Pants on Fire

Opinion | These A.I. Policies Will Hurt Our Business. We Should Do Them Anyway.

The risks posed by A.I. are too great to forgo any regulation, even for those who stand to gain tremendously from the technology’s rise.

A brief history of AI executives calling for regulation

The industry is in a panic, but it’s been claiming to want legal guardrails for years — with few meaningful results.

Lina Khan on Twitter / X

Law enforcers already have authority to charge companies and their CEOs for creating and releasing dangerous, unvetted, or defective products. We shouldn’t let discussions about new legal regimes distract from the fact that there’s no AI exemption from laws already on the books —…— Lina Khan (@linamkhan) September 13, 2026

The year of technoligarchy

In 2025, Trump brought tech executives into power to dismantle regulators and write their own rules. But the instabilities they’re creating may be their downfall.

Pacing the Frontier | Gillian K. Hadfield

The Pacing the Frontier letter calls on the US government to support an international effort to build the technical and governance tools needed to protect our option to pace AI development. I and others have been working on the problem of how to build such infrastructure for ten years, including participating in dialogues on AI safety with Chinese academic colleagues during the past three. Here are my suggestions: 1. Don’t rely on off-the-shelf models like FINRA and the FDA which were built for 20th Century single-domain government expertise. They’re not fit for purpose. 2. Don’t act like no-one’s thought about the AI governance problem before. We’ve spent two years refining a regulatory markets design into working legislative language, for example, and it’s now in AI governance bills in five states and in Congress. 3. Don’t try to write an exhaustive set of rules for AGI first.  4. Pick a domain that can achieve widespread global consensus to start. Mine would be recursive self-improvement: models should not build models. Build the technology that verifies that. 5.  Focus relentlessly on building flexible verification infrastructure that is able to enforce whatever rules we can ultimately agree on.  6. Don’t assume we already know how to do this and governments can just write tests into law. Technology needs to be built and by the private sector. 7. Don’t wait for the infrastructure to emerge first. The components and people are there and the ecosystem can scale fast with the right incentives. 8. Incentivize large-scale investment in verification technology by building a governance structure and industry funding that creates a market for private verification organizations. 9. Use licensing and public oversight to ensure verifiers are independent of the frontier labs. 10. Protect sovereignty by enabling each government to license its own verifiers from a global market of verifiers recognized by other countries. 11. Leverage the incentive of global trade for models and model services by requiring verification for market access. 12. Just start. Sources in comments.

AI Companies Should Report Pre- and Post-Mitigation Safety Evaluations

The rapid advancement of AI systems has raised widespread concerns about potential harms of frontier AI systems and the need for responsible evaluation and oversight. In this position paper, we argue that frontier AI companies should report both pre- and post-mitigation safety evaluations to enable informed policy decisions. Evaluating models at both stages provides policymakers with essential evidence to regulate deployment, access, and safety standards. We show that relying on either in isolation can create a misleading picture of model safety. Our analysis of AI safety disclosures from leading frontier labs identifies three critical gaps: (1) companies rarely evaluate both pre- and post-mitigation versions, (2) evaluation methods lack standardization, and (3) reported results are often too vague to inform policy. To address these issues, we recommend mandatory disclosure of pre- and post- mitigation capabilities to approved government bodies, standardized evaluation methods, and minimum transparency requirements for public safety reporting. These ensure that policymakers and regulators can craft targeted safety measures, assess deployment risks, and scrutinize companies’ safety claims effectively.

The Unaccountability Machine: Why Big Systems Make Terrible Decisions—and How the World Lost Its Mind

Longlisted for the 2024 Financial Times Book of the Year. How life and the economy became a black box—a collection of systems no one understands, producing outcomes no one likes.   Passengers get bumped from flights. Phone menus disconnect. Automated financial trades produce market collapse. Of all the challenges in modern life, some of the most vexing come from our relationships with automation: a large system does us wrong, and there’s nothing we can do about it. The problem, economist Dan Davies shows, is accountability sinks: systems in which decisions are delegated to a complex rule book or set of standard procedures, making it impossible to identify the source of mistakes when they happen. In our increasingly unhuman world—lives dominated by algorithms, artificial intelligence, and large organizations—these accountability sinks produce more than just aggravation. They make life and economy unknowable—a black box for no reason. In The Unaccountability Machine, Davies lays bare how markets, institutions, and even governments systematically generate outcomes that no one—not even those involved in making them—seems to want. Since the earliest days of the computer age, theorists have foreseen the dangers of complex systems without personal accountability. In response, British business scholar Stafford Beer developed an accountability-first approach to management called “cybernetics,” which might have taken off had his biggest client (the Chilean government) not fallen to a bloody coup in 1973. With his signature blend of economic and journalistic rigor, Davies examines what’s gone wrong since Beer, including what might have been had the world embraced cybernetics when it had the chance. The Unaccountability Machine is a revelatory and resonant account of how modern life became predisposed to dysfunction.

Why We Can't Let Enormous Weirdos Regulate AI

Imagine if instead of regulating drones via the standard lengthy, boring, and bureaucratic process - which we did - we instead decided, in the name of fostering all-important American drone innovation, to avoid regulating drones meaningfully at all. Also, imagine that we did not pay well-known aviation safety experts, aeronautical

Featured reports

CCDH’s research provides the evidence lawmakers need to enact policy change and hold the tech industry responsible for the harms they create.

Communication Bias in Large Language Models: A Regulatory Perspective

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly central to many applications, raising concerns about bias, fairness, and regulatory compliance. This paper reviews risks of biased outputs and their societal impact, focusing on frameworks like the EU's AI Act and the Digital Services Act. We argue that beyond constant regulation, stronger attention to competition and design governance is needed to ensure fair, trustworthy AI. This is a preprint of the Communications of the ACM article of the same title.

Communication Bias in Large Language Models: A Regulatory Perspective

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly central to many applications, raising concerns about bias, fairness, and regulatory compliance. This paper reviews risks of biased outputs and their societal impact, focusing on frameworks like the EU's AI Act and the Digital Services Act. We argue that beyond constant regulation, stronger attention to competition and design governance is needed to ensure fair, trustworthy AI. This is a preprint of the Communications of the ACM article of the same title.

Putting nudges in perspective

Conventional economic policy focuses on ‘economic’ solutions (e.g. taxes, incentives, regulation) to problems caused by market-level factors such as externalities, misaligned incentives and information asymmetries. By contrast, ‘nudges’ provide behavioural solutions to problems that have generally been assumed to originate from limitations in human decision making, such as present bias. While policy-makers have good reason for exploiting the power of nudges, we argue that these extremes leave open a large space of policy options that have received less attention in the academic literature. First, there is no reason that solution and problem need have the same theoretical basis: there are promising behavioural solutions to problems that have causes that are well explained by traditional economics, and conventional economic solutions often offer the best line of attack on problems of behavioural origin. Second, there is a wide range of hybrid policy actions with both economic and behavioural components (e.g. framing a tax or incentive in a specific way), and there exist many societal problems – perhaps the majority – that arise from both economic and behavioural factors (e.g. firms’ exploitation of consumers’ behavioural biases). This paper aims to remind policy-makers that behavioural economics can influence policy in a variety of ways, of which nudges are the most prominent but not necessarily the most powerful.

What Can We Learn From the FDA Model for AI Regulation? - AI Now Institute

After holding a rapid deliberation late last year that convened deep experts on the FDA alongside key participants in the AI policy debate, we pulled together several immediate insights into a memo. Though it was clear the path forward isn’t to port over any single regulatory model wholesale, hosting a deep dive into the Food […]

Anthropic bans ‘abusive or cruel behavior’ toward Claude

The usage policy update also adds new rules addressing propaganda campaigns, surveillance, and weapon development.

Competition Remedies Are Too Important to Be Left Untested

How user research can strengthen remedy design In digital markets, competition interventions too often miss the mark. Regulators devote years to running investigations, winning cases, or developing ex ante obligations. ...