized theory of consciousness to assess AI sentience—a demand that simply pushes the question beyond near-term resolution and deepens the AI welfare trap. What we actually need is a rigorous ontology of computation. The framework proposed here explicitly separates simulation (behavioral mimicry driven by vehicle causality) from instantiation (intrinsic physical constitution driven by content causality). Establishing this ontological boundary shows why algorithmic symbol manipulation is structurally incapable of instantiating experience. Crucially, this argument does not rely on biological exclusivity. If an artificial system were ever conscious, it would be because of its specific physical constitution, never its syntactic architecture. Ultimately, this framework offers a physically grounded refutation of computational functionalism to resolve the current uncertainty surrounding AI consciousness.
Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review
As neuroscientific theories of consciousness continue to proliferate, the need to assess their similarities and differences - as well as their predictive and explanatory power - becomes ever more pressing. Recently, a number of structured adversarial collaborations have been devised to test the competing predictions of several candidate theories of consciousness. In this review, we compare and contrast three theories being investigated in one such adversarial collaboration: Integrated Information Theory, Neurorepresentationalism, and Active Inference. We begin by presenting the core claims of each theory, before comparing them in terms of the phenomena they seek to explain, the sorts of explanations they avail, and the methodological strategies they endorse. We then consider some of the inherent challenges of theory-testing, and how adversarial collaboration addresses some of these difficulties. The stage is then set for the empirical work to come: first, we outline the key hypotheses to be tested across a series of multi-site experiments; second, we discuss the kinds of observations that would support or challenge each theory; third, we consider how these theories might assimilate or accommodate such observations. Finally, we show how data harvested across disparate experiments (and their replicates) may be formally integrated to provide a quantitative measure of the evidential support accrued under each theory. Besides orienting the reader to the theoretical foundations of our collaboration, this review aims to provide valuable meta-scientific insights into the mechanics of adversarial collaboration and theory-testing in general - including the way theories may be evaluated in terms of the scientific progress they deliver.
There Is No ‘Hard Problem Of Consciousness’
Consciousness is not separate from the physical world — our “soul” is of the same nature as our body and any other phenomenon of the world.
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.
Unified framework for information integration based on information geometry
Significance Measuring the degree of causal influences among multiple elements of a system is a fundamental problem in physics and biology. We propose a unified framework for quantifying any combination of causal relationships between elements in a hierarchical manner based on information geometry. Our measure of integration, called geometrical integrated information, quantifies the strength of multiple causal influences among elements by projecting the probability distribution of a system onto a constrained manifold. This measure overcomes mathematical problems of existing measures and enables an intuitive understanding of the relationships between integrated information and other measures of causal influence such as transfer entropy. Inspired by the integration of neural activity in consciousness studies, our measure should have general utility in analyzing complex systems. , Assessment of causal influences is a ubiquitous and important subject across diverse research fields. Drawn from consciousness studies, integrated information is a measure that defines integration as the degree of causal influences among elements. Whereas pairwise causal influences between elements can be quantified with existing methods, quantifying multiple influences among many elements poses two major mathematical difficulties. First, overestimation occurs due to interdependence among influences if each influence is separately quantified in a part-based manner and then simply summed over. Second, it is difficult to isolate causal influences while avoiding noncausal confounding influences. To resolve these difficulties, we propose a theoretical framework based on information geometry for the quantification of multiple causal influences with a holistic approach. We derive a measure of integrated information, which is geometrically interpreted as the divergence between the actual probability distribution of a system and an approximated probability distribution where causal influences among elements are statistically disconnected. This framework provides intuitive geometric interpretations harmonizing various information theoretic measures in a unified manner, including mutual information, transfer entropy, stochastic interaction, and integrated information, each of which is characterized by how causal influences are disconnected. In addition to the mathematical assessment of consciousness, our framework should help to analyze causal relationships in complex systems in a complete and hierarchical manner.
Experience, Signal Integration, and the FCLA-SFGA Modes: A Bridge Document
The 80/20 Rule: Reframing Consciousness
The Link Between Bioelectricity and Consciousness - Nautilus
“It’s really hard to define what’s special about neurons,” says Tufts molecular biologist Michael Levin. “Almost all cells do the things neurons do, just more slowly.”Illustration by jijomathaidesigners / Shutterstock Life seems to be tied to bioelectricity at every level. The late electrophysiologist and surgeon Robert Becker spent decades researching the role of the body’s…
The Entangled Brain: How Perception, Cognition, and Emotion Are Woven Together
A new vision of the brain as a fully integrated, networked organ.Popular neuroscience accounts often focus on specific mind-brain aspects like addiction, c
Constellation
Building foundation models of human state to understand brains, bodies, and environments
Consciousness as a Gödel sentence in the language of science
Why the Hard Problem (might be) so Hard
