Expecting a verifiable answer makes no sense. Here’s why.
Consciousness as a Gödel sentence in the language of science
Why the Hard Problem (might be) so Hard
The hard problem of consciousness is a distraction from the real one | Aeon Essays
It looks like scientists and philosophers might have made consciousness far more mysterious than it needs to be
How and why exactly did consciousness become a problem? | Aeon Essays
How exactly did consciousness become a problem? And why, after years off the table, is it a hot research subject now?
There Is No ‘Hard Problem Of Consciousness’
Consciousness is not separate from the physical world — our “soul” is of the same nature as our body and any other phenomenon of the world.
The Mythology Of Conscious AI
Why consciousness is more likely a property of life than of computation and why creating conscious, or even conscious-seeming AI, is a bad idea.
Arguments About AI Consciousness Remain Highly Motivated and At Best Overconfident
It has been roughly a year since my last dedicated post on this question. Its first sentence has not changed: I happily admit I am deeply confused about consciousness.
Conscious or Not
For as long as I remember, people have been arguing about whether machines could be intelligent or not.
No, Artificial Intelligence Is Not Conscious
Taken to its logical conclusion, this line of thinking is absurd—and damning.
AI Is Not Conscious, But It Is Our Unconscious
The Convivial Society: Vol. 7, No. 4
The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
Abstract. This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basi
Contra Chiang on machine consciousness
If you think you understand AI consciousness, then you don't understand AI consciousness
Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilPapers
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.
Can only meat machines be conscious?
Computational functionalism claims that executing certain computations is sufficient for consciousness, regardless of the physical mechanisms implementing those computations. This view neglects a compelling alternative: that subcomputational biological mechanisms, which realize computational processes, are necessary for consciousness. By contrasting computational roles with their subcomputational biological realizers, I show that there is a systematic tension in our criteria for consciousness: prioritizing computational roles favors consciousness in AI, while prioritizing subcomputational biological realizers favors consciousness in simpler animals. Current theories of consciousness are 'meat-neutral', but if specific physical substrates are necessary, AI may never achieve consciousness. Understanding whether consciousness depends on computational roles, biological realizers, or both, is crucial for assessing the prospects of consciousness in AI and less complex animals.
Alexander Lerchner, The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness - PhilArchive
Computational functionalism dominates current debates on AI consciousness. This is the hypothesis that subjective experience emerges entirely from abstract causal topology, regardless of the underlying physical substrate. We argue this view ...
