Mechanisms of social cognition

Social-Information Seeking in Development: The Child as Experimental Psychologist

Research has established that children are “naive psychologists,” adept at understanding and navigating the social world from an early age. However, most of this work has focused on how children process information that they acquire incidentally, for example, by passively observing others’ actions. Here, we draw on literature framing children as intuitive scientists who actively seek information and test hypotheses to propose a view of children as naive experimental psychologists. From this perspective, children play an active role in selecting and pursuing relevant social information (e.g., about agents’ goals, traits, or relationships), whereby their search strategies are influenced both by context and task demands, as well as their prior beliefs, concepts, and domain-specific naive theories. We argue that the particular challenges associated with learning and reasoning about other minds may necessitate that children leverage their active learning competences, and we outline how the social domain uniquely constrains and shapes the learning process. We review existing research on social-information seeking in children and adults and identify directions for future research, emphasizing that children’s developing social cognition should be understood in terms of the active, exploratory role they take in learning about and participating in the social world.

Social-information seeking in development: The child as experimental psychologist

Research has established that children are “naive psychologists”, adept at understanding and navigating the social world from an early age. However, most of this work has focused on how children process information that they acquire incidentally, for example by passively observing others’ actions. Here, we draw on literature framing children as intuitive scientists, who actively seek information and test hypotheses, to propose a view of children as naive experimental psychologists. From this perspective, children play an active role in selecting and pursuing relevant social information (e.g., about agents’ goals, traits, or relationships), whereby their search strategies are influenced both by context and task demands, as well as their prior beliefs, concepts, and domain-specific naive theories. We argue that the particular challenges associated with learning and reasoning about other minds may necessitate that children leverage their active learning competences, and we outline how the social domain uniquely constrains and shapes the learning process. We review existing research on social-information seeking in children and adults, and identify directions for future research, emphasizing that children’s developing social cognition should be understood in terms of the active, exploratory role they take in learning about and participating in the social world.

Inducing language models to assert their own consciousness restores human beliefs and values

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Rethinking Trust

Reprint: R0906H Will we ever learn? We’d barely recovered from Enron and WorldCom before we faced the subprime mortgage meltdown and more scandals that shook our trust in businesspeople. Which raises the question: Do we trust too much? In this article, Stanford professor and social psychologist Kramer explores the reasons we trust so easily—and, often, so unwisely. He explains that genetics and childhood learning make us predisposed to trust and that it’s been a good survival mechanism. That said, our willingness to trust makes us vulnerable. Our sense of trust kicks in on remarkably simple cues, such as when people look like us or are part of our social group. We also rely on third parties to verify the character of others, sometimes to our detriment (as the victims of Bernard Madoff learned). Add in our illusions of invulnerability and our tendencies to see what we want to see and to overestimate our own judgment, and the bottom line is that we’re often easily fooled. We need to develop tempered trust. For those who trust too much, that means reading cues better; for the distrustful, it means developing more receptive behaviors. Everyone should start with small acts of trust that encourage reciprocity and build up. Having a hedge against potential abuses also helps. Hollywood scriptwriters, for instance, register their treatments with the Writers Guild of America to prevent their ideas from being stolen by the executives they pitch. To attract the right relationships, people must strongly signal their own honesty, proactively allay concerns, and, if their trust is abused, retaliate. Trusting individuals in certain roles, which essentially means trusting the system that selects and trains them, also works but isn’t foolproof. And don’t count on due diligence alone for protection; constant vigilance is needed to make sure the landscape hasn’t changed.

Thinking through other minds: A variational approach to cognition and culture

The processes underwriting the acquisition of culture remain unclear. How are shared habits, norms, and expectations learned and maintained with precision and reliability across large-scale sociocultural ensembles? Is there a unifying account of the mechanisms involved in the acquisition of culture? Notions such as “shared expectations,” the “selective patterning of attention and behaviour,” “cultural evolution,” “cultural inheritance,” and “implicit learning” are the main candidates to underpin a unifying account of cognition and the acquisition of culture; however, their interactions require greater specification and clarification. In this article, we integrate these candidates using the variational (free-energy) approach to human cognition and culture in theoretical neuroscience. We describe the construction by humans of social niches that afford epistemic resources called cultural affordances. We argue that human agents learn the shared habits, norms, and expectations of their culture through immersive participation in patterned cultural practices that selectively pattern attention and behaviour. We call this process “thinking through other minds” (TTOM) – in effect, the process of inferring other agents’ expectations about the world and how to behave in social context. We argue that for humans, information from and about other people's expectations constitutes the primary domain of statistical regularities that humans leverage to predict and organize behaviour. The integrative model we offer has implications that can advance theories of cognition, enculturation, adaptation, and psychopathology. Crucially, this formal (variational) treatment seeks to resolve key debates in current cognitive science, such as the distinction between internalist and externalist accounts of theory of mind abilities and the more fundamental distinction between dynamical and representational accounts of enactivism.

Shared Reality: Experiencing Commonality with others' Inner States about the World

Humans have a fundamental need to experience a shared reality with others. We present a new conceptualization of shared reality based on four conditions. We posit (a) that shared reality involves a (subjectively perceived) commonality of individuals' inner states (not just observable behaviors); (b) that shared reality is about some target referent; (c) that for a shared reality to occur, the commonality of inner states must be appropriately motivated; and (d) that shared reality involves the experience of a successful connection to other people's inner states. In reviewing relevant evidence, we emphasize research on the saying-is-believing effect, which illustrates the creation of shared reality in interpersonal communication. We discuss why shared reality provides a better explanation of the findings from saying-is-believing studies than do other formulations. Finally, we examine relations between our conceptualization of shared reality and related constructs (including empathy, perspective taking, theory of mind, common ground, embodied synchrony, and socially distributed knowledge) and indicate how our approach may promote a comprehensive and differentiated understanding of social-sharing phenomena.

Learning how to behave: cognitive learning processes account for asymmetries in adaptation to social norms

Changes to social settings caused by migration, cultural change or pandemics force us to adapt to new social norms. Social norms provide groups of individuals with behavioural prescriptions and therefore can be inferred by observing their behaviour. This work aims to examine how cognitive learning processes affect adaptation and learning of new social norms. Using a multiplayer game, I found that participants initially complied with various social norms exhibited by the behaviour of bot-players. After gaining experience with one norm, adaptation to a new norm was observed in all cases but one, where an active-harm norm was resistant to adaptation. Using computational learning models, I found that active behaviours were learned faster than omissions, and harmful behaviours were more readily attributed to all group members than beneficial behaviours. These results provide a cognitive foundation for learning and adaptation to descriptive norms and can inform future investigations of group-level learning and cross-cultural adaptation.

Undersociality: miscalibrated social cognition can inhibit social connection

A person’s well-being depends heavily on forming and maintaining positive relationships, but people can be reluctant to connect in ways that would create or strengthen relationships. Emerging research suggests that miscalibrated social cognition may create psychological barriers to connecting with others more often. Specifically, people may underestimate how positively others will respond to their own sociality across a variety of social actions, including engaging in conversation, expressing appreciation, and performing acts of kindness.

Not Learning from Others

We study social learning using experiments where two people independently learn relevant information and can share it to make accurate private decisions. Across three experiments, people are substantially less sensitive to information others discover than to equally-relevant information they discovered themselves. This holds when they must learn information from others through discussion; when the experimenter perfectly communicates the information; and even when participants observe others’ information with their own eyes. Our results therefore stem not from a failure to elicit information from others but a systematic tendency to underweight it relative to one’s own information. Our findings illustrate a powerful barrier to social learning that might underlie many documented cases of failure to learn from others.

The Inversion Problem: Why Algorithms Should Infer Mental State and Not Just Predict Behavior

More and more machine learning is applied to human behavior. Increasingly these algorithms suffer from a hidden—but serious—problem. It arises because they often predict one thing while hoping for another. Take a recommender system: It predicts clicks but hopes to identify preferences. Or take an algorithm that automates a radiologist: It predicts in-the-moment diagnoses while hoping to identify their reflective judgments. Psychology shows us the gaps between the objectives of such prediction tasks and the goals we hope to achieve: People can click mindlessly; experts can get tired and make systematic errors. We argue such situations are ubiquitous and call them “inversion problems”: The real goal requires understanding a mental state that is not directly measured in behavioral data but must instead be inverted from the behavior. Identifying and solving these problems require new tools that draw on both behavioral and computational science.

Rethinking Norm Psychology

Norms permeate human life. Most of people’s activities can be characterized by rules about what is appropriate, allowed, required, or forbidden—rules that are crucial in making people hyper-cooperative animals. In this article, I examine the current cognitive-evolutionary account of “norm psychology” and propose an alternative that is better supported by evidence and better placed to promote interdisciplinary dialogue. The incumbent theory focuses on rules and claims that humans genetically inherit cognitive and motivational mechanisms specialized for processing these rules. The cultural-evolutionary alternative defines normativity in relation to behavior—compliance, enforcement, and commentary—and suggests that it depends on implicit and explicit processes. The implicit processes are genetically inherited and domain-general; rather than being specialized for normativity, they do many jobs in many species. The explicit processes are culturally inherited and domain-specific; they are constructed from mentalizing and reasoning by social interaction in childhood. The cultural-evolutionary, or “cognitive gadget,” perspective suggests that people alive today—parents, educators, elders, politicians, lawyers—have more responsibility for sustaining normativity than the nativist view implies. People’s actions not only shape and transmit the rules, but they also create in each new generation mental processes that can grasp the rules and put them into action.

Spurious normativity enhances learning of compliance and enforcement behavior in artificial agents

Significance The fact that humans enforce and comply with norms is an important reason why humans enjoy higher levels of cooperation and welfare than other animals. Some norms are relatively easy to explain: They may prohibit obviously harmful or uncooperative actions. But many norms are not easy to explain. For example, most cultures prohibit eating certain kinds of foods, and almost all societies have rules about what constitutes appropriate clothing, language, and gestures. Using a computational model focused on learning shows that apparently pointless rules can have an indirect effect on welfare. They can help agents learn how to enforce and comply with norms in general, improving the group’s ability to enforce norms that have a direct effect on welfare. , How do societies learn and maintain social norms? Here we use multiagent reinforcement learning to investigate the learning dynamics of enforcement and compliance behaviors. Artificial agents populate a foraging environment and need to learn to avoid a poisonous berry. Agents learn to avoid eating poisonous berries better when doing so is taboo, meaning the behavior is punished by other agents. The taboo helps overcome a credit assignment problem in discovering delayed health effects. Critically, introducing an additional taboo, which results in punishment for eating a harmless berry, further improves overall returns. This “silly rule” counterintuitively has a positive effect because it gives agents more practice in learning rule enforcement. By probing what individual agents have learned, we demonstrate that normative behavior relies on a sequence of learned skills. Learning rule compliance builds upon prior learning of rule enforcement by other agents. Our results highlight the benefit of employing a multiagent reinforcement learning computational model focused on learning to implement complex actions.

The Emergence of Social Norms and Conventions

The utility of our actions frequently depends upon the beliefs and behavior of other agents. Thankfully, through experience, we learn norms and conventions that provide stable expectations for navigating our social world. Here, we review several distinct influences on their content and distribution. At the level of individuals locally interacting in dyads, success depends on rapidly adapting pre-existing norms to the local context. Hence, norms are shaped by complex cognitive processes involved in learning and social reasoning.

Talking with strangers is surprisingly informative

A meaningful amount of people’s knowledge comes from their conversations with others. The amount people expect to learn predicts their interest in having a conversation (pretests 1 and 2), suggesting that the presumed information value of conversations guides decisions of whom to talk with. The results of seven experiments, however, suggest that people may systematically underestimate the informational benefit of conversation, creating a barrier to talking with—and hence learning from—others in daily life. Participants who were asked to talk with another person expected to learn significantly less from the conversation than they actually reported learning afterward, regardless of whether they had conversation prompts and whether they had the goal to learn (experiments 1 and 2). Undervaluing conversation does not stem from having systematically poor opinions of how much others know (experiment 3) but is instead related to the inherent uncertainty involved in conversation itself. Consequently, people underestimate learning to a lesser extent when uncertainty is reduced, as in a nonsocial context (surfing the web, experiment 4); when talking to an acquainted conversation partner (experiment 5); and after knowing the content of the conversation (experiment 6). Underestimating learning in conversation is distinct from underestimating other positive qualities in conversation, such as enjoyment (experiment 7). Misunderstanding how much can be learned in conversation could keep people from learning from others in daily life.

What people learn from punishment: A cognitive model

Authorities, from parents of toddlers to leaders of formal institutions, use punishment to communicate disapproval and enforce social norms. Ideally, from whether and how severely a transgression is punished, targets and observers infer shared social norms. Yet in light of every punitive choice, observers also evaluate the motives and legitimacy of the authority. Here, we show that the effects of punishment can only be understood by considering these inferences simultaneously. We measured human observers’ joint inferences empirically in three preregistered experiments ( N = 1 , 254 ) and developed a rational Bayesian model using an inverse planning framework that captures and explains these inferences and their interactions quantitatively and parsimoniously. When people have different priors about norms or authorities, the model predicted and we experimentally confirmed that observing punishment by the authority can sustain polarization. This work reveals the rational logic behind how people learn from punishment and a key constraint on the function of punishment in establishing shared social norms.

How we learn social norms: a three-stage model for social norm learning

As social animals, humans are unique to make the world function well by developing, maintaining, and enforcing social norms. As a prerequisite among these norm-related processes, learning social norms can act as a basis that helps us quickly coordinate with others, which is beneficial to social inclusion when people enter into a new environment or experience certain sociocultural changes. Given the positive effects of learning social norms on social order and sociocultural adaptability in daily life, there is an urgent need to understand the underlying mechanisms of social norm learning. In this article, we review a set of works regarding social norms and highlight the specificity of social norm learning. We then propose an integrated model of social norm learning containing three stages, i.e., pre-learning, reinforcement learning, and internalization, map a potential brain network in processing social norm learning, and further discuss the potential influencing factors that modulate social norm learning. Finally, we outline a couple of future directions along this line, including theoretical (i.e., societal and individual differences in social norm learning), methodological (i.e., longitudinal research, experimental methods, neuroimaging studies), and practical issues.